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aiturk-hermes-ide/hermes_cli/web_server.py
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"""
Hermes Agent — Web UI server.
Provides a FastAPI backend serving the Vite/React frontend and REST API
endpoints for managing configuration, environment variables, and sessions.
Usage:
python -m hermes_cli.main web # Start on http://127.0.0.1:9119
python -m hermes_cli.main web --port 8080
"""
import contextlib
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager, contextmanager
import asyncio
import atexit
import base64
import binascii
import concurrent.futures
import functools
from collections import deque
from dataclasses import dataclass
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import hashlib
import hmac
import inspect
import importlib.util
import ipaddress
import json
import logging
import math
import mimetypes
import os
import queue
import re
import secrets
import shlex
import shutil
import stat
import subprocess
import sys
import sysconfig
import tempfile
import threading
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import zipfile
from hermes_cli._subprocess_compat import windows_detach_flags, windows_hide_flags
from hermes_cli.install_identity import get_install_id as _shared_get_install_id
import urllib.request
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Any, Dict, List, Literal, Optional, Tuple
import yaml
PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).parent.parent.resolve()
if str(PROJECT_ROOT) not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, str(PROJECT_ROOT))
from hermes_cli import __version__, __release_date__
from hermes_cli.config import (
build_cron_model_impact,
cfg_get,
DEFAULT_CONFIG,
OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS,
clear_model_endpoint_credentials,
get_config_path,
get_env_path,
get_hermes_home,
get_process_hermes_home,
load_config,
load_env,
read_raw_config,
resolve_cron_model_drift_defaults,
save_config,
save_env_value,
remove_env_value,
custom_endpoint_key_env,
coerce_provider_id,
find_provider_entry,
check_config_version,
detect_install_method,
format_docker_update_message,
is_nix_install_method,
recommended_update_command_for_method,
redact_key,
write_platform_config_field,
_deep_merge,
)
from plugins.memory.config_schema import (
ProviderConfigSchema,
ProviderField,
STORAGE_HONCHO_HOST_BLOCK,
get_provider_config_schema,
)
from gateway.status import (
derive_gateway_busy,
derive_gateway_drainable,
get_running_pid_cached,
get_running_pid,
get_runtime_status_running_pid,
normalize_updated_at,
parse_active_agents,
read_runtime_status,
resolve_gateway_liveness,
)
from utils import env_var_enabled
try:
from fastapi import (
FastAPI, File, Form, HTTPException, Query, Request, UploadFile,
WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect,
)
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, Response
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from pydantic import BaseModel, SecretStr, field_validator
from starlette.concurrency import run_in_threadpool
except ImportError:
# First try lazy-installing the dashboard extras. Only the user actually
# running `hermes dashboard` needs fastapi+uvicorn; lazy install keeps
# them out of every other install path. After install, re-import.
try:
from tools.lazy_deps import ensure as _lazy_ensure
_lazy_ensure("tool.dashboard", prompt=False)
from fastapi import (
FastAPI, File, Form, HTTPException, Query, Request, UploadFile,
WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect,
)
from fastapi.middleware.cors import CORSMiddleware
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, HTMLResponse, JSONResponse, Response
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from pydantic import BaseModel, SecretStr, field_validator
from starlette.concurrency import run_in_threadpool
except Exception:
raise SystemExit(
"Web UI requires fastapi and uvicorn.\n"
f"Install with: {sys.executable} -m pip install 'fastapi' 'uvicorn[standard]'"
)
WEB_DIST = Path(os.environ["HERMES_WEB_DIST"]) if "HERMES_WEB_DIST" in os.environ else Path(__file__).parent / "web_dist"
_log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def _process_start_marker(pid: int) -> str:
"""Return a cross-runtime marker for the current incarnation of ``pid``.
``ProcessLookupError`` means the process is absent. Other failures are left
distinct so callers can fail safe rather than killing a healthy backend.
"""
if sys.platform == "linux":
try:
stat_line = Path(f"/proc/{pid}/stat").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except FileNotFoundError as exc:
raise ProcessLookupError(pid) from exc
# The command in field 2 may contain spaces or parentheses. Splitting
# after its final ')' leaves field 3 at index zero and field 22 at 19.
fields = stat_line.rsplit(")", 1)[1].strip().split()
if len(fields) < 20 or not fields[19].isdigit():
raise OSError(f"invalid /proc stat data for PID {pid}")
return f"linux:{fields[19]}"
if os.name == "nt":
import ctypes
from ctypes import wintypes
process_query_limited_information = 0x1000
kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL("kernel32", use_last_error=True)
kernel32.OpenProcess.argtypes = [wintypes.DWORD, wintypes.BOOL, wintypes.DWORD]
kernel32.OpenProcess.restype = wintypes.HANDLE
kernel32.GetProcessTimes.argtypes = [
wintypes.HANDLE,
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.FILETIME),
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.FILETIME),
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.FILETIME),
ctypes.POINTER(wintypes.FILETIME),
]
kernel32.GetProcessTimes.restype = wintypes.BOOL
kernel32.CloseHandle.argtypes = [wintypes.HANDLE]
kernel32.CloseHandle.restype = wintypes.BOOL
handle = kernel32.OpenProcess(process_query_limited_information, False, pid)
if not handle:
error = ctypes.get_last_error()
if error in (87, 1168): # invalid parameter / not found
raise ProcessLookupError(pid)
raise OSError(error, f"OpenProcess failed for PID {pid}")
creation = wintypes.FILETIME()
exit_time = wintypes.FILETIME()
kernel = wintypes.FILETIME()
user = wintypes.FILETIME()
try:
if not kernel32.GetProcessTimes(
handle,
ctypes.byref(creation),
ctypes.byref(exit_time),
ctypes.byref(kernel),
ctypes.byref(user),
):
error = ctypes.get_last_error()
raise OSError(error, f"GetProcessTimes failed for PID {pid}")
finally:
kernel32.CloseHandle(handle)
filetime = (creation.dwHighDateTime << 32) | creation.dwLowDateTime
return f"win:{filetime + 504911232000000000}"
result = subprocess.run(
["ps", "-p", str(pid), "-o", "lstart="],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
check=False,
)
marker = result.stdout.strip()
if result.returncode == 0 and marker:
return f"ps:{marker}"
if result.returncode == 1 and not marker:
raise ProcessLookupError(pid)
raise OSError(f"ps could not inspect PID {pid}: {result.stderr.strip()}")
def _valid_parent_start_marker(marker: str) -> bool:
prefix, separator, value = marker.partition(":")
if not separator or not value or value != value.strip():
return False
if prefix in ("linux", "win", "winms"):
return value.isdigit()
return prefix == "ps"
def _parent_start_markers_match(actual: str, expected: str) -> bool:
"""Compare parent markers across Desktop protocol generations.
Older Windows Desktop builds send .NET ticks (``win:``). New builds use
Electron's native process creation time in Unix milliseconds (``winms:``)
so startup does not need to launch PowerShell. The backend still reads the
exact FILETIME and normalizes it only when the expected marker is ``winms``.
"""
if actual == expected:
return True
if not actual.startswith("win:") or not expected.startswith("winms:"):
return False
try:
dotnet_ticks = int(actual.removeprefix("win:"))
expected_unix_ms = int(expected.removeprefix("winms:"))
except ValueError:
return False
dotnet_ticks_at_unix_epoch = 621_355_968_000_000_000
actual_unix_ms = (dotnet_ticks - dotnet_ticks_at_unix_epoch) // 10_000
return actual_unix_ms == expected_unix_ms
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Per-channel subscriber registry used by /api/pub (PTY-side gateway → dashboard)
# and /api/events (dashboard → browser sidebar). Keyed by an opaque channel id
# the chat tab generates on mount; entries auto-evict when the last subscriber
# drops AND the publisher has disconnected.
#
# State lives on app.state (not module-level globals) so that asyncio.Lock is
# created on the running event loop during lifespan startup. A module-level
# asyncio.Lock() binds to whatever loop was active at import time, which breaks
# when the same module is used across TestClient instances or uvicorn reloads.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _start_desktop_cron_ticker(stop_event: "threading.Event", interval: int = 60) -> None:
"""Tick the cron scheduler from inside the desktop dashboard backend.
The scheduler tick loop normally lives in ``hermes gateway run`` — but the
desktop app spawns a ``hermes dashboard`` backend, not a gateway, so a cron
a user creates in the app would never fire. We run the resolved cron
scheduler provider here (no live adapters; delivery falls back to the
per-platform send path).
Every local profile's store is ticked, not just this backend's own
(#69377's desktop sibling): the desktop pools per-profile backends and
reaps them after ~10 idle minutes, so a secondary profile's ticker dies
with its backend and that profile's jobs silently stop firing until the
user next opens it ("tasks on the sleeping profile could be idle" —
community report, Aug 2026). The primary backend outlives the pool, so it
owns every profile's tick, exactly like a multiplex gateway. External
providers keep the single-store behavior — their registries are not
profile-scoped (see _notify_cron_provider_for_profile).
Cross-process safe: the built-in provider's ``cron.scheduler.tick`` takes
the per-store ``cron/.tick.lock`` file lock, so this never double-fires
alongside a real gateway or a live pool backend on the same profile home —
whichever process grabs the lock first wins the tick.
"""
from cron.scheduler_provider import InProcessCronScheduler, resolve_cron_scheduler
provider = resolve_cron_scheduler()
start_kwargs: dict = {"interval": interval}
if isinstance(provider, InProcessCronScheduler):
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import profiles_to_serve
profile_homes = list(profiles_to_serve(multiplex=True))
if len(profile_homes) > 1:
start_kwargs["profile_homes"] = profile_homes
# Stand down, per tick, for any profile whose OWN gateway is
# running: that gateway ticks it with live adapters, and the
# tick-lock race otherwise lets this adapter-less ticker win
# and deliver the job through the standalone path (#100489).
# Evaluated every cycle so a gateway starting/stopping later
# is picked up without a dashboard restart.
from hermes_cli.profiles import _check_gateway_running
start_kwargs["profile_gate"] = (
lambda _name, home: not _check_gateway_running(Path(home))
)
from hermes_logging import enable_profile_log_routing
enable_profile_log_routing(profile_homes)
_log.info(
"Desktop cron scheduler will tick %d profile(s): %s",
len(profile_homes),
[name for name, _home in profile_homes],
)
except Exception:
# Fail open to the single-store ticker — the active profile's
# jobs must keep firing even if profile enumeration breaks.
_log.exception("Desktop cron: profile enumeration failed; ticking active profile only")
_log.info("Desktop cron scheduler started (provider=%s, interval=%ds)", provider.name, interval)
provider.start(stop_event, **start_kwargs)
# Desktop `serve` only (start_server(start_mcp_discovery_after_bind=True)):
# seconds after the READY sentinel before the MCP discovery thread starts.
_DESKTOP_MCP_DISCOVERY_DELAY_S = 1.0
def _warm_gateway_module() -> None:
"""Pre-import heavy modules so the event loop is not stalled on first use.
On a cold Windows install, importing these module chains triggers .pyc
compilation and Defender real-time scans that can stall the event loop
for 15-30s. The original fix (pre-#60800) only warmed
``hermes_cli.gateway``. But the first WS connection and its initial
RPC burst (``setup.status``, ``setup.runtime_check``,
``gateway.ready``→``resolve_skin``) pull in several *other* heavy
chains that were still imported on the loop thread, contributing to
the ~14s cold-start stall (#60800). Warm them all here so the cost
is paid in a worker thread while the server socket is already open.
"""
for mod in (
"hermes_cli.gateway",
# setup.status / setup.runtime_check resolve provider auth state,
# which imports copilot_auth (→ subprocess module) and scans
# credential files. First import is noticeably slow on Windows.
"hermes_cli.auth",
"hermes_cli.copilot_auth",
"hermes_cli.runtime_provider",
# resolve_skin() reads config + initialises the skin engine.
# Even though handle_ws now calls it via asyncio.to_thread
# (see tui_gateway/ws.py), warming it here avoids the first-call
# import cost inside that thread.
"hermes_cli.skin_engine",
# model.options / picker context — parses provider catalogs and
# the models.dev cache on first use.
"hermes_cli.inventory",
"hermes_cli.model_switch",
):
try:
__import__(mod)
except Exception:
pass
def _resolve_restart_drain_timeout() -> float:
try:
from hermes_cli.gateway import _get_restart_drain_timeout
return _get_restart_drain_timeout()
except ImportError:
from gateway.restart import DEFAULT_GATEWAY_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT
return DEFAULT_GATEWAY_RESTART_DRAIN_TIMEOUT
def _eager_reconcile_own_session_db() -> None:
"""One writable open of this process's own state.db at startup.
``SessionDB.__init__`` runs ``_init_schema`` → ``_reconcile_columns``,
bringing a store left behind by `hermes update` current before the
dashboard's first session-list poll, with the open-time lock patience
(jittered retries) absorbing transient contention. Never raises: a
store this cannot fix is still served through the read-probe heal in
:func:`_open_session_db_at_path`, which retries on every poll.
"""
try:
from hermes_state import SessionDB, _default_db_path
SessionDB(db_path=Path(_default_db_path()), read_only=False).close()
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning(
"startup schema reconcile of state.db failed (%s); session "
"reads will retry the heal per poll", exc,
)
@asynccontextmanager
async def _lifespan(app: "FastAPI"):
from hermes_cli.aiturk_media import configure_existing_media
from hermes_cli.config import read_raw_config, save_config
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
media_cfg = read_raw_config()
if configure_existing_media(media_cfg):
save_config(media_cfg)
app.state.event_channels = {} # dict[str, set]
app.state.event_lock = asyncio.Lock()
app.state.pty_active_session_files = {} # dict[str, Path]
# Serializes chat-argv resolution so concurrent /api/pty connections
# don't trigger overlapping ``npm install`` / ``npm run build`` work.
# On app.state (not a module global) so the Lock binds to the running
# event loop during lifespan startup — see _get_event_state's docstring.
app.state.chat_argv_lock = asyncio.Lock()
# Bring this profile's state.db schema current BEFORE the first
# session-list poll (#79531/#80037). Migrations used to run lazily on
# the first writable open — typically the user's first new session —
# so a store left behind by `hermes update` kept 500ing every
# /api/sessions poll (and the read-probe heal, while it retries per
# poll, can lose repeatedly to lock contention from orphaned sibling
# backends). One writable open here runs _init_schema →
# _reconcile_columns with the full open-time lock patience. Runs in a
# daemon thread so a locked store never delays the server socket (the
# Desktop ready-probe times out at 10s, GH-73083); reads that land
# before it finishes are still covered by the read-probe heal.
threading.Thread(
target=_eager_reconcile_own_session_db,
daemon=True,
name="statedb-eager-reconcile",
).start()
# Import hermes_cli.gateway eagerly *before* the lifespan yield so the
# GIL-heavy .pyc compilation and Defender scan cost is absorbed during
# backend initialisation — before the server socket accepts probes.
# On Windows + Python 3.11 the import does not release the GIL, so
# run_in_executor still froze the event loop for 15-22 s, causing the
# Desktop's 10-second WebSocket ready-probe to time out (GH-73083).
_warm_gateway_module()
# Snapshot the checkout revision at boot so risky lazy-import paths (the
# model picker) can detect when `hermes update` replaced the code
# underneath this long-lived process and refuse with a clear "restart
# required" message instead of a stale-module ImportError (#86207). This
# mirrors the gateway's record_boot_fingerprint in gateway/run.py; the
# dashboard is a separate process/unit that the update flow does not
# reliably restart, so it must detect the drift itself.
from gateway.code_skew import record_boot_fingerprint
record_boot_fingerprint()
# Hosted Bot rooms belong to the backend process, not to any connected
# Desktop socket. Recovery may need a contended state.db migration, so keep
# it off the lifespan's pre-yield path: Group Chat startup must degrade on
# its own instead of preventing every dashboard/Desktop feature from booting.
from tui_gateway import methods_groups as _hosted_groups
import tui_gateway.server # noqa: F401
hosted_room_start_cancel = threading.Event()
def _start_hosted_rooms() -> None:
try:
_hosted_groups.start_hosted_room_service()
except Exception:
_log.exception("Hosted Group Chat recovery failed during backend startup")
finally:
if hosted_room_start_cancel.is_set():
_hosted_groups.stop_hosted_room_service(timeout=1.0)
hosted_room_start_thread = threading.Thread(
target=_start_hosted_rooms,
daemon=True,
name="hosted-room-startup",
)
hosted_room_start_thread.start()
# Desktop-spawned backends (HERMES_DESKTOP=1) fire cron jobs themselves,
# since the app has no gateway running the scheduler. Server `hermes
# dashboard` is unaffected — it relies on its own gateway.
cron_stop: "threading.Event | None" = None
cron_thread: "threading.Thread | None" = None
if os.getenv("HERMES_DESKTOP") == "1":
# Before forking a fresh gateway, reap any orphan left by a previous
# serve session. Graceful shutdown reaps the managed child, but an
# abnormal exit (crash, SIGKILL, power loss, forced update) reparents
# the old gateway to launchd (PPID=1). It keeps holding the QQ
# WebSocket, and a newly forked gateway then races the same credential,
# splitting messages across parallel session trees (#77276).
#
# The sweep itself still runs unconditionally — a stale-but-present
# registration must not veto the #77276 orphan reap. Protection for
# a healthy standalone gateway (launched via `hermes gateway run`,
# no service supervisor) lives INSIDE the reaper: it probes the
# registration with cleanup_stale=False so the recorded PID always
# joins the exclusion set, even when liveness validation would have
# unlinked the record mid-sweep. That matters most on Windows, where
# every layer of the launcher chain (stub -> venv python -> runtime
# python) carries "gateway run" in its command line, so
# find_gateway_pids() matches processes the pidfile exclusion cannot
# see, and os.kill(SIGTERM) is a hard TerminateProcess — the
# gateway's planned-stop watcher (0.5s poll) has no time to drain.
try:
from hermes_cli.gateway import _reap_unsupervised_gateway_orphans
_reap_unsupervised_gateway_orphans()
except Exception:
_log.exception("Desktop startup: orphan gateway reap failed")
cron_stop = threading.Event()
cron_thread = threading.Thread(
target=_start_desktop_cron_ticker,
args=(cron_stop,),
daemon=True,
name="desktop-cron-ticker",
)
cron_thread.start()
# Reap idle/dead keep-alive PTY sessions in the background (30-min TTL).
pty_reaper_task = asyncio.create_task(run_reaper(PTY_REGISTRY))
# Periodic authenticated self-test (feeds the ``dashboard`` component on
# /api/status). The loop exits immediately when httpx is unavailable.
selftest_task = asyncio.create_task(_dashboard_selftest_loop())
# Live auto-archive timer — keeps a backend that stays up for days
# sweeping stale sessions on schedule, independent of list requests.
auto_archive_task = asyncio.create_task(_auto_archive_ticker_loop())
# Managed local runtime: when the user opted in (local_runtime.enabled,
# set by the Local Models 'Use' action), bring the llama-server back up
# so a restart doesn't strand a llamacpp main model without a backend.
# Off-thread and best-effort: binary check + spawn + health poll must
# not delay the server socket, and failure falls back to configured
# cloud providers exactly like a cold start.
def _boot_local_runtime():
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
from hermes_cli.local_runtime.bootstrap import ensure_local_runtime
# Server only — models load on first inference, always (residency
# design: downloaded = available; demand loads; idleness
# evicts). An empty router holds no VRAM; warming a model at
# boot would reload gigabytes nobody asked for yet.
ensure_local_runtime(load_config())
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
logging.getLogger(__name__).warning("local runtime boot failed: %s", exc)
threading.Thread(target=_boot_local_runtime, daemon=True,
name="local-runtime-boot").start()
try:
yield
finally:
hosted_room_start_cancel.set()
_hosted_groups.stop_hosted_room_service(timeout=5.0)
hosted_room_start_thread.join(timeout=1.0)
if cron_stop is not None:
cron_stop.set()
pty_reaper_task.cancel()
selftest_task.cancel()
auto_archive_task.cancel()
await PTY_REGISTRY.close_all()
# Stop the managed llama-server with its parent — a supervisor-less
# orphan would keep VRAM pinned after the app closes.
try:
from hermes_cli.local_runtime.bootstrap import shutdown_local_runtime
shutdown_local_runtime()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
pass
if os.getenv("HERMES_DESKTOP") == "1":
_terminate_desktop_managed_gateway()
def _get_event_state(app: "FastAPI"):
"""Return (event_channels, event_lock) from app.state.
Lazily initialises the state if the lifespan hasn't run (e.g. when
TestClient is constructed without a ``with`` block). The lifespan
path is preferred because it guarantees the Lock is created on the
correct event loop, but the lazy path lets existing non-``with``
TestClient usages keep working.
"""
try:
return app.state.event_channels, app.state.event_lock
except AttributeError:
app.state.event_channels = {}
app.state.event_lock = asyncio.Lock()
return app.state.event_channels, app.state.event_lock
def _get_chat_argv_lock(app: "FastAPI") -> asyncio.Lock:
"""Return the chat-argv resolution lock from app.state.
Mirrors :func:`_get_event_state`: prefers the lifespan-initialised Lock
(created on the correct event loop) but lazily initialises it for
non-``with`` TestClient usages.
"""
try:
return app.state.chat_argv_lock
except AttributeError:
app.state.chat_argv_lock = asyncio.Lock()
return app.state.chat_argv_lock
def _get_pty_active_session_files(app: "FastAPI") -> dict[str, Path]:
"""Return channel -> active-session-file state for dashboard PTYs."""
try:
return app.state.pty_active_session_files
except AttributeError:
app.state.pty_active_session_files = {}
return app.state.pty_active_session_files
app = FastAPI(title="Hermes Agent", version=__version__, lifespan=_lifespan)
# Memory-provider OAuth connect routes live in the memory layer, not here.
from hermes_cli.memory_oauth import router as _memory_oauth_router # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_memory_oauth_router)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session token for protecting sensitive endpoints (reveal).
# The desktop shell mints the token and injects it via
# HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN so its main process can authenticate the
# /api calls it makes on the user's behalf; otherwise we generate one fresh
# on every server start. Either way it dies when the process exits and is
# injected into the SPA HTML so only the legitimate web UI can use it.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _resolve_session_token() -> str:
return os.environ.get("HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN") or secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
_SESSION_TOKEN = _resolve_session_token()
_SESSION_HEADER_NAME = "X-Hermes-Session-Token"
_SSH_OWNER_NONCE: Optional[str] = None
_SSH_RUNTIME_PURELIB: Optional[Tuple[str, int, int]] = None
_SSH_RUNTIME_MARKER: Optional[str] = None
def _apply_ssh_session_token(token: str) -> None:
global _SESSION_TOKEN
if token:
_SESSION_TOKEN = token
def _apply_ssh_owner_nonce(nonce: Optional[str]) -> None:
global _SSH_OWNER_NONCE, _SSH_RUNTIME_PURELIB, _SSH_RUNTIME_MARKER
_SSH_OWNER_NONCE = nonce
_SSH_RUNTIME_PURELIB = None
_SSH_RUNTIME_MARKER = None
if nonce:
try:
purelib = sysconfig.get_paths()["purelib"]
except (KeyError, OSError):
return
# Primary identity: a marker FILE written into site-packages now.
# A replaced venv (rm -rf && recreate — same OR different Python
# version) loses the marker deterministically, while pip installs
# into the live venv leave it untouched (no false stales). A bare
# (dev, ino) snapshot of the directory is NOT sufficient on its
# own: ext4 reuses directory inodes immediately, so the exact
# reported repro (`rm -rf venv && uv venv`) can land on the same
# inode and pass undetected (proven live during salvage).
try:
marker = os.path.join(purelib, f".hermes-ssh-runtime-{nonce}")
with open(marker, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
fh.write(f"pid={os.getpid()}\n")
_SSH_RUNTIME_MARKER = marker
except OSError:
pass # read-only site-packages — fall back to the stat snapshot
try:
st = os.stat(purelib)
_SSH_RUNTIME_PURELIB = (purelib, st.st_dev, st.st_ino)
except OSError:
pass
def _ssh_runtime_intact() -> bool:
# Marker file is the deterministic signal when we managed to write one.
if _SSH_RUNTIME_MARKER is not None:
return os.path.isfile(_SSH_RUNTIME_MARKER)
# Fallback (read-only site-packages): directory identity snapshot.
# Weaker — inode reuse can mask a same-filesystem recreate — but still
# catches cross-device moves and version-bump path changes.
if _SSH_RUNTIME_PURELIB is None:
return True
purelib, device, inode = _SSH_RUNTIME_PURELIB
try:
st = os.stat(purelib)
except OSError:
return False
return (st.st_dev, st.st_ino) == (device, inode)
# In-browser Chat tab (/chat, /api/pty, /api/ws, …). Always enabled: the
# desktop app and the dashboard's own Chat tab both drive the agent over the
# `/api/ws` + `/api/pty` WebSockets, so the embedded-chat surface is an
# unconditional part of the dashboard. Kept as a module-level constant (rather
# than inlining ``True`` at every gate) so the WS endpoints and the SPA token
# injection share a single, testable seam.
_DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED = True
# Desktop's file.attach compatibility transport sends a complete base64 data
# URL in one JSON-RPC frame. Uvicorn defaults to 16 MiB, which rejects files at
# the preview ceiling before the dispatcher sees them. Keep the gateway
# finite while allowing the 256 MiB raw Desktop attach cap plus base64/JSON
# overhead.
_DESKTOP_ATTACHMENT_WS_MAX_BYTES = 384 * 1024 * 1024
# Simple rate limiter for the reveal endpoint
_reveal_timestamps: List[float] = []
_REVEAL_MAX_PER_WINDOW = 5
_REVEAL_WINDOW_SECONDS = 30
# CORS: restrict to localhost origins only. The web UI is intended to run
# locally; binding to 0.0.0.0 with allow_origins=["*"] would let any website
# read/modify config and secrets.
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origin_regex=r"^https?://(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1)(:\d+)?$",
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Endpoints that do NOT require the session token. Everything else under
# /api/ is gated by the auth middleware below.
#
# This list is defined in ``hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths`` so the
# OAuth gate middleware can honour the same allowlist — keeping the two
# gates in lockstep avoids drift like the wildcard-subdomain regression
# where ``/api/status`` was public under the legacy gate but 401'd under
# the OAuth gate (breaking the portal's liveness probe).
#
# Keep the upstream list minimal — only truly non-sensitive, read-only
# endpoints belong there.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.public_paths import (
PUBLIC_API_PATHS as _PUBLIC_API_PATHS,
)
def _has_valid_session_token(request: Request) -> bool:
"""True if the request carries a valid dashboard session token.
The dedicated session header avoids collisions with reverse proxies that
already use ``Authorization`` (for example Caddy ``basic_auth``). We still
accept the legacy Bearer path for backward compatibility with older
dashboard bundles.
"""
session_header = request.headers.get(_SESSION_HEADER_NAME, "")
if session_header and hmac.compare_digest(
session_header.encode(),
_SESSION_TOKEN.encode(),
):
return True
auth = request.headers.get("authorization", "")
expected = f"Bearer {_SESSION_TOKEN}"
return hmac.compare_digest(auth.encode(), expected.encode())
# Routes that may also authenticate via a ``?token=`` query param, for download
# links opened by the OS shell or a new browser tab where the session header
# can't be set. Kept narrow — same query-token tradeoff as the /api/pty WS.
_QUERY_TOKEN_API_PATHS: frozenset[str] = frozenset({"/api/files/download"})
def _has_valid_query_token(request: Request, path: str) -> bool:
if path not in _QUERY_TOKEN_API_PATHS:
return False
token = request.query_params.get("token", "")
return bool(token) and hmac.compare_digest(token.encode(), _SESSION_TOKEN.encode())
def _require_token(request: Request) -> None:
"""Authorize a sensitive endpoint, raising 401 if the caller isn't allowed.
Two auth schemes protect the dashboard, exactly one active per bind:
* **Loopback / ``--insecure`` mode** (``auth_required`` False): the
ephemeral ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` is injected into the SPA HTML and echoed
back via ``X-Hermes-Session-Token`` (or the legacy ``Bearer`` header).
Validate it here.
* **Gated / OAuth mode** (``auth_required`` True): ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` is
NOT injected (the SPA authenticates with a session cookie), so there is
no token to check. The ``gated_auth_middleware`` has already verified the
cookie before the request reached this handler — any non-public ``/api/``
route it lets through carries a verified ``request.state.session``. The
legacy ``auth_middleware`` likewise short-circuits in this mode. Requiring
the (absent) token here would 401 every cookie-authenticated request,
making plugin install/enable/disable and the other ``_require_token``
endpoints permanently unreachable behind the gate. Defer to the gate.
"""
if getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
# Gate is authoritative. It attaches ``request.state.session`` on
# success and 401s otherwise, so a request that reached us is already
# authenticated. Belt-and-braces: confirm the session is present.
if getattr(request.state, "session", None) is not None:
return
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unauthorized")
if not _has_valid_session_token(request):
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Unauthorized")
# Accepted Host header values for loopback binds. DNS rebinding attacks
# point a victim browser at an attacker-controlled hostname (evil.test)
# which resolves to 127.0.0.1 after a TTL flip — bypassing same-origin
# checks because the browser now considers evil.test and our dashboard
# "same origin". Validating the Host header at the app layer rejects any
# request whose Host isn't one we bound for. See GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7.
_LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES: frozenset = frozenset({
"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1",
})
def _dashboard_public_hosts() -> frozenset[str]:
"""Return the exact hostname declared by ``dashboard.public_url``.
``public_url`` is already Hermes' canonical browser-facing URL behind a
reverse proxy. Reusing its validated hostname here keeps OAuth redirects,
HTTP Host validation, and WebSocket Origin validation on one source of
truth. Malformed or unset values fail closed as an empty set.
"""
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import resolve_public_url
public_url = resolve_public_url()
if not public_url:
return frozenset()
try:
hostname = urllib.parse.urlparse(public_url).hostname
except ValueError:
return frozenset()
if not hostname:
return frozenset()
return frozenset({hostname.lower()})
def should_require_auth(host: str, allow_public: bool = False) -> bool:
"""Return True iff the dashboard auth gate must be active.
Truth table:
host == loopback → False (no auth — local-only, trusted operator)
host != loopback → True (gate engages — OAuth or password required)
"Loopback" is 127.0.0.1, localhost, ::1. RFC1918 / CGNAT / link-local are
deliberately treated as PUBLIC — a hostile device on the same LAN is exactly
the threat model the gate is designed for.
``allow_public`` (the legacy ``--insecure`` escape hatch) NO LONGER disables
the gate. It is accepted for backward-compat with old launch scripts and
desktop shells but is ignored: a non-loopback bind ALWAYS requires an auth
provider (OAuth or the bundled password provider). This closes the
unauthenticated-public-dashboard hole behind the June 2026 ``hermes-0day``
MCP-persistence campaign, where ``--insecure --host 0.0.0.0`` left the
config/MCP/agent surface open to internet scanners.
"""
return host not in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES
def should_require_dashboard_auth(
host: str,
trusted_public_hosts: Optional[frozenset[str]] = None,
) -> bool:
"""Return whether the dashboard auth gate must be active.
The browser-facing URL is part of the exposure boundary: a non-loopback
``dashboard.public_url`` requires authentication even when a reverse proxy
reaches a backend bound to loopback. Callers may pass the already-resolved
host set so startup and request validation use the same snapshot.
"""
if trusted_public_hosts is None:
trusted_public_hosts = _dashboard_public_hosts()
return should_require_auth(host) or any(
candidate not in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES
for candidate in trusted_public_hosts
)
def _desktop_loopback_auth_exempt(
host: str,
ssh_session_token: Optional[str] = None,
ssh_owner_nonce: Optional[str] = None,
) -> bool:
"""True for a Desktop-owned loopback backend (#96490).
A non-loopback ``dashboard.public_url`` engages the ticket-only auth gate
for EVERY ``hermes serve`` on the machine — including the private loopback
backends the Desktop app spawns for itself. Those backends authenticate
with the per-spawn session token (injected via
``HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN`` for local spawns, ``--ssh-session-token
-file``/``--ssh-owner-nonce`` for Desktop SSH), which the gate's WS path
refuses outright — Desktop could not boot with a ``public_url`` configured.
The public_url describes a DIFFERENT deployment: the actual public
dashboard is a separate process on a non-loopback bind, whose own startup
computes ``should_require_dashboard_auth`` from its host and stays gated.
Exempting this process therefore never opens the public surface.
Exemption requires ALL of: loopback bind, ``HERMES_DESKTOP=1`` (set by
every Desktop spawn path — local and SSH), and an operator-minted
credential (env token, SSH session token, or owner nonce). A plain
``hermes serve`` with ``HERMES_DESKTOP=1`` exported but no credential is
NOT exempt.
"""
if host not in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES:
return False
if os.environ.get("HERMES_DESKTOP") != "1":
return False
return bool(
os.environ.get("HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN")
or ssh_session_token
or ssh_owner_nonce
)
def _host_header_hostname(host_header: str) -> str:
"""Return a normalized hostname from a valid HTTP Host authority.
Host headers are authorities, not full URLs. Reject ambiguous ports,
malformed IPv6 brackets, and URL syntax so validation always fails closed.
"""
value = (host_header or "").strip()
if not value:
return ""
if any(char in value for char in ('"', "'", "<", ">", " ", "\n", "\r", "\t")):
return ""
if "://" in value or any(char in value for char in ("/", "?", "#", "@")):
return ""
if value.startswith("["):
close = value.find("]")
if close == -1:
return ""
hostname = value[1:close]
# Bracket notation is reserved for IPv6 literals.
if ":" not in hostname:
return ""
suffix = value[close + 1:]
if suffix and not re.fullmatch(r":\d+", suffix):
return ""
return hostname.lower()
# Unbracketed IPv6 authorities are ambiguous with a port separator.
if value.count(":") > 1:
return ""
if ":" in value:
hostname, port = value.rsplit(":", 1)
if not hostname or not port.isdigit():
return ""
return hostname.lower()
return value.lower()
def _is_accepted_host(
host_header: str,
bound_host: str,
trusted_public_hosts: frozenset[str] = frozenset(),
) -> bool:
"""True if the Host header targets the interface we bound to.
Accepts:
- Exact bound host (with or without port suffix)
- Loopback aliases when bound to loopback
- Exact operator-declared public hosts (with or without port suffix)
- Any host when bound to 0.0.0.0 (explicit opt-in to non-loopback,
no protection possible at this layer)
"""
host_only = _host_header_hostname(host_header)
if not host_only:
return False
if host_only in trusted_public_hosts:
return True
# 0.0.0.0 bind means operator explicitly opted into all-interfaces
# (requires --insecure per web_server.start_server). No Host-layer
# defence can protect that mode; rely on operator network controls.
if bound_host in {"0.0.0.0", "::"}:
return True
# Loopback bind: accept the loopback names
bound_lc = bound_host.lower()
if bound_lc in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES:
return host_only in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES
# Explicit non-loopback bind: require exact host match
return host_only == bound_lc
@app.middleware("http")
async def host_header_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
"""Reject requests whose Host header doesn't match the bound interface.
Defends against DNS rebinding: a victim browser on a localhost
dashboard is tricked into fetching from an attacker hostname that
TTL-flips to 127.0.0.1. CORS and same-origin checks don't help —
the browser now treats the attacker origin as same-origin with the
dashboard. Host-header validation at the app layer catches it.
See GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7.
"""
# Store the bound host on app.state so this middleware can read it —
# set by start_server() at listen time.
bound_host = getattr(app.state, "bound_host", None)
if bound_host:
host_header = request.headers.get("host", "")
trusted_public_hosts = getattr(
app.state, "trusted_public_hosts", frozenset()
)
if not _is_accepted_host(
host_header, bound_host, trusted_public_hosts
):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=400,
content={
"detail": (
"Invalid Host header. Dashboard requests must use the "
"bound hostname or the configured public hostname."
),
},
)
return await call_next(request)
@app.middleware("http")
async def _plugin_api_runtime_gate(request: Request, call_next):
"""Block requests to disabled plugin API routes at request time.
:func:`_mount_plugin_api_routes` gates at import time, but if a plugin
is disabled *after* the dashboard is already running, its FastAPI router
remains mounted until restart. This middleware enforces the enabled/
disabled policy on every request to ``/api/plugins/{name}/...`` so that
runtime config changes take effect immediately.
Registered BEFORE the auth middlewares (so it executes AFTER them): a
request that hasn't cleared auth must get auth's 401 first, never this
gate's 404 — otherwise an unauthenticated caller could fingerprint which
plugins are installed/enabled by reading the status code. We only reach
the enabled/disabled check for a request that auth already let through.
"""
path = request.url.path
if path.startswith("/api/plugins/"):
# Only gate authenticated requests. Unauthenticated ones fall
# through so auth_middleware / the OAuth gate return 401 first and
# this route can't be used as a plugin-name oracle.
_authed = (
getattr(request.state, "token_authenticated", False)
or getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False)
or _has_valid_session_token(request)
or _has_valid_query_token(request, path)
)
if _authed:
# Extract plugin name from /api/plugins/<name>/...
parts = path.split("/")
# parts: ['', 'api', 'plugins', '<name>', ...]
if len(parts) >= 4:
plugin_name = parts[3]
if plugin_name:
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import (
_get_enabled_set,
_get_disabled_set,
)
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
# Determine plugin source. Check the cached plugin list;
# if not found, assume user plugin (safe default — blocks).
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins()
plugin = next(
(p for p in plugins if p.get("name") == plugin_name),
None,
)
source = plugin.get("source") if plugin else "user"
if source == "user":
if plugin_name in disabled_set or plugin_name not in enabled_set:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=404,
content={"detail": "Plugin not found"},
)
elif source == "bundled":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=404,
content={"detail": "Plugin not found"},
)
return await call_next(request)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard OAuth auth gate — engaged only when start_server flags the
# bind as non-loopback-without-insecure. No-op pass-through in loopback
# mode so the legacy auth_middleware (below) handles those binds via
# the injected ``_SESSION_TOKEN``. Registered between host_header and
# auth_middleware so the order is: host check → cookie auth → token auth.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.middleware("http")
async def _dashboard_auth_gate(request: Request, call_next):
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.middleware import gated_auth_middleware
return await gated_auth_middleware(request, call_next)
@app.middleware("http")
async def auth_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
"""Require the session token on all /api/ routes except the public list."""
# A request already authenticated by the token-auth seam (a service caller
# presenting a bearer token on a registered token route) carries
# ``token_authenticated`` — never bounce it through the cookie/session gate.
if getattr(request.state, "token_authenticated", False):
return await call_next(request)
# When the OAuth gate is active, cookie-based auth (gated_auth_middleware
# above) is authoritative. The legacy _SESSION_TOKEN path is loopback-only
# and is skipped here so the gate's session attachment isn't overridden.
if getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
return await call_next(request)
path = request.url.path
is_mcp_oauth_callback = path.startswith("/api/mcp/oauth/callback/")
if path.startswith("/api/") and path not in _PUBLIC_API_PATHS and not is_mcp_oauth_callback:
if not _has_valid_session_token(request) and not _has_valid_query_token(request, path):
return JSONResponse(
status_code=401,
content={"detail": "Unauthorized"},
)
return await call_next(request)
@app.middleware("http")
async def _token_auth_seam(request: Request, call_next):
"""Outermost auth seam: non-interactive bearer-token auth for opted-in routes.
Registered LAST so it runs FIRST (Starlette middleware is outermost-last).
A registered token route is fully owned here — authenticate by token,
attach the principal + ``token_authenticated`` flag, and let the downstream
cookie/session gates skip enforcement. Non-token routes pass straight
through untouched.
"""
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.token_auth import token_auth_middleware
return await token_auth_middleware(request, call_next)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard component health — in-process error/self-test counters that feed
# the ``components`` dict on ``/api/status``. That endpoint is in
# ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS``, so everything exported from here must be counts and
# enums only: no exception messages, no request paths, no tokens.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_DASHBOARD_HEALTH_WINDOW_SECONDS = 300.0
class DashboardHealth:
"""Module-level holder for dashboard-process health signals.
Tracks unhandled exceptions / 5xx responses seen by the outermost HTTP
middleware (rolling window) and the result of the periodic authenticated
self-test. ``last_error_path`` and ``last_error_type`` are internal
diagnostics for logs/debuggers — :meth:`snapshot` deliberately exports
neither (public-payload no-secrets contract).
"""
def __init__(self, window_seconds: float = _DASHBOARD_HEALTH_WINDOW_SECONDS) -> None:
self.window_seconds = window_seconds
self._error_times: "deque[float]" = deque(maxlen=256)
self.last_error_type: Optional[str] = None
self.last_error_path: Optional[str] = None # internal-only, never serialized
self.last_error_at: Optional[float] = None
self.selftest_status: str = "unknown" # unknown | ok | failing
self.selftest_http_status: Optional[int] = None
self.selftest_at: Optional[float] = None
def record_error(self, exc_type: str, path: str) -> None:
now = time.time()
self._error_times.append(now)
self.last_error_type = exc_type
self.last_error_path = path
self.last_error_at = now
def record_selftest(self, passed: bool, http_status: Optional[int]) -> None:
self.selftest_status = "ok" if passed else "failing"
self.selftest_http_status = http_status
self.selftest_at = time.time()
def recent_error_count(self) -> int:
cutoff = time.time() - self.window_seconds
while self._error_times and self._error_times[0] < cutoff:
self._error_times.popleft()
return len(self._error_times)
def snapshot(self) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Public component payload: status enum + counts + timestamps only."""
errors = self.recent_error_count()
status = "degraded" if (errors or self.selftest_status == "failing") else "ok"
return {
"status": status,
"recent_unhandled_errors": errors,
"last_error_at": self.last_error_at,
"selftest": self.selftest_status,
}
DASHBOARD_HEALTH = DashboardHealth()
@app.middleware("http")
async def _dashboard_health_middleware(request: Request, call_next):
"""Outermost middleware: count unhandled exceptions and 5xx responses.
Registered after ``_token_auth_seam`` so it is the outermost layer
(Starlette middleware is outermost-last) — nothing below can raise past
it unseen. Records into :data:`DASHBOARD_HEALTH` and re-raises; never
swallows or alters the response.
"""
try:
response = await call_next(request)
except Exception as exc:
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_error(type(exc).__name__, request.url.path)
raise
if response.status_code >= 500:
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_error(f"http_{response.status_code}", request.url.path)
return response
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Authenticated-route self-test: every minute, make one in-process request
# against a cheap DB-touching authenticated route with the real session
# token. Catches the class of failure where liveness looks fine but every
# authenticated request 500s (e.g. wedged state DB).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 60.0
_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_ROUTE = "/api/sessions?limit=1"
async def _dashboard_selftest_once() -> None:
"""Run one authenticated in-process self-test request and record it."""
try:
import httpx
except ImportError:
return # optional dependency — skip cleanly, leave status "unknown"
try:
transport = httpx.ASGITransport(app=app)
# base_url uses a loopback name so the Host-header middleware accepts
# the request on loopback binds.
async with httpx.AsyncClient(
transport=transport, base_url="http://127.0.0.1"
) as client:
resp = await client.get(
_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_ROUTE,
headers={_SESSION_HEADER_NAME: _SESSION_TOKEN},
)
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_selftest(resp.status_code == 200, resp.status_code)
except Exception:
DASHBOARD_HEALTH.record_selftest(False, None)
async def _dashboard_selftest_loop() -> None:
"""Periodic self-test driver started from the lifespan."""
try:
import httpx # noqa: F401
except ImportError:
_log.debug("httpx unavailable — dashboard self-test disabled")
return
while True:
await asyncio.sleep(_DASHBOARD_SELFTEST_INTERVAL_SECONDS)
# On OAuth-gated binds the legacy session token is not honoured, so
# the probe would false-alarm 401 — skip until the gate is off.
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
continue
await _dashboard_selftest_once()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Config schema — auto-generated from DEFAULT_CONFIG
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Manual overrides for fields that need select options or custom types
def _memory_provider_options() -> List[str]:
"""Discovered memory providers for the ``memory.provider`` select.
Directory-scan only (no provider imports), so it's safe at module import
time. ``""`` (built-in only) is always first; discovery failures degrade to
the bundled defaults rather than dropping the field. The literal
``builtin`` alias is deliberately NOT offered — built-in memory is not a
provider plugin, and ``_normalize_memory_provider_name`` already maps any
legacy ``builtin``/``built-in``/``none`` value back to ``""`` (#49513).
"""
options = [""]
try:
from plugins.memory import list_memory_provider_names
options.extend(list_memory_provider_names())
except Exception:
options.extend(["honcho"])
# Dedupe, preserve order
return list(dict.fromkeys(options))
def _timezone_options() -> List[str]:
"""Return sorted IANA timezone identifiers, cached at import time."""
try:
import zoneinfo
return sorted(zoneinfo.available_timezones()) or ["UTC"]
except Exception: # pragma: no cover
return ["UTC"]
_SCHEMA_OVERRIDES: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {
"timezone": {
"type": "select",
"description": "IANA timezone (e.g. America/New_York). Blank uses the system timezone.",
"options": _timezone_options(),
"searchable": True,
"clearable": True,
},
"memory.provider": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Memory provider plugin",
"options": _memory_provider_options(),
},
"model": {
"type": "string",
"description": "Default model (e.g. anthropic/claude-sonnet-4.6)",
"category": "general",
},
"model_context_length": {
"type": "number",
"description": "Context window override (0 = auto-detect from model metadata)",
"category": "general",
},
"terminal.backend": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Terminal execution backend",
"options": ["local", "docker", "ssh", "modal", "daytona", "vercel_sandbox", "singularity"],
},
"terminal.vercel_runtime": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Vercel Sandbox runtime",
"options": ["node24", "node22", "python3.13"], # sync with _SUPPORTED_VERCEL_RUNTIMES in terminal_tool.py
},
"terminal.modal_mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Modal sandbox mode",
"options": ["sandbox", "function"],
},
"proxy.enabled": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": (
"Docker-only egress credential firewall. Requires `hermes egress setup` "
"and `hermes egress start`; Modal/SSH/Daytona are not wired yet."
),
"category": "security",
},
"proxy.credential_source": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Where iron-proxy loads real upstream secrets at start time",
"options": ["env", "bitwarden"],
"category": "security",
},
"proxy.enforce_on_docker": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "Refuse Docker sandboxes when egress is enabled but not configured/running",
"category": "security",
},
"tts.provider": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Text-to-speech provider",
"options": ["edge", "elevenlabs", "openai", "xai", "minimax", "mistral", "gemini", "neutts", "kittentts", "piper"],
},
"stt.provider": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Speech-to-text provider",
# "mistral" temporarily removed — mistralai PyPI package quarantined
# (malicious 2.4.6 release on 2026-05-12). Restore once available.
"options": ["local", "groq", "openai", "xai", "elevenlabs"],
},
"stt.local.model": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Local faster-whisper model size",
"options": ["tiny", "base", "small", "medium", "large-v3"],
},
"stt.groq.model": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Groq Whisper model",
"options": ["whisper-large-v3-turbo", "whisper-large-v3", "distil-whisper-large-v3-en"],
},
"stt.openai.model": {
"type": "select",
"description": "OpenAI transcription model",
"options": ["whisper-1", "gpt-4o-mini-transcribe", "gpt-4o-transcribe", "gpt-transcribe"],
},
"stt.elevenlabs.model_id": {
"type": "select",
"description": "ElevenLabs Scribe model",
"options": ["scribe_v2", "scribe_v1"],
},
"display.skin": {
"type": "select",
"description": "CLI visual theme",
"options": ["default", "ares", "mono", "slate"],
},
"dashboard.theme": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Web dashboard visual theme",
"options": ["default", "midnight", "ember", "mono", "cyberpunk", "rose"],
},
"display.resume_display": {
"type": "select",
"description": "How resumed sessions display history",
"options": ["minimal", "full", "off"],
},
"display.busy_input_mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Input behavior while agent is running",
"options": ["interrupt", "queue", "steer"],
},
"approvals.mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Dangerous command approval mode",
"options": ["manual", "smart", "off"],
},
"context.engine": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Context management engine",
"options": ["default", "custom"],
},
"human_delay.mode": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Simulated typing delay mode",
"options": ["off", "typing", "fixed"],
},
"logging.level": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Log level for agent.log",
"options": ["DEBUG", "INFO", "WARNING", "ERROR"],
},
"agent.service_tier": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Fast mode: fast = always, auto = first N seconds of each turn, cold = first turn only",
"options": ["", "normal", "fast", "auto", "cold"],
},
"delegation.reasoning_effort": {
"type": "select",
"description": "Reasoning effort for delegated subagents",
"options": ["", "minimal", "low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max", "ultra"],
},
"updates.non_interactive_local_changes": {
"type": "select",
"description": (
"When the chat app / gateway updates Hermes (no terminal prompt), "
"what to do with uncommitted local source edits. 'stash' keeps them "
"and re-applies them after the update; 'discard' throws them away. "
"Terminal updates always ask, regardless of this setting."
),
"options": ["stash", "discard"],
},
"updates.refresh_cua_driver": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": (
"Refresh an already-installed cua-driver during hermes update. "
"Disable this on non-admin macOS accounts where /Applications is "
"not writable."
),
},
"browser.headed": {
"type": "boolean",
"description": "Run the local browser in headed mode (visible window). Also keeps the window open between turns; idle sessions are still reaped after browser.inactivity_timeout.",
},
"plugins.hook_callback_timeout": {
"type": "number",
"description": (
"Wall-clock cap (seconds) for timeout-bounded in-process Python "
"plugin hook callbacks (hot-path observers + pre_tool_call). "
"Timed-out pre_tool_call fails closed. 0 disables the cap; "
"values above 600 are clamped. Caller-thread hooks such as "
"subagent_stop are never moved onto a timeout worker."
),
},
}
# Categories with fewer fields get merged into "general" to avoid tab sprawl.
_CATEGORY_MERGE: Dict[str, str] = {
"privacy": "security",
"context": "agent",
"skills": "agent",
"cron": "agent",
"network": "agent",
# `models_dev.url` (mirror override) is the only schema-surfaced
# models_dev field — fold it in with the other network/agent plumbing
# rather than spawning a one-field orphan tab.
"models_dev": "agent",
"checkpoints": "agent",
"approvals": "security",
"human_delay": "display",
"dashboard": "display",
"code_execution": "agent",
"prompt_caching": "agent",
# bot_mode holds a couple of relay tuning knobs — keep it folded into the
# agent tab rather than spawning a tiny standalone category.
"bot_mode": "agent",
"goals": "agent",
"updates": "general",
# `onboarding.profile_build` is the only schema-surfaced onboarding field
# (`onboarding.seen` is an internal latch dict, not a user setting), so fold
# it into the agent tab rather than spawning a one-field orphan category.
"onboarding": "agent",
# Only `telegram.reactions` currently lives under telegram — fold it in
# with the other messaging-platform config (discord) so it isn't an
# orphan tab of one field.
"telegram": "discord",
# `mcp.auto_reload_on_config_change` is the only schema-surfaced mcp
# runtime field (server definitions live under mcp_servers, edited via
# the MCP tab) — fold it into the agent tab rather than spawning a
# one-field orphan category.
"mcp": "agent",
# `computer_use.cua_telemetry` is the only schema-surfaced computer_use
# field — fold it into the agent tab rather than spawning a one-field
# orphan category.
"computer_use": "agent",
# `telemetry.shared_metrics.enabled` is the only schema-surfaced telemetry
# field — fold it into security alongside the other privacy-posture toggles.
"telemetry": "security",
# `plugins.hook_callback_timeout` is the only schema-surfaced plugins field
# (`enabled`/`disabled` are list allow-lists omitted from DEFAULT_CONFIG) —
# fold it into the agent tab rather than spawning a one-field orphan category.
"plugins": "agent",
# `doctor.live_probe_timeout` is the only schema-surfaced doctor field —
# fold it into general rather than spawning a one-field orphan category.
"doctor": "general",
# `runtime.nofile_soft_limit` (#78873) is the only schema-surfaced runtime
# field — fold it into the agent tab rather than spawning a one-field
# orphan category.
"runtime": "agent",
# `session.terminal_continue` is the only schema-surfaced session field —
# fold it into general rather than spawning a one-field orphan category.
"session": "general",
# `nous.keepalive_interval_seconds` is the only schema-surfaced nous field
# (Portal tokens live in auth.json) — fold it into the agent tab.
"nous": "agent",
}
# Display order for tabs — unlisted categories sort alphabetically after these.
_CATEGORY_ORDER = [
"general", "agent", "terminal", "display", "delegation",
"memory", "compression", "security", "browser", "voice",
"tts", "stt", "logging", "discord", "auxiliary",
]
def _infer_type(value: Any) -> str:
"""Infer a UI field type from a Python value."""
if isinstance(value, bool):
return "boolean"
if isinstance(value, int):
return "number"
if isinstance(value, float):
return "number"
if isinstance(value, list):
return "list"
if isinstance(value, dict):
return "object"
return "string"
def _build_schema_from_config(
config: Dict[str, Any],
prefix: str = "",
) -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Walk DEFAULT_CONFIG and produce a flat dot-path → field schema dict."""
schema: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for key, value in config.items():
full_key = f"{prefix}.{key}" if prefix else key
# Skip internal / version keys
if full_key in {"_config_version"}:
continue
# Category is the first path component for nested keys, or "general"
# for top-level scalar fields (model, toolsets, timezone, etc.).
if prefix:
category = prefix.split(".")[0]
elif isinstance(value, dict):
category = key
else:
category = "general"
if isinstance(value, dict):
# Recurse into nested dicts
schema.update(_build_schema_from_config(value, full_key))
else:
entry: Dict[str, Any] = {
"type": _infer_type(value),
"description": full_key.replace(".", " → ").replace("_", " ").title(),
"category": category,
}
# Apply manual overrides
if full_key in _SCHEMA_OVERRIDES:
entry.update(_SCHEMA_OVERRIDES[full_key])
# Merge small categories
entry["category"] = _CATEGORY_MERGE.get(entry["category"], entry["category"])
schema[full_key] = entry
return schema
CONFIG_SCHEMA = _build_schema_from_config(DEFAULT_CONFIG)
# Inject virtual fields that don't live in DEFAULT_CONFIG but are surfaced
# by the normalize/denormalize cycle. Insert model_context_length right after
# the "model" key so it renders adjacent in the frontend.
_mcl_entry = _SCHEMA_OVERRIDES["model_context_length"]
_ordered_schema: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for _k, _v in CONFIG_SCHEMA.items():
_ordered_schema[_k] = _v
if _k == "model":
_ordered_schema["model_context_length"] = _mcl_entry
CONFIG_SCHEMA = _ordered_schema
def _is_command_provider_block(value: Any) -> bool:
"""Return True when *value* declares a command-type voice provider.
Mirrors the runtime discriminators
(``tools.tts_tool._is_command_provider_config`` /
``tools.transcription_tools._is_command_stt_provider_config``) and the
desktop's ``isCommandProvider`` in
``apps/desktop/src/app/settings/helpers.ts``: ``type`` is OPTIONAL and
case/space-insensitive (absent or normalizing to ``"command"``), and
``command`` MUST be a non-empty string. Built-in blocks (which carry
``voice``/``model`` and no ``command``) and the ``providers`` container
itself are rejected.
"""
if not isinstance(value, dict):
return False
ptype = str(value.get("type") or "").strip().lower()
if ptype and ptype != "command":
return False
command = value.get("command")
return isinstance(command, str) and bool(command.strip())
def _custom_provider_options(
kind: str,
builtin_names: List[str],
cfg: Dict[str, Any],
) -> List[str]:
"""Return a merged provider option list without hard-coding vendor names.
*kind* is ``"tts"`` or ``"stt"``. The result keeps the built-in display
names first (original order — NOT re-sorted), then appends:
1. Command-type providers declared under the canonical
``<kind>.providers.<name>`` location, plus the legacy top-level
``<kind>.<name>`` fallback — exactly the dual resolution the runtime
performs in ``_get_named_provider_config`` /
``_get_named_stt_provider_config``. Names colliding with a RUNTIME
built-in are excluded case-insensitively (the runtime rejects a
built-in name as a command provider before any config lookup), so a
``providers.EDGE`` command block is not offered.
2. Plugin-registered provider names from ``agent.tts_registry`` /
``agent.transcription_registry`` — opportunistic only: plugins
register at runtime via ``ctx.register_tts_provider()``, and this
process does not necessarily call ``discover_plugins()``, so the
registry may legitimately be empty here. (There is no static
``provides: [tts]`` manifest convention to scan — real manifests only
carry ``provides_tools``/``provides_hooks``.)
3. The current ``<kind>.provider`` value when not already present — a
custom name that only appears as the active provider stays
selectable (matches desktop ``enumOptionsFor``'s current-value
preservation).
Guard semantics deliberately mirror
``apps/desktop/src/app/settings/helpers.ts:commandProviderNames`` so the
backend schema (web dashboard) and the desktop client agree on which
names are offered.
"""
names = [str(n) for n in builtin_names]
seen = {n.strip().lower() for n in names}
# Guard against the RUNTIME built-in sets, not the display shortlist
# above: the display list drifts from the runtime sets (e.g. omits
# ``deepinfra``), and filtering on it would offer names the runtime
# would never honour as command providers.
if kind == "tts":
from tools.tts_tool import BUILTIN_TTS_PROVIDERS as _runtime_builtins
else:
from tools.transcription_tools import BUILTIN_STT_PROVIDERS as _runtime_builtins
def _add(name: Any) -> None:
if not isinstance(name, str):
return
stripped = name.strip()
key = stripped.lower()
if stripped and key not in seen:
names.append(stripped)
seen.add(key)
section = cfg.get(kind)
if not isinstance(section, dict):
section = {}
# Canonical nested location first, then the legacy top-level fallback —
# the same order the runtime resolves them in.
candidate_blocks: List[Any] = []
providers_map = section.get("providers")
if isinstance(providers_map, dict):
candidate_blocks.append(providers_map)
candidate_blocks.append(
{k: v for k, v in section.items() if k != "providers"}
)
for block in candidate_blocks:
for name, value in block.items():
if (
isinstance(name, str)
and name.strip().lower() not in _runtime_builtins
and _is_command_provider_block(value)
):
_add(name)
# Plugin-registered providers (only populated when plugins are loaded in
# this process). Registry names can never collide with built-ins — the
# registries reject such registrations.
try:
if kind == "tts":
from agent.tts_registry import list_providers as _list_voice_providers
else:
from agent.transcription_registry import list_providers as _list_voice_providers
for _p in _list_voice_providers():
_add(getattr(_p, "name", None))
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - registry import should not break schema
pass
# Current-value preservation (``cfg_get`` takes *keys*, not dotted paths).
_add(cfg_get(cfg, kind, "provider"))
return names
def _memory_provider_schema_options(cfg: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[str]:
"""Discovered memory providers for a per-request schema merge.
Reuses the cheap directory scan of :func:`_memory_provider_options` and
additionally preserves the currently-configured provider, so a value
selected in config but not (yet) discoverable — e.g. a plugin removed from
disk — never silently vanishes from the dropdown.
"""
options = _memory_provider_options()
memory = cfg.get("memory")
configured = memory.get("provider") if isinstance(memory, dict) else None
current = _normalize_memory_provider_name(configured)
if current and current not in options:
options = [*options, current]
return options
def _schema_with_dynamic_provider_options() -> Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return CONFIG_SCHEMA with per-request discovery-driven options merged.
Some ``*.provider`` selects have options that are discovered at runtime
(voice backends via the tts/stt registries + config.yaml command
providers; memory providers via a plugin-dir scan). The module-level
``_SCHEMA_OVERRIDES`` freezes those lists at import time, so a provider
installed after the server started never appears. This recomputes them at
request time — reflecting the CURRENT config.yaml, the profile-scoped
config when the request carries a ``profile`` param, and mid-session
plugin installs — for every surface that reads the schema (desktop, CLI,
dashboard), with no extra frontend round-trips.
The module-level ``CONFIG_SCHEMA`` is never mutated; entries that change
are shallow-copied onto a copied mapping.
"""
try:
cfg = load_config()
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - schema must survive config errors
return CONFIG_SCHEMA
overlay: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
def merge(key: str, options: List[str]) -> None:
entry = CONFIG_SCHEMA.get(key)
if isinstance(entry, dict) and isinstance(entry.get("options"), list) and options != entry["options"]:
overlay[key] = {**entry, "options": options}
for kind in ("tts", "stt"):
entry = CONFIG_SCHEMA.get(f"{kind}.provider")
existing = entry.get("options") if isinstance(entry, dict) else None
if isinstance(existing, list):
merge(f"{kind}.provider", _custom_provider_options(kind, list(existing), cfg))
merge("memory.provider", _memory_provider_schema_options(cfg))
tb_entry = CONFIG_SCHEMA.get("terminal.backend")
if isinstance(tb_entry, dict) and isinstance(tb_entry.get("options"), list):
try:
plugin_names = sorted(
{row["name"] for row in _plugin_terminal_backend_rows()}
- set(tb_entry["options"])
)
except Exception:
plugin_names = []
if plugin_names:
merge("terminal.backend", [*tb_entry["options"], *plugin_names])
if not overlay:
return CONFIG_SCHEMA
return {**CONFIG_SCHEMA, **overlay}
from hermes_cli.web_models import ( # noqa: F401
ConfigUpdate,
EnvVarUpdate,
EnvVarDelete,
EnvVarReveal,
MemoryProviderConfigUpdate,
MemoryProviderSetupRequest,
CustomEndpointUpdate,
MessagingPlatformUpdate,
TelegramOnboardingStart,
TelegramOnboardingApply,
WhatsAppOnboardingStart,
WhatsAppOnboardingApply,
AudioTranscriptionRequest,
ManagedFileUpload,
ChatImageUpload,
ManagedDirectoryCreate,
ManagedFileDelete,
ModelAssignment,
MoaModelSlot,
_MoaReferenceControls,
MoaPresetPayload,
MoaConfigPayload,
FsWriteText,
GitPathBody,
GitFileBody,
GitCommitBody,
GitWorktreeAddBody,
GitWorktreeRemoveBody,
GitBranchSwitchBody,
CuratorPause,
LearningNodeRef,
LearningNodeEdit,
DebugShareRequest,
TTSSpeakRequest,
TTSLeaseRequest,
OAuthSubmitBody,
BulkDeleteSessions,
SessionImport,
SessionRename,
SessionPrune,
CronJobCreate,
CronJobUpdate,
AutomationBlueprintInstantiate,
MCPServerCreate,
MCPServersReplace,
MCPEnabledToggle,
MCPCatalogInstall,
PairingApprove,
PairingRevoke,
WebhookCreate,
WebhookEnabledToggle,
CredentialPoolAdd,
MemoryProviderSelect,
MemoryReset,
BackupRequest,
ImportRequest,
HookCreate,
HookDelete,
SkillInstallRequest,
SkillUninstallRequest,
SkillsUpdateRequest,
ProfileCreate,
ProfileRename,
ProfileSoulUpdate,
ProfileActiveUpdate,
ProfileDescriptionUpdate,
ProfileModelUpdate,
ProfileDescribeAuto,
SkillToggle,
SkillCreate,
SkillContentUpdate,
ToolsetToggle,
ToolsetProviderSelect,
ToolsetModelSelect,
ToolsetEnvUpdate,
ToolsetPostSetup,
TerminalBackendSelect,
RawConfigUpdate,
ThemeSetBody,
FontSetBody,
_AgentPluginInstallBody,
_PluginProvidersPutBody,
_PluginVisibilityBody,
)
_AUDIO_MIME_EXTENSIONS: Dict[str, str] = {
"audio/aac": ".aac",
"audio/flac": ".flac",
"audio/m4a": ".m4a",
"audio/mp3": ".mp3",
"audio/mp4": ".mp4",
"audio/mpeg": ".mp3",
"audio/ogg": ".ogg",
"audio/wav": ".wav",
"audio/wave": ".wav",
"audio/webm": ".webm",
"audio/x-m4a": ".m4a",
"audio/x-wav": ".wav",
"video/webm": ".webm",
}
_MAX_TRANSCRIPTION_UPLOAD_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
def _audio_extension_for_mime(mime_type: str) -> str:
normalized = (mime_type or "").split(";", 1)[0].strip().lower()
return _AUDIO_MIME_EXTENSIONS.get(normalized, ".webm")
def _normalize_main_model_assignment(provider: str, model: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Normalize a main-slot (provider, model) pair before persisting.
The Models page has two assignment paths and only one of them was safe:
- The "Change" picker sends a real Hermes provider slug — fine.
- The per-card "Use as → Main model" menu sends ``entry.provider``
from the analytics rows, falling back to the model's VENDOR prefix
(``modelVendor("anthropic/claude-opus-4.6") == "anthropic"``) when
the session row has no ``billing_provider`` (older sessions, NULL
rows). That wrote ``provider: anthropic`` +
``default: anthropic/claude-opus-4.6`` to config — a vendor-prefixed
OpenRouter slug on the NATIVE Anthropic provider. New sessions then
400 against api.anthropic.com ("model: anthropic/claude-opus-4.6 not
found") and the user reads it as "changing models does nothing".
Two repairs, both at this single chokepoint so every caller inherits:
1. Vendor-name → Hermes-provider mapping: when the provider string is
not a known Hermes provider/alias (e.g. ``moonshotai``, ``x-ai`` is
known but ``poolside`` isn't) but the model is a vendor-prefixed
aggregator slug, keep the user's CURRENT aggregator if they're on
one, else fall back to openrouter.
Named custom providers (``custom:litellm``, etc.) are excluded from
this fallback: ``_KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES`` only lists the bare
``"custom"`` bucket, never a specific ``custom:<name>`` slug, so
without this exclusion every named custom provider paired with a
slash-bearing model (e.g. ``ollama/glm-5.2`` behind a LiteLLM proxy)
looked exactly like the stray-vendor-prefix case above and got
silently reassigned to ``openrouter``.
2. Model-format normalization for the resolved provider via
``normalize_model_for_provider`` (e.g. ``anthropic/claude-opus-4.6``
on native anthropic → ``claude-opus-4-6``).
"""
from hermes_cli.config import get_compatible_custom_providers
from hermes_cli.models import _KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES, normalize_provider
from hermes_cli.model_normalize import normalize_model_for_provider
from hermes_cli.providers import resolve_custom_provider, resolve_user_provider
prov_in = (provider or "").strip()
model_in = (model or "").strip()
canonical = normalize_provider(prov_in)
# User-declared providers are real routing targets, not analytics vendor
# labels. Resolve them before the unknown-vendor fallback. ``providers:``
# keeps its declared bare slug; ``custom_providers:`` canonicalizes both a
# bare display name and ``custom:<name>`` to the durable custom slug.
try:
cfg = load_config()
except Exception:
cfg = {}
user_providers = cfg.get("providers") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else None
user_provider = resolve_user_provider(
prov_in, user_providers if isinstance(user_providers, dict) else {}
)
custom_provider = resolve_custom_provider(
prov_in,
get_compatible_custom_providers(cfg) if isinstance(cfg, dict) else [],
)
if user_provider is not None:
return user_provider.id, model_in
if custom_provider is not None:
return custom_provider.id, model_in
# A named custom provider that didn't resolve above (typo, config
# mismatch, entry missing from custom_providers/providers) must still
# not be treated as a stray vendor prefix -- it isn't a known Hermes
# provider/alias, but it also isn't the analytics-vendor case this
# fallback exists for. Match only the durable named-custom syntax
# (bare "custom" bucket, or "custom:<name>" per
# ``providers.custom_provider_slug``) -- a bare ``startswith("custom")``
# would also swallow unrelated unconfigured vendor names that merely
# happen to start with "custom" (e.g. "customproxy").
is_custom_provider_slug = canonical == "custom" or canonical.startswith("custom:")
if (
canonical not in _KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES
and not is_custom_provider_slug
and "/" in model_in
):
# Vendor prefix posing as a provider (analytics fallback). Resolve
# against the user's current provider when it's an aggregator that
# serves vendor-prefixed slugs; otherwise default to openrouter.
try:
cur_cfg = cfg.get("model", {})
cur_provider = (
str(cur_cfg.get("provider", "") or "").strip().lower()
if isinstance(cur_cfg, dict) else ""
)
except Exception:
cur_provider = ""
from hermes_cli.models import _AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS
if cur_provider and normalize_provider(cur_provider) in _AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS:
canonical = normalize_provider(cur_provider)
prov_in = cur_provider
else:
canonical = "openrouter"
prov_in = "openrouter"
# Custom/user-config providers keep the model verbatim — the registry
# normalizer doesn't know their namespaces.
if canonical in _KNOWN_PROVIDER_NAMES and not canonical.startswith("custom"):
try:
normalized_model = normalize_model_for_provider(model_in, canonical)
if normalized_model:
model_in = normalized_model
except Exception:
_log.debug("model normalization failed for %s/%s", prov_in, model_in, exc_info=True)
return prov_in, model_in
def _apply_main_model_assignment(
model_cfg: "Any", provider: str, model: str, base_url: str = "", api_key: str = ""
) -> dict:
"""Apply a main-slot model assignment to a ``model`` config dict in place.
Sets ``provider``/``default``, then reconciles ``base_url``:
- An explicitly supplied ``base_url`` is always persisted (covers
``custom``/local endpoints and any provider whose key is bound to a
non-default host).
- Otherwise, a stale ``base_url`` is cleared ONLY when switching to a
*different* provider — that URL belonged to the old provider. When the
provider is unchanged and no new URL is supplied, the existing
``base_url`` is preserved. This keeps a user's custom endpoint (e.g. a
Xiaomi MiMo Token Plan host, ``https://token-plan-*.xiaomimimo.com/v1``)
alive when they merely re-pick a model under the same provider — picking
a model previously wiped it, forcing the registry default and breaking
Token Plan keys.
The runtime resolver reads ``model.base_url`` from config (it ignores
``OPENAI_BASE_URL``) and only honors it when the configured provider matches
and the pool entry is on the registry default, so preserving it here is what
lets the override actually route. The hardcoded ``context_length`` override
is always dropped since the new model may have a different context window.
Returns the same dict (coerced to a fresh dict if the input wasn't one) so
callers can assign it straight back onto the model config.
"""
if not isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
model_cfg = {}
prev_provider = str(model_cfg.get("provider") or "").strip().lower()
new_provider = provider.strip().lower()
model_cfg["provider"] = provider
model_cfg["default"] = model
if base_url.strip():
model_cfg["base_url"] = base_url.strip()
elif model_cfg.get("base_url") and new_provider != prev_provider:
# Switching providers: the old URL belonged to the old provider, drop
# it so the new provider's default endpoint is used. Same-provider
# re-assignment keeps the user's configured base_url intact.
model_cfg["base_url"] = ""
# The endpoint key follows the same lifecycle as base_url: an explicit key
# is always persisted; an existing key is dropped only when switching to a
# different provider (it belonged to the old endpoint), and preserved on a
# same-provider re-pick so re-selecting a model doesn't wipe the key.
if api_key.strip():
model_cfg["api_key"] = api_key.strip()
model_cfg.pop("api", None)
elif (model_cfg.get("api_key") or model_cfg.get("api")) and new_provider != prev_provider:
# A stale endpoint secret can live under the legacy ``api`` alias with
# no ``api_key`` (the resolver still reads ``model.api`` as a key), so
# the switch-clears-the-key path must trigger on either field — else the
# old endpoint's secret survives in config.yaml and contaminates a later
# custom resolution. clear_model_endpoint_credentials scrubs both.
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(model_cfg, clear_api_mode=False)
if new_provider != prev_provider:
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(model_cfg, clear_api_key=False)
model_cfg.pop("context_length", None)
return model_cfg
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL = os.getenv("GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL")
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX = 1.0
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_ROUTE_TIMEOUT = 1.0
try:
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = float(os.getenv("GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT", "1"))
except (ValueError, TypeError):
_log.warning(
"Invalid GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT value %r — using default 1.0s",
os.getenv("GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT"),
)
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = 1.0
if _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT <= 0:
_log.warning(
"Invalid non-positive GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT value %.3fs — using default 1.0s",
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT,
)
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = 1.0
elif _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT > _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX:
_log.warning(
"Capping GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT %.3fs to %.3fs for dashboard liveness probes",
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT,
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX,
)
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT = _GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT_MAX
_STATUS_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_TIMEOUT = 0.75
# DEPRECATED (scheduled for removal): GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL / GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT.
# Cross-container / cross-host gateway liveness detection will be folded into a
# first-class dashboard config key so it's no longer Docker-adjacent lore buried
# in env vars. The env vars still work for now so existing Compose deployments
# don't break. Do not add new callers — wire new uses through the planned
# config surface.
def _probe_gateway_health() -> tuple[bool, dict | None]:
"""Probe the gateway via its HTTP health endpoint (cross-container).
.. deprecated::
Driven by the deprecated ``GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL`` /
``GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT`` env vars. Scheduled for removal alongside
a move to a first-class dashboard config key. See
:data:`_GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL` for context.
Uses ``/health/detailed`` first (returns full state), falling back to
the simpler ``/health`` endpoint. Returns ``(is_alive, body_dict)``.
Accepts any of these as ``GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL``:
- ``http://gateway:8642`` (base URL — recommended)
- ``http://gateway:8642/health`` (explicit health path)
- ``http://gateway:8642/health/detailed`` (explicit detailed path)
This is a **blocking** call — run via ``run_in_executor`` from async code.
"""
if not _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL:
return False, None
# Normalise to base URL so we always probe the right paths regardless of
# whether the user included /health or /health/detailed in the env var.
base = _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL.rstrip("/")
if base.endswith("/health/detailed"):
base = base[: -len("/health/detailed")]
elif base.endswith("/health"):
base = base[: -len("/health")]
for path in (f"{base}/health/detailed", f"{base}/health"):
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(path, method="GET")
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=_GATEWAY_HEALTH_TIMEOUT) as resp:
if resp.status == 200:
body = json.loads(resp.read())
return True, body
except Exception:
continue
return False, None
def _count_status_active_sessions() -> int:
"""Return the dashboard status active-session count.
This is best-effort status garnish, not a critical path. Opens read-only
(via the shared stale-schema heal, same as every other dashboard read
path) so /api/status never routinely writes to state.db while another
Hermes process is using it.
"""
from hermes_state import _default_db_path
# The heal helper bootstraps a missing store; this garnish must not — on
# a fresh install /api/status polls would otherwise create state.db
# before the user's first session.
if not Path(_default_db_path()).exists():
return 0
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(None, read_only=True)
try:
sessions = db.list_sessions_rich(limit=50, compact_rows=True)
now = time.time()
return sum(
1 for s in sessions
if s.get("ended_at") is None
and (now - s.get("last_active", s.get("started_at", 0))) < 300
)
finally:
db.close()
async def _status_active_sessions() -> int:
try:
return await asyncio.wait_for(
run_in_threadpool(_count_status_active_sessions),
timeout=_STATUS_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_TIMEOUT,
)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
_log.debug(
"/api/status active session count exceeded %.2fs; returning 0",
_STATUS_ACTIVE_SESSIONS_TIMEOUT,
)
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("/api/status active session count unavailable: %s", exc)
return 0
# Image MIME types this endpoint will serve. Extension-allowlisted so an
# authenticated caller can't pull non-image files through it.
_MEDIA_CONTENT_TYPES = {
".png": "image/png",
".jpg": "image/jpeg",
".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
".gif": "image/gif",
".webp": "image/webp",
".svg": "image/svg+xml",
".bmp": "image/bmp",
".ico": "image/x-icon",
}
_MEDIA_MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT_ENV = "HERMES_DASHBOARD_FILES_ROOT"
_MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES = 100 * 1024 * 1024
_STREAMABLE_MEDIA_EXTENSIONS = frozenset(
{
".avi",
".flac",
".m4a",
".mkv",
".mov",
".mp3",
".mp4",
".ogg",
".opus",
".wav",
".webm",
}
)
_HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT = Path("/opt/data")
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManagedFilesPolicy:
default_path: Path
locked_root: Path | None
can_change_path: bool
_FS_READDIR_HIDDEN = {
".git",
".hg",
".svn",
".cache",
".next",
".turbo",
".venv",
"__pycache__",
"build",
"dist",
"node_modules",
"target",
"venv",
}
# Filenames that must never be listed, read, or downloaded through the
# managed-files API. These typically contain credentials (API keys, tokens)
# and exposing them through the dashboard file browser is a security leak —
# see issue #57505. The set mirrors the credential-file basenames of the two
# canonical credential guards elsewhere in the codebase
# (agent.file_safety.get_read_block_error and
# gateway.platforms.base._ROOT_CREDENTIAL_FILES) so the dashboard Files tab
# doesn't lag behind them — an operator can point the managed root at
# HERMES_HOME itself, at which point every one of these basenames is a live
# secret store sitting in the browsable tree.
_SENSITIVE_MANAGED_FILE_BASENAMES = frozenset({
"auth.json",
"auth.lock",
"credentials",
"config.yaml",
".anthropic_oauth.json",
"google_token.json",
"google_oauth_pending.json",
"google_oauth.json",
"webhook_subscriptions.json",
"bws_cache.json",
"bws_cache.enc.json",
# git's credential-store helper cache (agent.file_safety blocks this too).
".git-credentials",
})
# Directory names whose entire subtree is credential material. Both canonical
# guards deny these as directory trees, not basenames:
# * gateway.platforms.base._ROOT_CREDENTIAL_DIRS = {"pairing", "mcp-tokens"}
# * agent.file_safety.get_read_block_error (mcp-tokens/ prefix match)
# The managed-files API lets the browser descend into subdirs, so a
# basename-only guard would still expose e.g. ``mcp-tokens/<server>.json``
# (live MCP OAuth tokens) and ``pairing/<x>``. We match on ANY path component
# so these trees are blocked wherever they appear under the browsable root,
# without needing to resolve them relative to HERMES_HOME.
_SENSITIVE_MANAGED_DIR_NAMES = frozenset({
"mcp-tokens",
"pairing",
})
def _is_sensitive_filename(name: str) -> bool:
"""Return True for a basename the managed-files API must never expose.
Covers ``.env`` / ``.env.<suffix>`` / ``.envrc`` variants plus the
canonical Hermes credential-store basenames (see
``_SENSITIVE_MANAGED_FILE_BASENAMES`` above).
Case-insensitive so ``.ENV`` / ``.Env.local`` / ``Auth.JSON`` on
case-insensitive filesystems (macOS/Windows mounts) can't slip past
the guard.
Basename-only: for the directory-tree credential stores
(``mcp-tokens/``, ``pairing/``) that the canonical guards also deny,
use :func:`_is_sensitive_path`, which the API call sites route through.
"""
lowered = name.lower()
if lowered == ".env" or lowered.startswith(".env.") or lowered == ".envrc":
return True
return lowered in _SENSITIVE_MANAGED_FILE_BASENAMES
def _is_sensitive_path(path: Path) -> bool:
"""Return True for any path the managed-files API must never expose.
Combines the basename denylist (:func:`_is_sensitive_filename`) with a
credential-directory-tree check: a path is sensitive if its own basename
is sensitive OR any of its path components is a credential directory
(``mcp-tokens`` / ``pairing``). The component match is case-insensitive
and needs no HERMES_HOME resolution, so it blocks these trees wherever
they sit under the operator-configured managed root — closing the gap
the canonical guards cover as directory trees but a basename-only check
would miss.
Read-side only: this guards list/read/download (the #57505 exfil surface).
The write endpoints (upload/mkdir/delete) are a separate threat class
handled by the write-path checks; extending this guard to them is out of
scope for this fix.
"""
if _is_sensitive_filename(path.name):
return True
return any(part.lower() in _SENSITIVE_MANAGED_DIR_NAMES for part in path.parts)
_FS_DATA_URL_MAX_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024
_FS_TEXT_SOURCE_MAX_BYTES = 64 * 1024 * 1024
_FS_TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES = 512 * 1024
# Upper bound for the in-app spot editor's save. The editor only opens
# non-truncated text (<= the preview cap), so this is a safety ceiling against
# a pasted-in megablob, not the expected payload size.
_FS_TEXT_WRITE_MAX_BYTES = 8 * 1024 * 1024
_FS_PREVIEW_LANGUAGE_BY_EXT = {
".c": "c",
".conf": "ini",
".cpp": "cpp",
".css": "css",
".csv": "csv",
".go": "go",
".graphql": "graphql",
".h": "c",
".hpp": "cpp",
".html": "html",
".java": "java",
".js": "javascript",
".json": "json",
".jsx": "jsx",
".kt": "kotlin",
".lua": "lua",
".md": "markdown",
".mjs": "javascript",
".py": "python",
".rb": "ruby",
".rs": "rust",
".sh": "shell",
".sql": "sql",
".svg": "xml",
".toml": "toml",
".ts": "typescript",
".tsx": "tsx",
".txt": "text",
".xml": "xml",
".yaml": "yaml",
".yml": "yaml",
".zsh": "shell",
}
_FS_MIME_TYPES = {
".avi": "video/x-msvideo",
".bmp": "image/bmp",
".flac": "audio/flac",
".gif": "image/gif",
".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
".jpg": "image/jpeg",
".m4a": "audio/mp4",
".mkv": "video/x-matroska",
".mov": "video/quicktime",
".mp3": "audio/mpeg",
".mp4": "video/mp4",
".ogg": "audio/ogg",
".opus": "audio/ogg; codecs=opus",
".png": "image/png",
".svg": "image/svg+xml",
".wav": "audio/wav",
".webm": "video/webm",
".webp": "image/webp",
}
def _fs_path(raw_path: str) -> Path:
raw = str(raw_path or "").strip()
if not raw:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is required")
if "\0" in raw:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
try:
if raw.lower().startswith("file:"):
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(raw)
if parsed.netloc and parsed.netloc not in {"", "localhost"}:
raise ValueError
raw = urllib.request.url2pathname(parsed.path)
candidate = Path(raw).expanduser()
if not candidate.is_absolute():
candidate = Path.cwd() / candidate
return candidate.resolve(strict=False)
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
def _fs_mime_type(path: Path) -> str:
suffix = path.suffix.lower()
if suffix in _FS_MIME_TYPES:
return _FS_MIME_TYPES[suffix]
guessed, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(str(path))
return guessed or "application/octet-stream"
def _fs_looks_binary(data: bytes) -> bool:
if not data:
return False
if b"\0" in data:
return True
suspicious = sum(1 for byte in data if byte < 32 and byte not in {9, 10, 13})
return suspicious / len(data) > 0.12
def _fs_regular_file(path: Path) -> tuple[Path, os.stat_result]:
target = _fs_path(str(path))
try:
st = target.stat()
except FileNotFoundError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
except NotADirectoryError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "Invalid path")
if stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path points to a directory")
if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Only regular files can be read")
return target, st
def _fs_find_git_root(start: Path) -> str | None:
directory = start
for _ in range(50):
try:
if (directory / ".git").exists():
return str(directory)
except OSError:
return None
parent = directory.parent
if parent == directory:
return None
directory = parent
return None
def _fs_default_cwd() -> str:
cfg_terminal = load_config().get("terminal") or {}
raw = str(cfg_terminal.get("cwd") or os.environ.get("TERMINAL_CWD") or "").strip()
if raw and raw not in {".", "auto", "cwd"}:
try:
candidate = Path(raw).expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
if candidate.is_dir():
return str(candidate)
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
pass
return str(Path.cwd())
def _fs_git_branch(cwd: str) -> str:
try:
run_kwargs: Dict[str, Any] = {
"capture_output": True,
"text": True,
"timeout": 2,
"check": False,
}
if sys.platform == "win32":
run_kwargs["creationflags"] = windows_hide_flags()
result = subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", cwd, "branch", "--show-current"],
**run_kwargs,
)
return result.stdout.strip() if result.returncode == 0 else ""
except Exception:
return ""
def _media_serve_roots() -> list[Path]:
"""Directories ``GET /api/media`` is allowed to read from.
Confined to where the agent and attach pipeline actually write media on the
gateway host — its images dir and cache subtree. This stops an authenticated
client from reading image-extension files anywhere on disk (e.g. a renamed
key or a screenshot outside the cache) merely because the suffix passes the
allowlist.
"""
home = get_hermes_home()
roots = [home / "images", home / "screenshots", home / "cache"]
out: list[Path] = []
for root in roots:
try:
out.append(root.resolve())
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
continue
return out
@app.get("/api/media")
async def get_media(path: str):
"""Return a gateway-local image file as a base64 data URL.
Lets remote clients (the desktop app over the network, or the web dashboard
in a browser) display images the agent wrote to *this* machine's filesystem
— they can't read the gateway's local disk directly.
Auth-gated by the session token like every other /api route. Restricted to
an image-extension allowlist, a size cap, AND the gateway's own media roots
(resolved, symlink-safe) so it can't be used to read arbitrary files.
"""
try:
target = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
if target.suffix.lower() not in _MEDIA_CONTENT_TYPES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=415, detail="Unsupported media type")
roots = _media_serve_roots()
if not any(target == root or root in target.parents for root in roots):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path outside media roots")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
if target.stat().st_size > _MEDIA_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File too large")
encoded = base64.b64encode(target.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
return {"data_url": f"data:{_MEDIA_CONTENT_TYPES[target.suffix.lower()]};base64,{encoded}"}
def _canonical_path(path: Path, *, require_exists: bool = False) -> Path:
try:
return path.expanduser().resolve(strict=require_exists)
except FileNotFoundError:
if require_exists:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Path not found")
raise
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
def _ensure_managed_root(raw_path: str | Path) -> Path:
root = Path(raw_path).expanduser()
try:
root.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
resolved = root.resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError) as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Managed files root is unavailable: {exc}")
if not resolved.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Managed files root is not a directory")
return resolved
def _path_is_under(root: Path, target: Path) -> bool:
return target == root or root in target.parents
def _path_text(raw_path: str | None) -> str:
text = str(raw_path or "").strip()
if "\x00" in text:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
return text
def _local_dashboard_request(request: Request) -> bool:
if getattr(request.app.state, "auth_required", False):
return False
host = (request.url.hostname or "").lower()
client_host = (request.client.host if request.client else "").lower()
local_hosts = {"", "localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "testserver", "testclient"}
return host in local_hosts or client_host in local_hosts
def _default_hermes_root_is_opt_data() -> bool:
raw = os.environ.get("HERMES_HOME", "").strip()
if not raw:
return False
try:
from hermes_constants import get_default_hermes_root
root = get_default_hermes_root().expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
root = Path(raw).expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
return root == _HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT
def _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally() -> bool:
"""Return true when the dashboard should not offer ``hermes update``.
Containerized dashboards are updated by the outer launcher/image, not by an
in-browser local update action. Keep this dashboard capability separate
from install-method detection: manual git/pip installs inside containers can
still behave like their actual install method in the CLI.
However, when the install method is ``git`` (a bind-mounted checkout inside
a container — e.g. the hermes-webui image sharing the Hermes source tree),
the dashboard's ``hermes update`` button is the correct update path and
should not be suppressed. Other containerized install methods remain
externally managed unless their apply path is proven safe inside the
running container filesystem.
"""
if _default_hermes_root_is_opt_data():
return True
try:
from hermes_constants import is_container
if not is_container():
return False
except Exception:
return False
# We are inside a container, but the install may still be self-managed.
# If the install method is git, the dashboard update button works against
# the mounted checkout and should be offered. Keep pip blocked inside
# containers: its apply path mutates the running container filesystem and
# is not the bind-mounted checkout case this gate is meant to recover.
try:
method = detect_install_method(PROJECT_ROOT)
if method == "git":
return False
except Exception:
pass
return True
def _managed_files_policy(request: Request, *, create_root: bool = True) -> ManagedFilesPolicy:
raw_forced_root = os.environ.get(_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT_ENV, "").strip()
if raw_forced_root:
root = _ensure_managed_root(raw_forced_root) if create_root else _canonical_path(Path(raw_forced_root))
return ManagedFilesPolicy(default_path=root, locked_root=root, can_change_path=False)
# Remote/OAuth access does not imply a hosted container. Users can expose a
# local dashboard through the auth gate (for example a macOS launchd install)
# and still expect the Files page to browse their local home directory. Lock
# to /opt/data only when the installation's Hermes root is actually /opt/data
# (the container/hosted layout) or when HERMES_DASHBOARD_FILES_ROOT is set.
if _default_hermes_root_is_opt_data():
root = _ensure_managed_root(_HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT) if create_root else _HOSTED_MANAGED_FILES_ROOT
return ManagedFilesPolicy(default_path=root, locked_root=root, can_change_path=False)
home = _canonical_path(Path.home())
return ManagedFilesPolicy(default_path=home, locked_root=None, can_change_path=True)
def _resolve_managed_path(
raw_path: str | None,
request: Request,
*,
for_write: bool = False,
) -> tuple[ManagedFilesPolicy, Path, str]:
policy = _managed_files_policy(request)
text = _path_text(raw_path)
root = policy.locked_root
if root is not None and (not text or text in {".", "/"}):
candidate = root
elif not text:
candidate = policy.default_path
else:
candidate = Path(text).expanduser()
if root is not None and not candidate.is_absolute():
if any(part == ".." for part in candidate.parts):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path cannot contain '..'")
candidate = root / candidate
elif not candidate.is_absolute():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path must be absolute")
if ".." in candidate.parts:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path cannot contain '..'")
if for_write and not candidate.exists():
parent = _canonical_path(candidate.parent)
resolved = parent / candidate.name
else:
resolved = _canonical_path(candidate, require_exists=not for_write)
if root is not None and not _path_is_under(root, resolved):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path outside managed files root")
return policy, resolved, str(resolved)
def _managed_response_meta(policy: ManagedFilesPolicy) -> Dict[str, Any]:
locked_root = str(policy.locked_root) if policy.locked_root is not None else None
return {
"root": locked_root,
"locked_root": locked_root,
"can_change_path": policy.can_change_path,
}
def _managed_file_entry(policy: ManagedFilesPolicy, target: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
try:
resolved = target.resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid path")
if policy.locked_root is not None and not _path_is_under(policy.locked_root, resolved):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path outside managed files root")
try:
st = resolved.stat()
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not stat path: {exc}")
is_dir = resolved.is_dir()
mime_type = None if is_dir else (mimetypes.guess_type(resolved.name)[0] or "application/octet-stream")
return {
"name": target.name or resolved.name or str(resolved),
"path": str(resolved),
"is_directory": is_dir,
"size": None if is_dir else st.st_size,
"mtime": st.st_mtime,
"mime_type": mime_type,
}
def _decode_data_url(data_url: str) -> tuple[bytes, str]:
text = (data_url or "").strip()
if not text.startswith("data:") or "," not in text:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload must be a data URL")
header, encoded = text.split(",", 1)
mime_type = header[5:].split(";", 1)[0] or "application/octet-stream"
if ";base64" not in header:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload must be base64 encoded")
try:
data = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload is not valid base64")
if len(data) > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
return data, mime_type
_CHAT_IMAGE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
_CHAT_IMAGE_ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS = frozenset({".png", ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".gif", ".webp", ".bmp"})
_CHAT_IMAGE_MAGIC: tuple[tuple[bytes, str], ...] = (
(b"\x89PNG\r\n\x1a\n", ".png"),
(b"\xff\xd8\xff", ".jpg"),
(b"GIF87a", ".gif"),
(b"GIF89a", ".gif"),
(b"BM", ".bmp"),
)
def _sanitize_chat_image_filename(filename: str | None) -> str:
candidate = Path(str(filename or "").strip()).name
candidate = re.sub(r"[\x00-\x1f]+", "_", candidate)
candidate = candidate.strip().strip(".")
return candidate or "pasted-image"
def _chat_image_extension(data: bytes) -> str | None:
head = data[:16]
if head.startswith(b"RIFF") and head[8:12] == b"WEBP":
return ".webp"
for sig, ext in _CHAT_IMAGE_MAGIC:
if head.startswith(sig):
return ext
return None
def _decode_chat_image_upload(payload: ChatImageUpload) -> tuple[bytes, str, str]:
data, mime_type = _decode_data_url(payload.data_url)
if not mime_type.lower().startswith("image/"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Upload payload must be an image")
if len(data) > _CHAT_IMAGE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES:
mb = _CHAT_IMAGE_UPLOAD_MAX_BYTES // (1024 * 1024)
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail=f"Image is too large; cap is {mb} MB")
ext = _chat_image_extension(data)
if ext not in _CHAT_IMAGE_ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Unsupported image type")
return data, mime_type, ext
@app.post("/api/chat/image-upload")
async def upload_chat_image(payload: ChatImageUpload, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Persist a browser-provided chat image where the embedded TUI can read it.
The dashboard /chat page runs Hermes inside an xterm.js PTY. Browser
clipboard image bytes are not visible to the server-side clipboard, so the
page uploads them here, then drives the TUI's ``/image <path>`` command
with the returned gateway-visible path. Files land under
``HERMES_HOME/images/`` — the same directory ``clipboard.paste`` /
``image.attach`` already use.
"""
def _run():
data, mime_type, ext = _decode_chat_image_upload(payload)
with _profile_scope(profile) as scoped_home:
home = scoped_home or get_hermes_home()
img_dir = Path(home) / "images"
try:
img_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Image directory is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not create image directory: {exc}")
stem = Path(_sanitize_chat_image_filename(payload.filename)).stem or "pasted-image"
stem = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]+", "_", stem).strip("._-") or "pasted-image"
ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d_%H%M%S")
target = img_dir / f"dashboard_{ts}_{secrets.token_hex(4)}_{stem}{ext}"
try:
target.write_bytes(data)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Image directory is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write image: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"path": str(target),
"name": target.name,
"bytes": len(data),
"mime_type": mime_type,
}
# _profile_scope acquires _SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK and the body does file I/O —
# keep both off the event loop (asyncio.to_thread copies the contextvar
# context, so the profile override stays scoped to the worker thread).
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.get("/api/files")
async def list_managed_files(request: Request, path: Optional[str] = None):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request)
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Path not found")
if not target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is not a directory")
try:
with os.scandir(target) as scan:
entries = [
_managed_file_entry(policy, Path(entry.path))
for entry in scan
if not _is_sensitive_path(Path(entry.path))
]
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Directory is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read directory: {exc}")
entries.sort(key=lambda item: (not item["is_directory"], str(item["name"]).lower()))
locked_root = policy.locked_root
parent = None
if target.parent != target and (locked_root is None or target != locked_root):
parent = str(target.parent)
return {
"path": display_path,
"parent": parent,
"entries": entries,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
@app.get("/api/files/read")
async def read_managed_file(request: Request, path: str):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request)
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is not a file")
if _is_sensitive_path(target):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access to sensitive files is not allowed")
try:
size = target.stat().st_size
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not stat file: {exc}")
if size > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
mime_type = mimetypes.guess_type(target.name)[0] or "application/octet-stream"
try:
encoded = base64.b64encode(target.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read file: {exc}")
return {
"name": target.name,
"path": display_path,
"size": size,
"mime_type": mime_type,
"data_url": f"data:{mime_type};base64,{encoded}",
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
def _managed_file_response(
request: Request,
path: str,
*,
content_disposition_type: str,
media_only: bool = False,
) -> FileResponse:
"""Build a range-aware response after applying managed-file policy."""
policy, target, _display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request)
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path is not a file")
if _is_sensitive_path(target):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access to sensitive files is not allowed")
if media_only and target.suffix.lower() not in _STREAMABLE_MEDIA_EXTENSIONS:
raise HTTPException(status_code=415, detail="Unsupported media type")
try:
size = target.stat().st_size
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not stat file: {exc}")
if size > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
mime_type = mimetypes.guess_type(target.name)[0] or "application/octet-stream"
return FileResponse(
path=str(target),
media_type=mime_type,
filename=target.name,
content_disposition_type=content_disposition_type,
headers={"X-Content-Type-Options": "nosniff"} if media_only else None,
)
@app.get("/api/files/download")
async def download_managed_file(request: Request, path: str):
"""Stream a managed file as an attachment download.
Remote clients (desktop app, browser dashboard) open agent-written files
that live on *this* gateway's disk, not theirs. Auth-gated like every other
managed-files route — ``auth_middleware`` additionally accepts the session
token as a ``?token=`` query param here so a shell/browser-opened download
(which can't set the session header) still authenticates. See ``/api/pty``
for the same query-token precedent. Chromium identifies ``<audio>`` and
``<video>`` subresource requests through ``Sec-Fetch-Dest``; serve those
inline for compatibility with Desktop builds that still use this route as
their player source, while preserving attachment semantics for ordinary
link/document requests.
"""
fetch_destination = request.headers.get("sec-fetch-dest", "").lower()
is_media_subresource = fetch_destination in {"audio", "video"}
return _managed_file_response(
request,
path,
content_disposition_type="inline" if is_media_subresource else "attachment",
media_only=is_media_subresource,
)
@app.get("/api/files/stream")
@app.head("/api/files/stream")
async def stream_managed_file(request: Request, path: str):
"""Stream managed audio/video inline with HTTP Range support.
Electron's Chromium media pipeline may reject an attachment response used
as an ``<audio>`` or ``<video>`` source. This route shares the download
endpoint's authentication, size cap, sensitive-file guard, MIME detection,
and Starlette ``FileResponse`` range handling, but explicitly marks the
response inline so metadata loading, playback, and seeking work remotely.
"""
return _managed_file_response(
request,
path,
content_disposition_type="inline",
media_only=True,
)
@app.post("/api/files/upload")
async def upload_managed_file(payload: ManagedFileUpload, request: Request):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request, for_write=True)
if target.exists() and target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="A directory already exists at that path")
if target.exists() and not payload.overwrite:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="File already exists")
data, _mime_type = _decode_data_url(payload.data_url)
try:
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
target.write_bytes(data)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write file: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"entry": _managed_file_entry(policy, target),
"path": display_path,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
# Stream uploads to disk in fixed-size chunks. The legacy JSON endpoint above
# buffers the whole file as a base64 data URL in a JSON body, which (a) inflates
# the payload ~33%, (b) holds the entire file (plus its decoded copy) in memory,
# and (c) reliably trips upstream proxy body-size/timeout limits with a 502 on
# large backup archives (NS-501). This multipart endpoint reads the request body
# in 1 MiB chunks straight to a temp file, enforces the size cap as it goes, and
# atomically renames into place — constant memory, no base64 inflation.
_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES = 1024 * 1024
@app.post("/api/files/upload-stream")
async def upload_managed_file_stream(
request: Request,
file: UploadFile = File(...),
path: str = Form(...),
overwrite: bool = Form(True),
):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(path, request, for_write=True)
if target.exists() and target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="A directory already exists at that path")
if target.exists() and not overwrite:
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="File already exists")
try:
target.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not create parent directory: {exc}")
# Write to a sibling temp file first so a partial/aborted upload never
# clobbers an existing file, then atomically rename into place.
tmp_fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=f".{target.name}.", suffix=".upload", dir=str(target.parent)
)
tmp_path = Path(tmp_name)
total = 0
renamed = False
try:
with os.fdopen(tmp_fd, "wb") as out:
while True:
chunk = await file.read(_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES)
if not chunk:
break
total += len(chunk)
if total > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File is too large")
out.write(chunk)
os.replace(tmp_path, target)
renamed = True
except HTTPException:
raise
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write file: {exc}")
finally:
# Clean up the temp file on every non-success exit, including
# BaseException paths the `except` clauses above don't catch — most
# importantly asyncio.CancelledError when a browser aborts a large
# upload mid-stream (the exact NS-501 scenario). os.replace clears
# tmp_path on success, so only unlink when the rename didn't happen.
if not renamed:
tmp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
await file.close()
return {
"ok": True,
"entry": _managed_file_entry(policy, target),
"path": display_path,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
@app.post("/api/files/mkdir")
async def create_managed_directory(payload: ManagedDirectoryCreate, request: Request):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request, for_write=True)
if target.exists() and not target.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="A file already exists at that path")
try:
target.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Directory is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not create directory: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"entry": _managed_file_entry(policy, target),
"path": display_path,
**_managed_response_meta(policy),
}
@app.delete("/api/files")
async def delete_managed_file(payload: ManagedFileDelete, request: Request):
policy, target, display_path = _resolve_managed_path(payload.path, request)
if policy.locked_root is not None and target == policy.locked_root:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete the managed files root")
if target.parent == target:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Cannot delete the filesystem root")
if not target.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Path not found")
try:
if target.is_dir():
if payload.recursive:
shutil.rmtree(target)
else:
target.rmdir()
else:
target.unlink()
except OSError as exc:
status_code = 409 if target.is_dir() and not payload.recursive else 500
raise HTTPException(status_code=status_code, detail=f"Could not delete path: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "path": display_path, **_managed_response_meta(policy)}
@app.get("/api/fs/list")
async def fs_list(path: str):
target = _fs_path(path)
try:
entries = []
with os.scandir(target) as scan:
for entry in scan:
if entry.name in _FS_READDIR_HIDDEN:
continue
entries.append({
"name": entry.name,
"path": str(target / entry.name),
"isDirectory": entry.is_dir(follow_symlinks=False),
})
entries.sort(key=lambda item: (not item["isDirectory"], item["name"].lower(), item["name"]))
return {"entries": entries}
except FileNotFoundError:
return {"entries": [], "error": "ENOENT"}
except NotADirectoryError:
return {"entries": [], "error": "ENOTDIR"}
except PermissionError:
return {"entries": [], "error": "EACCES"}
except OSError as exc:
return {"entries": [], "error": getattr(exc, "strerror", None) or "read-error"}
@app.get("/api/fs/read-text")
async def fs_read_text(path: str):
target, st = _fs_regular_file(_fs_path(path))
if st.st_size > _FS_TEXT_SOURCE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File too large")
bytes_to_read = min(st.st_size, _FS_TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES)
try:
with target.open("rb") as handle:
data = handle.read(bytes_to_read)
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "File read failed")
return {
"binary": _fs_looks_binary(data[:4096]),
"byteSize": st.st_size,
"language": _FS_PREVIEW_LANGUAGE_BY_EXT.get(target.suffix.lower(), "text"),
"mimeType": _fs_mime_type(target),
"path": str(target),
"text": data.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"),
"truncated": st.st_size > _FS_TEXT_PREVIEW_MAX_BYTES,
}
@app.post("/api/fs/write-text")
async def fs_write_text(payload: FsWriteText):
"""Overwrite (or create) a UTF-8 text file for the in-app spot editor.
Mirrors the local Electron ``hermes:fs:writeText`` hardening: the path is
resolved + validated by ``_fs_path``, the parent directory must already
exist (we never build directory trees), only regular files may be replaced,
and the payload is size-capped. The write is staged to a sibling temp file
and ``os.replace``-d into place so a crash mid-write can't truncate the
original. Stale-on-disk detection is the client's job (re-read before save),
so both transports behave identically.
"""
target = _fs_path(payload.path)
text = payload.content or ""
if len(text.encode("utf-8")) > _FS_TEXT_WRITE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Content too large")
try:
st: Optional[os.stat_result] = target.stat()
except FileNotFoundError:
st = None
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "Invalid path")
if st is not None and stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Path points to a directory")
if st is not None and not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Only regular files can be written")
if not target.parent.is_dir():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Parent directory does not exist")
tmp = target.with_name(f".{target.name}.hermes-tmp-{os.getpid()}")
try:
tmp.write_text(text, encoding="utf-8")
os.replace(tmp, target)
except PermissionError:
tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not writable")
except OSError as exc:
tmp.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not write file: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "path": str(target), "byteSize": len(text.encode("utf-8"))}
@app.get("/api/fs/read-data-url")
async def fs_read_data_url(path: str):
target, st = _fs_regular_file(_fs_path(path))
if st.st_size > _FS_DATA_URL_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="File too large")
try:
encoded = base64.b64encode(target.read_bytes()).decode("ascii")
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="File is not readable")
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "File read failed")
return {"dataUrl": f"data:{_fs_mime_type(target)};base64,{encoded}"}
@app.get("/api/fs/download")
async def fs_download(path: str):
target, _st = _fs_regular_file(_fs_path(path))
if _is_sensitive_path(target):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access to sensitive files is not allowed")
return FileResponse(
path=str(target),
media_type=_fs_mime_type(target),
filename=target.name,
content_disposition_type="attachment",
)
@app.get("/api/fs/git-root")
async def fs_git_root(path: str):
target = _fs_path(path)
try:
st = target.stat()
start = target if stat.S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) else target.parent
except OSError:
start = target
return {"root": _fs_find_git_root(start)}
@app.get("/api/fs/default-cwd")
async def fs_default_cwd():
cwd = _fs_default_cwd()
return {"cwd": cwd, "branch": _fs_git_branch(cwd)}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Git ops — the remote half of the desktop coding rail + review pane.
#
# The desktop runs these as Electron-local git on the user's machine; over a
# remote gateway that's the wrong filesystem, so we mirror them here (same auth
# gate + path hardening as /api/fs). Logic lives in ``hermes_cli.web_git``;
# these are thin, executor-offloaded wrappers (git/gh can block).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
from hermes_cli import web_git as _web_git # noqa: E402
async def _git_op(fn, *args):
"""Run a (blocking) git op off the event loop; map a failed mutation to 400."""
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
return await loop.run_in_executor(None, fn, *args)
except RuntimeError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc) or "git operation failed")
def _git_path(path: str) -> str:
return str(_fs_path(path))
from hermes_cli.web_routers import git as _git_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_git_routes.router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers import local_models as _local_models_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_local_models_routes.router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.git import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
git_status_route,
git_worktrees_route,
git_branches_route,
git_base_branches_route,
git_review_list_route,
git_review_diff_route,
git_file_diff_route,
git_commit_context_route,
git_rev_parse_route,
git_ship_info_route,
git_stage_route,
git_unstage_route,
git_revert_route,
git_commit_route,
git_push_route,
git_create_pr_route,
git_worktree_add_route,
git_worktree_remove_route,
git_branch_switch_route,
)
# Host TCP ports each port-binding gateway platform listens on, as
# ``platform-name -> (config port key, adapter default)``. Mirrors
# ``PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES`` in gateway/config.py and each adapter's
# DEFAULT_PORT / DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_PORT constant. Used only for the dashboard's
# gateway-topology readout — best-effort display data, not a bind source.
_PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_PORTS: Dict[str, Tuple[str, int]] = {
"webhook": ("port", 8644),
"api_server": ("port", 8642),
"msgraph_webhook": ("port", 8646),
"feishu": ("webhook_port", 8765),
"wecom_callback": ("port", 8645),
"bluebubbles": ("webhook_port", 8645),
"sms": ("webhook_port", 8080),
"whatsapp_cloud": ("webhook_port", 8090),
"line": ("port", 8646),
"teams": ("port", 3978),
}
# Platform states that mean the adapter is NOT serving its port right now.
_PLATFORM_DEAD_STATES = frozenset({"fatal", "disconnected", "stopped"})
def _profile_platform_ports(profile_home: Path, runtime: Optional[dict]) -> Dict[str, int]:
"""Best-effort map of ``platform -> host TCP port`` for one profile's gateway.
Reads the platforms the running gateway reported in its
``gateway_state.json`` and resolves each port-binding platform's port from
the profile's ``config.yaml`` (top-level ``platforms:`` wins over
``gateway.platforms:``, matching ``load_gateway_config`` precedence),
falling back to the adapter default. Display-only: env-var port overrides
(e.g. ``WEBHOOK_PORT`` in that profile's .env) are not resolved here.
"""
platforms = (runtime or {}).get("platforms") or {}
active = [
name for name, state in platforms.items()
if name in _PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_PORTS
and isinstance(state, dict)
and state.get("state") not in _PLATFORM_DEAD_STATES
]
if not active:
return {}
blocks: Dict[str, dict] = {}
try:
# Multi-profile probe: load_config() targets the ACTIVE profile's
# home, so read the probed profile's file via the raw primitive.
from hermes_cli.config import read_user_config_raw
cfg = read_user_config_raw(profile_home / "config.yaml")
gateway_cfg = cfg.get("gateway") if isinstance(cfg.get("gateway"), dict) else {}
# gateway.platforms first, top-level platforms second — later wins,
# matching the precedence in gateway.config.load_gateway_config().
for src in ((gateway_cfg or {}).get("platforms"), cfg.get("platforms")):
if not isinstance(src, dict):
continue
for plat_name, plat_block in src.items():
if isinstance(plat_block, dict):
blocks.setdefault(plat_name, {}).update(plat_block)
except Exception:
blocks = {}
ports: Dict[str, int] = {}
for name in active:
port_key, default_port = _PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_PORTS[name]
block = blocks.get(name) or {}
extra = block.get("extra") if isinstance(block.get("extra"), dict) else {}
raw = block.get(port_key, (extra or {}).get(port_key, default_port))
try:
ports[name] = int(raw)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
ports[name] = default_port
return ports
def _profile_gateway_writer_identity(
profile_home: Path, runtime: Optional[dict]
) -> Optional[tuple]:
"""``(pid, start_time)`` identity of the profile's LIVE gateway, or None.
Reuses the validated-liveness helper — recorded PID checked against the
live process table, the start-time PID-reuse fingerprint, and the
profile's home — then reads the live process's fingerprint via the same
``_get_process_start_time`` that stamped it, so equality is exact (no
unit or clock-source mismatch). None when the record doesn't belong to
a live gateway; nothing in it is current by definition then.
"""
try:
from gateway.status import (
_get_process_start_time,
get_runtime_status_running_pid,
)
pid = get_runtime_status_running_pid(runtime, expected_home=profile_home)
if pid is None:
return None
start_time = _get_process_start_time(pid)
if start_time is None:
return None
return (pid, start_time)
except Exception:
return None
def _owned_profile_platforms(
writer_identity: Optional[tuple], platforms: dict
) -> dict:
"""Keep only platform entries the profile's CURRENT process wrote.
Gateway startup deliberately preserves plain platform entries in
``gateway_state.json`` across restarts (the dashboard keeps showing
last-known state while adapters reconnect), and the active-profile
endpoint compensates by filtering them against the current
configuration. The cross-profile aggregation has no equivalent config
context (a profile's platform set depends on tokens in that profile's
``.env`` behind its secret scope), so it demands strict process
ownership instead: ``write_runtime_status`` stamps every platform write
with the writer's ``(pid, start_time)`` identity, and an entry is
aggregatable only when that identity equals the profile's live gateway
process — exact match, no clock heuristics, so an entry written moments
before a fast restart can never masquerade as current. A fatal entry
left behind by a platform the operator has since disabled/removed thus
stops degrading fleet health as soon as that profile's gateway restarts
(a config change requires that restart to take effect anyway). Fail
closed: entries without a writer identity (legacy records) or records
with no live process are excluded — aggregation is a supplement, and a
false "degraded forever" is the worse failure mode.
"""
if writer_identity is None:
return {}
live_pid, live_start = writer_identity
owned: Dict[str, dict] = {}
for key, value in platforms.items():
if not isinstance(value, dict):
continue
if (
value.get("writer_pid") == live_pid
and value.get("writer_start_time") == live_start
):
owned[key] = value
return owned
def _collect_profile_gateway_topology() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Enumerate profiles and the gateways serving them for ``/api/status``.
Returns ``{"profiles": [...], "gateway_mode": ..., "gateways": [...]}``:
* ``profiles`` — every profile on the host (default + named), from
``profiles_to_serve(True)`` (the cheap enumeration chokepoint — no
per-profile config reads or skill counts).
* ``gateways`` — one entry per profile with a LIVE gateway process:
``{"profile", "ports", "served_profiles"?}``. Liveness reuses
``_check_gateway_running`` so this agrees with the profiles sidebar.
* ``gateway_mode`` — ``"multiplex"`` when the default gateway serves
multiple profiles (gateway.multiplex_profiles), ``"single"`` for one
live gateway, ``"multiple"`` for independent per-profile gateways,
``"none"`` when nothing is running.
* ``profile_platforms`` — ``{profile: platforms}`` runtime platform maps
for each LIVE gateway, ownership-filtered to entries stamped by that
profile's current process (stale preserved entries for since-removed
platforms are excluded — see ``_owned_profile_platforms``). Internal
aggregation input for ``/api/status`` (independent per-profile gateways
write failures to their own ``gateway_state.json``, which the
unparameterized endpoint would otherwise never see). Never exposed
directly.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import _check_gateway_running, profiles_to_serve
from gateway.status import read_runtime_status
homes = profiles_to_serve(True)
except Exception:
_log.debug("profile/gateway topology enumeration failed", exc_info=True)
return {
"profiles": [],
"gateway_mode": "unknown",
"gateways": [],
"profile_platforms": {},
}
profile_names = [name for name, _home in homes]
gateways: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
profile_platforms: Dict[str, dict] = {}
multiplex = False
for name, home in homes:
try:
if not _check_gateway_running(home):
continue
except Exception:
continue
try:
runtime = read_runtime_status(home / "gateway_state.json")
except Exception:
runtime = None
served = [str(p) for p in ((runtime or {}).get("served_profiles") or [])]
if name == "default" and len(served) > 1:
multiplex = True
plats = (runtime or {}).get("platforms")
if isinstance(plats, dict) and plats:
# Ownership filter: gateway startup preserves plain platform
# entries across restarts, so the raw map can carry fatal state
# for platforms the operator has since disabled/removed. Only
# entries stamped with the profile's current live process's
# writer identity are aggregation candidates (see
# _owned_profile_platforms).
owned = _owned_profile_platforms(
_profile_gateway_writer_identity(home, runtime), plats
)
if owned:
profile_platforms[name] = owned
entry: Dict[str, Any] = {
"profile": name,
"ports": _profile_platform_ports(home, runtime),
}
if served:
entry["served_profiles"] = served
gateways.append(entry)
if multiplex:
mode = "multiplex"
elif len(gateways) > 1:
mode = "multiple"
elif len(gateways) == 1:
mode = "single"
else:
mode = "none"
return {
"profiles": profile_names,
"gateway_mode": mode,
"gateways": gateways,
"profile_platforms": profile_platforms,
}
# /api/status is polled ~1/s by the desktop app while it waits for the backend
# (and again by the dashboard badge). Each uncached call above walks 7+ profile
# homes (yaml.safe_load with the pure-Python loader + psutil process-table
# probes + realpath walks) inside the default executor; concurrent polls pile
# up and hold the GIL for 14-16s, starving the event loop — the desktop WS
# never receives gateway.ready and boot fails ("event loop stalled ... GIL
# pressure suspected"). Topology changes on gateway start/stop, so a short TTL
# cache with a collapse lock keeps the scan to one per window. The cache also
# remembers which collector produced the entry: tests monkeypatch
# _collect_profile_gateway_topology per case, and the identity check keeps
# them hermetic without needing a reset hook (a swapped collector is a miss).
_TOPOLOGY_CACHE: Dict[str, Any] = {"ts": 0.0, "data": None, "fn": None}
_TOPOLOGY_CACHE_LOCK = threading.Lock()
_TOPOLOGY_CACHE_TTL = 10.0
# Stable install identity for /api/status. One random opaque id per physical
# install, minted on first read and persisted under the ROOT Hermes home
# (get_default_hermes_root()) — NOT the profile-scoped HERMES_HOME — so every
# profile served by the same install reports the same id. Clients (the desktop
# connection registry) use it to recognize that two registered addresses
# (hostname + Tailscale IP, LAN + WAN) are one backend and collapse duplicate
# roster rows. Privacy: uuid4 hex, no hardware/user-derived material; the only
# fact it reveals is "these addresses are the same box", which is the feature.
# It must never change across restarts/updates, so reads are cached for the
# process lifetime and the file is written once, atomically.
_INSTALL_ID_CACHE: Dict[str, Optional[str]] = {"root": None, "value": None}
def get_install_id() -> Optional[str]:
"""Process-lifetime-cached stable install id."""
return _shared_get_install_id(cache=_INSTALL_ID_CACHE)
# Serializes read-modify-write cycles over config.yaml for handlers that run
# in worker threads (asyncio.to_thread). config.py's _CONFIG_LOCK covers each
# load_config()/save_config() call individually, not the span between them —
# when these handlers ran on the event loop the loop itself serialized the
# whole cycle, but off-loop two concurrent updates could interleave
# load→mutate→save and silently drop one another's writes. Held only in
# worker threads, so it can never block the event loop. RLock so a locked
# section that calls helpers which also take it can't self-deadlock.
_CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK = threading.RLock()
def _topology_cache_get(fn: Any) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
if (
_TOPOLOGY_CACHE["data"] is not None
and _TOPOLOGY_CACHE["fn"] is fn
and time.monotonic() - _TOPOLOGY_CACHE["ts"] < _TOPOLOGY_CACHE_TTL
):
return _TOPOLOGY_CACHE["data"]
return None
def _collect_profile_gateway_topology_cached() -> Dict[str, Any]:
fn = _collect_profile_gateway_topology
cached = _topology_cache_get(fn)
if cached is not None:
return cached
with _TOPOLOGY_CACHE_LOCK:
cached = _topology_cache_get(fn)
if cached is not None:
return cached
data = fn()
_TOPOLOGY_CACHE["data"] = data
_TOPOLOGY_CACHE["fn"] = fn
_TOPOLOGY_CACHE["ts"] = time.monotonic()
return data
def _load_configured_gateway_platforms() -> set[str]:
"""Load connected platform names away from the asyncio event loop.
The first ``load_gateway_config()`` call performs platform discovery and
can take longer than Desktop's WebSocket connect timeout on Windows. This
helper is synchronous by design; ``get_status`` runs it in Starlette's
worker pool so a concurrent ``/api/ws`` handshake can still complete.
"""
from gateway.config import load_gateway_config
gateway_config = load_gateway_config()
return {platform.value for platform in gateway_config.get_connected_platforms()}
@app.get("/api/ssh/ownership")
async def get_ssh_ownership(request: Request):
_require_token(request)
if not _SSH_OWNER_NONCE:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="SSH ownership is not active")
return {
"ok": True,
"sshOwnerNonce": _SSH_OWNER_NONCE,
"protocolVersion": 1,
"runtimeIntact": _ssh_runtime_intact(),
}
@app.get("/api/health")
async def get_health():
"""Lightweight process liveness for desktop/backend readiness probes."""
return {
"ok": True,
"version": __version__,
"auth_required": bool(getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False)),
}
_PROFILE_PLATFORM_STATUS_KEY_RE = re.compile(
# Profile segment mirrors hermes_cli.profiles._PROFILE_ID_RE. Platform
# segment mirrors the Platform enum's normalized values: built-in members
# plus plugin directory names (lowercased), which allow hyphens as well
# as underscores (e.g. ``reviewer:foo-bar``).
r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}:[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$"
)
def _is_profile_platform_status_key(key: object) -> bool:
"""Accept only the runner's public ``<profile>:<platform>`` key grammar."""
return isinstance(key, str) and bool(_PROFILE_PLATFORM_STATUS_KEY_RE.fullmatch(key))
def _status_platform_key_allowed(
key: object, configured: "set[str] | None"
) -> bool:
"""Decide whether a runtime-status platform key may appear publicly.
Namespaced ``<profile>:<platform>`` keys are validated against the key
grammar *unconditionally* — the config-set load failing must not fail
open into projecting arbitrary colon-containing keys from a process-local
JSON file onto the public endpoint. Plain platform keys keep the
long-standing behavior: checked against the configured set when it
loaded, passed through when it did not.
"""
if not isinstance(key, str):
return False
if ":" in key:
return _is_profile_platform_status_key(key)
return configured is None or key in configured
# Per-entry writer-identity stamps (added by gateway.status.write_runtime_status
# for the aggregation ownership check) are process recon — the same class of
# detail as the auth-gated top-level ``gateway_pid`` — and must not project
# onto the public endpoint.
_PRIVATE_PLATFORM_ENTRY_KEYS = frozenset({"writer_pid", "writer_start_time"})
def _public_platform_entry(value: Any) -> Any:
"""Strip writer-identity stamps from a platform entry before projection."""
if not isinstance(value, dict):
return value
return {k: v for k, v in value.items() if k not in _PRIVATE_PLATFORM_ENTRY_KEYS}
def _merge_profile_gateway_platforms(
gateway_platforms: dict, profile_platforms: dict
) -> dict:
"""Merge independent per-profile gateway platform states (OOF-3).
Hosts that run separate gateway services per profile (``gateway_mode ==
"multiple"``) persist each profile's platform failures in that profile's
own ``gateway_state.json``. The unparameterized ``/api/status`` — the
machine-level probe NAS health monitoring reads — only read the active
profile's file, so those failures were invisible to fleet health. Fold
them in under the same validated ``<profile>:<platform>`` grammar the
multiplex path uses. The active profile's own map is skipped (its
entries are already present, including any multiplex-namespaced ones),
and existing keys are never overwritten.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_active_profile_name
active = get_active_profile_name()
except Exception:
active = "default"
merged = dict(gateway_platforms)
for prof, plats in (profile_platforms or {}).items():
if prof == active or not isinstance(plats, dict):
continue
for key, value in plats.items():
if not isinstance(key, str) or ":" in key or not isinstance(value, dict):
continue
namespaced = f"{prof}:{key}"
if not _is_profile_platform_status_key(namespaced):
continue
merged.setdefault(namespaced, _public_platform_entry(value))
return merged
@app.get("/api/status")
async def get_status(profile: Optional[str] = None):
status_scope = None
requested_profile = (profile or "").strip()
# Plain /api/status stays the machine-level public liveness probe. The
# dashboard adds ?profile= when its management switcher targets another
# profile, so its gateway badge reflects the selected profile.
#
# Use the config-only (contextvar) scope, NOT _profile_scope: this handler
# awaits the remote-health probe, and _profile_scope swaps process-global
# skills-module attributes that a concurrent request would cross-restore
# across that await. Status only resolves get_hermes_home() at call time
# (config/env/gateway state), which the task-local contextvar covers.
profile_dir: Optional[Path] = None
if requested_profile and requested_profile.lower() != "current":
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested_profile)
status_scope = _config_profile_scope(requested_profile)
status_scope.__enter__()
try:
current_ver, latest_ver = check_config_version()
# --- Gateway liveness detection ---
# Delegated to the single shared ladder in gateway.status so this
# endpoint and /api/messaging/platforms can never disagree about
# whether the gateway is up (they used to: sidebar "running" while
# the Channels page rendered "The gateway is not running").
#
# When ?profile=<name> was given, scope PID and state reads to that
# profile's directory — gateway identity files (PID, lock, runtime
# status) are written to the per-profile home, not the process-level
# HERMES_HOME (see issue #69143). Plain /api/status keeps the exact
# zero-arg call so its behavior (and cache signature) is unchanged.
#
# The module-level probe references are handed to the resolver so the
# long-standing `monkeypatch.setattr(web_server, "get_running_pid_cached", ...)`
# seam used across the test-suite still intercepts them.
def _bounded_health_probe():
"""Health probe with the route's blocking-call budget preserved.
The resolver only reaches this rung when the local PID probe came
up empty, so the timeout is paid at most once per request and only
in the cross-container case that needs it.
"""
with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=1) as pool:
future = pool.submit(_probe_gateway_health)
try:
return future.result(timeout=_GATEWAY_HEALTH_ROUTE_TIMEOUT)
except concurrent.futures.TimeoutError:
_log.warning(
"/api/status gateway health probe exceeded %.2fs; "
"using local status",
_GATEWAY_HEALTH_ROUTE_TIMEOUT,
)
return False, None
except Exception:
return False, None
local_runtime = (
read_runtime_status(path=profile_dir / "gateway_state.json")
if profile_dir
else read_runtime_status()
)
liveness = await run_in_threadpool(
lambda: resolve_gateway_liveness(
profile_dir=profile_dir,
runtime=local_runtime,
health_probe=_bounded_health_probe if _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL else None,
pid_probe=get_running_pid_cached,
runtime_reader=read_runtime_status,
runtime_pid_probe=get_runtime_status_running_pid,
)
)
gateway_running = liveness.running
gateway_pid = liveness.pid
remote_health_body: dict | None = liveness.health_body
gateway_state = None
gateway_platforms: dict = {}
gateway_exit_reason = None
gateway_updated_at = None
configured_gateway_platforms: set[str] | None = None
try:
configured_gateway_platforms = await run_in_threadpool(
_load_configured_gateway_platforms
)
except Exception:
configured_gateway_platforms = None
# Prefer the detailed health endpoint response (has full state) when the
# local runtime status file is absent or stale (cross-container).
runtime = local_runtime
if runtime is None and remote_health_body and remote_health_body.get("gateway_state"):
runtime = remote_health_body
if runtime:
gateway_state = runtime.get("gateway_state")
gateway_platforms = runtime.get("platforms") or {}
# Namespaced entries are emitted by configured secondary-profile
# adapters. The config set here belongs to the active/default
# profile, so suffix-checking against it would incorrectly hide
# secondary-only platforms. Colon-containing keys are validated
# against the narrow key grammar UNCONDITIONALLY — a failed config
# load must not fail open into projecting arbitrary keys from a
# process-local JSON file onto this public endpoint.
gateway_platforms = {
key: _public_platform_entry(value)
for key, value in gateway_platforms.items()
if _status_platform_key_allowed(key, configured_gateway_platforms)
}
gateway_exit_reason = runtime.get("exit_reason")
# Contract: gateway_updated_at is RFC3339 string | null, never a
# number. ``runtime`` here may be the local gateway_state.json
# (legacy gateways wrote epoch floats; hand edits can inject
# anything) or a remote /health/detailed body — normalize both.
gateway_updated_at = normalize_updated_at(runtime.get("updated_at"))
if not gateway_running:
gateway_state = gateway_state if gateway_state in {"stopped", "startup_failed"} else "stopped"
# A cleanly stopped gateway's platform states are stale noise —
# clear them so a dead process can't report "connected". But a
# startup_failed gateway's FATAL entries are the diagnosis:
# they carry per-profile credential collisions and auth
# failures (multiplex entries under ``<profile>:<platform>``)
# that the single exit_reason string can't express. Writer
# -identity and freshness filtering upstream already dropped
# entries from other/older processes, so keeping fatals here
# cannot leak another gateway's live state (#80451 follow-up).
if gateway_state == "startup_failed":
gateway_platforms = {
key: value
for key, value in gateway_platforms.items()
if isinstance(value, dict) and value.get("state") == "fatal"
}
else:
gateway_platforms = {}
elif gateway_running and remote_health_body is not None:
# The health probe confirmed the gateway is alive, but the local
# runtime status file may be stale (cross-container). Override
# stopped/None state so the dashboard shows the correct badge.
if gateway_state in {None, "stopped"}:
gateway_state = "running"
# If there was no runtime info at all but the health probe confirmed alive,
# ensure we still report the gateway as running (no shared volume scenario).
if gateway_running and gateway_state is None and remote_health_body is not None:
gateway_state = "running"
# Profile + gateway topology (cached, TTL 10s): fetched here — before
# the platform rollup — because plain ``/api/status`` is the
# machine-level probe NAS reads, and hosts running independent
# per-profile gateway services (gateway_mode == "multiple") persist
# each profile's platform failures in that profile's own
# gateway_state.json. Fold those in under the validated
# ``<profile>:<platform>`` grammar so fleet health sees them (OOF-3).
# A ``?profile=`` request targets one profile's view and is left
# unmerged.
topology = await run_in_threadpool(_collect_profile_gateway_topology_cached)
if not requested_profile:
gateway_platforms = _merge_profile_gateway_platforms(
gateway_platforms, topology.get("profile_platforms") or {}
)
active_sessions = await _status_active_sessions()
# Busy/drainable readout (NAS lifecycle-safety gate). active_agents is
# the in-flight gateway-turn count the gateway now persists at every
# turn boundary; gateway_busy/gateway_drainable are derived from it +
# liveness via the single shared contract in gateway.status. Liveness
# keys off gateway_running (a live PID/health probe), NEVER
# gateway_updated_at — a healthy idle gateway never advances that.
active_agents = parse_active_agents((runtime or {}).get("active_agents", 0))
gateway_busy = derive_gateway_busy(
gateway_running=gateway_running,
gateway_state=gateway_state,
active_agents=active_agents,
)
gateway_drainable = derive_gateway_drainable(
gateway_running=gateway_running,
gateway_state=gateway_state,
)
# Resolved drain timeout (seconds) so NAS can size its poll deadline
# without out-of-band knowledge. Offload to a thread: on a cold
# Windows install the first import of hermes_cli.gateway blocks the
# asyncio event loop for 15-30s (.pyc compilation + Defender scans),
# exceeding the desktop handshake's 15s socket timeout. After the
# first call the module is in sys.modules and the worker call returns
# in microseconds.
restart_drain_timeout = await run_in_threadpool(_resolve_restart_drain_timeout)
# Dashboard auth gate (Phase 7): surface whether the gate is engaged
# and which providers are registered so ``hermes status`` and the
# SPA's StatusPage can show "OAuth gate ON via Nous Research" or
# "loopback only — no auth gate" with no extra round trips.
auth_required = bool(getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False))
auth_providers: list[str] = []
# RFC 8252 native-app capability advertisement. The desktop reads this
# to decide whether it can use the system-browser + loopback + PKCE
# flow (no embedded webview, no session cookies) or must fall back to
# the legacy embedded-webview cookie flow. "cookie" is always available
# in gated mode; "native_pkce" is present when at least one interactive
# session provider is registered — OAuth providers broker the upstream
# IDP round trip, password providers complete interactively at /login
# in the system browser (where OS password managers can autofill; an
# embedded webview cannot reach them). Token-only credentials (e.g.
# drain) don't count. Absent field / missing "native_pkce" ⇒ older
# gateway ⇒ desktop falls back automatically.
auth_flows: list[str] = []
try:
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import (
list_providers as _list_providers,
list_session_providers as _list_session_providers,
)
auth_providers = [p.name for p in _list_providers()]
if auth_required:
auth_flows.append("cookie")
if _list_session_providers():
auth_flows.append("native_pkce")
except Exception:
# Module not importable yet (early startup) — leave as [].
pass
# Nous bootstrap-session validity for the NAS health sweep. A hosted
# agent whose Nous auth dies terminally (invalid_grant / quarantine)
# looks HEALTHY to every liveness/connectivity probe — the machine,
# relay, and this dashboard all stay up — yet every inference turn
# fails. This is the ONLY signal that surfaces that condition, and it
# is determinable with no working token (local auth-store state). NAS
# re-mints the bootstrap session when it reads "terminal". Best-effort:
# never let auth classification break the public liveness probe.
nous_session_valid = "unknown"
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import get_nous_session_validity
nous_session_valid = get_nous_session_validity()
except Exception:
nous_session_valid = "unknown"
# Always-public liveness + auth-gate shape. Safe for external uptime
# probes (NAS's wildcard-subdomain liveness probe), the SPA's pre-login
# bootstrap, and anyone who can curl the host — i.e. exactly the audience
# ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS`` documents this endpoint as serving.
status = {
"version": __version__,
"release_date": __release_date__,
"config_version": current_ver,
"latest_config_version": latest_ver,
"can_update_hermes": not _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally(),
"gateway_running": gateway_running,
"gateway_state": gateway_state,
"gateway_platforms": gateway_platforms,
"gateway_exit_reason": gateway_exit_reason,
"gateway_updated_at": gateway_updated_at,
"active_agents": active_agents,
"gateway_busy": gateway_busy,
"gateway_drainable": gateway_drainable,
"restart_drain_timeout": restart_drain_timeout,
"active_sessions": active_sessions,
"auth_required": auth_required,
"auth_providers": auth_providers,
"auth_flows": auth_flows,
"nous_session_valid": nous_session_valid,
}
# Stable per-install identity (see get_install_id above). First call
# may touch disk, so keep it off the event loop; afterwards it is a
# process-global cache hit. Omitted (not null) when unpersistable so
# older-client behavior and the no-identity fallback stay identical.
install_id = await run_in_threadpool(get_install_id)
if install_id:
status["install_id"] = install_id
# Component-level health rollup. Counts and status enums only — this
# payload is public (PUBLIC_API_PATHS), so no messages, paths, or
# other detail that could carry secrets. The storage probe reuses the
# gateway readiness state_db check (read-only, 1s-bounded) in an
# executor so a wedged DB can't stall the event loop.
components: Dict[str, Any] = {
"gateway": {
"status": "ok" if gateway_running and gateway_state in {"running", "draining"} else "degraded",
"state": gateway_state or ("running" if gateway_running else "stopped"),
},
"dashboard": DASHBOARD_HEALTH.snapshot(),
}
try:
from gateway.readiness import _probe_state_db
storage_check = await run_in_threadpool(_probe_state_db, get_hermes_home())
components["storage"] = {"status": storage_check.get("status", "degraded")}
except Exception:
components["storage"] = {"status": "degraded"}
platform_states = [
str(value.get("state") or value.get("status") or "").lower()
for value in gateway_platforms.values()
if isinstance(value, dict)
]
platforms_ok = all(
state in {"connected", "running", "ok"} for state in platform_states
)
components["platforms"] = {
"status": "ok" if platforms_ok else "degraded",
"configured": len(gateway_platforms),
"connected": sum(
1 for state in platform_states if state in {"connected", "running", "ok"}
),
}
status["components"] = components
status["overall"] = (
"ok"
if all(item.get("status") == "ok" for item in components.values())
else "degraded"
)
# Memory-pressure rollup (NS-656). Distilled from the gateway's
# 30s loop heartbeat + lifecycle sentinel — two small file reads,
# no gateway IPC. Coarse MB numbers/enums/booleans only: this
# endpoint is public (PUBLIC_API_PATHS), same disclosure class as
# nous_session_valid above. Deliberately NOT folded into
# components/overall — memory pressure is advisory (toast/notice
# material), not a liveness verdict, and flipping `overall` to
# "degraded" on it would page NAS's availability sweep for a
# condition the valve is already handling.
try:
from gateway.memory_status import collect_memory_status
status["memory"] = await run_in_threadpool(
collect_memory_status,
profile_dir if profile_dir else get_hermes_home(),
)
except Exception:
status["memory"] = {"pressure": "unknown"}
# Disk-usage rollup (NS-656, same lineage as OOF-2/OOF-107 fleet
# disk-exhaustion incidents). One statvfs call on HERMES_HOME's
# filesystem — coarse MB numbers + enum, same public disclosure
# class as the memory block, and equally advisory: not folded
# into components/overall.
try:
from gateway.disk_status import collect_disk_status
status["disk"] = await run_in_threadpool(
collect_disk_status,
profile_dir if profile_dir else get_hermes_home(),
)
except Exception:
status["disk"] = {"pressure": "unknown"}
# Deferred FTS rebuild progress (schema v23): lets the desktop /
# dashboard render a "search index rebuilding: N%" indicator instead
# of users wondering why old-message search is slower after an
# update. None/absent when no rebuild is pending (the common case).
# Read-only probe, never blocks startup, never raises.
try:
from hermes_state import SessionDB as _SDB
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home as _ghh
_db_path = _ghh() / "state.db"
if _db_path.exists():
_sdb = _SDB(db_path=_db_path, read_only=True)
try:
_rebuild = _sdb.fts_rebuild_status()
finally:
_sdb.close()
if _rebuild is not None:
status["fts_rebuild"] = _rebuild
except Exception:
pass
# Profile + gateway topology: which profiles exist, whether one
# multiplexed gateway or several per-profile gateways serve them, and
# (gated) which host ports the live gateways' port-binding platforms
# listen on. Enumerating profiles walks the filesystem and probes the
# process table, so keep it off the event loop.
#
# Split by sensitivity: profile NAMES (``profiles``) and the gateway
# ``gateway_mode`` are low-sensitivity PRODUCT surface — Hermes Cloud
# renders the profile list in the Portal, which reads this endpoint over
# the network (a gated bind), so they must survive the auth gate. The
# per-gateway ``gateways[]`` detail carries host ports (deployment
# recon), so it stays gated with the host paths / PID below.
# (``topology`` was already fetched above, before the platform rollup,
# so the per-profile platform merge could use it — the TTL cache makes
# the earlier fetch the only real scan either way.)
status["profiles"] = topology["profiles"]
status["gateway_mode"] = topology["gateway_mode"]
# Absolute host paths, the gateway PID, the internal gateway health
# URL, and per-gateway ports are deployment recon a liveness probe never
# needs. ``/api/status`` is in ``PUBLIC_API_PATHS`` so it bypasses
# dashboard auth; on a network-exposed (gated) bind that means *any*
# unauthenticated caller reaches it, and leaking host metadata there
# contradicts the allowlist's own contract ("version, gateway state,
# active session count, and the dashboard auth-gate shape. No bodies, no
# session content, no secrets"). Surface this detail only on a loopback
# / ``--insecure`` bind, where the dashboard is local-only and the
# caller is already inside the trust envelope — the same loopback/gated
# split ``should_require_auth`` draws.
if not auth_required:
status.update({
"hermes_home": str(get_hermes_home()),
"config_path": str(get_config_path()),
"env_path": str(get_env_path()),
"gateway_pid": gateway_pid,
"gateway_health_url": _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL,
"gateways": topology["gateways"],
})
return status
finally:
if status_scope is not None:
status_scope.__exit__(*sys.exc_info())
_WINDOWS_11_MIN_BUILD = 22000
def _windows_build_number(version: str, platform_label: str) -> Optional[int]:
"""Extract the Windows NT build number from stdlib platform strings."""
for value in (version or "", platform_label or ""):
match = re.search(r"(?:^|[^\d])10\.0\.(\d{5,})(?:[^\d]|$)", value)
if not match:
continue
try:
return int(match.group(1))
except ValueError:
continue
return None
def _display_system_platform(
*,
system: str,
release: str,
version: str,
platform_label: str,
) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Return host OS fields for display while preserving stdlib detail."""
if system == "Windows" and release == "10":
build = _windows_build_number(version, platform_label)
if build is not None and build >= _WINDOWS_11_MIN_BUILD:
platform_label = re.sub(
r"^Windows-10(?=-)",
"Windows-11",
platform_label,
count=1,
)
release = "11"
return {
"os": system,
"os_release": release,
"os_version": version,
"platform": platform_label,
}
@app.get("/api/system/stats")
async def get_system_stats():
"""Host + process system stats for the System page.
OS / Python / host identity from stdlib; CPU / memory / disk / uptime from
psutil when available, with graceful degradation when it isn't. Read-only
and non-sensitive (no env values, no paths beyond the hermes home root).
"""
import platform as _platform
info: Dict[str, Any] = {
**_display_system_platform(
system=_platform.system(),
release=_platform.release(),
version=_platform.version(),
platform_label=_platform.platform(),
),
"arch": _platform.machine(),
"hostname": _platform.node(),
"python_version": _platform.python_version(),
"python_impl": _platform.python_implementation(),
"hermes_version": __version__,
"cpu_count": os.cpu_count(),
}
# psutil enriches the picture when present; everything below is optional.
try:
import psutil # type: ignore
vm = psutil.virtual_memory()
info["memory"] = {
"total": vm.total,
"available": vm.available,
"used": vm.used,
"percent": vm.percent,
}
try:
du = psutil.disk_usage(str(get_hermes_home()))
info["disk"] = {
"total": du.total,
"used": du.used,
"free": du.free,
"percent": du.percent,
}
except Exception:
pass
try:
info["cpu_percent"] = psutil.cpu_percent(interval=0.1)
la = getattr(psutil, "getloadavg", None)
if la:
info["load_avg"] = list(la())
except Exception:
pass
try:
boot = psutil.boot_time()
info["uptime_seconds"] = int(time.time() - boot)
except Exception:
pass
try:
proc = psutil.Process()
info["process"] = {
"pid": proc.pid,
"rss": proc.memory_info().rss,
"create_time": int(proc.create_time()),
"num_threads": proc.num_threads(),
}
except Exception:
pass
info["psutil"] = True
except Exception:
info["psutil"] = False
# stdlib-only fallbacks for load average + uptime where the kernel
# exposes them.
try:
info["load_avg"] = list(os.getloadavg())
except (OSError, AttributeError):
pass
return info
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Curator endpoints — background skill-maintenance status + controls.
#
# The curator periodically reviews skills (archive stale, prune, pin). The
# dashboard surfaces its state and the pause/resume/run-now controls that
# `hermes curator` exposes.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/curator")
async def get_curator_status():
try:
from agent import curator
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Curator unavailable: {exc}")
try:
state = curator.load_state()
except Exception:
state = {}
return {
"enabled": _safe_call(curator, "is_enabled", True),
"paused": _safe_call(curator, "is_paused", False),
"interval_hours": _safe_call(curator, "get_interval_hours", None),
"last_run_at": state.get("last_run_at"),
"min_idle_hours": _safe_call(curator, "get_min_idle_hours", None),
"stale_after_days": _safe_call(curator, "get_stale_after_days", None),
"archive_after_days": _safe_call(curator, "get_archive_after_days", None),
}
@app.put("/api/curator/paused")
async def set_curator_paused(body: CuratorPause):
from agent import curator
curator.set_paused(bool(body.paused))
return {"ok": True, "paused": bool(body.paused)}
@app.post("/api/curator/run")
async def run_curator():
"""Trigger a curator review now (backgrounded; tail via action status)."""
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["curator", "run"], "curator-run")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run curator: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "curator-run"}
@app.get("/api/learning/graph")
async def get_learning_graph(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Learning graph payload for the desktop panel.
Profile-scoped view of learned, non-base skills plus memory chunks, with
graph links derived from skill relations and memory-skill overlap.
"""
def _run():
from agent.learning_graph import build_learning_graph
with _profile_scope(profile):
return build_learning_graph()
try:
# _profile_scope takes _SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK and the graph build reads
# skills/memories from disk — keep it off the event loop.
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/learning/graph failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to build learning graph")
@app.get("/api/learning/node")
async def get_learning_node(id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Current content of a journey node (skill SKILL.md or memory chunk), for an edit prefill."""
from agent.learning_mutations import node_detail
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
return node_detail(id)
res = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
if not res.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=res.get("message", "not found"))
return res
@app.delete("/api/learning/node")
async def delete_learning_node(body: LearningNodeRef):
"""Delete a journey node — skills are archived (restorable), memories removed."""
from agent.learning_mutations import delete_node
def _run():
with _profile_scope(body.profile):
return delete_node(body.id)
res = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
if not res.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=res.get("message", "delete failed"))
return res
@app.put("/api/learning/node")
async def update_learning_node(body: LearningNodeEdit):
"""Rewrite a journey node's content (SKILL.md or memory chunk)."""
from agent.learning_mutations import edit_node
def _run():
with _profile_scope(body.profile):
return edit_node(body.id, body.content)
res = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
if not res.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=res.get("message", "edit failed"))
return res
def _safe_call(mod, fn_name: str, default):
try:
fn = getattr(mod, fn_name, None)
return fn() if callable(fn) else default
except Exception:
return default
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Portal endpoint — Nous Portal auth + Tool Gateway routing status (read-only).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/portal")
async def get_portal_status():
# load_config() + auth/subscription snapshots are disk reads — this is a
# polled endpoint, so keep them off the event loop.
def _run():
return _get_portal_status_sync()
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
def _get_portal_status_sync():
cfg = load_config() or {}
auth: Dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import get_nous_auth_status_local
# Read-only dashboard endpoint: refresh-free snapshot so polling
# never performs an OAuth refresh or burns a refresh token.
auth = get_nous_auth_status_local() or {}
except Exception:
auth = {}
features = []
try:
from hermes_cli.nous_subscription import get_nous_subscription_features
feats = get_nous_subscription_features(cfg)
if feats is not None:
for feat in feats.items():
if getattr(feat, "managed_by_nous", False):
state = "via Nous Portal"
elif getattr(feat, "active", False) and getattr(feat, "current_provider", None):
state = feat.current_provider
elif getattr(feat, "active", False):
state = "active"
else:
state = "not configured"
features.append({"label": getattr(feat, "label", ""), "state": state})
except Exception:
_log.exception("portal features failed")
model_cfg = cfg.get("model") if isinstance(cfg.get("model"), dict) else {}
return {
"logged_in": bool(auth.get("logged_in")),
"portal_url": auth.get("portal_base_url"),
"inference_url": auth.get("inference_base_url"),
"provider": str((model_cfg or {}).get("provider") or ""),
"subscription_url": "https://portal.nousresearch.com/manage-subscription",
"features": features,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Diagnostics: prompt-size, support dump, debug upload, config migrate.
# All produce text output, so they spawn background actions tailed via
# /api/actions/<name>/status.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.post("/api/ops/prompt-size")
async def run_prompt_size():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["prompt-size"], "prompt-size")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "prompt-size"}
@app.post("/api/ops/dump")
async def run_dump():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["dump"], "dump")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "dump"}
@app.post("/api/ops/config-migrate")
async def run_config_migrate():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["config", "migrate"], "config-migrate")
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "config-migrate"}
@app.post("/api/ops/debug-share")
async def run_debug_share_endpoint(body: DebugShareRequest | None = None):
"""Upload a redacted debug report + full logs and return the paste URLs.
Unlike the other diagnostics actions (doctor, dump, prompt-size) this is
*synchronous*: the whole point of ``debug share`` is the set of shareable
URLs it produces, so we run the upload in a worker thread and return the
structured ``{urls, failures, redacted, ...}`` payload directly. The
dashboard renders those as real, copyable links instead of scraping a log
tail. Pastes auto-delete after 6 hours (handled inside the share core).
"""
from hermes_cli.debug import build_debug_share
req = body or DebugShareRequest()
try:
result = await asyncio.to_thread(
build_debug_share,
log_lines=max(1, min(int(req.lines), 5000)),
redact=bool(req.redact),
)
except RuntimeError as exc:
# Required summary-report upload failed (offline / paste service down).
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Upload failed: {exc}")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("debug share failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"urls": result.urls,
"failures": result.failures,
"redacted": result.redacted,
"auto_delete_seconds": result.auto_delete_seconds,
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Gateway + update actions (invoked from the Status page).
#
# Both commands are spawned as detached subprocesses so the HTTP request
# returns immediately. stdin is closed (``DEVNULL``) so any stray ``input()``
# calls fail fast with EOF rather than hanging forever. stdout/stderr are
# streamed to a per-action log file under ``~/.hermes/logs/<action>.log`` so
# the dashboard can tail them back to the user.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_ACTION_LOG_DIR: Path = get_hermes_home() / "logs"
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_BYTES = 256 * 1024
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_INITIAL_CHUNK_BYTES = 8 * 1024
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_CHUNK_BYTES = 64 * 1024
# Short ``name`` (from the URL) → absolute log file path.
_ACTION_LOG_FILES: Dict[str, str] = {
"gateway-restart": "gateway-restart.log",
"gateway-start": "gateway-start.log",
"gateway-stop": "gateway-stop.log",
"hermes-update": "hermes-update.log",
"doctor": "action-doctor.log",
"security-audit": "action-security-audit.log",
"backup": "action-backup.log",
"import": "action-import.log",
"checkpoints-prune": "action-checkpoints-prune.log",
"skills-install": "action-skills-install.log",
"skills-uninstall": "action-skills-uninstall.log",
"skills-update": "action-skills-update.log",
"curator-run": "action-curator-run.log",
"prompt-size": "action-prompt-size.log",
"dump": "action-dump.log",
"config-migrate": "action-config-migrate.log",
"tools-post-setup": "action-tools-post-setup.log",
}
# ``name`` → most recently spawned Popen handle. Used so ``status`` can
# report liveness and exit code without shelling out to ``ps``.
_ACTION_PROCS: Dict[str, subprocess.Popen] = {}
_ACTION_COMMANDS: Dict[str, Tuple[str, ...]] = {}
_ACTION_IDS: Dict[str, str] = {}
# A finished ``gateway-restart`` child does not mean the gateway is back: the
# child exits as soon as it has handed the restart to the supervisor (or to the
# running gateway), while the gateway itself is still stopping and coming up.
# The in-flight reuse in :func:`_spawn_gateway_restart` therefore stops
# coalescing exactly when repeat requests do the most damage, so a stale cached
# frontend that re-fires its restart every few seconds gets a brand new restart
# every time (#89034: 77 restarts, 17 of them inside one minute, killing the
# gateway often enough mid-FTS5-write to corrupt state.db). Suppress repeats
# for a short window after the last spawn as well.
#
# MAINTAINER DECISION: a fixed window, not "until the gateway reports healthy".
# Health-gating is what #89034 asks for, but it cannot be made to fail safe
# here — a gateway that never comes back would leave the restart action
# permanently inert, which is a worse failure than the flood it prevents. A
# fixed window always releases. 10s is above the ~3.5s spacing of the reported
# storm and below the time an operator waits before deliberately retrying.
GATEWAY_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS = 10.0
# ``(monotonic spawn time, Popen, command)`` for the last gateway restart this
# process started. Deliberately NOT read out of ``_ACTION_PROCS``: entries
# there are reaped once the child exits, and a guard that disappears when the
# child exits is the bug this exists to fix.
_LAST_GATEWAY_RESTART: Optional[Tuple[float, subprocess.Popen, Tuple[str, ...]]] = None
_UPDATE_ACTION_COMPLETED_RE = re.compile(
r"^=== hermes-update completed ([0-9a-f]{32}) ===$"
)
# ``name`` → completed synthetic action result for actions the server handled
# without spawning a subprocess (for example, unsupported Docker updates).
_ACTION_RESULTS: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
def _terminate_desktop_managed_gateway() -> None:
"""Stop a live gateway restart child when its Desktop backend shuts down."""
proc = _ACTION_PROCS.get("gateway-restart")
if proc is None:
return
try:
if proc.poll() is None:
proc.terminate()
except OSError:
# The child may have exited between poll() and terminate().
pass
def _record_completed_action(name: str, message: str, exit_code: int = 1) -> None:
"""Record a non-spawned action result and write it to the action log."""
log_file_name = _ACTION_LOG_FILES[name]
_ACTION_LOG_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
log_path = _ACTION_LOG_DIR / log_file_name
with open(log_path, "ab", buffering=0) as log_file:
log_file.write(
f"\n=== {name} completed {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')} ===\n".encode()
)
log_file.write(message.encode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
if not message.endswith("\n"):
log_file.write(b"\n")
_ACTION_PROCS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_COMMANDS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_IDS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_RESULTS[name] = {"exit_code": exit_code, "pid": None}
def _dashboard_spawn_executable() -> str:
"""Interpreter for detached dashboard actions.
Prefers the install's own venv interpreter over ``sys.executable`` when
they differ. Under an SSH remote backend the web server is launched by
running the **uv base interpreter** with the venv's site-packages
injected into ``sys.path`` at startup (``-c "sys.path[:0]=[...];
runpy.run_module('hermes_cli.main', ...)"``) — so ``sys.executable`` is
the dependency-less base python and a detached action spawned from it
dies on the first third-party import (``ModuleNotFoundError: yaml``),
because the injected path is a startup artifact of the parent and is
not inherited (#90026). The venv launcher resolves the same dependency
set on its own.
Falls back to ``sys.executable`` when no venv interpreter exists next
to the install (in-process dev runs, exotic layouts). On Windows the
spawn below carries ``windows_detach_flags()`` (CREATE_NO_WINDOW), so
the console python owns a single hidden console that its own subprocess
spawns inherit — the action stays invisible without resorting to
console-less pythonw.exe, which would make every console-subsystem
descendant flash its own conhost (#54220/#56747).
"""
exe = Path(sys.executable)
try:
for rel in ("venv/bin/python", "venv/Scripts/python.exe"):
candidate = PROJECT_ROOT / rel
if candidate.is_file():
# Same interpreter → keep sys.executable (preserves the
# docstring's console-ownership behavior verbatim). Compare
# UNRESOLVED normalized paths: a venv's bin/python is
# typically a SYMLINK to the base interpreter, so resolving
# both sides makes the venv python and the dependency-less
# base compare equal — exactly the SSH-runtime case this
# function exists to fix. The unresolved path IS the venv's
# identity (pyvenv.cfg discovery keys off argv0's location).
if os.path.normcase(os.path.normpath(str(candidate))) == (
os.path.normcase(os.path.normpath(str(exe)))
):
return sys.executable
# Return the candidate UNRESOLVED for the same reason:
# invoking the resolved target would bypass pyvenv.cfg and
# run the bare base interpreter again.
return str(candidate)
except OSError:
pass
return sys.executable
def _spawn_hermes_action(
subcommand: List[str],
name: str,
*,
env_overrides: Optional[Dict[str, str]] = None,
) -> subprocess.Popen:
"""Spawn ``hermes <subcommand>`` detached and record the Popen handle.
Uses the running interpreter's ``hermes_cli.main`` module so the action
inherits the same venv/PYTHONPATH the web server is using.
"""
log_file_name = _ACTION_LOG_FILES[name]
_ACTION_LOG_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
log_path = _ACTION_LOG_DIR / log_file_name
log_file = open(log_path, "ab", buffering=0)
log_file.write(
f"\n=== {name} started {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')} ===\n".encode()
)
cmd = [_dashboard_spawn_executable(), "-m", "hermes_cli.main", *subcommand]
# The dashboard runs *inside* the gateway process, so os.environ carries
# _HERMES_GATEWAY=1. Inheriting it makes a spawned `hermes gateway restart`
# trip the in-process restart-loop guard and exit 1 — silently failing the
# dashboard's auto-restart paths. The gateway's own restart watcher already
# drops it (gateway/run.py); mirror that here (#52470).
action_env = {**os.environ, "HERMES_NONINTERACTIVE": "1"}
action_env.pop("_HERMES_GATEWAY", None)
popen_kwargs: Dict[str, Any] = {
"cwd": str(PROJECT_ROOT),
"stdin": subprocess.DEVNULL,
"stdout": log_file,
"stderr": subprocess.STDOUT,
"env": {**action_env, **(env_overrides or {})},
}
if sys.platform == "win32":
popen_kwargs["creationflags"] = windows_detach_flags()
else:
popen_kwargs["start_new_session"] = True
proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, **popen_kwargs)
# The child inherits its own duplicated fd for stdout/stderr, so the
# parent's handle can be released immediately — otherwise we leak one
# fd per spawned action.
log_file.close()
_ACTION_RESULTS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_COMMANDS[name] = tuple(subcommand)
_ACTION_PROCS[name] = proc
action_id = (env_overrides or {}).get("HERMES_ACTION_ID")
if action_id:
_ACTION_IDS[name] = action_id
else:
_ACTION_IDS.pop(name, None)
return proc
def _tail_lines(path: Path, n: int) -> List[str]:
"""Return the last ``n`` lines of ``path`` without loading huge logs."""
if n <= 0 or not path.exists():
return []
try:
size = path.stat().st_size
except OSError:
return []
if size <= 0:
return []
min_offset = max(0, size - _ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_BYTES)
offset = size
chunk_size = _ACTION_LOG_TAIL_INITIAL_CHUNK_BYTES
newline_count = 0
chunks: List[bytes] = []
drop_partial_first_line = False
try:
with path.open("rb") as handle:
while offset > min_offset and newline_count <= n:
read_size = min(chunk_size, offset - min_offset)
offset -= read_size
handle.seek(offset)
chunk = handle.read(read_size)
chunks.append(chunk)
newline_count += chunk.count(b"\n")
chunk_size = min(
chunk_size * 2,
_ACTION_LOG_TAIL_MAX_CHUNK_BYTES,
)
if offset > 0:
handle.seek(offset - 1)
drop_partial_first_line = handle.read(1) != b"\n"
except OSError:
return []
lines = (
b"".join(reversed(chunks))
.decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
.splitlines()
)
if drop_partial_first_line and lines:
lines = lines[1:]
return lines[-n:]
def _durable_completed_update_action_id(lines: List[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Recover the latest successful update identity from ``update.log``.
The dashboard action process can restart the dashboard that spawned it.
That loses the in-memory ``Popen``/result registries while the durable
update log survives. Only accept a completion marker that occurs after
the latest update-start marker, so a stale success cannot mask a newer
failed attempt.
"""
last_start = -1
last_completed = -1
completed_action_id: Optional[str] = None
for index, line in enumerate(lines):
if line.startswith("=== hermes update started "):
last_start = index
match = _UPDATE_ACTION_COMPLETED_RE.fullmatch(line.strip())
if match:
last_completed = index
completed_action_id = match.group(1)
if completed_action_id and last_completed > last_start:
return completed_action_id
return None
def _gateway_subcommand(profile: Optional[str], verb: str) -> List[str]:
return _profile_cli_args(profile) + ["gateway", verb]
def _gateway_display_command(profile: Optional[str], verb: str) -> str:
return " ".join(["hermes", *_gateway_subcommand(profile, verb)])
# Kept in sync with the corresponding frontend validation in ChannelsPage.tsx.
_TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_RE = re.compile(r"\d+:[A-Za-z0-9_-]{30,}")
_TELEGRAM_USER_ID_RE = re.compile(r"\d+")
_SLACK_MEMBER_ID_RE = re.compile(r"[UW][A-Z0-9]{2,}")
def _validate_messaging_env_value(platform_id: str, key: str, value: str) -> None:
"""Reject platform credentials that are clearly in the wrong field."""
if not value:
return
if platform_id == "telegram":
if key == "TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN" and not _TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN_RE.fullmatch(value):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Telegram bot token must be the complete token from @BotFather, such as 123456789:ABC…",
)
if key == "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS":
user_ids = [part.strip() for part in value.split(",") if part.strip()]
if any(not _TELEGRAM_USER_ID_RE.fullmatch(user_id) for user_id in user_ids):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Telegram allowed users must be comma-separated numeric user IDs.",
)
return
if platform_id != "slack":
return
if key == "SLACK_BOT_TOKEN" and not value.startswith("xoxb-"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Slack Bot Token must start with xoxb-. Paste the bot token from OAuth & Permissions.",
)
if key == "SLACK_APP_TOKEN" and not value.startswith("xapp-"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Slack App Token must start with xapp-. Paste the app-level token from Basic Information > App-Level Tokens.",
)
if key == "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS":
# Mirror the gateway's parse (gateway/platforms/slack.py): split on comma,
# strip, and drop empty entries so a trailing/interior comma isn't rejected
# here when the runtime would accept it. "*" is the allow-all wildcard.
user_ids = [part.strip() for part in value.split(",") if part.strip()]
invalid = [
user_id
for user_id in user_ids
if user_id != "*" and not _SLACK_MEMBER_ID_RE.fullmatch(user_id)
]
if invalid:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Slack allowed user IDs must be comma-separated member IDs like U01ABC2DEF3.",
)
def _spawn_gateway_restart(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> Tuple[subprocess.Popen, bool]:
"""Spawn ``hermes gateway restart``, reusing an in-flight restart.
Multiple dashboard paths can request a restart in quick succession
(restart button double-click, or a stale cached frontend firing its own
restart after the server already auto-restarted post-onboarding). Two
concurrent ``hermes gateway restart`` children race each other on the
manual kill-and-start path, so reuse the live one instead.
Reusing only the *live* child is not enough. The child exits as soon as
the restart has been handed off, long before the gateway is back, so a
frontend re-firing every few seconds cleared that guard every time and
kept restarting a gateway that was still coming up (#89034). Requests
within ``GATEWAY_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS`` of the last spawn for the
same profile are coalesced onto that spawn as well.
Before spawning, sweep for orphaned gateway processes whose parent has
exited (e.g. desktop-app restarts leaving a reparented gateway child
under launchd/PPID=1). Without this the orphan keeps its platform
connection alive and the fresh gateway stacks a duplicate (#77276).
Returns ``(proc, reused)``.
"""
# Reap orphaned gateways before spawning a new one (#77276).
try:
from hermes_cli.gateway import _reap_unsupervised_gateway_orphans
_reap_unsupervised_gateway_orphans()
except Exception:
pass # best-effort — don't block the restart on a reap failure
global _LAST_GATEWAY_RESTART
subcommand = _gateway_subcommand(profile, "restart")
existing = _ACTION_PROCS.get("gateway-restart")
if existing is not None and existing.poll() is None:
existing_command = _ACTION_COMMANDS.get("gateway-restart")
if existing_command is None or existing_command == tuple(subcommand):
return existing, True
raise RuntimeError("gateway restart already in progress for another profile")
recent = _LAST_GATEWAY_RESTART
if recent is not None:
spawned_at, recent_proc, recent_command = recent
age = time.monotonic() - spawned_at if recent_command == tuple(subcommand) else None
if age is not None and age < GATEWAY_RESTART_COOLDOWN_SECONDS:
_log.info(
"Coalescing gateway restart: one was started %.1fs ago "
"(pid %s) and the gateway may still be coming back; not "
"spawning another (#89034).",
age,
getattr(recent_proc, "pid", "?"),
)
return recent_proc, True
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(subcommand, "gateway-restart")
_LAST_GATEWAY_RESTART = (time.monotonic(), proc, tuple(subcommand))
return proc, False
def _restart_gateway_after_webhook_enable(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Best-effort gateway restart after enabling the webhook platform."""
try:
proc, reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to auto-restart gateway after enabling webhooks")
return {
"restart_started": False,
"restart_error": str(exc),
}
if reused:
_log.info(
"Webhook enable: reusing in-flight gateway restart (pid %s)",
proc.pid,
)
return {
"restart_started": True,
"restart_action": "gateway-restart",
"restart_pid": proc.pid,
}
@app.post("/api/gateway/restart")
async def restart_gateway(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Kick off a ``hermes gateway restart`` in the background."""
try:
proc, _reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn gateway restart")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to restart gateway: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"pid": proc.pid,
"name": "gateway-restart",
}
@app.post("/api/gateway/drain")
async def gateway_drain(request: Request):
"""Begin or cancel an external (NAS-driven) gateway drain.
Authenticated by the non-interactive token-auth seam: the
``dashboard_auth/drain`` plugin registers this exact path as a token route
and verifies the ``Authorization`` bearer secret. If that plugin isn't
active (no ``HERMES_DASHBOARD_DRAIN_SECRET``), the route is NOT a token
route, so on a gated bind the cookie gate handles it (a browser session can
still drive it from the dashboard) and on a loopback bind the legacy
session-token gate applies — either way it is never unauthenticated on a
network-exposed bind.
Body: ``{"action": "drain"}`` (begin) or ``{"action": "cancel"}`` (cancel).
Begin writes the ``.drain_request.json`` marker the gateway's
``_drain_control_watcher`` observes (flip to ``draining`` + refuse new
turns); cancel removes it (revert to ``running`` + re-accept). Idempotent
on both sides. This endpoint only writes/removes the marker — the gateway
process owns the actual state transition (there is no HTTP control channel
into the running gateway; the marker IS the channel, decisions.md Q-B).
The force-override (D6: "unless a user commands it") is NOT here — an
immediate, drain-skipping action maps onto the existing
``POST /api/gateway/restart`` force path, which supersedes a drain.
"""
from gateway.drain_control import (
clear_drain_request,
drain_requested,
write_drain_request,
)
try:
body = await request.json()
except Exception:
body = {}
action = str((body or {}).get("action", "drain")).strip().lower()
# Attribute the request to the verified token principal when present
# (token-auth seam attaches it); fall back to a generic label otherwise.
principal_obj = getattr(request.state, "token_principal", None)
principal = getattr(principal_obj, "principal", None) or "dashboard"
if action == "cancel":
existed = clear_drain_request()
_log.info("Gateway drain CANCEL requested by %s (existed=%s)", principal, existed)
return {"ok": True, "action": "cancel", "was_draining": existed}
if action != "drain":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown drain action {action!r}; expected 'drain' or 'cancel'",
)
payload = write_drain_request(
principal=str(principal),
suppress_notification=bool((body or {}).get("suppress_notification", False)),
)
_log.info(
"Gateway drain BEGIN requested by %s (suppress_notification=%s)",
principal,
payload["suppress_notification"],
)
return {
"ok": True,
"action": "drain",
"requested_at": payload["requested_at"],
# Echo so a caller polling /api/status knows the marker is now set;
# the gateway watcher flips gateway_state -> draining within ~1s.
"draining": drain_requested(),
"suppress_notification": payload["suppress_notification"],
}
@app.post("/api/hermes/update")
async def update_hermes():
"""Kick off ``hermes update`` in the background."""
if _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally():
message = (
"Hermes updates are managed outside this dashboard in "
"containerized environments. The built-in local updater is "
"disabled here."
)
_record_completed_action("hermes-update", message, exit_code=1)
return {
"ok": False,
"pid": None,
"name": "hermes-update",
"error": "dashboard_update_managed_externally",
"message": message,
"update_command": "managed outside dashboard",
}
# Shared admission gate (#91277 Phase 3): marker-first, then the
# docker/nix/apt heuristics — one decision with the CLI paths. The
# response keeps the pre-existing per-kind error codes the dashboard UI
# already keys on.
from hermes_cli.update_contract import (
evaluate_update_admission,
record_refusal_receipt,
)
refusal = evaluate_update_admission(PROJECT_ROOT)
if refusal is not None:
_record_completed_action("hermes-update", refusal.message, exit_code=1)
record_refusal_receipt(refusal)
error_code = {
"docker": "docker_update_unsupported",
"image-marker": "docker_update_unsupported",
"image-marker-invalid": "docker_update_unsupported",
"apt": "apt_update_required",
"nix": "nix_update_unsupported",
}.get(refusal.code, "update_not_in_place")
return {
"ok": False,
"pid": None,
"name": "hermes-update",
"error": error_code,
"message": refusal.message,
"update_command": refusal.update_command,
}
existing = _ACTION_PROCS.get("hermes-update")
if existing is not None and existing.poll() is None:
response = {
"ok": True,
"pid": existing.pid,
"name": "hermes-update",
"already_running": True,
}
action_id = _ACTION_IDS.get("hermes-update")
if action_id:
response["action_id"] = action_id
return response
action_id = secrets.token_hex(16)
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(
["update"],
"hermes-update",
env_overrides={"HERMES_ACTION_ID": action_id},
)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn hermes update")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to start update: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"pid": proc.pid,
"name": "hermes-update",
"action_id": action_id,
}
def _recent_upstream_commits(n: int = 20) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Commits the local checkout is behind ``origin/main`` by, newest first.
Logs the SAME range the behind-count uses (``HEAD..origin/main`` — see
``banner._check_via_local_git``), NOT the branch's ``@{upstream}``. On a
feature-branch checkout ``@{upstream}`` is the branch's own tip (zero
commits), which would leave the changelog empty even though the count is
non-zero. Pinning to ``origin/main`` keeps count and changelog consistent.
Best-effort: returns [] if not a git checkout, origin/main is unreachable,
or git is unavailable. Never raises into the request path.
"""
try:
out = subprocess.run(
[
"git",
"-C",
str(PROJECT_ROOT),
"log",
"--format=%H%x1f%s%x1f%an%x1f%ct",
"HEAD..origin/main",
f"-n{int(n)}",
],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
# git log emits UTF-8 (commit subjects can carry emoji/CJK). On
# Windows text=True defaults to the ANSI code page — a byte like
# 0x90 (3rd byte of 🐛) is undefined in cp1252 and crashed the
# stdlib _readerthread, killing the desktop backend (#52649).
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
timeout=5,
)
if out.returncode != 0:
return []
rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for line in out.stdout.splitlines():
if not line.strip():
continue
parts = (line.split("\x1f") + ["", "", "", "0"])[:4]
sha, summary, author, at = parts
rows.append(
{
"sha": sha[:7],
"summary": summary,
"author": author,
"at": int(at or 0),
}
)
return rows
except Exception:
return []
@app.get("/api/hermes/update/check")
async def check_hermes_update(force: bool = False):
"""Report whether a Hermes update is available, without applying it.
Powers the dashboard's "check before you update" flow: the System page
shows the commit-behind count and asks the user to confirm before
``POST /api/hermes/update`` actually runs ``hermes update``.
Returns:
install_method: 'apt' | 'git' | 'docker' | 'nix' | 'nixos' | 'unknown'
current_version: installed Hermes version string
behind: commits behind upstream (>=1), 0 if up to date,
-1 if behind by an unknown count, or null if the
check could not run (offline, no remote, etc.)
update_available: convenience bool (behind is non-zero and not null)
can_apply: True when the dashboard's update button can apply it
in place (git); False for other install methods where the
user must update out-of-band
update_command: the recommended command for this install method
message: human-readable guidance for non-applyable methods
commits: for git installs that are behind, a list of the commits
the local checkout is behind upstream by — each
{sha, summary, author, at}. Absent/empty otherwise. The
desktop's remote update overlay renders this as "what's
changed". Additive: existing consumers ignore it.
"""
if _dashboard_local_update_managed_externally():
return {
"install_method": "managed-runtime",
"current_version": __version__,
"behind": None,
"update_available": False,
"can_apply": False,
"update_command": "managed outside dashboard",
"message": (
"Hermes updates are managed outside this dashboard in "
"containerized environments."
),
}
install_method = detect_install_method(PROJECT_ROOT)
update_command = recommended_update_command_for_method(install_method)
payload: Dict[str, Any] = {
"install_method": install_method,
"current_version": __version__,
"behind": None,
"update_available": False,
"can_apply": install_method == "git",
"update_command": update_command,
"message": None,
}
if install_method == "docker":
payload["message"] = format_docker_update_message()
return payload
if install_method == "apt":
payload["message"] = (
"Hermes is managed by Termux APT; run `pkg upgrade hermes-agent`."
)
return payload
# banner.check_for_updates() handles git / nix-revision paths and
# caches the result for 6h. ``force`` busts the cache so the "Check now"
# button reflects reality immediately.
try:
from hermes_cli.banner import check_for_updates
if force:
try:
(get_hermes_home() / ".update_check").unlink()
except OSError:
pass
behind = await asyncio.to_thread(check_for_updates)
except Exception:
_log.exception("Update check failed")
behind = None
payload["behind"] = behind
if behind is None:
payload["message"] = "Couldn't reach the update source — try again later."
elif behind == 0:
payload["message"] = "You're on the latest version."
else:
payload["update_available"] = True
# Enrich with the actual commits we're behind by, so the desktop's
# remote update overlay can show "what's changed". git only;
# best-effort (empty list on any failure).
if install_method == "git":
payload["commits"] = await asyncio.to_thread(_recent_upstream_commits)
return payload
@app.post("/api/audio/transcribe")
async def transcribe_audio_upload(
payload: AudioTranscriptionRequest, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
data_url = (payload.data_url or "").strip()
if not data_url.startswith("data:") or "," not in data_url:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid audio payload")
header, encoded = data_url.split(",", 1)
if ";base64" not in header:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail="Audio payload must be base64 encoded"
)
mime_type = (
payload.mime_type or header[5:].split(";", 1)[0] or "audio/webm"
).strip()
normalized_mime_type = mime_type.split(";", 1)[0].lower()
if not (
normalized_mime_type.startswith("audio/")
or normalized_mime_type == "video/webm"
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail="Payload must be an audio recording"
)
try:
audio_bytes = base64.b64decode(encoded, validate=True)
except (binascii.Error, ValueError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Audio payload is not valid base64")
if not audio_bytes:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Audio recording is empty")
if len(audio_bytes) > _MAX_TRANSCRIPTION_UPLOAD_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Audio recording is too large")
temp_path = ""
try:
suffix = _audio_extension_for_mime(mime_type)
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
prefix="hermes-desktop-voice-",
suffix=suffix,
delete=False,
) as tmp:
tmp.write(audio_bytes)
temp_path = tmp.name
# transcribe_recording (not raw transcribe_audio): filters Whisper
# hallucinations and maps provider "empty transcript" errors to a
# successful empty result — the live voice loop treats "" as silence
# and re-listens instead of surfacing a 400 on every quiet turn.
from tools.voice_mode import transcribe_recording
def _transcribe_scoped():
# Home-only scope (contextvar), NOT _profile_scope: transcription
# blocks for the provider round-trip and _profile_scope holds a
# process-global skills lock for its entire body (see the MCP
# probe above). STT only needs config/.env resolution, which the
# contextvar override provides inside this worker thread.
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
return transcribe_recording(temp_path)
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
result = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _transcribe_scoped)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Desktop voice transcription failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Transcription failed: {exc}")
finally:
if temp_path:
try:
os.unlink(temp_path)
except OSError:
pass
if not result.get("success"):
err = result.get("error") or "Transcription failed"
# An empty transcript means no speech was detected — a normal outcome
# for VAD/continuous voice loops (e.g. a wake-word conversation
# re-listening on silence), not an error. Return an empty transcript so
# the client quietly re-listens instead of surfacing a "transcription
# failed" toast on every silent gap.
if "empty transcript" in err.lower():
return {"ok": True, "transcript": "", "provider": result.get("provider")}
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=err)
return {
"ok": True,
"transcript": str(result.get("transcript") or "").strip(),
"provider": result.get("provider"),
}
@app.get("/api/audio/voice-config")
async def get_client_voice_config(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""The active profile's STT/TTS config for CLIENT-DIRECT voice.
Lets the desktop cut the audio relay hop: mic audio goes straight to the
profile's STT provider and reply text is synthesized on the client with
the profile's TTS provider — the desktop↔gateway link carries only text.
Providers that can only run on this host (local whisper, edge-tts,
command/plugin providers) resolve to ``{"mode": "relay"}`` and the
desktop keeps using the /api/audio/* relay endpoints.
Same trust boundary as every profile-scoped route: the caller is an
authenticated client that can already drive the agent. Keys in the
response are held in client memory only, never persisted client-side.
Gate: ``voice.client_direct`` in config.yaml (default true).
"""
from tools.voice_client_config import resolve_client_voice_config
def _resolve_scoped():
# Home-only contextvar scope, same rationale as transcribe above:
# resolution reads config/.env only and must not hold the process-
# global skills lock across the (cheap, but still I/O) resolution.
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
return resolve_client_voice_config()
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
result = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _resolve_scoped)
except Exception:
_log.exception("Client voice-config resolution failed")
fallback = {"mode": "relay", "reason": "resolution error"}
return {"ok": True, "stt": fallback, "tts": dict(fallback)}
return {"ok": True, **result}
def _elevenlabs_voice_label(voice: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
name = str(voice.get("name") or voice.get("voice_id") or "Voice").strip()
category = str(voice.get("category") or "").strip()
return f"{name} ({category})" if category else name
# Collapses repeated identical ElevenLabs voice-list failures (the desktop
# re-polls on every settings open/focus) to a single log line. Re-arms on
# success or when the error signature changes, so a real new failure is seen.
_voice_list_last_error: Optional[str] = None
def _voice_list_error_logged_once(signature: Optional[str]) -> bool:
"""Return True if ``signature`` is new and should be logged now.
Passing ``None`` clears the latch (call on success). Idempotent per
signature: the same error logs once until it changes.
"""
global _voice_list_last_error
if signature is None:
_voice_list_last_error = None
return False
if signature == _voice_list_last_error:
return False
_voice_list_last_error = signature
return True
@app.get("/api/audio/elevenlabs/voices")
async def get_elevenlabs_voices(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return ElevenLabs voices when an API key is configured.
The desktop UI uses this for the ``tts.elevenlabs.voice_id`` dropdown.
Only non-secret voice metadata is returned; the API key stays server-side.
"""
# Config-only scope (await-safe): the key lookup reads the requested
# profile's .env, matching the profile the settings UI writes to.
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
api_key = (load_env().get("ELEVENLABS_API_KEY") or "").strip()
if not api_key:
# Fallback for env-only deployments — scope-aware (Slack pattern):
# under multiplex os.environ may hold another profile's key, so
# honor the installed scope's verdict before touching the env.
try:
from agent.secret_scope import UnscopedSecretError, get_secret
try:
api_key = (get_secret("ELEVENLABS_API_KEY") or "").strip()
except UnscopedSecretError:
api_key = (os.environ.get("ELEVENLABS_API_KEY") or "").strip()
except Exception:
api_key = (os.environ.get("ELEVENLABS_API_KEY") or "").strip()
if not api_key:
return {"available": False, "voices": []}
request = urllib.request.Request(
"https://api.elevenlabs.io/v1/voices",
headers={
"Accept": "application/json",
"xi-api-key": api_key,
},
)
try:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def _fetch() -> Dict[str, Any]:
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response:
return json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
payload = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _fetch)
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
# An auth failure (bad/expired/scoped key) is a persistent,
# user-fixable state, not a transient blip — the desktop polls this on
# every settings open/focus, so a per-poll WARNING floods the log
# (#voice-list-401-spam). Treat 401/403 as "integration unavailable":
# report it to the UI with a 200 and log at most once until the error
# signature changes (see _voice_list_error_logged_once).
if exc.code in (401, 403):
if _voice_list_error_logged_once(f"http-{exc.code}"):
_log.info(
"ElevenLabs voices unavailable: %s — check ELEVENLABS_API_KEY", exc
)
return {"available": False, "voices": [], "error": "unauthorized"}
if _voice_list_error_logged_once(f"http-{exc.code}"):
_log.warning("ElevenLabs voice list failed: %s", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Could not load ElevenLabs voices")
except Exception as exc:
if _voice_list_error_logged_once(str(exc)):
_log.warning("ElevenLabs voice list failed: %s", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Could not load ElevenLabs voices")
_voice_list_error_logged_once(None) # success — re-arm logging for next failure
voices = []
for voice in payload.get("voices") or []:
if not isinstance(voice, dict):
continue
voice_id = str(voice.get("voice_id") or "").strip()
if not voice_id:
continue
voices.append({
"voice_id": voice_id,
"name": str(voice.get("name") or voice_id),
"label": _elevenlabs_voice_label(voice),
})
voices.sort(key=lambda item: str(item.get("label") or "").lower())
return {"available": True, "voices": voices}
@app.post("/api/audio/speak")
async def speak_text(payload: TTSSpeakRequest, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Synthesize speech and return audio as base64 data URL.
Used by the desktop voice-conversation mode to play back assistant
responses without exposing the on-disk file path. Reuses the
existing TTS provider chain (Edge / OpenAI / ElevenLabs / etc.)
configured in ``~/.hermes/config.yaml`` under ``tts.``.
"""
text = (payload.text or "").strip()
if not text:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Text is required")
try:
from tools.tts_tool import text_to_speech_tool
def _speak_scoped():
# Home-only scope (contextvar), NOT _profile_scope: synthesis
# blocks for the provider round-trip and only needs config/.env
# resolution, so the task-local override inside this worker
# thread is sufficient (same reasoning as the MCP probe scope).
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
return text_to_speech_tool(text)
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
result_json = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _speak_scoped)
except HTTPException:
# _config_profile_scope raises 400/404 for a bad profile — pass it
# through instead of masking it as a 500 synthesis failure.
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Desktop voice TTS failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Speech synthesis failed: {exc}")
try:
result = json.loads(result_json) if isinstance(result_json, str) else result_json
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Invalid TTS response")
if not result.get("success"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=result.get("error") or "Speech synthesis failed",
)
file_path = result.get("file_path")
if not file_path or not os.path.isfile(file_path):
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Audio file missing")
ext = os.path.splitext(file_path)[1].lower()
mime_type = {
".mp3": "audio/mpeg",
".ogg": "audio/ogg",
".opus": "audio/ogg",
".wav": "audio/wav",
".flac": "audio/flac",
}.get(ext, "audio/mpeg")
def _read_and_unlink() -> bytes:
# Off-loop: synthesized audio can be several MB; reading it inline
# blocks the uvicorn event loop (Pattern A). Unlink rides the same
# thread hop so the temp file cannot outlive an early return.
try:
with open(file_path, "rb") as fh:
return fh.read()
finally:
try:
os.unlink(file_path)
except OSError:
pass
try:
audio_bytes = await asyncio.to_thread(_read_and_unlink)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read audio: {exc}")
encoded = base64.b64encode(audio_bytes).decode("ascii")
return {
"ok": True,
"data_url": f"data:{mime_type};base64,{encoded}",
"mime_type": mime_type,
"provider": result.get("provider"),
}
@app.post("/api/audio/tts-lease")
async def tts_lease(payload: TTSLeaseRequest, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Desktop TTS-output toggles as warm-up / release signals.
"Read replies aloud" and voice-conversation mode are explicit "speech is
about to be needed" gestures. ``active: true`` registers the toggle as a
lease on the TTS engine and pre-loads the configured provider (local
piper/kittentts model, lazily-installed SDK) so the first spoken reply
doesn't pay the load as dead air; ``active: false`` drops the lease and,
once no surface holds one, unloads resident local models.
Blocking work (model load, voice download) runs off the event loop.
Warm-up failures are reported in the body, never as an HTTP error — the
toggle must succeed even when the engine can't preload.
"""
lease = (payload.lease or "").strip()
if not lease:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="lease is required")
def _apply():
from tools.tts_tool import acquire_tts_lease, release_tts_lease
if payload.active:
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
return acquire_tts_lease(lease)
return release_tts_lease(lease)
try:
result = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(None, _apply)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("TTS lease %s (%s) failed: %s", lease, payload.active, exc)
result = {"leases": None, "action": "error", "error": str(exc)}
return {"ok": True, "lease": lease, "active": payload.active, **result}
def _split_text_for_speak_stream(text: str, cap: int) -> list:
"""Split *text* into provider-cap-sized pieces on sentence boundaries.
Deliberately NOT unified with gateway.platforms.helpers'
split_text_fence_aware: this splitter reflows whitespace (sentences are
re-joined with single spaces) and has no fence/markdown semantics, so
expressing it as knobs on the fence-aware core would change behavior.
"""
from tools.tts_streaming import SENTENCE_BOUNDARY_RE as _SENTENCE_BOUNDARY_RE
cap = cap if cap and cap > 0 else 4000
pieces, buf = [], ""
for sentence in filter(str.strip, _SENTENCE_BOUNDARY_RE.split(text)):
while len(sentence) > cap:
pieces.append(sentence[:cap])
sentence = sentence[cap:]
if buf and len(buf) + len(sentence) + 1 > cap:
pieces.append(buf)
buf = sentence
else:
buf = f"{buf} {sentence}" if buf else sentence
if buf:
pieces.append(buf)
return pieces
@app.websocket("/api/audio/speak-stream")
async def speak_stream_ws(ws: "WebSocket") -> None:
"""Streaming TTS for the desktop: text in, raw int16 PCM frames out.
The socket is a per-reply speech *session*: the client feeds text
incrementally as LLM deltas arrive, the server cuts sentences
(``SentenceChunker`` — same cutter as the CLI/TUI speaker pipeline) and
streams each one's PCM the moment it's ready. Speech overlaps generation,
exactly like the token→sentence→TTS pipelining the realtime-voice
literature converges on.
Protocol:
client → ``{"text": "..."}`` frames (incremental; may combine with done),
``{"done": true}`` when the reply is complete,
``{"stop": true}`` or disconnect = barge-in
server → ``{"type": "start", "sample_rate": N, "channels": 1}``,
binary PCM frames, then ``{"type": "end"}``
server → ``{"type": "fallback"}`` when the configured provider has no
chunked API — the client uses the POST endpoint instead.
"""
if not _ws_auth_ok(ws):
await ws.close(code=4401)
return
if not _ws_request_is_allowed(ws):
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
await ws.accept()
# Profile via query param, like /api/pty and /api/console: the provider
# chain + API keys must resolve from the requesting profile's config, not
# the dashboard's own. The streamer captures its config at resolve time,
# so scoping resolution scopes the whole session.
profile = (ws.query_params.get("profile") or "").strip() or None
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def _resolve():
from tools.tts_streaming import resolve_streaming_provider
from tools.tts_tool import _get_provider, _load_tts_config, _resolve_max_text_length
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
cfg = _load_tts_config()
streamer = resolve_streaming_provider(cfg)
cap = _resolve_max_text_length(_get_provider(cfg), cfg) if streamer else 0
return streamer, cap
try:
streamer, cap = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _resolve)
except Exception:
_log.exception("speak-stream provider resolution failed")
streamer, cap = None, 0
if streamer is None:
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await ws.send_json({"type": "fallback"})
await ws.close()
return
await ws.send_json(
{"type": "start", "sample_rate": streamer.sample_rate, "channels": streamer.channels}
)
stop = threading.Event()
text_q: queue.Queue = queue.Queue() # str deltas; None = end-of-text
chunks: asyncio.Queue = asyncio.Queue() # PCM out; None = synthesis done
def _produce():
from tools.tts_streaming import SentenceChunker
from tools.tts_tool import _strip_markdown_for_tts
chunker = SentenceChunker()
# The session stays open for a whole agent turn, and the client only
# sends `done` when the turn ends. During tool execution no text
# arrives, so without an idle flush a narration line with no trailing
# whitespace ("Let me check.") sits in the chunker until end-of-turn
# and is spoken long after the tool already finished. Mirror the CLI
# speaker pipeline: poll with a timeout and flush the buffer when the
# producer goes idle — immediately when the buffer ends on sentence
# punctuation, after a longer quiet spell otherwise.
idle_poll_seconds = 0.5
idle_polls_before_force_flush = 4 # ~2s of silence
def _sentences():
idle_polls = 0
while not stop.is_set():
try:
delta = text_q.get(timeout=idle_poll_seconds)
except queue.Empty:
idle_polls += 1
buffered = chunker.buf.strip()
if not buffered or ("<think" in chunker.buf and "</think>" not in chunker.buf):
continue
if buffered.endswith((".", "!", "?", "…", ":")) or idle_polls >= idle_polls_before_force_flush:
yield from chunker.flush()
continue
idle_polls = 0
if delta is None:
yield from chunker.flush()
return
yield from chunker.feed(delta)
try:
for sentence in _sentences():
cleaned = _strip_markdown_for_tts(sentence)
if not cleaned:
continue
for piece in _split_text_for_speak_stream(cleaned, cap):
for chunk in streamer.stream(piece):
if stop.is_set():
return
loop.call_soon_threadsafe(chunks.put_nowait, chunk)
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("speak-stream synthesis failed: %s", exc)
finally:
loop.call_soon_threadsafe(chunks.put_nowait, None)
threading.Thread(target=_produce, daemon=True).start()
async def _pump_client():
# Text frames feed synthesis; done ends the text; stop/disconnect
# (or any unparseable frame) is barge-in.
try:
while True:
frame = json.loads(await ws.receive_text())
if frame.get("text"):
text_q.put(str(frame["text"]))
if frame.get("stop"):
break
if frame.get("done"):
text_q.put(None)
except Exception:
pass
stop.set()
text_q.put(None) # unblock the producer
pump = asyncio.ensure_future(_pump_client())
try:
while True:
chunk = await chunks.get()
if chunk is None:
break
await ws.send_bytes(chunk)
if not stop.is_set():
await ws.send_json({"type": "end"})
except (WebSocketDisconnect, RuntimeError):
pass
finally:
stop.set()
text_q.put(None)
pump.cancel()
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await ws.close()
@app.get("/api/actions/{name}/status")
async def get_action_status(name: str, lines: int = 200):
"""Tail an action log and report whether the process is still running."""
log_file_name = _ACTION_LOG_FILES.get(name)
if log_file_name is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown action: {name}")
log_path = _ACTION_LOG_DIR / log_file_name
requested_lines = min(max(lines, 1), 2000)
tail = _tail_lines(log_path, requested_lines)
durable_update_action_id = None
update_receipt_summary = None
if name == "hermes-update":
durable_lines = _tail_lines(_ACTION_LOG_DIR / "update.log", 2000)
durable_update_action_id = _durable_completed_update_action_id(durable_lines)
if durable_update_action_id:
marker = f"=== hermes-update completed {durable_update_action_id} ==="
if marker not in tail:
tail = [*tail, marker][-requested_lines:]
# Phase-1 bullet 3 (#91277): the update receipt is the durable,
# structured truth about the last update — written by every run
# including refused/failed ones, and it survives the dashboard
# restarting itself mid-action. Surface its summary alongside the
# log-marker recovery so clients (Desktop, dashboard) READ the
# outcome instead of inferring it from liveness probes
# (#81193/#87359 class).
update_receipt_summary = _latest_update_receipt_summary()
proc = _ACTION_PROCS.get(name)
if proc is None:
result = _ACTION_RESULTS.get(name)
running = False
exit_code = result.get("exit_code") if result else None
pid = result.get("pid") if result else None
if result is None and durable_update_action_id:
exit_code = 0
if (
result is None
and exit_code is None
and update_receipt_summary is not None
and update_receipt_summary.get("outcome") in ("success", "partial")
):
# No in-memory result and no log marker (e.g. log rotated), but
# the receipt proves a completed run: report its outcome rather
# than a null that clients time out on. ``partial`` maps to
# exit 1 exactly like the CLI run itself did.
exit_code = 0 if update_receipt_summary["outcome"] == "success" else 1
else:
exit_code = proc.poll()
running = exit_code is None
pid = proc.pid
if exit_code is not None:
try:
proc.wait(timeout=1)
except Exception:
pass
_ACTION_RESULTS[name] = {"exit_code": exit_code, "pid": pid}
_ACTION_PROCS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_COMMANDS.pop(name, None)
_ACTION_IDS.pop(name, None)
response = {
"name": name,
"running": running,
"exit_code": exit_code,
"pid": pid,
"lines": tail,
}
if durable_update_action_id:
response["action_id"] = durable_update_action_id
if update_receipt_summary is not None:
response["receipt"] = update_receipt_summary
return response
def _latest_update_receipt_summary() -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Compact summary of the most recent update receipt, or None.
Phase-1 bullet 3 (#91277): the receipt (written by EVERY ``hermes
update`` run since #91283, including refused and failed ones, with a
``latest.json`` pointer) is the durable success signal the Desktop and
dashboard should read instead of inferring outcomes from liveness
probes across the update's stop/start gap (#81193, #87359). Summary
only — steps and skips stay in the full receipt endpoint.
Never raises.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.update_receipt import read_latest_receipt
receipt = read_latest_receipt()
if not receipt:
return None
fleet = receipt.get("fleet") or []
return {
"outcome": receipt.get("outcome"),
"started_at": receipt.get("started_at"),
"finished_at": receipt.get("finished_at"),
"pre_sha": (receipt.get("pre_update") or {}).get("sha"),
"post_sha": (receipt.get("post_update") or {}).get("sha"),
"post_version": (receipt.get("post_update") or {}).get("version"),
"fleet_states": sorted(
{str(e.get("state")) for e in fleet if isinstance(e, dict)}
),
}
except Exception:
return None
@app.get("/api/hermes/update/receipt")
async def get_update_receipt():
"""The most recent update receipt — the durable update-outcome record.
Phase-1 bullet 3 (#91277): dashboards and the Desktop read this instead
of inferring update success from backend liveness (the inference misread
the update's own restart gap as 'Backend update failed' / 'boot failed'
— #81193, #87359). Returns the FULL receipt (steps, skips, gateway
restart outcome, fleet matrix) plus a compact ``summary``; 404 when no
update has run since receipts landed.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.update_receipt import read_latest_receipt
receipt = read_latest_receipt()
except Exception:
receipt = None
if not receipt:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="No update receipt found (no `hermes update` run recorded).",
)
return {"receipt": receipt, "summary": _latest_update_receipt_summary()}
# Per-row fields that no session LIST consumer reads but that dominate the
# payload. ``system_prompt`` is the fully rendered prompt — tens of KB per
# row — and made a 21-row /api/sessions response 528KB (96% dead weight),
# re-fetched by the desktop sidebar on every refresh. The desktop's
# SessionInfo type doesn't declare either field and the web UI never touches
# them; ``GET /api/sessions/{id}`` detail reads stay complete. List callers
# that genuinely need the full rows can pass ``?full=1``.
_SESSION_LIST_HEAVY_FIELDS = ("system_prompt", "model_config")
def _strip_session_list_rows(sessions: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
for s in sessions:
for key in _SESSION_LIST_HEAVY_FIELDS:
s.pop(key, None)
return sessions
from hermes_cli.web_routers import sessions as _sessions_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_sessions_routes.list_router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.sessions import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
get_sessions,
)
from hermes_cli.web_routers import profiles as _profiles_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_profiles_routes.sessions_router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.profiles import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
get_profiles_sessions,
get_profiles_sessions_sidebar,
)
app.include_router(_sessions_routes.search_router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.sessions import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
search_sessions,
)
def _normalize_config_for_web(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Normalize config for the web UI.
Hermes supports ``model`` as either a bare string (``"anthropic/claude-sonnet-4"``)
or a dict (``{default: ..., provider: ..., base_url: ...}``). The schema is built
from DEFAULT_CONFIG where ``model`` is a string, but user configs often have the
dict form. Normalize to the string form so the frontend schema matches.
Also surfaces ``model_context_length`` as a top-level field so the web UI can
display and edit it. A value of 0 means "auto-detect".
"""
config = dict(config) # shallow copy
model_val = config.get("model")
if isinstance(model_val, dict):
# Extract context_length before flattening the dict
ctx_len = model_val.get("context_length", 0)
config["model"] = model_val.get("default", model_val.get("name", ""))
config["model_context_length"] = ctx_len if isinstance(ctx_len, int) else 0
else:
config["model_context_length"] = 0
return config
# ── Memory provider config: one generic GET/PUT pair, dispatching on storage ──
def _provider_field_entry(field: ProviderField) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Static, storage-independent shape of one field for the UI payload."""
return {
"key": field.key,
"label": field.label,
"kind": field.kind,
"description": field.description,
"info": field.info,
"placeholder": field.placeholder,
"inline": field.inline,
"group": field.group,
"options": [
{"value": opt.value, "label": opt.label, "description": opt.description}
for opt in field.options
],
}
# Sentinel: remove this key so it falls back to the host or built-in default.
_UNSET: Any = object()
def _coerce_field_value(field: ProviderField, raw: str) -> Any:
"""Coerce a submitted non-secret value to its native JSON type.
Values arrive as strings over the API; this converts them to the type the
Honcho resolver expects (bool/number/list/dict), so e.g. a boolean is stored
as a JSON ``false`` rather than the string ``"false"`` (which would read as
truthy). Returns ``_UNSET`` when the field should be removed. Raises
``ValueError`` on malformed input.
"""
value = (raw or "").strip()
kind = field.kind
if kind == "select":
if not value:
value = field.default
if value not in field.allowed_values():
raise ValueError(f"Invalid value for '{field.key}'")
return value
if kind == "bool":
from utils import is_truthy_value
return is_truthy_value(value)
if kind == "number":
if not value:
return _UNSET
try:
number = float(value)
except ValueError as exc:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid number for '{field.key}'") from exc
return int(number) if number.is_integer() else number
if kind == "json":
if not value:
return _UNSET
try:
parsed = json.loads(value)
except (ValueError, TypeError) as exc:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid JSON for '{field.key}'") from exc
if not isinstance(parsed, (dict, list)):
raise ValueError(f"'{field.key}' must be a JSON object or array")
return parsed
# text / secret — blank clears the key so it falls back to host/default.
return value if value else _UNSET
def _serialize_field_value(field: ProviderField, value: Any) -> str:
"""Render a stored native value as the string the generic UI edits.
``None`` (key absent) yields the field's declared default. Bools become
``"true"``/``"false"``, JSON objects/arrays are re-encoded, numbers are
stringified — so the renderer's per-kind controls always get the shape they
expect regardless of how the value sits on disk.
"""
if value is None:
return field.default
if field.kind == "bool":
from utils import is_truthy_value
return "true" if is_truthy_value(value) else "false"
if field.kind == "json":
if isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
return json.dumps(value)
return str(value)
return str(value)
# — flat-json backend (default; reusable for simple providers) —
def _flat_json_path(provider: ProviderConfigSchema) -> Path:
return get_hermes_home() / provider.name / "config.json"
def _read_flat_json(provider: ProviderConfigSchema) -> Dict[str, Any]:
path = _flat_json_path(provider)
if not path.exists():
return {}
try:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read memory provider config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
return {}
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
def _read_field(field: ProviderField, sources: tuple, env: Dict[str, str]) -> Any:
"""Return the stored native value from the first source holding it, or ``None``.
Presence (``key in source``) decides, not truthiness, so a stored ``False``
or ``0`` survives instead of being mistaken for "unset".
"""
for source in sources:
for source_key in (field.key, *field.aliases):
if source_key in source and source[source_key] is not None:
return source[source_key]
for env_key in field.env_fallbacks:
value = env.get(env_key)
if value:
return value
return None
def _declared_field_is_set(field: ProviderField, sources: tuple, env: Dict[str, str]) -> bool:
for env_key in (field.env_key, *field.env_fallbacks):
if env_key and env.get(env_key):
return True
return any(source.get(k) for source in sources for k in (field.key, *field.aliases))
# — honcho host-block backend —
def _honcho_resolvers():
"""Lazily import the Honcho plugin's resolvers (optional plugin)."""
from plugins.memory.honcho.client import _host_block, resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path
return resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path, _host_block
def _honcho_read_sources() -> tuple[Dict[str, Any], str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return (root config, active host key, host block) for the current profile."""
resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path, host_block_of = _honcho_resolvers()
host = resolve_active_host()
path = resolve_config_path()
raw: Dict[str, Any] = {}
if path.exists():
try:
loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
raw = loaded if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read Honcho config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
return raw, host, host_block_of(raw, host)
def _declared_provider_payload(provider: ProviderConfigSchema) -> Dict[str, Any]:
fields: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
env = load_env()
is_honcho = provider.storage == STORAGE_HONCHO_HOST_BLOCK
if is_honcho:
raw, host, host_block = _honcho_read_sources()
def sources_for(field: ProviderField) -> tuple:
return (host_block, raw) if field.scope == "host" else (raw,)
else:
host = ""
data = _read_flat_json(provider)
def sources_for(field: ProviderField) -> tuple:
return (data,)
for field in provider.fields:
entry = _provider_field_entry(field)
sources = sources_for(field)
if field.is_secret:
entry["value"] = "" # secrets are write-only over the API
entry["is_set"] = _declared_field_is_set(field, sources, env)
fields.append(entry)
continue
native = _read_field(field, sources, env)
if is_honcho and not field.placeholder and field.key in {"workspace", "aiPeer"}:
# Blank fields surface the resolved host Honcho will actually use.
entry["placeholder"] = host
value = _serialize_field_value(field, native)
if field.kind == "select" and value not in field.allowed_values():
value = field.default
entry["value"] = value
# Presence, not truthiness — a stored False/0 is still "set".
entry["is_set"] = native is not None if is_honcho else bool(value)
fields.append(entry)
return {"name": provider.name, "label": provider.label, "docs_url": provider.docs_url, "fields": fields}
def _apply_field_values(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str], target_for) -> None:
"""Apply submitted non-secret fields to their backend dict, in place.
Only keys present in ``values`` are touched, so a partial save never
clobbers fields owned by another surface. ``_UNSET`` clears the key (and
its aliases) so it falls back to the host/default mapping.
"""
for field in provider.fields:
if field.is_secret or field.key not in values:
continue
target = target_for(field)
coerced = _coerce_field_value(field, values[field.key])
if coerced is _UNSET:
target.pop(field.key, None)
for alias in field.aliases:
target.pop(alias, None)
else:
target[field.key] = coerced
def _write_provider_flat(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str]) -> None:
from utils import atomic_json_write
existing = _read_flat_json(provider)
for field in provider.fields:
if field.is_secret:
submitted = (values.get(field.key) or "").strip()
if submitted and field.env_key:
save_env_value(field.env_key, submitted)
_apply_field_values(provider, values, lambda field: existing)
path = _flat_json_path(provider)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
atomic_json_write(path, existing, mode=0o600)
def _write_provider_honcho(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str]) -> None:
"""Persist submitted fields to Honcho's real config for the active host.
Only keys present in ``values`` are touched, so a partial save (e.g. the
inline panel) never clobbers fields owned by the full-config editor. Blank
text clears a key so it falls back to the host/default mapping.
"""
from plugins.memory.honcho.oauth import ACCESS_TOKEN_PREFIX, _config_refresh_lock
from utils import atomic_json_write
resolve_active_host, resolve_config_path, host_block_of = _honcho_resolvers()
host = resolve_active_host()
# Write the file reads resolve, or a save shadows it with a sparse copy.
path = resolve_config_path()
# OAuth rotation is single-use; an unlocked RMW here can revoke the grant.
with _config_refresh_lock(path):
cfg: Dict[str, Any] = {}
if path.exists():
try:
loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
cfg = loaded if isinstance(loaded, dict) else {}
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read Honcho config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
hosts = cfg.get("hosts")
cfg["hosts"] = hosts = hosts if isinstance(hosts, dict) else {}
# Update the block reads resolve (legacy dot-form included), never shadow it.
existing = host_block_of(cfg, host)
host_key = next((k for k, v in hosts.items() if v is existing), host) if existing else host
host_block = hosts.setdefault(host_key, existing)
for field in provider.fields:
if not field.is_secret:
continue
submitted = (values.get(field.key) or "").strip()
if not submitted:
continue
if field.env_key:
save_env_value(field.env_key, submitted)
# Persist where the client reads first; an OAuth token owns that slot.
stored = host_block.get(field.key)
if not (isinstance(stored, str) and stored.startswith(ACCESS_TOKEN_PREFIX)):
host_block[field.key] = submitted
_apply_field_values(provider, values, lambda field: host_block if field.scope == "host" else cfg)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
atomic_json_write(path, cfg, mode=0o600)
def _stringify_submitted_values(values: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""The declared-schema path edits strings; the dashboard may send natives."""
out: Dict[str, str] = {}
for key, value in values.items():
if value is None:
out[key] = ""
elif isinstance(value, str):
out[key] = value
elif isinstance(value, bool):
out[key] = "true" if value else "false"
elif isinstance(value, (dict, list)):
out[key] = json.dumps(value)
else:
out[key] = str(value)
return out
def _update_memory_provider_config(provider: ProviderConfigSchema, values: Dict[str, str]) -> None:
if provider.storage == STORAGE_HONCHO_HOST_BLOCK:
_write_provider_honcho(provider, values)
else:
_write_provider_flat(provider, values)
config = load_config()
memory_config = config.get("memory")
if not isinstance(memory_config, dict):
memory_config = {}
config["memory"] = memory_config
if memory_config.get("provider") != provider.name:
memory_config["provider"] = provider.name
save_config(config)
def _memory_provider_label(name: str) -> str:
return name.replace("_", " ").replace("-", " ").title()
def _normalize_memory_provider_name(name: Any) -> str:
provider = str(name or "").strip()
if provider.lower() in {"built-in", "builtin", "none"}:
return ""
return provider
def _load_memory_provider(name: str):
try:
from plugins.memory import load_memory_provider
return load_memory_provider(name)
except Exception:
_log.debug("Failed to load memory provider %s", name, exc_info=True)
return None
def _memory_provider_manifest(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
try:
from plugins.memory import find_provider_dir
provider_dir = find_provider_dir(name)
if provider_dir is None:
return {}
manifest_path = provider_dir / "plugin.yaml"
if not manifest_path.exists():
return {}
with manifest_path.open(encoding="utf-8-sig") as handle:
manifest = yaml.safe_load(handle) or {}
return manifest if isinstance(manifest, dict) else {}
except Exception:
_log.debug("Failed to read memory provider manifest for %s", name, exc_info=True)
return {}
def _string_list(value: Any) -> List[str]:
if not isinstance(value, list):
return []
return [str(item).strip() for item in value if str(item).strip()]
def _memory_provider_setup_manifest(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
manifest = _memory_provider_manifest(name)
external_dependencies: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
for raw in manifest.get("external_dependencies") or []:
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
continue
dep = {
"name": str(raw.get("name") or "").strip(),
"install": str(raw.get("install") or "").strip(),
"check": str(raw.get("check") or "").strip(),
}
if dep["name"] or dep["install"] or dep["check"]:
external_dependencies.append(dep)
return {
"pip_dependencies": _string_list(manifest.get("pip_dependencies")),
"external_dependencies": external_dependencies,
"required_env": _string_list(manifest.get("requires_env")),
}
def _memory_provider_setup_info(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
setup = _memory_provider_setup_manifest(name)
setup["dependencies_installed"] = _memory_provider_dependencies_installed(setup)
return setup
_MEMORY_PROVIDER_IMPORT_NAMES = {
"honcho-ai": "honcho",
"mem0ai": "mem0",
"hindsight-client": "hindsight_client",
"hindsight-all": "hindsight",
}
def _memory_provider_dependency_package(dep: str) -> str:
return re.split(r"[\[<>=!~;]", dep, maxsplit=1)[0].strip()
def _memory_provider_import_name(dep: str) -> str:
package = _memory_provider_dependency_package(dep)
return _MEMORY_PROVIDER_IMPORT_NAMES.get(package, package.replace("-", "_"))
def _dependency_importable(dep: str) -> bool:
import_name = _memory_provider_import_name(dep)
if not import_name:
return False
try:
__import__(import_name)
return True
except ImportError:
return False
def _trim_setup_output(value: Optional[str], limit: int = 4000) -> str:
text = str(value or "")
if len(text) <= limit:
return text
return f"{text[:limit]}\n... truncated ..."
def _memory_provider_setup_env() -> Dict[str, str]:
# External package-manager child (npm/uv/pip): exact env preservation —
# scrubbing or HOME rewriting could break user tool auth/config.
from tools.environments.local import build_subprocess_env
env = build_subprocess_env(scrub_secrets=False, inherit_profile_home=False)
home = Path.home()
extra_bins = [
home / ".brv-cli" / "bin",
home / ".local" / "bin",
home / ".npm-global" / "bin",
Path("/usr/local/bin"),
]
existing_path = env.get("PATH", "")
prefix = os.pathsep.join(str(path) for path in extra_bins if path.exists())
if prefix:
env["PATH"] = prefix + os.pathsep + existing_path
return env
def _command_result(
*,
kind: str,
name: str,
status: str,
command: str = "",
completed: Optional[subprocess.CompletedProcess] = None,
error: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"kind": kind,
"name": name,
"status": status,
"command": command,
"returncode": None if completed is None else completed.returncode,
"stdout": "" if completed is None else _trim_setup_output(completed.stdout),
"stderr": _trim_setup_output(error or ("" if completed is None else completed.stderr)),
}
def _run_setup_command(
command: Any,
*,
display: str,
shell: bool = False,
timeout: int = 180,
) -> subprocess.CompletedProcess:
return subprocess.run(
command,
shell=shell,
executable="/bin/bash" if shell else None,
env=_memory_provider_setup_env(),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
# Lossy UTF-8 decode — setup tools emit UTF-8; never let a
# locale-mismatched byte raise in the reader thread (#52649).
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
timeout=timeout,
check=False,
)
def _memory_provider_dependencies_installed(setup: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
pip_dependencies = _string_list(setup.get("pip_dependencies"))
external_dependencies = setup.get("external_dependencies") or []
pip_ok = all(_dependency_importable(dep) for dep in pip_dependencies)
external_ok = True
for dep in external_dependencies:
if not isinstance(dep, dict):
continue
check_cmd = str(dep.get("check") or "").strip()
install_cmd = str(dep.get("install") or "").strip()
if not check_cmd:
if install_cmd:
external_ok = False
continue
try:
completed = _run_setup_command(
shlex.split(check_cmd),
display=check_cmd,
timeout=20,
)
except Exception:
external_ok = False
continue
if completed.returncode != 0:
external_ok = False
return pip_ok and external_ok
def _install_memory_provider_pip_dependencies(dependencies: List[str]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
missing = [dep for dep in dependencies if not _dependency_importable(dep)]
if not dependencies:
return []
if not missing:
return [
_command_result(kind="pip", name=", ".join(dependencies), status="already_installed")
]
# Route through the lazy-install pipeline (tools.lazy_deps.install_specs)
# instead of shelling out to pip against sys.executable directly. That
# pipeline is environment-aware: on hosted/immutable images the agent venv
# under /opt/hermes is sealed read-only, and installs must be redirected
# to the writable durable target on the data volume
# (HERMES_LAZY_INSTALL_TARGET, e.g. /opt/data/lazy-packages) — the same
# path every lazy backend already uses. A direct `pip install --python
# sys.executable` on those images fails with a permission error (NS-605).
# install_specs also activates the target on sys.path post-install so the
# availability recheck below sees the new packages without a restart.
try:
from tools.lazy_deps import install_specs
outcome = install_specs(missing, timeout=240)
except Exception as exc:
return [
_command_result(
kind="pip",
name=", ".join(missing),
status="failed",
error=str(exc),
)
]
if outcome.blocked:
return [
_command_result(
kind="pip",
name=", ".join(missing),
status="failed",
command=outcome.command,
error=outcome.reason,
)
]
return [
_command_result(
kind="pip",
name=", ".join(missing),
status="installed" if outcome.ok else "failed",
command=outcome.command,
completed=subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args=outcome.command,
returncode=0 if outcome.ok else 1,
stdout=outcome.stdout,
stderr=outcome.stderr,
),
)
]
def _install_memory_provider_external_dependencies(
dependencies: List[Dict[str, str]],
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
results: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for dep in dependencies:
name = dep.get("name") or "dependency"
check_cmd = dep.get("check") or ""
install_cmd = dep.get("install") or ""
if check_cmd:
try:
check = _run_setup_command(
shlex.split(check_cmd),
display=check_cmd,
timeout=20,
)
except Exception as exc:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="missing" if install_cmd else "failed",
command=check_cmd,
error=str(exc),
)
)
else:
if check.returncode == 0:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="already_installed",
command=check_cmd,
completed=check,
)
)
continue
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="missing" if install_cmd else "failed",
command=check_cmd,
completed=check,
)
)
if not install_cmd:
continue
if install_cmd:
try:
install = _run_setup_command(
install_cmd,
display=install_cmd,
shell=True,
timeout=300,
)
except Exception as exc:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_install",
name=name,
status="failed",
command=install_cmd,
error=str(exc),
)
)
continue
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_install",
name=name,
status="installed" if install.returncode == 0 else "failed",
command=install_cmd,
completed=install,
)
)
if check_cmd and install.returncode == 0:
try:
post_check = _run_setup_command(
shlex.split(check_cmd),
display=check_cmd,
timeout=20,
)
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="verified" if post_check.returncode == 0 else "failed",
command=check_cmd,
completed=post_check,
)
)
except Exception as exc:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="external_check",
name=name,
status="failed",
command=check_cmd,
error=str(exc),
)
)
return results
def _install_memory_provider_setup(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
manifest = _memory_provider_manifest(name)
if provider is None and not manifest:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
setup = _memory_provider_setup_manifest(name)
results = []
results.extend(_install_memory_provider_pip_dependencies(setup["pip_dependencies"]))
results.extend(
_install_memory_provider_external_dependencies(setup["external_dependencies"])
)
if not results:
results.append(
_command_result(
kind="setup",
name=name,
status="no_declared_steps",
)
)
ok = all(result["status"] not in {"failed"} for result in results)
statuses = {row["name"]: row for row in _discover_memory_provider_statuses()}
return {
"ok": ok,
"provider": name,
"results": results,
"status": statuses.get(name),
}
def _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name: str, provider: Any) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
raw_schema: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
if provider is not None and hasattr(provider, "get_config_schema"):
try:
raw = provider.get_config_schema()
if isinstance(raw, list):
raw_schema = [field for field in raw if isinstance(field, dict)]
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to read memory provider schema for %s", name, exc_info=True)
fields: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for raw in raw_schema:
key = str(raw.get("key") or "").strip()
if not key:
continue
choices = raw.get("choices") or raw.get("options") or []
if not isinstance(choices, list):
choices = []
explicit_kind = str(raw.get("kind") or raw.get("type") or "").strip().lower()
if raw.get("secret"):
kind = "secret"
elif choices:
kind = "select"
elif explicit_kind in {"bool", "boolean"} or isinstance(raw.get("default"), bool):
kind = "boolean"
elif explicit_kind in {"int", "integer"} or (
isinstance(raw.get("default"), int) and not isinstance(raw.get("default"), bool)
):
kind = "integer"
elif explicit_kind in {"float", "number"} or isinstance(raw.get("default"), float):
kind = "number"
else:
kind = "text"
options = []
for choice in choices:
value = str(choice)
options.append({"value": value, "label": value, "description": ""})
description = str(raw.get("description") or "")
fields.append({
"key": key,
"label": str(raw.get("label") or key.replace("_", " ").title()),
"kind": kind,
"description": description,
"placeholder": str(raw.get("placeholder") or ""),
"required": bool(raw.get("required", False)),
"default": raw.get("default", ""),
"options": options,
"url": str(raw.get("url") or ""),
"when": raw.get("when") if isinstance(raw.get("when"), dict) else None,
"minimum": raw.get("minimum"),
"maximum": raw.get("maximum"),
"step": raw.get("step"),
"_env_key": str(raw.get("env_var") or "") or None,
})
return fields
def _read_json_file(path: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if not path.exists():
return {}
try:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
_log.debug("Failed to read JSON config from %s", path, exc_info=True)
return {}
return data if isinstance(data, dict) else {}
def _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Best-effort read of existing provider config across legacy/native stores."""
hermes_home = get_hermes_home()
values: Dict[str, Any] = {}
# Common native provider stores.
for path in (
hermes_home / f"{name}.json",
hermes_home / name / "config.json",
):
values.update(_read_json_file(path))
try:
cfg = load_config()
except Exception:
cfg = {}
memory_cfg = cfg.get("memory") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}
if isinstance(memory_cfg, dict):
provider_cfg = memory_cfg.get(name)
if isinstance(provider_cfg, dict):
values.update(provider_cfg)
legacy_cfg = memory_cfg.get("provider_config")
if isinstance(legacy_cfg, dict):
values = {**legacy_cfg, **values}
# Holographic stores under plugins.hermes-memory-store.
plugins_cfg = cfg.get("plugins") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {}
if name == "holographic" and isinstance(plugins_cfg, dict):
holographic_cfg = plugins_cfg.get("hermes-memory-store")
if isinstance(holographic_cfg, dict):
values.update(holographic_cfg)
return values
def _env_lookup(env_key: Optional[str]) -> str:
if not env_key:
return ""
env_on_disk = load_env()
return str(env_on_disk.get(env_key) or os.environ.get(env_key) or "")
def _coerce_bool(value: Any, *, default: bool = False) -> bool:
if isinstance(value, bool):
return value
if value is None or value == "":
return default
if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
return bool(value)
text = str(value).strip().lower()
if text in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}:
return True
if text in {"0", "false", "no", "off"}:
return False
raise ValueError(f"Invalid boolean value: {value}")
def _field_default(field: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
default = field.get("default", "")
if field["kind"] == "boolean":
return _coerce_bool(default, default=False)
return default
def _field_value(field: Dict[str, Any], data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Any:
if field["kind"] == "secret":
return ""
value = data.get(field["key"])
if value in (None, ""):
value = _env_lookup(field.get("_env_key"))
if value in (None, ""):
value = _field_default(field)
if field["kind"] == "select":
allowed = {opt["value"] for opt in field.get("options", [])}
value = str(value)
return value if value in allowed else str(_field_default(field))
if field["kind"] == "boolean":
return _coerce_bool(value, default=_coerce_bool(_field_default(field), default=False))
return str(value)
def _field_is_set(field: Dict[str, Any], data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
if field["kind"] == "secret":
return bool(_env_lookup(field.get("_env_key")) or data.get(field["key"]))
value = _field_value(field, data)
return value not in (None, "")
def _field_visible(
field: Dict[str, Any],
data: Dict[str, Any],
fields_by_key: Optional[Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]]] = None,
) -> bool:
when = field.get("when")
if not isinstance(when, dict) or not when:
return True
for dep_key, expected in when.items():
dep_field = (fields_by_key or {}).get(str(dep_key)) or {
"key": str(dep_key),
"kind": "text",
"default": "",
"_env_key": None,
}
actual = _field_value(dep_field, data)
if str(actual) != str(expected):
return False
return True
def _public_memory_provider_field(field: Dict[str, Any], data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
entry = {
"key": field["key"],
"label": field["label"],
"kind": field["kind"],
"description": field["description"],
"placeholder": field["placeholder"],
"required": field["required"],
"value": "" if field["kind"] == "secret" else _field_value(field, data),
"is_set": _field_is_set(field, data),
"options": field.get("options", []),
"url": field.get("url", ""),
"when": field.get("when"),
"minimum": field.get("minimum"),
"maximum": field.get("maximum"),
"step": field.get("step"),
}
return entry
def _memory_provider_payload(name: str, provider: Any) -> Dict[str, Any]:
data = _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name)
fields = [
_public_memory_provider_field(field, data)
for field in _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
]
return {
"name": name,
"label": _memory_provider_label(name),
"fields": fields,
"setup": _memory_provider_setup_info(name),
}
def _coerce_schema_field(field: Dict[str, Any], raw: Any) -> Any:
if field["kind"] == "boolean":
return _coerce_bool(raw, default=_coerce_bool(_field_default(field), default=False))
if field["kind"] in {"integer", "number"}:
value = raw if raw is not None and raw != "" else _field_default(field)
try:
if isinstance(value, bool):
raise ValueError
parsed = float(value)
if not math.isfinite(parsed):
raise ValueError
if field["kind"] == "integer":
if not parsed.is_integer():
raise ValueError
result: int | float = int(parsed)
else:
result = parsed
except (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError) as exc:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid numeric value for '{field['key']}'") from exc
minimum = field.get("minimum")
maximum = field.get("maximum")
if minimum is not None and result < minimum:
raise ValueError(f"'{field['key']}' must be at least {minimum}")
if maximum is not None and result > maximum:
raise ValueError(f"'{field['key']}' must be at most {maximum}")
return result
value = str(raw if raw is not None else "").strip()
if field["kind"] == "select":
if not value:
value = str(_field_default(field))
allowed = {opt["value"] for opt in field.get("options", [])}
if value not in allowed:
raise ValueError(f"Invalid value for '{field['key']}'")
return value
return value or _field_default(field)
def _save_memory_provider_native_config(name: str, provider: Any, values: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
if provider is not None and hasattr(provider, "save_config"):
try:
from agent.memory_provider import MemoryProvider as _BaseMemoryProvider
except Exception:
provider.save_config(values, str(get_hermes_home()))
return
if type(provider).save_config is not _BaseMemoryProvider.save_config:
provider.save_config(values, str(get_hermes_home()))
return
cfg = load_config()
memory_cfg = cfg.get("memory")
if not isinstance(memory_cfg, dict):
memory_cfg = {}
cfg["memory"] = memory_cfg
current = memory_cfg.get(name)
if not isinstance(current, dict):
current = {}
current.update(values)
memory_cfg[name] = current
save_config(cfg)
def _memory_provider_is_configured(name: str, provider: Any) -> bool:
data = _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name)
fields = _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
fields_by_key = {field["key"]: field for field in fields}
visible_fields = [
field for field in fields if _field_visible(field, data, fields_by_key)
]
required_fields = [field for field in visible_fields if field.get("required")]
if not required_fields:
return True
return all(_field_is_set(field, data) for field in required_fields)
def _discover_memory_provider_statuses() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
discovered: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
try:
from plugins.memory import discover_memory_providers
for name, description, available in discover_memory_providers():
discovered[str(name)] = {
"name": str(name),
"description": str(description or ""),
"available": bool(available),
"missing": False,
}
except Exception:
_log.exception("discover_memory_providers failed")
cfg = load_config()
active = ""
mem = cfg.get("memory")
if isinstance(mem, dict):
active = _normalize_memory_provider_name(mem.get("provider"))
if active and active not in discovered:
discovered[active] = {
"name": active,
"description": "Configured provider was not found.",
"available": False,
"missing": True,
}
providers: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for name in sorted(discovered):
row = discovered[name]
provider = None if row["missing"] else _load_memory_provider(name)
setup = _memory_provider_setup_info(name)
configured = False if row["missing"] else _memory_provider_is_configured(name, provider)
schema_fields = [] if row["missing"] else _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
if row["missing"]:
status = "missing"
elif not row["available"] and not setup.get("dependencies_installed", True):
status = "unavailable"
elif not configured:
status = "needs_config"
elif not row["available"] and schema_fields:
status = "needs_config"
elif not row["available"]:
status = "unavailable"
else:
status = "ready"
providers.append({
"name": name,
"description": row["description"],
"available": row["available"],
"configured": configured,
"status": status,
"setup": setup,
})
return providers
def _require_memory_provider_ready(name: str) -> None:
if not name:
return
statuses = {row["name"]: row for row in _discover_memory_provider_statuses()}
row = statuses.get(name)
if row is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown memory provider '{name}'.",
)
if row["status"] != "ready":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=(
f"Memory provider '{name}' is not ready "
f"({row['status'].replace('_', ' ')}). Configure it in the dashboard first."
),
)
def _write_memory_provider_config_values(
name: str,
provider: Any,
values: Dict[str, Any],
) -> None:
existing = _read_memory_provider_existing_values(name)
fields = _normalize_memory_provider_schema(name, provider)
fields_by_key = {field["key"]: field for field in fields}
config_values: Dict[str, Any] = {}
secrets: Dict[str, str] = {}
for field in fields:
if not _field_visible(field, {**existing, **config_values}, fields_by_key):
continue
if field["kind"] == "secret":
submitted = str(values.get(field["key"]) or "").strip()
if submitted and field.get("_env_key"):
secrets[str(field["_env_key"])] = submitted
continue
raw = (
values[field["key"]]
if field["key"] in values
else existing.get(field["key"], _field_default(field))
)
config_values[field["key"]] = _coerce_schema_field(field, raw)
_save_memory_provider_native_config(name, provider, config_values)
for env_key, secret in secrets.items():
save_env_value(env_key, secret)
_MEMORY_PROVIDER_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_-]{0,63}$")
def _require_valid_memory_provider_name(name: str) -> None:
"""Reject provider names that could traverse outside the plugin dirs.
``name`` is interpolated into filesystem paths by ``find_provider_dir()``
and gates which plugin manifest's setup commands run. A strict charset
allowlist (no path separators, no dots) makes traversal impossible
regardless of how the downstream lookup evolves.
"""
if not _MEMORY_PROVIDER_NAME_RE.fullmatch(name or ""):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
@app.get("/api/memory/providers/{name}/config")
async def get_memory_provider_config(name: str, surface: Optional[str] = None, profile: Optional[str] = None):
_require_valid_memory_provider_name(name)
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
if surface == "declared":
declared = get_provider_config_schema(name)
if declared is None:
# Undeclared providers (e.g. builtin) have no desktop
# config surface; the generic panel renders nothing.
return {"name": name, "label": name, "docs_url": "", "fields": []}
return _declared_provider_payload(declared)
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
if provider is None:
# Undeclared providers (e.g. builtin) have no config surface. Return an
# empty schema so the generic panel simply renders nothing.
return {"name": name, "label": name, "fields": [], "setup": _memory_provider_setup_info(name)}
return _memory_provider_payload(name, provider)
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.post("/api/memory/providers/{name}/setup")
async def setup_memory_provider(name: str, body: MemoryProviderSetupRequest):
_require_valid_memory_provider_name(name)
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
if provider is None and not _memory_provider_manifest(name):
# No discoverable plugin directory → nothing whose manifest could
# legitimately declare setup commands. Refuse before the
# command-running path. (provider may be None with a manifest present
# when its pip deps aren't installed yet — that's the setup use case.)
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
if provider is not None and body.values:
try:
_write_memory_provider_config_values(name, provider, body.values)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("Failed to persist memory provider setup values for %s", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return _install_memory_provider_setup(name)
@app.put("/api/memory/providers/{name}/config")
async def update_memory_provider_config(
name: str, body: MemoryProviderConfigUpdate, surface: Optional[str] = None, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
_require_valid_memory_provider_name(name)
values = body.values or {}
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
if surface == "declared":
declared = get_provider_config_schema(name)
if declared is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
_update_memory_provider_config(declared, _stringify_submitted_values(values))
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return {"ok": True}
provider = _load_memory_provider(name)
if provider is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown memory provider: {name}")
_write_memory_provider_config_values(name, provider, values)
_require_memory_provider_ready(name)
config = load_config()
memory_config = config.get("memory")
if not isinstance(memory_config, dict):
memory_config = {}
config["memory"] = memory_config
memory_config["provider"] = name
save_config(config)
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return {"ok": True, "active": name}
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/memory/providers/%s/config failed", name)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
@app.get("/api/config")
async def get_config(profile: Optional[str] = None):
# _profile_scope blocks on the process-wide _SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK and
# load_config() reads from disk; on the event loop a slow lock-holder
# froze the whole gateway for >1s (observed via the loop watchdog).
# asyncio.to_thread copies the contextvar context, so the profile
# override stays scoped to the worker thread.
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
return _normalize_config_for_web(load_config())
config = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
# Strip internal keys that the frontend shouldn't see or send back
return {k: v for k, v in config.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
@app.get("/api/config/defaults")
async def get_defaults():
return DEFAULT_CONFIG
@app.get("/api/config/schema")
async def get_schema(profile: Optional[str] = None):
# Discovery-driven provider options (voice command providers + memory
# provider plugins) are merged per-request so providers added after server
# start still show up, scoped to the requested profile's config.
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
fields = _schema_with_dynamic_provider_options()
return {"fields": fields, "category_order": _CATEGORY_ORDER}
@app.get("/api/egress/status")
async def get_egress_status():
"""Dashboard/Desktop-readable egress proxy status and remediation text."""
from hermes_cli.proxy_cli import format_status_text
return {"text": format_status_text()}
_EMPTY_MODEL_INFO: dict = {
"model": "",
"provider": "",
"auto_context_length": 0,
"config_context_length": 0,
"effective_context_length": 0,
"capabilities": {},
}
@app.get("/api/model/info")
def get_model_info(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return resolved model metadata for the currently configured model.
Calls the same context-length resolution chain the agent uses, so the
frontend can display "Auto-detected: 200K" alongside the override field.
Also returns model capabilities (vision, reasoning, tools) when available.
"""
try:
with _profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
model_cfg = cfg.get("model", "")
# Extract model name and provider from the config
if isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
model_name = model_cfg.get("default", model_cfg.get("name", ""))
provider = model_cfg.get("provider", "")
base_url = model_cfg.get("base_url", "")
config_ctx = model_cfg.get("context_length")
else:
model_name = str(model_cfg) if model_cfg else ""
provider = ""
base_url = ""
config_ctx = None
if not model_name:
return dict(_EMPTY_MODEL_INFO, provider=provider)
# Resolve auto-detected context length (pass config_ctx=None to get
# purely auto-detected value, then separately report the override)
try:
from agent.model_metadata import get_model_context_length
auto_ctx = get_model_context_length(
model=model_name,
base_url=base_url,
provider=provider,
config_context_length=None, # ignore override — we want auto value
)
except Exception:
auto_ctx = 0
config_ctx_int = 0
if isinstance(config_ctx, int) and config_ctx > 0:
config_ctx_int = config_ctx
# Effective is what the agent actually uses
effective_ctx = config_ctx_int if config_ctx_int > 0 else auto_ctx
# Try to get model capabilities from models.dev
caps = {}
try:
from agent.models_dev import get_model_capabilities
mc = get_model_capabilities(provider=provider, model=model_name)
if mc is not None:
caps = {
"supports_tools": mc.supports_tools,
"supports_vision": mc.supports_vision,
"supports_reasoning": mc.supports_reasoning,
"context_window": mc.context_window,
"max_output_tokens": mc.max_output_tokens,
"model_family": mc.model_family,
}
except Exception:
pass
return {
"model": model_name,
"provider": provider,
"auto_context_length": auto_ctx,
"config_context_length": config_ctx_int,
"effective_context_length": effective_ctx,
"capabilities": caps,
}
except HTTPException:
# Unknown/invalid profile must surface as 404, not degrade into a
# 200 with empty model info (which would render as "no model set").
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/info failed")
return dict(_EMPTY_MODEL_INFO)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Model assignment — pick provider+model for main slot or auxiliary slots.
# Mirrors the model.options JSON-RPC from tui_gateway but uses REST so the
# Models page (which has no chat PTY open) can drive it.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Canonical auxiliary task slots. Keep in sync with DEFAULT_CONFIG["auxiliary"]
# in hermes_cli/config.py — listed here for deterministic ordering in the UI.
_AUX_TASK_SLOTS: Tuple[str, ...] = (
"vision",
"compression",
"skills_hub",
"approval",
"mcp",
"title_generation",
"review",
"triage_specifier",
"kanban_decomposer",
"profile_describer",
"curator",
)
def _dashboard_code_skew_guard() -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a clear \"restart required\" message when this process runs stale code.
The dashboard and Desktop-owned ``hermes serve`` are long-lived; their
``sys.modules`` is frozen at boot. When ``hermes update`` (or a manual
``git pull``) replaces the checkout underneath them, a first-time lazy
import on a new code path can resolve a freshly-pulled consumer module
against a stale cached dependency -> ImportError — e.g. ``/api/model/options``
500 after the update added ``agent.model_metadata.is_grok_46_family`` while
the running process kept serving the pre-update module (#86207). Mirror
the gateway's ``_model_switch_skew_guard``: refuse the risky call with an
actionable, deployment-aware message instead of crashing with a cryptic
import error (#97046).
Returns None when no drift is detectable (fresh process, or a non-git
install where the boot fingerprint could not be read — never a false
positive).
"""
from gateway.code_skew import detect_code_skew
skew = detect_code_skew()
if not skew:
return None
boot_rev, disk_rev = skew
return (
f"This process is running code from {boot_rev} but the checkout on "
f"disk is now {disk_rev}. The model picker would risk a stale-module "
f"crash — {_dashboard_skew_restart_hint()}"
)
def _dashboard_skew_restart_hint() -> str:
"""Restart advice that matches how this process is actually owned.
The same FastAPI app backs the browser dashboard *and* Desktop-owned
``hermes serve --isolated`` (local or SSH). Hardcoding a systemd unit
misleads macOS/launchd hosts and Desktop SSH backends, which have no
``hermes-dashboard`` unit (#97046).
"""
if os.environ.get("HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS") == "1":
return (
"restart the Desktop-owned backend to load the new code "
"(use Restart backend in Hermes Desktop, or quit and reopen the app)"
)
return (
"restart this Hermes process to load the new code "
"(hermes dashboard --port <port>, or the equivalent service restart for this install)"
)
@app.get("/api/model/options")
async def get_model_options(
profile: Optional[str] = None,
refresh: bool = False,
include_unconfigured: bool = False,
explicit_only: bool = False,
):
"""Return authenticated providers + their curated model lists.
REST equivalent of the ``model.options`` JSON-RPC on tui_gateway, so the
dashboard Models page can render the picker without a live chat session.
The response shape matches ``model.options`` 1:1 so ``ModelPickerDialog``
can share the same types.
``profile`` scopes the picker context (current model/provider, custom
providers from config, per-profile .env auth state) so the Models page
reads the SAME profile /api/model/set writes.
``refresh`` busts the per-provider model-id disk cache so every row
re-fetches its live catalog — used by the picker's explicit "Refresh
Models" control. Normal opens leave it false to stay on the 1h cache.
"""
try:
skew_msg = _dashboard_code_skew_guard()
if skew_msg:
_log.warning("GET /api/model/options refused: %s", skew_msg)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=503, detail=f"Restart required: {skew_msg}"
)
from hermes_cli.inventory import build_model_options_payload, load_picker_context
def _build_payload_scoped() -> dict:
# Keep the profile override inside the worker thread so the full
# sync picker build (config load, pricing, refresh probes) runs
# off the event loop under the requested profile.
# Use _config_profile_scope (contextvar only, no skill-module
# lock) — the payload build can block for 15s on a models.dev
# cache miss, and _profile_scope's RLock held across that block
# starves concurrent /api/config and freezes the server (#58576).
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
return build_model_options_payload(
load_picker_context(),
explicit_only=bool(explicit_only),
include_unconfigured=bool(include_unconfigured),
refresh=bool(refresh),
)
return await run_in_threadpool(_build_payload_scoped)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/options failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to list model options")
@app.get("/api/model/recommended-default")
def get_recommended_default_model(provider: str = ""):
"""Return the recommended default model for a freshly-authenticated provider.
Mirrors the model-curation `hermes model` does so GUI onboarding lands on a
sensible default instead of blindly taking the first curated entry. For
Nous this honors the user's free/paid tier: free users get a free model,
paid users get the full curated default. For any other provider it falls
back to the first curated model (same as before).
Response: {"provider": str, "model": str, "free_tier": bool | None}
where free_tier is True/False for Nous and None otherwise. `model` may be
empty if nothing could be resolved (caller degrades gracefully).
"""
slug = (provider or "").strip().lower()
if slug == "nous":
try:
from hermes_cli.models import (
get_curated_nous_model_ids,
get_pricing_for_provider,
check_nous_free_tier,
nous_policy_allowed_ids,
partition_nous_models_by_tier,
pick_silent_default_model,
restrict_to_nous_policy,
union_with_portal_free_recommendations,
union_with_portal_paid_recommendations,
)
from hermes_cli.auth import get_provider_auth_state
model_ids = get_curated_nous_model_ids()
pricing = get_pricing_for_provider("nous") or {}
free_tier = check_nous_free_tier(force_fresh=True)
portal_url = ""
try:
state = get_provider_auth_state("nous") or {}
portal_url = state.get("portal_base_url", "") or ""
except Exception:
portal_url = ""
# This endpoint picks the model a user lands on without choosing it,
# so an unreachable one here is worse than in a picker. Narrow before
# the tier split, so a rescued id still has to pass the free/paid
# predicate.
_policy_allowed = nous_policy_allowed_ids()
if free_tier:
model_ids, pricing = union_with_portal_free_recommendations(
model_ids, pricing, portal_url
)
model_ids = restrict_to_nous_policy(
model_ids, _policy_allowed, rescue_empty=True,
)
model_ids, _unavailable = partition_nous_models_by_tier(
model_ids, pricing, free_tier=True
)
else:
model_ids, pricing = union_with_portal_paid_recommendations(
model_ids, pricing, portal_url
)
model_ids = restrict_to_nous_policy(
model_ids, _policy_allowed, rescue_empty=True,
)
model = pick_silent_default_model(model_ids, provider="nous")
return {"provider": "nous", "model": model, "free_tier": bool(free_tier)}
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/recommended-default (nous) failed")
return {"provider": "nous", "model": "", "free_tier": None}
# Non-Nous: preferred silent default when the provider's curated list
# carries it, else the first curated model. Aggregator lists lead with the
# priciest Anthropic flagship (claude-fable-5), which must never be the
# model a user lands on without explicitly picking it.
try:
from hermes_cli.inventory import build_models_payload, load_picker_context
from hermes_cli.models import pick_silent_default_model
payload = build_models_payload(load_picker_context())
for row in payload.get("providers", []):
if str(row.get("slug", "")).lower() == slug:
models = [str(m) for m in (row.get("models") or [])]
return {"provider": slug, "model": pick_silent_default_model(models, provider=slug), "free_tier": None}
return {"provider": slug, "model": "", "free_tier": None}
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/recommended-default failed")
return {"provider": slug, "model": "", "free_tier": None}
@app.get("/api/model/auxiliary")
def get_auxiliary_models(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return current auxiliary task assignments.
Shape:
{
"tasks": [
{"task": "vision", "provider": "auto", "model": "", "base_url": ""},
...
],
"main": {"provider": "openrouter", "model": "anthropic/claude-opus-4.7"},
}
``profile`` scopes the read — without it, the Models page would show
the dashboard profile's auxiliary pins while /api/model/set wrote the
selected profile's (read/write asymmetry).
"""
try:
with _profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
aux_cfg = cfg.get("auxiliary", {})
if not isinstance(aux_cfg, dict):
aux_cfg = {}
tasks = []
for slot in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
slot_cfg = aux_cfg.get(slot, {}) if isinstance(aux_cfg.get(slot), dict) else {}
tasks.append({
"task": slot,
"provider": str(slot_cfg.get("provider", "auto") or "auto"),
"model": str(slot_cfg.get("model", "") or ""),
"base_url": str(slot_cfg.get("base_url", "") or ""),
})
model_cfg = cfg.get("model", {})
if isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
main = {
"provider": str(model_cfg.get("provider", "") or ""),
"model": str(model_cfg.get("default", model_cfg.get("name", "")) or ""),
}
else:
main = {"provider": "", "model": str(model_cfg) if model_cfg else ""}
return {"tasks": tasks, "main": main}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/auxiliary failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to read auxiliary config")
@app.get("/api/model/moa")
def get_moa_models(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return the configured Mixture-of-Agents provider/model slots."""
try:
from hermes_cli.moa_config import normalize_moa_config
with _profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
return normalize_moa_config(cfg.get("moa") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else {})
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/model/moa failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to read MoA config")
@app.put("/api/model/moa")
def set_moa_models(body: MoaConfigPayload, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Persist the Mixture-of-Agents provider/model slots."""
try:
from hermes_cli.moa_config import normalize_moa_config, validate_moa_payload
def _slot_dict(slot: MoaModelSlot) -> dict:
# Drop unset optionals so saved slots stay minimal ({provider, model}).
return {k: v for k, v in slot.dict().items() if v is not None}
def _preset_dict(preset: MoaPresetPayload) -> dict:
return {
"reference_models": [_slot_dict(slot) for slot in preset.reference_models],
"aggregator": _slot_dict(preset.aggregator),
"reference_temperature": preset.reference_temperature,
"aggregator_temperature": preset.aggregator_temperature,
"reference_timeout": preset.reference_timeout,
"degraded_reference_policy": preset.degraded_reference_policy,
"max_tokens": preset.max_tokens,
"reference_max_tokens": preset.reference_max_tokens,
"fanout": preset.fanout,
"enabled": preset.enabled,
}
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
cfg = load_config()
if body.presets:
raw = {
"default_preset": body.default_preset,
"active_preset": body.active_preset,
"presets": {name: _preset_dict(preset) for name, preset in body.presets.items()},
}
else:
raw = _preset_dict(
MoaPresetPayload(
reference_models=body.reference_models,
aggregator=body.aggregator,
reference_temperature=body.reference_temperature,
aggregator_temperature=body.aggregator_temperature,
reference_timeout=body.reference_timeout,
degraded_reference_policy=body.degraded_reference_policy,
max_tokens=body.max_tokens,
reference_max_tokens=body.reference_max_tokens,
fanout=body.fanout,
enabled=body.enabled,
)
)
# Reject-don't-repair: normalize_moa_config() silently swaps any
# preset containing incomplete slots for the hardcoded defaults —
# correct tolerance for hand-edited configs at READ time, silent
# data loss at WRITE time (#64156: desktop autosave of a
# half-filled slot replaced the user's whole preset). Refuse the
# save loudly so no client can corrupt config through this route.
problems = validate_moa_payload(raw)
if problems:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=422,
detail="Invalid MoA config: " + "; ".join(problems),
)
normalized = normalize_moa_config(raw)
# Merge instead of overwrite so that hand-edited keys not declared
# in MoaConfigPayload (e.g. save_traces, trace_dir) survive a GUI
# save. See issue #58819.
cfg.setdefault("moa", {}).update(normalized)
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, **normalized}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/model/moa failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to save MoA config")
@app.post("/api/model/set")
async def set_model_assignment(body: ModelAssignment, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Assign a model to the main slot or an auxiliary task slot.
Writes to ``~/.hermes/config.yaml`` — applies to **new** sessions only.
The currently running chat PTY (if any) is not affected; use the
``/model`` slash command inside a chat to hot-swap that specific session.
"""
scope = (body.scope or "").strip().lower()
provider = (body.provider or "").strip()
model = (body.model or "").strip()
task = (body.task or "").strip().lower()
base_url = (body.base_url or "").strip()
api_key = (body.api_key or "").strip()
if scope not in {"main", "auxiliary"}:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="scope must be 'main' or 'auxiliary'")
try:
# Expensive-model warning runs BEFORE the profile scope is entered:
# _profile_scope must never be held across an await (the RLock is
# reentrant per-thread, so a second coroutine interleaving on the
# event-loop thread could cross-restore the module globals).
if model and not body.confirm_expensive_model:
try:
from hermes_cli.model_selection_guards import combined_selection_warning
# Pricing lookup can hit models.dev / a /models endpoint on a
# cache miss — keep it off the event loop.
warning = await asyncio.to_thread(
combined_selection_warning,
model,
provider=provider,
base_url=base_url,
)
except Exception:
warning = None
if warning is not None:
return {
"ok": False,
"scope": scope,
"provider": provider,
"model": model,
"confirm_required": True,
"confirm_message": warning.message,
}
def _apply_assignment():
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
return _apply_model_assignment_sync(
scope, provider, model, task, base_url, api_key
)
return await asyncio.to_thread(_apply_assignment)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("POST /api/model/set failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to save model assignment")
def _apply_model_assignment_sync(
scope: str, provider: str, model: str, task: str, base_url: str, api_key: str = ""
):
"""Synchronous body of POST /api/model/set.
Runs inside ``_profile_scope`` (in a worker thread) so every
load_config/save_config lands in the requested profile. Raises
HTTPException for validation errors — the async wrapper re-raises them.
"""
cfg = load_config()
if scope == "main":
if not provider or not model:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="provider and model required for main")
provider, model = _normalize_main_model_assignment(provider, model)
providers_cfg = cfg.get("providers")
provider_entry = providers_cfg.get(provider) if isinstance(providers_cfg, dict) else None
if not base_url and isinstance(provider_entry, dict) and provider_entry.get("base_url"):
base_url = str(provider_entry.get("base_url") or "").strip()
model_cfg = _apply_main_model_assignment(
cfg.get("model", {}), provider, model, base_url, api_key
)
_raw_assign_entry = None
try:
_stored, _raw_assign_entry = find_provider_entry(
read_raw_config().get("providers"), provider
)
except Exception:
_raw_assign_entry = None
_assign_key_env = (
str(_raw_assign_entry.get("key_env") or "").strip()
if isinstance(_raw_assign_entry, dict)
else ""
)
if _assign_key_env:
# #88990: carry the credential POINTER, never a resolved secret.
model_cfg["key_env"] = _assign_key_env
model_cfg.pop("api_key", None)
elif isinstance(provider_entry, dict) and provider_entry.get("api_key"):
# #88990: provider_entry comes from load_config(), which expands
# ${VAR} env refs to plaintext. Copying that resolved value into
# model.api_key writes the SECRET into config.yaml (and recreates
# it on every re-apply, even after the user deletes it by hand).
# Prefer the raw ${VAR} template; only fall back to the expanded
# value when the raw yaml itself stores the key as a literal (no
# new exposure in that case).
_raw_key = (
str(_raw_assign_entry.get("api_key") or "").strip()
if isinstance(_raw_assign_entry, dict)
else ""
)
if _raw_key.startswith("${") and _raw_key.endswith("}"):
model_cfg["api_key"] = _raw_key
else:
model_cfg["api_key"] = provider_entry["api_key"]
cfg["model"] = model_cfg
# When switching the main provider to Nous, mirror the CLI's
# post-model-selection behaviour (hermes_cli/main.py
# prompt_enable_tool_gateway / tools_config apply_nous_managed_defaults):
# auto-route any *unconfigured* tools through the Nous Tool Gateway.
# This is purely additive — apply_nous_managed_defaults skips every
# tool where the user already has a direct key (FIRECRAWL_API_KEY,
# FAL_KEY, etc.) or an explicit backend/provider in config, so it
# never overwrites a user's own setup. GUI users thus land on the
# gateway the same way CLI users do, without a separate prompt.
gateway_tools: list[str] = []
if provider.strip().lower() == "nous":
try:
from hermes_cli.nous_subscription import apply_nous_managed_defaults
from hermes_cli.tools_config import _get_platform_tools
enabled = _get_platform_tools(
cfg, "cli", include_default_mcp_servers=False
)
changed = apply_nous_managed_defaults(
cfg,
enabled_toolsets=enabled,
force_fresh=True,
)
gateway_tools = sorted(changed)
except Exception:
# Portal lookup hiccups / non-subscriber / non-nous gating
# must never block saving the model assignment.
_log.debug("apply_nous_managed_defaults skipped", exc_info=True)
save_config(cfg)
# Register a named ``custom_providers`` entry for a custom/local
# endpoint, mirroring the ``hermes model`` custom flow
# (_save_custom_provider). Without this the endpoint only lives in
# ``model.*`` and the picker has no proper ready row for it — the
# GUI then surfaces a "needs setup" dead-end on the bare ``custom``
# provider. Dedups by base_url, so re-saving is idempotent.
if provider.strip().lower() in {"custom", "local"} and base_url:
try:
from hermes_cli.main import _auto_provider_name, _save_custom_provider
_save_custom_provider(
base_url,
api_key,
model,
name=_auto_provider_name(base_url),
)
except Exception:
# Never block the assignment on the bookkeeping write —
# model.* is already persisted and routable.
_log.debug("custom_providers registration skipped", exc_info=True)
# Surface auxiliary slots still pinned to a *different* provider than
# the new main one. Switching the main model does NOT touch aux pins
# (they're independent, sticky per-task overrides — see
# auxiliary_client._resolve_auto). A user who switches main away from
# a now-unpaid provider (e.g. nous with $0 balance) keeps paying 402s
# on every background aux call until they reset those pins. We never
# auto-clear them — pinning aux to a cheaper/different model is a
# legitimate config — but we tell the caller so the UI can offer a
# "reset to main" nudge instead of silently burning credits.
new_provider = provider.strip().lower()
stale_aux: list[dict] = []
aux_cfg = cfg.get("auxiliary", {})
if isinstance(aux_cfg, dict):
for slot in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
slot_cfg = aux_cfg.get(slot)
if not isinstance(slot_cfg, dict):
continue
slot_provider = str(slot_cfg.get("provider", "") or "").strip()
if (
slot_provider
and slot_provider.lower() not in {"auto", ""}
and slot_provider.lower() != new_provider
):
stale_aux.append({
"task": slot,
"provider": slot_provider,
"model": str(slot_cfg.get("model", "") or ""),
})
try:
effective_config = load_config()
effective_provider, effective_model = resolve_cron_model_drift_defaults(
effective_config
)
cron_model_impact = build_cron_model_impact(
current_provider=effective_provider or provider,
current_model=effective_model or model,
config=effective_config,
)
except Exception:
_log.debug("cron model impact inspection failed", exc_info=True)
cron_model_impact = build_cron_model_impact(config=cfg, jobs={})
return {
"ok": True,
"scope": "main",
"provider": provider,
"model": model,
"base_url": model_cfg.get("base_url", ""),
"gateway_tools": gateway_tools,
"stale_aux": stale_aux,
"cron_model_impact": cron_model_impact,
}
# scope == "auxiliary"
aux = cfg.get("auxiliary")
if not isinstance(aux, dict):
aux = {}
if task == "__reset__":
# Reset every slot to provider="auto", model="" — keeps other fields intact.
for slot in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
slot_cfg = aux.get(slot)
if not isinstance(slot_cfg, dict):
slot_cfg = {}
slot_cfg["provider"] = "auto"
slot_cfg["model"] = ""
slot_cfg.pop("base_url", None)
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(slot_cfg)
aux[slot] = slot_cfg
cfg["auxiliary"] = aux
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "scope": "auxiliary", "reset": True}
if not provider:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="provider required for auxiliary")
targets = [task] if task else list(_AUX_TASK_SLOTS)
for slot in targets:
if slot not in _AUX_TASK_SLOTS:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"unknown auxiliary task: {slot}")
slot_cfg = aux.get(slot)
if not isinstance(slot_cfg, dict):
slot_cfg = {}
prev_provider = str(slot_cfg.get("provider") or "").strip().lower()
new_provider = provider.strip().lower()
slot_cfg["provider"] = provider
slot_cfg["model"] = model
if base_url:
# Sibling of the main-slot endpoint handling (#65254): an aux
# assignment for a custom/local endpoint must carry its own
# base_url, or the slot silently rebinds to whatever
# model.base_url happens to hold — and breaks entirely once the
# main slot switches away and clears it. The auxiliary resolver
# already reads auxiliary.<task>.base_url/api_key
# (_resolve_task_provider_model), so persisting them here is
# what actually wires the endpoint in.
slot_cfg["base_url"] = base_url
if api_key:
slot_cfg["api_key"] = api_key
elif new_provider != prev_provider and new_provider != "custom":
slot_cfg.pop("base_url", None)
clear_model_endpoint_credentials(slot_cfg)
aux[slot] = slot_cfg
cfg["auxiliary"] = aux
save_config(cfg)
return {
"ok": True,
"scope": "auxiliary",
"tasks": targets,
"provider": provider,
"model": model,
}
def _infer_provider_on_model_change(model_val: str, prev_provider: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Infer which provider serves ``model_val`` when the flat Config-page Model
field changes, given the previously-saved ``prev_provider``.
Returns ``(provider, model)``; ``provider`` is empty when no switch is
warranted (leave the existing provider untouched). Two signals, in order:
1. Curated-catalog detection (``detect_provider_for_model``) — handles the
~28 OpenRouter-curated models and direct provider-static catalogs.
2. Vendor-slug heuristic — a ``vendor/model`` slug cannot belong to a
single-model / non-aggregator provider (e.g. ``ollama-local``). When the
current provider is not an aggregator that serves vendor-prefixed slugs,
route to an aggregator. ``_normalize_main_model_assignment`` (called by
the caller) keeps the user's current aggregator when they're already on
one, else falls back to openrouter — the same chokepoint logic as
``POST /api/model/set``.
"""
name = (model_val or "").strip()
if not name:
return "", name
try:
from hermes_cli.models import (
_AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS,
detect_provider_for_model,
normalize_provider,
)
except Exception:
return "", name
try:
detected = detect_provider_for_model(name, prev_provider)
except Exception:
detected = None
if detected:
return detected[0], detected[1]
# Vendor-prefixed slug under a non-aggregator provider → reassign. Use a
# sentinel "openrouter" here; _normalize_main_model_assignment resolves the
# real aggregator (keeps a current aggregator, else openrouter).
if "/" in name:
try:
cur_is_aggregator = normalize_provider(prev_provider) in _AGGREGATOR_PROVIDERS
except Exception:
cur_is_aggregator = False
if not cur_is_aggregator:
return "openrouter", name
return "", name
def _denormalize_config_from_web(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Reverse _normalize_config_for_web before saving.
Reconstructs ``model`` as a dict by reading the current on-disk config
to recover model subkeys (provider, base_url, api_mode, etc.) that were
stripped from the GET response. The frontend only sees model as a flat
string; the rest is preserved transparently.
Also handles ``model_context_length`` — writes it back into the model dict
as ``context_length``. A value of 0 means "auto-detect" (omitted from the
dict so get_model_context_length() uses its normal resolution). ``config``
may be a partial update (e.g. the Settings autosave diff) that omits
``model_context_length`` entirely when the user didn't touch it — that
must leave the on-disk override untouched, not get treated the same as an
explicit 0 and cleared.
"""
config = dict(config)
# Remove any _model_meta that might have leaked in (shouldn't happen
# with the stripped GET response, but be defensive)
config.pop("_model_meta", None)
# Extract and remove model_context_length before processing model, but
# remember whether it was actually present: a partial update omitting the
# key means "unchanged", which is different from an explicit 0.
ctx_sent = "model_context_length" in config
ctx_override = config.pop("model_context_length", 0)
if not isinstance(ctx_override, int):
try:
ctx_override = int(ctx_override)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
ctx_override = 0
model_val = config.get("model")
if (isinstance(model_val, str) and model_val) or ctx_sent:
# Read the current disk config to recover model subkeys
try:
disk_config = load_config()
disk_model = disk_config.get("model")
if isinstance(disk_model, dict):
if isinstance(model_val, str) and model_val:
prev_default = str(disk_model.get("default") or "").strip()
prev_provider = str(disk_model.get("provider") or "").strip()
# When the model name actually changed, re-detect which
# provider serves it. The Config-page Model field is a flat
# string with no provider info, so without this a user who
# picks an OpenRouter model while their default provider is
# ollama-local keeps the stale provider and 404s. Only fires
# on a real model change so saving unrelated config fields
# never overwrites an explicit provider.
if model_val != prev_default and prev_provider:
new_provider, resolved_model = _infer_provider_on_model_change(
model_val, prev_provider
)
if new_provider and new_provider.strip().lower() != prev_provider.lower():
# Route through the canonical assignment chokepoints so
# the model is normalized for the new provider and stale
# base_url/api_mode/api_key are cleared on the switch
# (and preserved on a same-provider re-pick).
norm_provider, norm_model = _normalize_main_model_assignment(
new_provider, resolved_model
)
disk_model = _apply_main_model_assignment(
disk_model, norm_provider, norm_model
)
model_val = norm_model
# Preserve all subkeys, update default with the new value
disk_model["default"] = model_val
# Write context_length into the model dict (0 = remove/auto),
# but only when the payload actually carried the key.
if ctx_sent:
if ctx_override > 0:
disk_model["context_length"] = ctx_override
else:
disk_model.pop("context_length", None)
config["model"] = disk_model
# Model was previously a bare string (or absent) — upgrade to a
# dict if the user is setting a context_length override.
elif ctx_sent and ctx_override > 0:
if isinstance(model_val, str) and model_val:
default = model_val
elif isinstance(disk_model, str) and disk_model:
default = disk_model
else:
default = ""
config["model"] = {
"default": default,
"context_length": ctx_override,
}
except Exception:
pass # can't read disk config — just use the string form
return config
@app.put("/api/config")
async def update_config(body: ConfigUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
def _run():
approvals_mode_changed = False
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# The dashboard form is schema-driven (see CONFIG_SCHEMA). Any root
# key absent from the schema — most visibly ``custom_providers``, but
# also ``agent.personalities``, ``terminal.lifetime_seconds``, etc. —
# is not sent in the PUT body. A full-replace save would silently
# drop those keys. Deep-merge incoming over what's on disk so the
# frontend can only overwrite what it explicitly sends.
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
existing = read_raw_config()
incoming = _denormalize_config_from_web(body.config)
merged = _deep_merge(existing, incoming)
# Compare normalized approvals.mode across the in-memory
# documents, not config blocks and not cache re-reads: the
# settings page PUTs the defaulted GET record while disk
# holds sparse YAML, so a block compare is always-unequal
# (every autosave would broadcast), and reloading after the
# save can serve the pre-save cache on an (mtime_ns, size)
# key collision. Only approvals.mode feeds session.info, so
# it is the honest trigger.
approvals_mode_changed = _approval_mode_of(merged) != _approval_mode_of(existing)
save_config(merged)
# REST saves bypass the config.set RPC (which re-emits itself), so
# refresh live sessions' cached approval/YOLO indicators after a mode
# change. Own-profile saves only: a profile-scoped save targets a
# different HERMES_HOME than this process's gateway sessions.
if approvals_mode_changed and not _is_other_profile(body.profile or profile):
_broadcast_gateway_session_info()
return {"ok": True}
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/config failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
def _is_other_profile(profile: Optional[str]) -> bool:
"""True when ``profile`` names a profile other than this process's own."""
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
return False
try:
target = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
except HTTPException:
return True
return target.resolve() != get_process_hermes_home().resolve()
def _approval_mode_of(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
"""Normalize approvals.mode from an in-memory config document.
Both sides of the broadcast comparison use in-memory documents (the raw
on-disk dict and the about-to-be-saved dict): re-reading through the
config cache after a save can serve the pre-save document when the
replacement file collides on the (mtime_ns, size) cache key, which would
suppress the broadcast exactly when the mode changed. Absent block or
key normalizes to the same default the approval gate uses.
"""
from tools.approval import _normalize_approval_mode
approvals = config.get("approvals")
default_mode = (DEFAULT_CONFIG.get("approvals") or {}).get("mode", "manual")
mode = approvals.get("mode", default_mode) if isinstance(approvals, dict) else default_mode
return _normalize_approval_mode(mode)
def _broadcast_gateway_session_info() -> None:
"""Broadcast session.info on the in-process gateway when it's loaded.
``sys.modules`` guard, not an import: gateway never imported means no
live sessions in this process to notify.
"""
server = sys.modules.get("tui_gateway.server")
if server is None:
return
try:
server.broadcast_session_info()
except Exception:
_log.exception("session.info broadcast after config save failed")
def _catalog_provider_env_metadata() -> dict:
"""Map provider env vars → desktop card metadata, derived from the catalog.
Returns ``{env_var: {provider, provider_label, description, url, is_password,
advanced}}`` for every API-key provider in the unified ``provider_catalog()``
(i.e. the ``hermes model`` universe). This is what lets the desktop Keys tab
render a card for a provider even when its env var was never hand-added to
``OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS`` — closing the drift where CLI-configurable providers
(openai-api, kilocode, novita, tencent-tokenhub, copilot, …) were missing
from the GUI.
Hand ``OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS`` prose is layered ON TOP of this in the endpoint;
this only supplies membership + grouping + sensible fallbacks.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.provider_catalog import provider_catalog
except Exception:
return {}
# Env vars already declared with a NON-provider category (e.g. the shared
# GITHUB_TOKEN, which is a Skills-Hub "tool" credential) must not be
# promoted into a provider card. Copilot lists GITHUB_TOKEN among its auth
# aliases, but its provider card uses the provider-owned COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN.
try:
from hermes_cli.config import OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS as _OPT
except Exception:
_OPT = {}
_non_provider_keys = {
k for k, v in _OPT.items()
if (v or {}).get("category") and (v or {}).get("category") != "provider"
}
meta: dict = {}
for d in provider_catalog():
if d.tab != "keys":
continue
# API-key vars: the first is the primary (password) field; any aliases
# are kept as additional password fields so users can clear them too.
for env_var in d.api_key_env_vars:
if env_var in _non_provider_keys:
continue # don't hijack a shared tool/messaging credential
meta.setdefault(
env_var,
{
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": d.description,
"url": d.signup_url or None,
"is_password": True,
"advanced": False,
"category": "provider",
},
)
# Base-URL override is an advanced, non-secret field for the same card.
if d.base_url_env_var:
meta.setdefault(
d.base_url_env_var,
{
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": f"{d.label} base URL override",
"url": None,
"is_password": False,
"advanced": True,
"category": "provider",
},
)
# AWS-SDK providers (Bedrock) authenticate via the AWS credential chain
# rather than a pasted API key, so they have no api_key_env_vars. Tag
# their AWS_* settings to the provider card so they still appear on the
# Keys tab (otherwise Bedrock — a `hermes model` provider — would be
# invisible in the desktop app).
if d.auth_type == "aws_sdk":
for aws_var in ("AWS_REGION", "AWS_PROFILE"):
existing = meta.get(aws_var, {})
meta[aws_var] = {
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": existing.get("description") or f"{d.label} ({aws_var})",
"url": existing.get("url"),
"is_password": False,
"advanced": existing.get("advanced", True),
"category": "provider",
}
# Vertex AI authenticates via OAuth2 (service-account JSON or ADC), not a
# pasted API key, so it also has no api_key_env_vars. Tag its credential
# env var to the provider card so it appears on the Keys tab (otherwise
# Vertex — a `hermes model` provider — would be invisible in the desktop
# app). The value is a filesystem path, not a secret string, so it is
# not a password field.
if d.auth_type == "vertex":
existing = meta.get("VERTEX_CREDENTIALS_PATH", {})
meta["VERTEX_CREDENTIALS_PATH"] = {
"provider": d.slug,
"provider_label": d.label,
"description": existing.get("description")
or f"{d.label} — service account JSON path (or use ADC)",
"url": existing.get("url"),
"is_password": False,
"advanced": existing.get("advanced", True),
"category": "provider",
}
return meta
@app.get("/api/env")
async def get_env_vars(profile: Optional[str] = None):
# _profile_scope takes _SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK and load_env()/catalog
# discovery read from disk — keep the whole build off the event loop.
return await asyncio.to_thread(_get_env_vars_sync, profile)
def _get_env_vars_sync(profile: Optional[str] = None):
with _profile_scope(profile):
env_on_disk = load_env()
channel_keys = _channel_managed_env_keys()
catalog_meta = _catalog_provider_env_metadata()
def _row(var_name: str, info: dict, *, custom: bool = False) -> dict:
value = env_on_disk.get(var_name)
cat_meta = catalog_meta.get(var_name) or {}
# Hand OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS prose wins where present; the catalog fills any
# gaps (description/url) and always supplies provider grouping hints.
return {
"is_set": bool(value),
"redacted_value": redact_key(value) if value else None,
"description": info.get("description") or cat_meta.get("description", ""),
"url": info.get("url") if info.get("url") is not None else cat_meta.get("url"),
"category": info.get("category") or cat_meta.get("category", ""),
"is_password": info.get("password", cat_meta.get("is_password", False)),
"tools": info.get("tools", []),
"advanced": info.get("advanced", cat_meta.get("advanced", False)),
# True when this var is a messaging-platform credential owned by a
# Channels page card. The Keys/Env page uses this to hide it and
# avoid duplicating the (richer) Channels configuration UI.
"channel_managed": var_name in channel_keys,
# Provider grouping hints derived from the unified provider catalog
# so the desktop Keys tab groups by the SAME provider identity the
# CLI `hermes model` picker uses (not desktop-only prefix guesses).
"provider": cat_meta.get("provider", ""),
"provider_label": cat_meta.get("provider_label", ""),
# True when this key exists in the user's .env but is NOT in any
# catalog (OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS or the provider catalog) — an
# arbitrary/custom env var the user added directly. Surfaced so the
# Keys page can list (and let the user manage) them instead of
# hiding everything it doesn't recognise.
"custom": custom,
}
result = {}
for var_name, info in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.items():
result[var_name] = _row(var_name, info)
# Synthesize rows for catalog provider env vars that have no hand entry in
# OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS — these are the providers that were CLI-configurable but
# invisible in the desktop app until now.
for var_name in catalog_meta:
if var_name not in result:
result[var_name] = _row(var_name, {})
# Surface arbitrary/custom keys the user set in .env that aren't in any
# catalog. These are always "set" (they're on disk). Treated as secrets by
# default (is_password=True → redacted, reveal-gated) since an unrecognised
# key could hold anything. Channel-managed credentials are excluded — those
# belong to the Channels page. This makes the "add a custom key" surface
# round-trip: a key added there reappears here under its own section.
for var_name in env_on_disk:
if var_name in result or var_name in channel_keys:
continue
row = _row(var_name, {}, custom=True)
row["category"] = "custom"
row["is_password"] = True
result[var_name] = row
return result
@app.put("/api/env")
async def set_env_var(body: EnvVarUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
def _run():
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# Unified credential lifecycle: writes .env AND reconciles any
# config.yaml mirror still holding the previous value of this var
# (model.api_key / auxiliary.*.api_key / custom_providers[*]),
# so a rotation can't leave a stale higher-precedence copy that
# keeps authenticating with the old key (#62269).
from hermes_cli.credential_lifecycle import save_provider_env_credential
return save_provider_env_credential(body.key, body.value)
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except ValueError as exc:
# save_env_value raises ValueError for invalid names and for keys
# on the denylist (LD_PRELOAD, PATH, PYTHONPATH, …). Surface the
# message to the SPA so the user understands why the write was
# refused instead of seeing an opaque 500.
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/env failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
# Live credential probes keyed by env var. Each entry is (method, url, auth)
# where auth is "bearer" (Authorization header) or "query" (?key=). A cheap
# read-only models/key call that 401s on a bad token — enough to catch a
# mistyped key before it's persisted. Providers absent from this map (or local
# endpoints) are not network-validated; the client treats those as "unknown".
_CREDENTIAL_PROBES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
"OPENROUTER_API_KEY": ("https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/key", "bearer"),
"OPENAI_API_KEY": ("https://api.openai.com/v1/models", "bearer"),
"XAI_API_KEY": ("https://api.x.ai/v1/models", "bearer"),
"GEMINI_API_KEY": ("https://generativelanguage.googleapis.com/v1beta/models", "query"),
}
def _parse_model_ids(resp: "Any") -> List[str]:
"""Extract model ids from an OpenAI-compatible ``/v1/models`` response.
Tolerant of the common shapes: ``{"data": [{"id": ...}]}`` (OpenAI / vLLM /
llama.cpp) and a bare ``{"data": ["id", ...]}``. Returns ``[]`` on any
parse/HTTP error so a slightly non-standard endpoint never hard-blocks.
"""
try:
if not resp.is_success:
return []
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
return []
data = payload.get("data") if isinstance(payload, dict) else payload
if not isinstance(data, list):
return []
ids: List[str] = []
for item in data:
if isinstance(item, dict):
mid = str(item.get("id") or "").strip()
else:
mid = str(item or "").strip()
if mid:
ids.append(mid)
return ids
def _custom_endpoint_id(raw: str, fallback: str = "custom") -> str:
slug = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_-]+", "-", coerce_provider_id(raw)).strip("-_").lower()
return slug or fallback
def _models_from_custom_endpoint_entry(entry: Dict[str, Any]) -> List[str]:
models: List[str] = []
raw_models = entry.get("models")
if isinstance(raw_models, dict):
models.extend(str(model).strip() for model in raw_models.keys())
elif isinstance(raw_models, list):
models.extend(str(model).strip() for model in raw_models)
default_model = str(entry.get("model") or entry.get("default_model") or "").strip()
if default_model:
models.insert(0, default_model)
seen: set[str] = set()
return [model for model in models if model and not (model in seen or seen.add(model))]
def _api_key_display(entry: Dict[str, Any]) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
"""Return ``(has_api_key, preview)`` for a provider or model config block.
Keys live in ``.env`` behind ``key_env``; only entries written before
#69449 still carry a plaintext ``api_key``. Checking both keeps the panel
honest either way — reading only ``api_key`` reported "no API key" for
every endpoint whose key had been moved to ``.env``.
"""
plaintext = str(entry.get("api_key") or "").strip()
if plaintext:
return True, redact_key(plaintext)
key_env = str(entry.get("key_env") or "").strip()
if key_env:
return True, f"${{{key_env}}}"
return False, None
def _config_api_key_is_env_ref(endpoint_id: str) -> bool:
"""True when this endpoint's on-disk ``api_key`` is a ``${VAR}`` template.
``load_config()`` expands env refs, so a hand-written
``api_key: ${MY_KEY}`` is indistinguishable from a literal secret by the
time it reaches us. Such an entry is already keeping its secret out of
config.yaml, so migrating it would only copy that secret into a second
env var the user didn't ask for.
"""
_stored, entry = find_provider_entry(read_raw_config().get("providers"), endpoint_id)
raw_key = entry.get("api_key") if isinstance(entry, dict) else None
return bool(isinstance(raw_key, str) and re.search(r"\$\{[^}]+\}", raw_key))
def _custom_endpoint_response(cfg: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
model_cfg = cfg.get("model", {}) if isinstance(cfg.get("model"), dict) else {}
current_provider = str(model_cfg.get("provider", "") or "")
current_model = str(model_cfg.get("default", model_cfg.get("name", "")) or "")
current_base_url = str(model_cfg.get("base_url", "") or "")
endpoints: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
providers = cfg.get("providers")
if isinstance(providers, dict):
for provider_id, raw_entry in providers.items():
if not isinstance(raw_entry, dict):
continue
base_url = str(raw_entry.get("base_url") or raw_entry.get("url") or raw_entry.get("api") or "").strip()
if not base_url:
continue
endpoint_id = str(provider_id)
models = _models_from_custom_endpoint_entry(raw_entry)
endpoint_model = str(raw_entry.get("model") or raw_entry.get("default_model") or (models[0] if models else ""))
has_api_key, api_key_preview = _api_key_display(raw_entry)
endpoints.append({
"id": endpoint_id,
"name": str(raw_entry.get("name") or endpoint_id),
"base_url": base_url,
"model": endpoint_model,
"models": models,
"context_length": raw_entry.get("context_length"),
"discover_models": bool(raw_entry.get("discover_models", True)),
"has_api_key": has_api_key,
"api_key_preview": api_key_preview,
"is_current": endpoint_id == current_provider,
"source": "providers",
})
if current_provider.lower() == "custom" and current_base_url and not any(e["id"] == "custom" for e in endpoints):
has_api_key, api_key_preview = _api_key_display(model_cfg)
endpoints.insert(0, {
"id": "custom",
"name": "Custom",
"base_url": current_base_url,
"model": current_model,
"models": [current_model] if current_model else [],
"context_length": model_cfg.get("context_length"),
"discover_models": True,
"has_api_key": has_api_key,
"api_key_preview": api_key_preview,
"is_current": True,
"source": "direct-config",
})
return {
"endpoints": endpoints,
"current": {
"provider": current_provider,
"model": current_model,
"base_url": current_base_url,
},
}
def _detach_main_model_from_provider(cfg: Dict[str, Any], provider_key: str) -> None:
"""Drop the main-slot mirror of a provider that no longer exists.
``activate_custom_endpoint`` copies the endpoint's ``base_url`` and
``api_key`` onto ``model``. That mirror outranks the environment at client
construction (#62269), so deleting the endpoint without clearing it leaves
the agent still authenticating to the deleted host with the deleted key —
and leaves that key sitting in config.yaml after the operator believes the
dashboard removed it.
Only touches ``model`` when it actually names the deleted provider, so an
endpoint deleted while a *different* provider is active is left alone.
"""
model_cfg = cfg.get("model")
if not isinstance(model_cfg, dict):
return
if str(model_cfg.get("provider") or "").strip().lower() != provider_key:
return
for field in ("provider", "base_url", "api_key", "key_env"):
model_cfg.pop(field, None)
cfg["model"] = model_cfg
def _write_custom_endpoint(cfg: Dict[str, Any], body: CustomEndpointUpdate) -> Tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
endpoint_id = _custom_endpoint_id(body.id or body.name)
name = (body.name or "").strip()
base_url = (body.base_url or "").strip().rstrip("/")
model = (body.model or "").strip()
if not name:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="name required")
if not base_url:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="base_url required")
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base_url)
if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="base_url must include scheme and host")
if not model:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="model required")
providers = cfg.get("providers")
if not isinstance(providers, dict):
providers = {}
stored_key, existing = find_provider_entry(providers, endpoint_id)
if existing is None:
existing = {}
# Merge onto the existing entry rather than replacing it. A providers.<name>
# block is not owned by this panel: it can carry hand-written keys the
# dashboard has no field for — ``api_mode``, ``key_env``/``api_key_env``,
# ``extra_headers`` (which may themselves carry credentials),
# ``request_overrides`` — and rebuilding from scratch silently dropped every
# one of them on an unrelated edit, leaving a provider that no longer
# authenticates or speaks the right protocol.
entry: Dict[str, Any] = dict(existing)
entry.update({
"name": name,
"base_url": base_url,
"model": model,
"discover_models": bool(body.discover_models),
})
# Same for the model map: merge rather than replace, so existing models
# keep their context lengths. ``body.models`` is the catalogue the panel's
# Test button already discovered — without it only the one hand-typed
# model survived Save, and every picker showed a single-entry list for a
# provider serving dozens (#69988). A payload with no ``models`` (older
# UI) still just ensures the named default is present.
existing_models = entry.get("models")
models_map: Dict[str, Any] = dict(existing_models) if isinstance(existing_models, dict) else {}
for candidate in (*(body.models or ()), model):
model_id = str(candidate).strip()
if not model_id:
continue
current = models_map.get(model_id)
models_map[model_id] = dict(current) if isinstance(current, dict) else {}
entry["models"] = models_map
if body.context_length and body.context_length > 0:
entry["context_length"] = int(body.context_length)
entry["models"][model]["context_length"] = int(body.context_length)
# API keys never belong in config.yaml (#69449). Write to .env and
# reference it via ``key_env`` — the same indirection built-in providers
# use and that runtime_provider.py already resolves at load time.
env_var = custom_endpoint_key_env(endpoint_id)
submitted_key = body.api_key.strip() if body.api_key is not None else None
if submitted_key:
save_env_value(env_var, submitted_key)
entry["key_env"] = env_var
entry.pop("api_key", None)
elif submitted_key is not None:
# Blank field means "clear the key", not "leave it alone".
remove_env_value(env_var)
entry.pop("key_env", None)
entry.pop("api_key", None)
elif str(entry.get("api_key") or "").strip() and not _config_api_key_is_env_ref(endpoint_id):
# No new key submitted, but this entry still carries one an earlier
# release wrote in plaintext. Migrate it on the next save so endpoints
# configured before the fix get cleaned up too, without the user
# having to re-enter the key.
save_env_value(env_var, entry["api_key"].strip())
entry["key_env"] = env_var
entry.pop("api_key", None)
if stored_key is not None and stored_key != endpoint_id:
providers.pop(stored_key, None)
providers[endpoint_id] = entry
cfg["providers"] = providers
from hermes_cli.aiturk_media import configure_media
configure_media(cfg, entry)
if body.make_default:
cfg["model"] = _apply_main_model_assignment(
cfg.get("model", {}), endpoint_id, model, base_url
)
if entry.get("key_env") and isinstance(cfg["model"], dict):
cfg["model"]["key_env"] = entry["key_env"]
cfg["model"].pop("api_key", None)
return endpoint_id, entry
@app.get("/api/providers/custom-endpoints")
def list_custom_endpoints(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Return configured OpenAI-compatible custom endpoints for Desktop.
Scoped to the requested profile's config.yaml (issue: custom providers
only landing in the default profile): the desktop settings UI targets the
active profile, so read/write must resolve that profile's home rather than
the process-level HERMES_HOME. Mirrors ``/api/config``'s profile scoping.
"""
try:
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
return _custom_endpoint_response(load_config())
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("GET /api/providers/custom-endpoints failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to list custom endpoints")
@app.post("/api/providers/custom-endpoints")
def upsert_custom_endpoint(body: CustomEndpointUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Create or update a v12+ ``providers`` custom endpoint entry."""
try:
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
endpoint_id, _entry = _write_custom_endpoint(cfg, body)
save_config(cfg)
response = _custom_endpoint_response(cfg)
response["ok"] = True
response["id"] = endpoint_id
return response
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("POST /api/providers/custom-endpoints failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to save custom endpoint")
@app.post("/api/providers/custom-endpoints/{endpoint_id}/activate")
def activate_custom_endpoint(endpoint_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Set a configured custom endpoint as the default model provider."""
try:
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
provider_key = _custom_endpoint_id(endpoint_id)
_stored, entry = find_provider_entry(cfg.get("providers"), provider_key)
if entry is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="custom endpoint not found")
models = _models_from_custom_endpoint_entry(entry)
model = str(entry.get("model") or (models[0] if models else "")).strip()
base_url = str(entry.get("base_url") or "").strip()
if not model or not base_url:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="custom endpoint is incomplete")
model_cfg = _apply_main_model_assignment(cfg.get("model", {}), provider_key, model, base_url)
if entry.get("key_env"):
model_cfg["key_env"] = entry["key_env"]
model_cfg.pop("api_key", None)
elif entry.get("api_key"):
# Same #88990 shape as /api/model/set: `cfg` is env-expanded,
# so a raw `${VAR}` api_key would land as plaintext. Copy the
# raw template when that's what's on disk.
_raw_entry = None
try:
_stored_raw, _raw_entry = find_provider_entry(
read_raw_config().get("providers"), provider_key
)
except Exception:
_raw_entry = None
_raw_key = (
str(_raw_entry.get("api_key") or "").strip()
if isinstance(_raw_entry, dict)
else ""
)
if _raw_key.startswith("${") and _raw_key.endswith("}"):
model_cfg["api_key"] = _raw_key
else:
model_cfg["api_key"] = entry["api_key"]
cfg["model"] = model_cfg
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "provider": provider_key, "model": model}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("POST /api/providers/custom-endpoints/%s/activate failed", endpoint_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to activate custom endpoint")
@app.delete("/api/providers/custom-endpoints/{endpoint_id}")
def delete_custom_endpoint(endpoint_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Remove a configured custom endpoint from ``providers``."""
try:
with _config_profile_scope(profile):
cfg = load_config()
provider_key = _custom_endpoint_id(endpoint_id)
providers = cfg.get("providers")
stored_key, entry = find_provider_entry(providers, provider_key)
if entry is None or not isinstance(providers, dict):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="custom endpoint not found")
providers.pop(stored_key, None)
cfg["providers"] = providers
_detach_main_model_from_provider(cfg, provider_key)
remove_env_value(custom_endpoint_key_env(provider_key))
save_config(cfg)
response = _custom_endpoint_response(cfg)
response["ok"] = True
return response
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("DELETE /api/providers/custom-endpoints/%s failed", endpoint_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to delete custom endpoint")
@app.post("/api/providers/custom-endpoints/validate")
async def validate_custom_endpoint(body: CustomEndpointUpdate):
"""Probe a custom endpoint by calling its OpenAI-compatible /models URL."""
import httpx
base_url = (body.base_url or "").strip().rstrip("/")
if not base_url:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "Enter an endpoint URL first.", "models": []}
url = base_url + "/models"
headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
if body.api_key and body.api_key.strip():
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {body.api_key.strip()}"
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=httpx.Timeout(8.0)) as client:
resp = await client.get(url, headers=headers)
except Exception:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": False, "message": f"Could not reach {url}.", "models": []}
if resp.status_code in (401, 403):
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "The endpoint rejected the API key.", "models": []}
if not resp.is_success:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": f"Endpoint returned HTTP {resp.status_code}.", "models": []}
return {"ok": True, "reachable": True, "message": "", "models": _parse_model_ids(resp)}
@app.post("/api/providers/validate")
async def validate_provider_credential(body: EnvVarUpdate, request: Request):
"""Live-probe a provider credential before it's saved.
Returns {ok, reachable, message}. ok=True means the provider accepted the
key; ok=False + reachable=True means the key is bad (caller should block);
reachable=False means the network probe couldn't run (caller may save with
a warning rather than hard-blocking offline users).
"""
_require_token(request)
import httpx
key = (body.key or "").strip()
value = (body.value or "").strip()
if not value:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "Enter a value first."}
# Local / custom endpoint: validate connectivity, not auth — any HTTP
# response (even 401) proves the endpoint is up. Also surface the model
# ids the endpoint advertises (OpenAI ``/v1/models`` shape) so the GUI can
# auto-pick a default without asking the user to type a model name.
if key == "OPENAI_BASE_URL":
url = value.rstrip("/") + "/models"
# Send the optional API key so endpoints that require auth on
# ``/v1/models`` (many hosted OpenAI-compatible servers) still enumerate
# their models instead of returning an empty list behind a 401.
api_key = (body.api_key or "").strip()
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {api_key}"} if api_key else None
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=httpx.Timeout(8.0)) as client:
resp = await client.get(url, headers=headers)
return {"ok": True, "reachable": True, "message": "", "models": _parse_model_ids(resp)}
except Exception:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": False, "message": f"Could not reach {url}."}
probe = _CREDENTIAL_PROBES.get(key)
if not probe:
# No probe for this provider — can't validate, don't block.
return {"ok": True, "reachable": False, "message": ""}
url, auth = probe
headers = {"Accept": "application/json"}
params = {}
if auth == "bearer":
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {value}"
else:
params["key"] = value
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=httpx.Timeout(10.0)) as client:
resp = await client.get(url, headers=headers, params=params)
except Exception:
return {"ok": False, "reachable": False, "message": "Could not reach the provider to verify the key."}
if resp.status_code in (401, 403):
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": "That API key was rejected. Double-check it and try again."}
if resp.status_code == 429 or resp.is_success:
# 429 = key is valid but rate-limited; success = valid.
return {"ok": True, "reachable": True, "message": ""}
return {"ok": False, "reachable": True, "message": f"Provider returned HTTP {resp.status_code} for this key."}
@app.delete("/api/env")
async def remove_env_var(body: EnvVarDelete, profile: Optional[str] = None):
def _run():
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# Unified credential lifecycle: clears the .env entry AND every
# mirror of the credential — env-seeded credential_pool entries in
# auth.json (stale ones kept providers alive in the model picker,
# #51071/#59761), the affected providers' model-cache rows, and
# value-matched config.yaml api_key mirrors. OAuth/device-code/
# manual pool entries for the same provider are preserved.
from hermes_cli.credential_lifecycle import remove_provider_env_credential
return remove_provider_env_credential(body.key)
try:
result = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
if not result.get("found"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"{body.key} not found in .env")
return result
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
# remove_env_value raises ValueError for invalid key names. Surface
# the message to the SPA so the user understands why the delete was
# refused instead of seeing an opaque 500. Mirrors PUT /api/env.
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception:
_log.exception("DELETE /api/env failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
@app.post("/api/env/reveal")
async def reveal_env_var(
body: EnvVarReveal, request: Request, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
"""Return the real (unredacted) value of a single env var.
Protected by:
- Ephemeral session token (generated per server start, injected into SPA)
- Rate limiting (max 5 reveals per 30s window)
- Audit logging
"""
# --- Token check ---
_require_token(request)
# --- Rate limit ---
now = time.time()
cutoff = now - _REVEAL_WINDOW_SECONDS
_reveal_timestamps[:] = [t for t in _reveal_timestamps if t > cutoff]
if len(_reveal_timestamps) >= _REVEAL_MAX_PER_WINDOW:
raise HTTPException(status_code=429, detail="Too many reveal requests. Try again shortly.")
_reveal_timestamps.append(now)
# --- Reveal ---
def _run():
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
return load_env()
env_on_disk = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
value = env_on_disk.get(body.key)
if value is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"{body.key} not found in .env")
_log.info("env/reveal: %s", body.key)
return {"key": body.key, "value": value}
# Entries omit fields they don't need to override; the catalog builder fills
# in env_vars from OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS via prefix matching when not specified,
# and pulls required_env from a plugin's PlatformEntry when available.
_PLATFORM_OVERRIDES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
"telegram": {
"name": "Telegram",
"description": "Run Hermes from Telegram DMs, groups, and topics.",
"docs_url": "https://core.telegram.org/bots/features#botfather",
"env_vars": ("TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN", "TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", "TELEGRAM_PROXY"),
"required_env": ("TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN",),
},
"discord": {
"name": "Discord",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Discord DMs, channels, and threads.",
"docs_url": "https://discord.com/developers/applications",
"env_vars": (
"DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN",
"DISCORD_ALLOWED_USERS",
),
"required_env": ("DISCORD_BOT_TOKEN",),
},
"slack": {
"name": "Slack",
"description": "Use Hermes from Slack via Socket Mode. Add allowed Slack member IDs so connected bots can respond.",
"docs_url": "https://api.slack.com/apps",
"env_vars": ("SLACK_BOT_TOKEN", "SLACK_APP_TOKEN", "SLACK_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("SLACK_BOT_TOKEN", "SLACK_APP_TOKEN"),
},
"mattermost": {
"name": "Mattermost",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Mattermost channels and direct messages.",
"docs_url": "https://mattermost.com/deploy/",
"env_vars": ("MATTERMOST_URL", "MATTERMOST_TOKEN", "MATTERMOST_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("MATTERMOST_URL", "MATTERMOST_TOKEN"),
},
"matrix": {
"name": "Matrix",
"description": "Use Hermes in Matrix rooms and direct messages.",
"docs_url": "https://matrix.org/ecosystem/servers/",
"env_vars": (
"MATRIX_HOMESERVER",
"MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN",
"MATRIX_USER_ID",
"MATRIX_ALLOWED_USERS",
),
"required_env": ("MATRIX_HOMESERVER", "MATRIX_ACCESS_TOKEN", "MATRIX_USER_ID"),
},
"signal": {
"name": "Signal",
"description": "Connect through a signal-cli REST bridge.",
"docs_url": "https://github.com/bbernhard/signal-cli-rest-api",
"env_vars": ("SIGNAL_HTTP_URL", "SIGNAL_ACCOUNT", "SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("SIGNAL_HTTP_URL", "SIGNAL_ACCOUNT"),
},
"whatsapp": {
"name": "WhatsApp",
"description": "Use Hermes through the bundled WhatsApp bridge with QR-based auth.",
"docs_url": "https://github.com/tulir/whatsmeow",
"env_vars": (
"WHATSAPP_ENABLED",
"WHATSAPP_MODE",
"WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY",
"WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS",
),
"required_env": (),
},
"homeassistant": {
"name": "Home Assistant",
"description": "Control your smart home from Hermes via Home Assistant.",
"docs_url": "https://www.home-assistant.io/docs/authentication/",
"env_vars": ("HASS_URL", "HASS_TOKEN"),
"required_env": ("HASS_URL", "HASS_TOKEN"),
},
"email": {
"name": "Email",
"description": "Talk to Hermes through an IMAP/SMTP mailbox.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/",
"env_vars": (
"EMAIL_ADDRESS",
"EMAIL_PASSWORD",
"EMAIL_IMAP_HOST",
"EMAIL_SMTP_HOST",
),
"required_env": (
"EMAIL_ADDRESS",
"EMAIL_PASSWORD",
"EMAIL_IMAP_HOST",
"EMAIL_SMTP_HOST",
),
},
"sms": {
"name": "SMS (Twilio)",
"description": "Send and receive text messages via Twilio.",
"docs_url": "https://www.twilio.com/console",
"env_vars": ("TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID", "TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN"),
"required_env": ("TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID", "TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN"),
},
"dingtalk": {
"name": "DingTalk",
"description": "Connect Hermes to DingTalk groups (钉钉).",
"docs_url": "https://open.dingtalk.com/document/orgapp/the-robot-development-process",
"env_vars": ("DINGTALK_CLIENT_ID", "DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET"),
"required_env": ("DINGTALK_CLIENT_ID", "DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET"),
},
"feishu": {
"name": "Feishu / Lark",
"description": "Use Hermes inside Feishu / Lark.",
"docs_url": "https://open.feishu.cn/document/uAjLw4CM/ukTMukTMukTM/reference/im-v1/intro",
"env_vars": (
"FEISHU_APP_ID",
"FEISHU_APP_SECRET",
"FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY",
"FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN",
),
"required_env": ("FEISHU_APP_ID", "FEISHU_APP_SECRET"),
},
"google_chat": {
"name": "Google Chat",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Google Chat via Cloud Pub/Sub.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/google_chat",
},
"wecom": {
"name": "WeCom (group bot)",
"description": "Send-only WeCom group bot via webhook.",
"docs_url": "https://developer.work.weixin.qq.com/document/path/91770",
"env_vars": ("WECOM_BOT_ID", "WECOM_SECRET"),
"required_env": ("WECOM_BOT_ID",),
},
"wecom_callback": {
"name": "WeCom (app)",
"description": "Two-way WeCom integration via callback app.",
"docs_url": "https://developer.work.weixin.qq.com/document/path/90930",
"env_vars": (
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_ID",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_SECRET",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_AGENT_ID",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_TOKEN",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_ENCODING_AES_KEY",
),
"required_env": (
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_ID",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_SECRET",
"WECOM_CALLBACK_AGENT_ID",
),
},
"weixin": {
"name": "Weixin / WeChat (Personal)",
"description": "Connect a personal WeChat account through Tencent's iLink Bot API.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/weixin/",
"env_vars": ("WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID", "WEIXIN_TOKEN", "WEIXIN_BASE_URL"),
"required_env": ("WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID", "WEIXIN_TOKEN"),
},
"bluebubbles": {
"name": "BlueBubbles (iMessage)",
"description": "Use Hermes through iMessage via a BlueBubbles server.",
"docs_url": "https://bluebubbles.app/",
"env_vars": (
"BLUEBUBBLES_SERVER_URL",
"BLUEBUBBLES_PASSWORD",
"BLUEBUBBLES_ALLOWED_USERS",
),
"required_env": ("BLUEBUBBLES_SERVER_URL", "BLUEBUBBLES_PASSWORD"),
},
"qqbot": {
"name": "QQ Bot",
"description": "Connect Hermes to a QQ Bot from the QQ Open Platform.",
"docs_url": "https://q.qq.com",
"env_vars": ("QQ_APP_ID", "QQ_CLIENT_SECRET", "QQ_ALLOWED_USERS"),
"required_env": ("QQ_APP_ID", "QQ_CLIENT_SECRET"),
},
# Teams ships as a platform plugin, so its name/env vars come from the
# plugin registry. Only the docs link needs an override here so the
# Channels page can point at the Microsoft Teams setup guide.
"teams": {
"description": "Connect Hermes to Microsoft Teams chats via the Bot Framework.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/teams",
},
# Bundled platform plugins: name comes from the plugin registry label;
# give each a human description (the registry's install_hint is a
# dependency note, not a description) and a docs link.
"irc": {
"description": "Relay messages between an IRC channel (or DMs) and Hermes.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/irc",
},
"line": {
"description": "Use Hermes from LINE via the LINE Messaging API webhook.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/line",
},
"ntfy": {
"description": "Chat with Hermes over ntfy push topics (ntfy.sh or self-hosted).",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/ntfy",
},
"photon": {
"description": "Use Hermes through iMessage via Photon's managed Spectrum platform.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/photon",
},
"raft": {
"description": "Join a Raft workspace as an external agent.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/raft",
},
"simplex": {
"description": "Talk to Hermes over SimpleX Chat via a local simplex-chat daemon.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/simplex",
},
"yuanbao": {
"name": "Yuanbao (元宝)",
"description": "Connect Hermes to Tencent Yuanbao.",
"docs_url": "",
"required_env": (),
},
"api_server": {
"name": "API server",
"description": "Expose Hermes as an OpenAI-compatible HTTP API for tools like Open WebUI.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/",
"env_vars": (
"API_SERVER_ENABLED",
"API_SERVER_KEY",
"API_SERVER_PORT",
"API_SERVER_HOST",
"API_SERVER_MODEL_NAME",
),
"required_env": (),
},
"webhook": {
"name": "Webhooks",
"description": "Receive events from GitHub, GitLab, and other webhook sources.",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/webhooks/",
"env_vars": ("WEBHOOK_ENABLED", "WEBHOOK_PORT", "WEBHOOK_SECRET"),
"required_env": (),
},
"msgraph_webhook": {
"name": "Microsoft Graph Webhook",
"description": "Receive Microsoft Graph change notifications (Teams meetings, Outlook, …).",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/msgraph-webhook",
"required_env": (),
},
"whatsapp_cloud": {
"name": "WhatsApp Cloud API",
"description": "Use Hermes via Meta's hosted WhatsApp Cloud API (no local bridge).",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/messaging/whatsapp-cloud",
},
"relay": {
"name": "Relay (experimental)",
"description": "Generic relay adapter fronted by the Hermes Relay connector.",
"docs_url": "",
"required_env": (),
},
}
# Display order: well-known platforms surface first; unknown plugins fall to
# the end alphabetically.
_PLATFORM_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (
"telegram",
"discord",
"slack",
"mattermost",
"matrix",
"whatsapp",
"signal",
"bluebubbles",
"homeassistant",
"email",
"sms",
"dingtalk",
"feishu",
"google_chat",
"wecom",
"wecom_callback",
"weixin",
"qqbot",
"yuanbao",
"api_server",
"webhook",
)
# Display labels for env vars not in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS (HOME_CHANNEL_*, bridge
# toggles, Twilio, HASS, Email, etc.). Anything missing from OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS
# falls back here so the UI can still render a friendly label.
_MESSAGING_ENV_FALLBACKS: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
"SIGNAL_HTTP_URL": {
"description": "signal-cli REST API base URL, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080",
"prompt": "Signal bridge URL",
"url": "https://github.com/bbernhard/signal-cli-rest-api",
},
"SIGNAL_ACCOUNT": {
"description": "Signal account phone number registered with the bridge",
"prompt": "Signal account",
},
"SIGNAL_ALLOWED_USERS": {
"description": "Comma-separated Signal users allowed to use the bot",
"prompt": "Allowed Signal users",
},
"WHATSAPP_ENABLED": {
"description": "Enable the WhatsApp gateway adapter",
"prompt": "Enable WhatsApp",
"advanced": True,
},
"WHATSAPP_MODE": {
"description": "WhatsApp bridge mode",
"prompt": "WhatsApp mode",
"advanced": True,
},
"WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY": {
"description": "How WhatsApp direct messages are authorized",
"prompt": "WhatsApp DM policy",
"advanced": True,
},
"WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS": {
"description": "Comma-separated WhatsApp users allowed to use the bot",
"prompt": "Allowed WhatsApp users",
},
"HASS_URL": {
"description": "Home Assistant base URL, e.g. https://homeassistant.local:8123",
"prompt": "Home Assistant URL",
},
"HASS_TOKEN": {
"description": "Long-lived access token from Home Assistant (Profile → Security)",
"prompt": "Home Assistant access token",
"password": True,
},
"EMAIL_ADDRESS": {
"description": "Email address to send and receive from",
"prompt": "Email address",
},
"EMAIL_PASSWORD": {
"description": "Email account password or app password",
"prompt": "Email password",
"password": True,
},
"EMAIL_IMAP_HOST": {
"description": "IMAP server host (e.g. imap.gmail.com)",
"prompt": "IMAP host",
},
"EMAIL_SMTP_HOST": {
"description": "SMTP server host (e.g. smtp.gmail.com)",
"prompt": "SMTP host",
},
"TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID": {
"description": "Twilio Account SID",
"prompt": "Twilio Account SID",
"url": "https://www.twilio.com/console",
},
"TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN": {
"description": "Twilio Auth Token",
"prompt": "Twilio Auth Token",
"password": True,
},
"WECOM_BOT_ID": {"description": "WeCom group bot ID", "prompt": "WeCom Bot ID"},
"WECOM_SECRET": {
"description": "WeCom group bot secret",
"prompt": "WeCom Secret",
"password": True,
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_ID": {
"description": "WeCom corp ID",
"prompt": "WeCom Corp ID",
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_CORP_SECRET": {
"description": "WeCom app corp secret",
"prompt": "WeCom Corp Secret",
"password": True,
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_AGENT_ID": {
"description": "WeCom app agent ID",
"prompt": "WeCom Agent ID",
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_TOKEN": {
"description": "WeCom callback verification token",
"prompt": "WeCom Token",
},
"WECOM_CALLBACK_ENCODING_AES_KEY": {
"description": "WeCom callback AES encoding key",
"prompt": "WeCom AES Key",
"password": True,
},
"WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID": {
"description": "iLink Bot account ID obtained through QR login in hermes gateway setup",
"prompt": "iLink Bot account ID",
},
"WEIXIN_TOKEN": {
"description": "iLink Bot token obtained through QR login in hermes gateway setup",
"prompt": "iLink Bot token",
"password": True,
},
"WEIXIN_BASE_URL": {
"description": "iLink API base URL saved by QR login (default: https://ilinkai.weixin.qq.com)",
"prompt": "iLink API base URL",
},
"FEISHU_APP_ID": {"description": "Feishu / Lark app ID", "prompt": "App ID"},
"FEISHU_APP_SECRET": {
"description": "Feishu / Lark app secret",
"prompt": "App secret",
"password": True,
},
"FEISHU_ENCRYPT_KEY": {
"description": "Feishu / Lark encrypt key",
"prompt": "Encrypt key",
"password": True,
},
"FEISHU_VERIFICATION_TOKEN": {
"description": "Feishu / Lark verification token",
"prompt": "Verification token",
"password": True,
},
"DINGTALK_CLIENT_ID": {
"description": "DingTalk client ID (App key)",
"prompt": "Client ID",
},
"DINGTALK_CLIENT_SECRET": {
"description": "DingTalk client secret (App secret)",
"prompt": "Client secret",
"password": True,
},
}
def _messaging_platform_catalog() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
"""Build the messaging catalog from the gateway's Platform enum + plugin registry.
Built-in platforms come from ``gateway.config.Platform`` (LOCAL is excluded).
Plugin platforms come from ``gateway.platform_registry.plugin_entries()``,
which lets newly installed adapters (e.g. IRC) appear without a code change
here. Per-platform UI metadata (description, docs URL, env-var picks) lives
in :data:`_PLATFORM_OVERRIDES`; anything not overridden gets reasonable
defaults derived from the platform id and required_env.
"""
from gateway.config import Platform
# Resolve plugin entries FIRST. Plugin platforms (irc, ntfy, photon, …)
# leak into ``Platform.__members__`` as pseudo-members the moment any
# earlier code path calls ``Platform("<plugin id>")`` — and iterating the
# enum first would then claim them with no plugin metadata, rendering
# nameless "Irc"/"Ntfy" cards with empty descriptions on the Channels
# page while the real label/install-hint sat unused in the registry.
plugin_map: dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
# Plugin discovery only runs as a side effect of importing
# model_tools; this server process doesn't do that, so trigger it
# explicitly (idempotent) or plugin_entries() is empty here and
# every plugin platform renders nameless.
from hermes_cli.plugins import discover_plugins
discover_plugins()
from gateway.platform_registry import platform_registry
for plugin_entry in platform_registry.plugin_entries():
plugin_map[plugin_entry.name] = plugin_entry
except Exception:
_log.debug("plugin platform registry unavailable", exc_info=True)
seen: set[str] = set()
entries: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
for member in Platform.__members__.values():
if member.value == "local":
continue
if member.value in seen:
continue
seen.add(member.value)
entries.append(
_build_catalog_entry(member.value, plugin_map.get(member.value))
)
for name, plugin_entry in plugin_map.items():
if name in seen:
continue
seen.add(name)
entries.append(_build_catalog_entry(name, plugin_entry))
order = {pid: idx for idx, pid in enumerate(_PLATFORM_ORDER)}
entries.sort(
key=lambda e: (order.get(e["id"], len(_PLATFORM_ORDER)), e["name"].lower())
)
return tuple(entries)
def _channel_managed_env_keys() -> frozenset[str]:
"""Env-var keys owned by a Channels page platform card.
The Channels page is the canonical surface for configuring messaging
platform credentials (with connection status, test, enable toggle and
gateway restart). The Keys/Env page consults this set to hide those vars
so the same fields aren't duplicated in a plainer UI. Best-effort: if the
gateway catalog can't be built, nothing is flagged and Keys shows it all.
"""
try:
keys: set[str] = set()
for entry in _messaging_platform_catalog():
keys.update(entry.get("env_vars", ()))
return frozenset(keys)
except Exception:
_log.debug("could not build channel-managed env key set", exc_info=True)
return frozenset()
# Cross-cutting gateway / relay knobs stay on the Keys → Settings tab even though
# they use the ``messaging`` category in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS. Platform-scoped vars
# (``DISCORD_*``, ``MATRIX_*``, …) are owned by the Messaging UI instead.
_MESSAGING_KEYS_PAGE_KEYS = frozenset({
"GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS",
"GATEWAY_PROXY_KEY",
"GATEWAY_PROXY_URL",
})
def _platform_env_prefixes(platform_id: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Env-var prefixes owned by a messaging platform card."""
aliases: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
"email": ("EMAIL_",),
"homeassistant": ("HASS_",),
"qqbot": ("QQ_", "QQBOT_"),
"sms": ("TWILIO_",),
"wecom": ("WECOM_BOT_", "WECOM_SECRET"),
"wecom_callback": ("WECOM_CALLBACK_",),
}
if platform_id in aliases:
return aliases[platform_id]
return (platform_id.upper().replace("-", "_") + "_",)
# Which per-platform knobs the setup UI hides, and why: see
# hermes_cli/setup_hidden_env.py. Shared with the `hermes setup gateway`
# wizard so the surfaces ask for the same things.
from hermes_cli.setup_hidden_env import ( # noqa: E402
is_setup_hidden_env as _is_setup_hidden_env,
)
def _discover_platform_env_vars(platform_id: str) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""All messaging-category env vars for a platform (override + plugin + prefix)."""
prefixes = _platform_env_prefixes(platform_id)
keys: list[str] = []
for name, info in OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.items():
if info.get("category") != "messaging":
continue
if name in _MESSAGING_KEYS_PAGE_KEYS:
continue
if _is_setup_hidden_env(name):
continue
if not any(name.startswith(prefix) for prefix in prefixes):
continue
keys.append(name)
return tuple(sorted(set(keys)))
def _merge_platform_env_vars(
platform_id: str,
override: dict[str, Any],
plugin_entry: Any | None,
) -> tuple[str, ...]:
"""Canonical env-var list for a messaging platform card.
Required credentials always survive: a platform that genuinely needs one of
the hidden-suffix vars to connect keeps it, since hiding a required field
would make the platform unconfigurable.
"""
discovered = _discover_platform_env_vars(platform_id)
if "env_vars" in override:
explicit = tuple(
key for key in override["env_vars"] if not _is_setup_hidden_env(key)
)
return tuple(dict.fromkeys((*explicit, *discovered)))
if plugin_entry is not None and plugin_entry.required_env:
return tuple(dict.fromkeys((*tuple(plugin_entry.required_env), *discovered)))
return discovered
def _build_catalog_entry(
platform_id: str, plugin_entry: Any | None = None
) -> dict[str, Any]:
override = _PLATFORM_OVERRIDES.get(platform_id, {})
env_vars = _merge_platform_env_vars(platform_id, override, plugin_entry)
if "required_env" in override:
required_env = tuple(override["required_env"])
elif plugin_entry is not None:
required_env = tuple(plugin_entry.required_env or ())
else:
required_env = ()
if override.get("name"):
name = override["name"]
elif plugin_entry is not None and plugin_entry.label:
name = plugin_entry.label
else:
name = platform_id.replace("_", " ").title()
description = override.get("description")
if not description and plugin_entry is not None:
description = plugin_entry.install_hint or ""
return {
"id": platform_id,
"name": name,
"description": description or "",
"docs_url": override.get("docs_url", ""),
"env_vars": env_vars,
"required_env": required_env,
}
def _catalog_lookup(platform_id: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
for entry in _messaging_platform_catalog():
if entry["id"] == platform_id:
return entry
return None
def _messaging_env_info(key: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
info = OPTIONAL_ENV_VARS.get(key) or _MESSAGING_ENV_FALLBACKS.get(key) or {}
return {
"description": info.get("description", ""),
"prompt": info.get("prompt", key),
"help": info.get("help", ""),
"url": info.get("url"),
"is_password": info.get("password", False),
"advanced": info.get("advanced", False),
}
def _gateway_platform_config(platform_id: str):
from gateway.config import Platform, load_gateway_config
config = load_gateway_config()
platform = Platform(platform_id)
platform_config = config.platforms.get(platform)
return config, platform, platform_config
def _messaging_platform_payload(
entry: dict[str, Any],
env_on_disk: dict[str, str],
runtime: dict | None,
scoped: bool = False,
profile_home: Optional[Path] = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
platform_id = entry["id"]
runtime_platforms = runtime.get("platforms") if runtime else {}
runtime_platform = (
runtime_platforms.get(platform_id, {})
if isinstance(runtime_platforms, dict)
else {}
)
# Same shared ladder /api/status uses. Before this was unified, the two
# endpoints disagreed on the same page load — the sidebar strip read
# "running" (it probed GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL and scoped to the requested
# profile) while the Channels page rendered "The gateway is not running"
# (it did neither). Cross-container, profile-scoped, and
# launch-service-managed deployments each hit that split.
#
# profile_home is passed when the request was scoped to a named profile:
# gateway/status readers resolve process-level paths and do NOT follow the
# HERMES_HOME contextvar override (#56986 / #69143), so the profile's
# directory has to be handed over explicitly or messaging silently reports
# another profile's gateway (#71211).
liveness = resolve_gateway_liveness(
profile_dir=profile_home,
runtime=runtime,
health_probe=(
_probe_gateway_health if _GATEWAY_HEALTH_URL else None
),
pid_probe=get_running_pid_cached,
runtime_reader=read_runtime_status,
runtime_pid_probe=get_runtime_status_running_pid,
)
gateway_running = liveness.running
env_vars = []
for key in entry["env_vars"]:
# When profile-scoped, judge only the profile's own .env — the
# dashboard process's os.environ carries the ROOT install's .env
# (loaded at startup) and would falsely report the root credentials
# as the profile's.
value = env_on_disk.get(key) or ("" if scoped else os.getenv(key, ""))
env_vars.append(
{
"key": key,
"required": key in entry["required_env"],
"is_set": bool(value),
"redacted_value": redact_key(value) if value else None,
**_messaging_env_info(key),
}
)
if scoped:
# Profile-scoped view: derive enablement/configuration from the
# profile's config.yaml + .env only. load_gateway_config()'s
# env-override layer reads os.environ and would leak the root
# install's tokens into the profile's reported state.
try:
cfg = load_config()
platforms_cfg = cfg.get("platforms") or {}
plat_cfg = platforms_cfg.get(platform_id)
if not isinstance(plat_cfg, dict):
plat_cfg = {}
enabled = bool(plat_cfg.get("enabled"))
hc = plat_cfg.get("home_channel")
home_channel = hc if isinstance(hc, dict) else None
except Exception:
enabled = False
home_channel = None
configured = all(env_on_disk.get(key) for key in entry["required_env"])
else:
try:
gateway_config, platform, platform_config = _gateway_platform_config(
platform_id
)
enabled = bool(platform_config and platform_config.enabled)
configured = bool(
platform_config
and gateway_config._is_platform_connected(platform, platform_config)
)
home_channel = (
platform_config.home_channel.to_dict()
if platform_config and platform_config.home_channel
else None
)
except Exception:
enabled = False
configured = all(
env_on_disk.get(key) or os.getenv(key, "")
for key in entry["required_env"]
)
home_channel = None
state = (
runtime_platform.get("state") if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict) else None
)
runtime_gateway_state = runtime.get("gateway_state") if isinstance(runtime, dict) else None
runtime_gateway_error = runtime.get("exit_reason") if isinstance(runtime, dict) else None
if not enabled:
state = "disabled"
elif not configured:
state = "not_configured"
elif gateway_running and not state:
state = "pending_restart"
elif (
not gateway_running
and not state
and runtime_gateway_state == "startup_failed"
):
state = "startup_failed"
elif not gateway_running and not state:
state = "gateway_stopped"
error_code = (
runtime_platform.get("error_code")
if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict)
else None
)
error_message = (
runtime_platform.get("error_message")
if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict)
else None
)
if state == "startup_failed":
error_code = error_code or "startup_failed"
error_message = error_message or runtime_gateway_error
whatsapp_setup = None
if platform_id == "whatsapp":
whatsapp_mode = (
env_on_disk.get("WHATSAPP_MODE")
or ("" if scoped else os.getenv("WHATSAPP_MODE", ""))
).strip()
allowed_users_value = (
env_on_disk.get("WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS")
or ("" if scoped else os.getenv("WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS", ""))
).strip()
whatsapp_setup = {
"mode": whatsapp_mode if whatsapp_mode in {"bot", "self-chat"} else "",
"allowed_users_set": bool(allowed_users_value),
"home_channel_set": bool(home_channel),
}
payload = {
"id": platform_id,
"name": entry["name"],
"description": entry["description"],
"docs_url": entry["docs_url"],
"enabled": enabled,
"configured": configured,
"gateway_running": gateway_running,
"state": state,
"error_code": error_code,
"error_message": error_message,
"updated_at": (
runtime_platform.get("updated_at")
if isinstance(runtime_platform, dict)
else None
),
"home_channel": home_channel,
"env_vars": env_vars,
}
if whatsapp_setup is not None:
payload["whatsapp_setup"] = whatsapp_setup
return payload
def _write_platform_enabled(platform_id: str, enabled: bool) -> None:
write_platform_config_field(platform_id, "enabled", enabled)
_WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TTL_SECONDS = 600
_WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES = {"connected", "error", "expired", "cancelled"}
@dataclass
class _WhatsAppOnboardingSession:
proc: subprocess.Popen | None
mode: str
allowed_users: str
session_path: str
expires_at: str
expires_at_ts: float
profile: str | None = None
status: str = "starting"
qr_payload: str | None = None
account_id: str | None = None
account_name: str | None = None
account_phone: str | None = None
error: str | None = None
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions: dict[str, _WhatsAppOnboardingSession] = {}
_whatsapp_onboarding_lock = threading.RLock()
def _utc_iso_from_ts(ts: float) -> str:
return datetime.fromtimestamp(ts, timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
def _normalize_whatsapp_onboarding_mode(value: Any) -> str:
mode = str(value or "bot").strip().lower()
if mode not in {"bot", "self-chat"}:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="WhatsApp mode must be 'bot' or 'self-chat'.")
return mode
def _normalize_whatsapp_allowed_users(value: Any) -> str:
raw = str(value or "").strip()
if not raw:
return ""
return ",".join(part.replace(" ", "") for part in raw.split(",") if part.strip())
def _whatsapp_session_path() -> Path:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_dir
return get_hermes_dir("platforms/whatsapp/session", "whatsapp/session")
def _whatsapp_phone_from_identifier(value: Any) -> str | None:
raw = str(value or "").strip()
if not raw:
return None
candidate = raw.split("@", 1)[0].split(":", 1)[0]
digits = re.sub(r"\D+", "", candidate)
return digits or None
def _whatsapp_linked_account_from_session(session_path: Path) -> tuple[str | None, str | None, str | None]:
creds_path = session_path / "creds.json"
try:
payload = json.loads(creds_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
return None, None, None
account_id: str | None = None
account_name: str | None = None
def collect(candidate: Any) -> None:
nonlocal account_id, account_name
if not isinstance(candidate, dict):
return
if account_id is None:
for key in ("id", "jid", "lid"):
value = str(candidate.get(key) or "").strip()
if value:
account_id = value
break
if account_name is None:
for key in ("name", "verifiedName", "notify", "pushName"):
value = str(candidate.get(key) or "").strip()
if value:
account_name = value
break
collect(payload.get("me"))
collect(payload.get("account"))
collect(payload)
return account_id, account_name, _whatsapp_phone_from_identifier(account_id)
def _ensure_whatsapp_bridge_dependencies(bridge_dir: Path) -> None:
"""Install bridge dependencies when the dashboard is the setup surface."""
if (bridge_dir / "node_modules").exists():
return
from hermes_constants import find_node_executable, with_hermes_node_path
from utils import env_int
npm = find_node_executable("npm")
if not npm:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="npm was not found. WhatsApp setup needs Node.js and npm.",
)
timeout = env_int("WHATSAPP_NPM_INSTALL_TIMEOUT", 300)
try:
result = subprocess.run(
[npm, "install", "--silent"],
cwd=str(bridge_dir),
capture_output=True,
text=True,
# npm output is UTF-8; guard the Windows ANSI-code-page default
# against undefined bytes crashing the reader thread (#52649).
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
timeout=timeout,
env=with_hermes_node_path(),
creationflags=windows_hide_flags(),
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Installing WhatsApp bridge dependencies timed out.",
) from exc
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Failed to install WhatsApp bridge dependencies: {exc}",
) from exc
if result.returncode != 0:
detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout or "").strip()
if detail:
detail = "\n".join(detail.splitlines()[-10:])
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"npm install failed for WhatsApp bridge: {detail or 'no output'}",
)
def _spawn_whatsapp_pairing_process(session_path: Path, mode: str) -> subprocess.Popen:
from gateway.platforms.whatsapp_common import resolve_whatsapp_bridge_dir
from hermes_constants import find_node_executable, with_hermes_node_path
bridge_dir = resolve_whatsapp_bridge_dir()
bridge_script = bridge_dir / "bridge.js"
if not bridge_script.exists():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"WhatsApp bridge script was not found at {bridge_script}.",
)
node = find_node_executable("node")
if not node:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Node.js was not found. WhatsApp setup needs Node.js.",
)
_ensure_whatsapp_bridge_dependencies(bridge_dir)
session_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
env = with_hermes_node_path()
env["WHATSAPP_MODE"] = mode
env["WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY"] = "pairing"
return subprocess.Popen(
[
node,
str(bridge_script),
"--pair-only",
"--pair-json",
"--session",
str(session_path),
],
cwd=str(bridge_dir),
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
text=True,
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
start_new_session=True,
env=env,
creationflags=windows_hide_flags(),
)
def _terminate_whatsapp_pairing(proc: subprocess.Popen | None) -> None:
if proc is None:
return
if proc.poll() is not None:
return
try:
proc.terminate()
proc.wait(timeout=3)
except Exception:
try:
proc.kill()
except Exception:
pass
def _watch_whatsapp_pairing(pairing_id: str, proc: subprocess.Popen) -> None:
try:
stream = proc.stdout
if stream is not None:
for line in stream:
raw = line.strip()
if not raw:
continue
try:
payload = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
continue
event = str(payload.get("event") or "").strip()
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.proc is not proc:
return
if event == "qr":
qr = str(payload.get("qr") or "").strip()
if qr:
record.qr_payload = qr
record.status = "waiting"
record.error = None
elif event == "connected":
user = payload.get("user")
if isinstance(user, dict):
account_id = str(user.get("id") or "").strip()
account_name = str(user.get("name") or "").strip()
record.account_id = account_id or None
record.account_name = account_name or None
record.account_phone = _whatsapp_phone_from_identifier(account_id)
record.status = "connected"
record.error = None
elif event == "error":
record.status = "error"
record.error = str(payload.get("error") or "WhatsApp pairing failed.")
elif event == "disconnected" and record.status == "starting":
record.status = "waiting"
returncode = proc.wait()
except Exception as exc:
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if record and record.proc is proc and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
record.status = "error"
record.error = str(exc)
return
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.proc is not proc:
return
if record.status in {"connected", "cancelled", "expired"}:
return
record.status = "error"
record.error = (
"WhatsApp pairing process exited before pairing completed."
if returncode == 0
else f"WhatsApp pairing process exited with code {returncode}."
)
def _run_whatsapp_pairing(pairing_id: str, session_path: Path, mode: str) -> None:
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.status in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
return
record.status = "installing"
try:
proc = _spawn_whatsapp_pairing_process(session_path, mode)
except Exception as exc:
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if record and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
record.status = "error"
record.error = str(exc)
return
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record or record.status in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(proc)
return
record.proc = proc
record.status = "starting"
_watch_whatsapp_pairing(pairing_id, proc)
def _prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions() -> None:
now = time.time()
remove_ids: list[str] = []
for pairing_id, record in _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.items():
if (
record.proc is not None
and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES
and record.proc.poll() is not None
):
record.status = "error"
record.error = "WhatsApp pairing process exited before pairing completed."
if record.expires_at_ts <= now and record.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(record.proc)
record.status = "expired"
record.error = "WhatsApp QR setup expired. Start a new setup."
if record.status in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES and record.expires_at_ts + 300 <= now:
remove_ids.append(pairing_id)
for pairing_id in remove_ids:
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.pop(pairing_id, None)
def _supersede_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions(session_path: Path) -> None:
for existing in _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.values():
if existing.session_path == str(session_path) and existing.status not in _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TERMINAL_STATUSES:
existing.status = "cancelled"
existing.error = "Superseded by a newer WhatsApp setup session."
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(existing.proc)
def _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id: str, record: _WhatsAppOnboardingSession) -> dict[str, Any]:
return {
"pairing_id": pairing_id,
"status": record.status,
"qr_payload": record.qr_payload,
"expires_at": record.expires_at,
"mode": record.mode,
"allowed_users": record.allowed_users,
"account_id": record.account_id,
"account_name": record.account_name,
"account_phone": record.account_phone,
"error": record.error,
}
def _restart_gateway_after_whatsapp_onboarding(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
try:
proc, reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to auto-restart gateway after WhatsApp onboarding")
return {
"restart_started": False,
"restart_error": str(exc),
}
if reused:
_log.info(
"WhatsApp onboarding: reusing in-flight gateway restart (pid %s)",
proc.pid,
)
return {
"restart_started": True,
"restart_action": "gateway-restart",
"restart_pid": proc.pid,
}
@app.post("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/start")
async def start_whatsapp_onboarding(body: WhatsAppOnboardingStart):
mode = _normalize_whatsapp_onboarding_mode(body.mode)
allowed_users = _normalize_whatsapp_allowed_users(body.allowed_users)
effective_profile = body.profile
with _config_profile_scope(effective_profile):
session_path = _whatsapp_session_path()
expires_at_ts = time.time() + _WHATSAPP_ONBOARDING_TTL_SECONDS
expires_at = _utc_iso_from_ts(expires_at_ts)
if (session_path / "creds.json").exists():
pairing_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
account_id, account_name, account_phone = _whatsapp_linked_account_from_session(session_path)
record = _WhatsAppOnboardingSession(
proc=None,
mode=mode,
allowed_users=allowed_users,
session_path=str(session_path),
expires_at=expires_at,
expires_at_ts=expires_at_ts,
profile=effective_profile,
status="connected",
account_id=account_id,
account_name=account_name,
account_phone=account_phone,
)
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
_supersede_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions(session_path)
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions[pairing_id] = record
return _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id, record)
pairing_id = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
record = _WhatsAppOnboardingSession(
proc=None,
mode=mode,
allowed_users=allowed_users,
session_path=str(session_path),
expires_at=expires_at,
expires_at_ts=expires_at_ts,
profile=effective_profile,
)
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
_supersede_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions(session_path)
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions[pairing_id] = record
threading.Thread(
target=_run_whatsapp_pairing,
args=(pairing_id, session_path, mode),
daemon=True,
).start()
return _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id, record)
@app.get("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def get_whatsapp_onboarding_status(pairing_id: str):
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="WhatsApp setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
if record.status == "expired":
raise HTTPException(status_code=410, detail=record.error or "WhatsApp setup expired.")
return _whatsapp_onboarding_payload(pairing_id, record)
@app.post("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/{pairing_id}/apply")
async def apply_whatsapp_onboarding(
pairing_id: str, body: WhatsAppOnboardingApply, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_prune_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions()
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="WhatsApp setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
if record.status != "connected":
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="WhatsApp setup is not connected yet.")
mode = _normalize_whatsapp_onboarding_mode(body.mode or record.mode)
allowed_users = _normalize_whatsapp_allowed_users(
record.allowed_users if body.allowed_users is None else body.allowed_users
)
if mode == "self-chat" and not allowed_users:
allowed_users = record.account_phone or record.account_id or ""
record_profile = record.profile
effective_profile = body.profile or profile or record_profile
try:
with _config_profile_scope(effective_profile):
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_MODE", mode)
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY", "pairing")
if allowed_users:
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_ALLOWED_USERS", allowed_users)
# Blank means "keep the existing allowlist"; explicit clearing
# still lives in the normal config editor where the field is visible.
save_env_value("WHATSAPP_ENABLED", "true")
_write_platform_enabled("whatsapp", True)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("WhatsApp onboarding apply failed")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Failed to save WhatsApp setup.",
) from exc
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
_whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.pop(pairing_id, None)
restart_result = _restart_gateway_after_whatsapp_onboarding(effective_profile)
return {
"ok": True,
"platform": "whatsapp",
"needs_restart": not restart_result["restart_started"],
**restart_result,
}
@app.delete("/api/messaging/whatsapp/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def cancel_whatsapp_onboarding(pairing_id: str):
with _whatsapp_onboarding_lock:
record = _whatsapp_onboarding_sessions.pop(pairing_id, None)
if record:
record.status = "cancelled"
_terminate_whatsapp_pairing(record.proc)
return {"ok": True}
_TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_DEFAULT_URL = "https://setup.hermes-agent.nousresearch.com"
_TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_USER_AGENT = f"HermesDashboard/{__version__}"
@dataclass
class _TelegramOnboardingPairing:
poll_token: str
expires_at: str
expires_at_ts: float
bot_token: str | None = None
bot_username: str | None = None
owner_user_id: str | None = None
_telegram_onboarding_pairings: dict[str, _TelegramOnboardingPairing] = {}
_telegram_onboarding_lock = threading.RLock()
def _telegram_onboarding_base_url() -> str:
return (
os.getenv("TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_URL", _TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_DEFAULT_URL)
.strip()
.rstrip("/")
)
def _parse_expiry_ts(value: str) -> float:
try:
normalized = value.replace("Z", "+00:00")
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized)
if parsed.tzinfo is None:
parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
return parsed.timestamp()
except Exception:
return time.time() + 600
def _prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings() -> None:
now = time.time()
expired = [
pairing_id
for pairing_id, record in _telegram_onboarding_pairings.items()
if record.expires_at_ts <= now
]
for pairing_id in expired:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
def _normalize_telegram_user_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
normalized = str(value or "").strip()
if _TELEGRAM_USER_ID_RE.fullmatch(normalized):
return normalized
return None
def _telegram_onboarding_error_message(error: str, fallback: str) -> str:
return {
"not_found": "Telegram pairing was not found. Start a new setup.",
"expired": "Telegram setup expired. Start a new setup.",
"claimed": "Telegram setup was already claimed. Start a new setup.",
"unauthorized": "Telegram setup service rejected this request.",
"telegram_manager_bot_token_not_configured": "Telegram setup service is not configured.",
"telegram_token_fetch_failed": "Telegram could not finish bot setup. Try again.",
}.get(error, fallback)
def _telegram_onboarding_request_sync(
method: str,
path: str,
*,
body: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
bearer_token: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
import httpx
headers = {
"Accept": "application/json",
"User-Agent": _TELEGRAM_ONBOARDING_USER_AGENT,
}
request_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {}
if body is not None:
headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json"
request_kwargs["json"] = body
if bearer_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {bearer_token}"
url = f"{_telegram_onboarding_base_url()}{path}"
try:
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(10.0)) as client:
response = client.request(
method,
url,
headers=headers,
**request_kwargs,
)
response.raise_for_status()
except httpx.HTTPStatusError as exc:
try:
parsed = exc.response.json()
except Exception:
parsed = {}
error = str(parsed.get("error") or parsed.get("status") or "")
detail = _telegram_onboarding_error_message(
error,
"Telegram setup service returned an error.",
)
status_code = 404 if exc.response.status_code == 404 else 502
if error in {"expired", "claimed"}:
status_code = 410
raise HTTPException(status_code=status_code, detail=detail) from exc
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service is unavailable. Try again shortly.",
) from exc
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service is unavailable. Try again shortly.",
) from exc
try:
parsed = response.json()
except Exception as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an invalid response.",
) from exc
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an invalid response.",
)
return parsed
async def _telegram_onboarding_request(
method: str,
path: str,
*,
body: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
bearer_token: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
return await asyncio.to_thread(
_telegram_onboarding_request_sync,
method,
path,
body=body,
bearer_token=bearer_token,
)
@app.post("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/start")
async def start_telegram_onboarding(body: TelegramOnboardingStart):
bot_name = (body.bot_name or "Hermes Agent").strip() or "Hermes Agent"
payload = await _telegram_onboarding_request(
"POST",
"/v1/telegram/pairings",
body={"bot_name": bot_name},
)
pairing_id = str(payload.get("pairing_id") or "").strip()
poll_token = str(payload.get("poll_token") or "").strip()
expires_at = str(payload.get("expires_at") or "").strip()
deep_link = str(payload.get("deep_link") or "").strip()
qr_payload = str(payload.get("qr_payload") or deep_link).strip()
suggested_username = str(payload.get("suggested_username") or "").strip()
if not pairing_id or not poll_token or not expires_at or not deep_link:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an incomplete response.",
)
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings()
_telegram_onboarding_pairings[pairing_id] = _TelegramOnboardingPairing(
poll_token=poll_token,
expires_at=expires_at,
expires_at_ts=_parse_expiry_ts(expires_at),
)
return {
"pairing_id": pairing_id,
"suggested_username": suggested_username,
"deep_link": deep_link,
"qr_payload": qr_payload,
"expires_at": expires_at,
}
@app.get("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def get_telegram_onboarding_status(pairing_id: str):
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings()
record = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Telegram setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
if record.bot_token:
return {
"status": "ready",
"bot_username": record.bot_username,
"owner_user_id": record.owner_user_id,
"expires_at": record.expires_at,
}
poll_token = record.poll_token
payload = await _telegram_onboarding_request(
"GET",
f"/v1/telegram/pairings/{urllib.parse.quote(pairing_id, safe='')}",
bearer_token=poll_token,
)
status = str(payload.get("status") or "").strip()
if status == "waiting":
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
current = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
expires_at = current.expires_at if current else ""
return {"status": "waiting", "expires_at": expires_at}
if status == "ready":
bot_token = str(payload.get("token") or "").strip()
bot_username = str(payload.get("bot_username") or "").strip()
if not bot_token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an incomplete response.",
)
owner_user_id = _normalize_telegram_user_id(payload.get("owner_user_id"))
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
record = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Telegram setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
record.bot_token = bot_token
record.bot_username = bot_username or None
record.owner_user_id = owner_user_id
return {
"status": "ready",
"bot_username": record.bot_username,
"owner_user_id": record.owner_user_id,
"expires_at": record.expires_at,
}
if status in {"expired", "claimed"}:
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=410,
detail=_telegram_onboarding_error_message(
status,
"Telegram setup is no longer available. Start a new setup.",
),
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Telegram setup service returned an unknown status.",
)
def _restart_gateway_after_telegram_onboarding(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Best-effort gateway restart after saving Telegram QR onboarding.
The QR flow naturally pulls users into Telegram on another device. If the
saved token waits on a separate dashboard restart click, Hermes appears
broken from the chat side. Keep the config save authoritative, but report
restart failures so the UI can fall back to the existing manual banner.
"""
try:
proc, reused = _spawn_gateway_restart(profile)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to auto-restart gateway after Telegram onboarding")
return {
"restart_started": False,
"restart_error": str(exc),
}
if reused:
_log.info(
"Telegram onboarding: reusing in-flight gateway restart (pid %s)",
proc.pid,
)
return {
"restart_started": True,
"restart_action": "gateway-restart",
"restart_pid": proc.pid,
}
@app.post("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/{pairing_id}/apply")
async def apply_telegram_onboarding(
pairing_id: str, body: TelegramOnboardingApply, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
allowed_user_ids = []
seen = set()
for raw_id in body.allowed_user_ids:
normalized = _normalize_telegram_user_id(raw_id)
if not normalized:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Allowed Telegram user IDs must be numeric.",
)
if normalized not in seen:
seen.add(normalized)
allowed_user_ids.append(normalized)
if not allowed_user_ids:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Add at least one allowed Telegram user ID.",
)
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_prune_telegram_onboarding_pairings()
record = _telegram_onboarding_pairings.get(pairing_id)
if not record:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="Telegram setup session was not found. Start a new setup.",
)
bot_token = record.bot_token
bot_username = record.bot_username
if not bot_token:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=409,
detail="Telegram setup is not ready yet.",
)
effective_profile = body.profile or profile
def _apply():
with _profile_scope(effective_profile):
save_env_value("TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN", bot_token)
save_env_value("TELEGRAM_ALLOWED_USERS", ",".join(allowed_user_ids))
_write_platform_enabled("telegram", True)
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(_apply)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Telegram onboarding apply failed")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Failed to save Telegram setup.",
) from exc
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
restart_result = _restart_gateway_after_telegram_onboarding(effective_profile)
return {
"ok": True,
"platform": "telegram",
"bot_username": bot_username,
"needs_restart": not restart_result["restart_started"],
**restart_result,
}
@app.delete("/api/messaging/telegram/onboarding/{pairing_id}")
async def cancel_telegram_onboarding(pairing_id: str):
with _telegram_onboarding_lock:
_telegram_onboarding_pairings.pop(pairing_id, None)
return {"ok": True}
@app.get("/api/messaging/platforms")
async def get_messaging_platforms(profile: Optional[str] = None):
# Profile-scoped so the dashboard's global profile switcher shows the
# TARGET profile's channel credentials/state, not the root install's.
# load_env() honors the HERMES_HOME contextvar override; the gateway
# status readers do NOT (they resolve process-level paths), so the
# profile directory is passed explicitly for those (#71211).
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile) as scoped_dir:
env_on_disk = load_env()
runtime = (
read_runtime_status(path=scoped_dir / "gateway_state.json")
if scoped_dir is not None
else read_runtime_status()
)
return {
"env_path": str(get_env_path()),
"gateway_start_command": _gateway_display_command(profile, "start"),
"platforms": [
_messaging_platform_payload(
entry,
env_on_disk,
runtime,
scoped=scoped_dir is not None,
profile_home=scoped_dir,
)
for entry in _messaging_platform_catalog()
]
}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
def _multiplex_port_binding_conflict(
platform_id: str, requested_profile: Optional[str]
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Reason enabling ``platform_id`` on the target profile would break a
multiplexed gateway, or ``None`` when the change is allowed.
Mirrors the gateway's startup rule (``_start_one_profile_adapters`` in
gateway/run.py): with ``gateway.multiplex_profiles`` on, the default
profile owns the single shared HTTP listener and serves every profile via
the ``/p/<profile>/`` prefix, so a SECONDARY profile must never enable a
port-binding platform. Without this pre-write check the dashboard happily
persisted the invalid config and the shared gateway died with
``MultiplexConfigError`` on its next start — for ALL profiles. Only
*enabling* is blocked; disabling/clearing stays allowed so users can
repair an already-invalid profile.
"""
from gateway.config import PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES, load_gateway_config
if platform_id not in PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES:
return None
requested = (requested_profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_active_profile_name
# The dashboard's own profile. "custom" (an unrecognized HERMES_HOME)
# is outside the profiles tree, so a multiplexed gateway never serves
# it — nothing to guard.
target = get_active_profile_name()
else:
_resolve_profile_dir(requested) # same 400/404 as _profile_scope
target = requested
if target in ("default", "custom"):
return None
# The multiplex flag that matters is the one the shared gateway reads at
# startup: the DEFAULT profile's gateway config (plus the process-wide
# GATEWAY_MULTIPLEX_PROFILES override, which load_gateway_config applies).
with _config_profile_scope("default"):
if not load_gateway_config().multiplex_profiles:
return None
return (
f"Cannot enable '{platform_id}' on profile '{target}': it binds its "
"own listener port, and gateway.multiplex_profiles is on, so the "
"default profile owns the single shared HTTP listener for every "
"profile. Configure this channel on the default profile instead "
"(disabling or clearing it here is still allowed)."
)
@app.put("/api/messaging/platforms/{platform_id}")
async def update_messaging_platform(
platform_id: str, body: MessagingPlatformUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None
):
entry = _catalog_lookup(platform_id)
if not entry:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown messaging platform: {platform_id}"
)
target_profile = body.profile or profile
if body.enabled:
conflict = _multiplex_port_binding_conflict(platform_id, target_profile)
if conflict:
# Reject BEFORE any .env/config.yaml write so the profile stays
# loadable by the multiplexed gateway.
_log.info(
"Rejected messaging platform update: platform=%s profile=%s "
"(multiplex port-binding conflict)",
platform_id,
target_profile or "current",
)
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail=conflict)
allowed_env = set(entry["env_vars"])
def _apply():
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
for key in body.clear_env:
if key not in allowed_env:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{key} is not configurable for {entry['name']}",
)
remove_env_value(key)
for key, value in body.env.items():
if key not in allowed_env:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{key} is not configurable for {entry['name']}",
)
trimmed = value.strip()
if trimmed:
_validate_messaging_env_value(platform_id, key, trimmed)
save_env_value(key, trimmed)
if body.enabled is not None:
_write_platform_enabled(platform_id, body.enabled)
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(_apply)
# Audit trail for channel config mutations: names only, never values.
_log.info(
"Messaging platform updated: platform=%s profile=%s enabled=%s "
"env_keys=%s cleared_keys=%s",
platform_id,
target_profile or "current",
body.enabled,
sorted(body.env),
sorted(body.clear_env),
)
return {"ok": True, "platform": platform_id}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
_log.exception("PUT /api/messaging/platforms/%s failed", platform_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Internal server error")
@app.post("/api/messaging/platforms/{platform_id}/test")
async def test_messaging_platform(platform_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
entry = _catalog_lookup(platform_id)
if not entry:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404, detail=f"Unknown messaging platform: {platform_id}"
)
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile) as scoped_dir:
env_on_disk = load_env()
runtime = (
read_runtime_status(path=scoped_dir / "gateway_state.json")
if scoped_dir is not None
else read_runtime_status()
)
return _messaging_platform_payload(
entry,
env_on_disk,
runtime,
scoped=scoped_dir is not None,
profile_home=scoped_dir,
)
payload = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
if not payload["enabled"]:
message = f"{entry['name']} is disabled. Enable it, then restart the gateway."
return {"ok": False, "state": payload["state"], "message": message}
if not payload["configured"]:
missing = [
field["key"]
for field in payload["env_vars"]
if field["required"] and not field["is_set"]
]
message = (
f"Missing required setup: {', '.join(missing)}"
if missing
else "Platform setup is incomplete."
)
return {"ok": False, "state": payload["state"], "message": message}
if not payload["gateway_running"]:
return {
"ok": False,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": "Gateway is not running. Restart the gateway to connect this platform.",
}
if payload["state"] == "connected":
return {
"ok": True,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": f"{entry['name']} is connected.",
}
if payload.get("error_message"):
return {
"ok": False,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": payload["error_message"],
}
return {
"ok": False,
"state": payload["state"],
"message": "Setup looks complete, but the gateway has not reported a connection yet. Restart the gateway.",
}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OAuth provider endpoints — status + disconnect (Phase 1)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Phase 1 surfaces *which OAuth providers exist* and whether each is
# connected, plus a disconnect button. Anthropic subscription OAuth is
# deliberately delegated away from the dashboard: its card is external and
# points to the supported terminal path. Phase 2 adds in-browser device-code
# flows for providers that support them. For unconnected providers we return
# the canonical ``hermes auth add <provider>`` command so the dashboard can
# surface a one-click copy.
def _truncate_token(value: Optional[str], visible: int = 6) -> str:
"""Return ``...XXXXXX`` (last N chars) for safe display in the UI.
We never expose more than the trailing ``visible`` characters of an
OAuth access token. JWT prefixes (the part before the first dot) are
stripped first when present so the visible suffix is always part of
the signing region rather than a meaningless header chunk.
Returns the Entra-ID placeholder when handed a callable (Azure Foundry
bearer provider) — the callable is NEVER invoked here.
"""
if not value:
return ""
if callable(value) and not isinstance(value, str):
# Entra ID bearer provider — never reveal a minted token in the UI.
return "<entra-id-bearer>"
s = str(value)
if "." in s and s.count(".") >= 2:
# Looks like a JWT — show the trailing piece of the signature only.
s = s.rsplit(".", 1)[-1]
if len(s) <= visible:
return s
return f"…{s[-visible:]}"
def _anthropic_oauth_status() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Status for the "Anthropic API Key" catalog entry.
Two sources, in priority order:
1. ``~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json`` — Hermes-managed terminal PKCE
credentials (the dashboard no longer has a Connect button for this)
2. ``ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`` → ``ANTHROPIC_TOKEN`` → ``CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN``
env vars (registry order) — from ``.env``, the shell, or an external
secret source like Bitwarden (whose keys are injected into the process
env during ``load_hermes_dotenv()``, so the same check covers them)
Claude Code's ``~/.claude/.credentials.json`` is deliberately NOT read
here — it has its own dedicated catalog entry (``claude-code`` →
``_claude_code_only_status``). Reporting it under the API-key entry
double-counts the token and shadows a real ANTHROPIC_API_KEY.
"""
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import (
read_hermes_oauth_credentials,
_get_hermes_oauth_file,
)
except ImportError:
read_hermes_oauth_credentials = None # type: ignore
_get_hermes_oauth_file = None # type: ignore
hermes_creds = None
if read_hermes_oauth_credentials:
try:
hermes_creds = read_hermes_oauth_credentials()
except Exception:
hermes_creds = None
if hermes_creds and hermes_creds.get("accessToken"):
return {
"logged_in": True,
"source": "hermes_pkce",
"source_label": f"Hermes PKCE ({_get_hermes_oauth_file() if _get_hermes_oauth_file else None})",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(hermes_creds.get("accessToken")),
"expires_at": hermes_creds.get("expiresAt"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(hermes_creds.get("refreshToken")),
}
# Env-var / secret-source path. ``get_env_value`` checks the process
# environment first (where Bitwarden-sourced secrets land) then .env.
env_var_order: tuple = ("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ANTHROPIC_TOKEN", "CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN")
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import PROVIDER_REGISTRY
env_var_order = PROVIDER_REGISTRY["anthropic"].api_key_env_vars
except (ImportError, KeyError):
pass
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
except ImportError:
get_env_value = None # type: ignore
try:
from hermes_cli.env_loader import format_secret_source_suffix
except ImportError:
format_secret_source_suffix = None # type: ignore
for var in env_var_order:
value = (get_env_value(var) if get_env_value else None) or os.getenv(var)
if not value:
continue
suffix = format_secret_source_suffix(var) if format_secret_source_suffix else ""
return {
"logged_in": True,
"source": "env_var",
"source_label": f"{var}{suffix}",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(value),
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": False,
}
return {"logged_in": False, "source": None}
def _claude_code_only_status() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Surface Claude Code CLI credentials as their own provider entry.
Independent of the Anthropic entry above so users can see whether their
Claude Code subscription tokens are actively flowing into Hermes even
when they also have a separate Hermes-managed PKCE login.
"""
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import read_claude_code_credentials
creds = read_claude_code_credentials()
except Exception:
creds = None
if creds and creds.get("accessToken"):
return {
"logged_in": True,
"source": "claude_code_cli",
"source_label": "~/.claude/.credentials.json",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(creds.get("accessToken")),
"expires_at": creds.get("expiresAt"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(creds.get("refreshToken")),
}
return {"logged_in": False, "source": None}
def _copilot_acp_status() -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Status for copilot-acp — credentials are owned by the Copilot CLI.
``logged_in`` is claimed only on positive evidence (a supported env token
or a known on-disk GitHub Copilot credential store, via
``auth.get_external_process_provider_status``). The Copilot CLI may also
hold its session in an OS keychain Hermes can't read, so the unverified
state is presented as "managed by the Copilot CLI" — never as signed out.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import get_external_process_provider_status
status = get_external_process_provider_status("copilot-acp") or {}
except Exception:
status = {}
verified = bool(status.get("auth_verified"))
configured = bool(status.get("configured"))
if verified:
source_label = status.get("auth_source") or "Copilot credentials detected"
elif configured:
found = status.get("resolved_command") or status.get("command") or "copilot"
source_label = f"Managed by the GitHub Copilot CLI ({found})"
else:
source_label = "GitHub Copilot CLI not found on PATH"
return {
"logged_in": verified,
"source": "copilot_cli",
"source_label": source_label,
"token_preview": None,
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": False,
"configured": configured,
}
def _external_process_cli_command(provider_id: str, default: str) -> str:
"""Render an external-process provider's sign-in command with the CLI the
user actually has configured.
The static catalog assumes the default executable name; users who point
Hermes at a custom binary (``HERMES_COPILOT_ACP_COMMAND`` /
``COPILOT_CLI_PATH``) would otherwise be told to run a command that isn't
the one Hermes spawns. Non-external-process providers get ``default`` back
untouched.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import PROVIDER_REGISTRY, get_external_process_provider_status
pconfig = PROVIDER_REGISTRY.get(provider_id)
if not pconfig or pconfig.auth_type != "external_process":
return default
status = get_external_process_provider_status(provider_id) or {}
command = str(status.get("command") or "").strip()
if command:
parts = default.split(" ", 1)
tail = f" {parts[1]}" if len(parts) > 1 else ""
return f"{command}{tail}"
except Exception:
pass
return default
# Explicit, hand-tuned OAuth/account provider cards. These carry the bits that
# can't be derived from the unified provider catalog: the OAuth ``flow`` shape,
# the per-provider ``status_fn``, the ``cli_command`` fallback, and curated
# display order. They are the OVERRIDE BASE for ``_build_oauth_catalog()``,
# which unions them with every accounts-tab provider in ``provider_catalog()``
# so newly-added OAuth/external providers appear automatically (no hand edit).
# This tuple also still includes two entries that are NOT catalog providers but
# must show on the Accounts tab: the Anthropic credential-status card and the
# synthetic ``claude-code`` subscription row.
# ``flow`` describes the account-management shape so the UI can pick the right
# behavior: ``device_code`` = show code + verification URL + poll, and
# ``external`` = read-only/delegated to a terminal or third-party CLI.
_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG: tuple[Dict[str, Any], ...] = (
{
"id": "nous",
"name": "Nous Portal",
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add nous",
"docs_url": "https://portal.nousresearch.com",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_nous_auth_status
},
{
"id": "openai-codex",
"name": "ChatGPT or Codex Subscription",
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add openai-codex",
"docs_url": "https://platform.openai.com/docs",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_codex_auth_status
},
{
"id": "qwen-oauth",
"name": "Qwen (via Qwen CLI)",
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add qwen-oauth",
"docs_url": "https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-code",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_qwen_auth_status
},
{
"id": "minimax-oauth",
"name": "MiniMax (OAuth)",
# MiniMax's flow is structurally device-code (verification URI +
# user code, backend polls the token endpoint) with a PKCE
# extension for code-binding. The dashboard renders the same UX
# as Nous's device-code flow; the PKCE bit is a security
# extension that doesn't change the operator experience.
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add minimax-oauth",
"docs_url": "https://www.minimax.io",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_minimax_oauth_auth_status
},
{
"id": "xai-oauth",
"name": "xAI Grok OAuth (SuperGrok / Premium+)",
# Device code is the default because it works in remote shells,
# containers, and desktop installs without requiring a reachable
# 127.0.0.1 callback.
"flow": "device_code",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add xai-oauth",
"docs_url": "https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/guides/xai-grok-oauth",
"status_fn": None, # dispatched via auth.get_xai_oauth_auth_status
},
{
"id": "copilot-acp",
"name": "GitHub Copilot (ACP)",
"flow": "external",
# `copilot login` is the CLI's non-interactive device-code login
# subcommand; the previous `copilot /login` form is not a valid
# invocation (slash-commands only exist inside an interactive
# session, reachable as `copilot -i /login`).
"cli_command": "copilot login",
"docs_url": "https://docs.github.com/en/copilot",
"status_fn": _copilot_acp_status,
},
# ── Anthropic / Claude entries sit at the bottom.
#
# This card is deliberately flow == "external" (no in-dashboard "Connect"
# button walking the user through claude.ai/oauth/authorize from the web
# server). Hermes previously reimplemented that subscription-OAuth PKCE
# dance itself for the dashboard (issues #87887/#87888); that surface was
# removed because it lets an unattended, scriptable HTTP endpoint mint
# Claude Pro/Max subscription tokens outside Anthropic's own client,
# which sits on the wrong side of Anthropic's usage policies for OAuth
# credentials. Login still works via the terminal (`hermes auth add
# anthropic`, unaffected by this change) or a plain API key below.
{
"id": "anthropic",
"name": "Anthropic API Key",
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": "hermes auth add anthropic",
"docs_url": "https://docs.claude.com/en/api/getting-started",
"status_fn": _anthropic_oauth_status,
},
{
"id": "claude-code",
"name": "Anthropic OAuth: Required Extra Usage Credits to Use Subscription",
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": "claude setup-token",
"docs_url": "https://docs.claude.com/en/docs/claude-code",
"status_fn": _claude_code_only_status,
},
)
def _resolve_provider_status(provider_id: str, status_fn) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Dispatch to the right status helper for an OAuth provider entry."""
if status_fn is not None:
try:
return status_fn()
except Exception as e:
return {"logged_in": False, "error": str(e)}
try:
from hermes_cli import auth as hauth
if provider_id == "nous":
# Read-only accounts-tab card: refresh-free snapshot so listing
# providers never performs an OAuth refresh.
raw = hauth.get_nous_auth_status_local()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": "nous_portal",
"source_label": raw.get("portal_base_url") or "Nous Portal",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("access_token")),
"expires_at": raw.get("access_expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(raw.get("has_refresh_token")),
}
if provider_id == "openai-codex":
raw = hauth.get_codex_auth_status()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": raw.get("source") or "openai_codex",
"source_label": raw.get("auth_mode") or "OpenAI Codex",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("api_key")),
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": False,
"last_refresh": raw.get("last_refresh"),
}
if provider_id == "qwen-oauth":
raw = hauth.get_qwen_auth_status()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": "qwen_cli",
"source_label": raw.get("auth_store_path") or "Qwen CLI",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("access_token")),
"expires_at": raw.get("expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(raw.get("has_refresh_token")),
}
if provider_id == "minimax-oauth":
raw = hauth.get_minimax_oauth_auth_status()
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": "minimax_oauth",
"source_label": f"MiniMax ({raw.get('region', 'global')})",
"token_preview": None,
"expires_at": raw.get("expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": True,
}
if provider_id == "xai-oauth":
raw = hauth.get_xai_oauth_auth_status()
# source_label is meant to be a human-readable origin (auth-store
# path / credential source), not the internal auth_mode string
# ("oauth_pkce"). Prefer the store path, then the source slug.
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": raw.get("source") or "xai_oauth",
"source_label": raw.get("auth_store") or raw.get("source") or "xAI Grok OAuth",
"token_preview": _truncate_token(raw.get("api_key")),
"expires_at": None,
"has_refresh_token": True,
"last_refresh": raw.get("last_refresh"),
}
# No hand-written branch for this provider id: fall through to the
# canonical slug-driven dispatcher so accounts-tab providers derived
# from the unified catalog (which carry status_fn=None) still reflect
# real login state instead of rendering permanently logged-out. This
# closes the membership-auto-extends-but-status-doesn't gap: add an
# OAuth/account provider plugin and its card shows the right state.
raw = hauth.get_auth_status(provider_id)
if isinstance(raw, dict) and "logged_in" in raw:
return {
"logged_in": bool(raw.get("logged_in")),
"source": raw.get("source") or raw.get("provider") or provider_id,
"source_label": (
raw.get("source_label")
or raw.get("auth_store")
or raw.get("auth_store_path")
or raw.get("base_url")
or raw.get("name")
or ""
),
"token_preview": _truncate_token(
raw.get("access_token") or raw.get("api_key")
),
"expires_at": raw.get("expires_at") or raw.get("access_expires_at"),
"has_refresh_token": bool(raw.get("has_refresh_token")),
}
except Exception as e:
return {"logged_in": False, "error": str(e)}
return {"logged_in": False}
def _oauth_provider_disconnect_command(provider: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Shell command that clears an external provider's credentials.
External providers store their credentials outside Hermes, so the disconnect
API deliberately refuses them (we never delete files another CLI owns on the
user's behalf via a silent API call). For the ones we know how to clear we
instead hand the GUI a command it can *run in the embedded terminal* — the
user sees exactly what executes, and Hermes then stops resolving the token.
Claude Code has no scriptable logout (only the interactive ``/logout``), so
we remove the credential the same way logout does: the macOS Keychain entry
(``Claude Code-credentials``) and/or the ``~/.claude/.credentials.json``
file — the two sources ``read_claude_code_credentials()`` consults. Returns
None for providers we can't safely clear (the GUI shows a manual hint).
"""
if provider.get("flow") != "external":
return None
if provider.get("id") == "claude-code":
rm_file = "rm -f ~/.claude/.credentials.json"
if sys.platform == "darwin":
return f'security delete-generic-password -s "Claude Code-credentials" 2>/dev/null; {rm_file}'
return rm_file
return None
def _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(provider: Dict[str, Any], status: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the manual disconnect path when the API cannot clear this provider."""
# "anthropic" is flow == "external" (no in-dashboard OAuth login, see the
# catalog entry) but, unlike other external providers, Hermes still OWNS
# the credential it can show here: the Hermes-managed PKCE file
# (~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json) and its credential-pool entry, both
# written by `hermes auth add anthropic` in the terminal. Those are ours
# to clear via the API, so this provider is excluded from the generic
# "external providers can't be auto-disconnected" rule below.
if provider.get("flow") == "external" and provider.get("id") != "anthropic":
if _oauth_provider_disconnect_command(provider):
# The GUI offers a one-click "run in terminal" path; this hint is the
# fallback wording for surfaces that only show text.
return "Managed outside Hermes — run the disconnect command to remove it."
return "Managed by that provider's CLI; remove it there."
if status.get("source") == "env_var":
return "Remove the API key from Settings → Keys instead."
return None
def _build_oauth_catalog() -> list[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Build the Accounts-tab provider list.
MEMBERSHIP is the union of:
1. ``_OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG`` — the explicit, hand-tuned cards that carry
bespoke flow / status_fn / cli_command (including the api-key Anthropic
PKCE card and the synthetic claude-code subscription row, which are not
catalog providers), and
2. every accounts-tab provider in the unified ``provider_catalog()`` (the
``hermes model`` universe) — so any OAuth/external provider added as a
plugin appears automatically, with sensible defaults, even if no
explicit card was written for it.
The explicit catalog wins on metadata; the unified catalog guarantees we
never silently drop a provider the CLI picker offers. Order: explicit cards
first (their curated order), then any catalog-only providers appended in
``hermes model`` order.
"""
rows: list[Dict[str, Any]] = []
seen: set[str] = set()
# 1. Explicit hand-tuned cards (authoritative metadata + curated order).
for entry in _OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG:
if entry["id"] in seen:
continue
seen.add(entry["id"])
rows.append(dict(entry))
# 2. Catalog accounts-providers not already covered — keeps the Accounts tab
# in lockstep with the `hermes model` universe (zero-edit for new plugins).
try:
from hermes_cli.provider_catalog import provider_catalog
for d in provider_catalog():
if d.tab != "accounts" or d.slug in seen:
continue
seen.add(d.slug)
rows.append({
"id": d.slug,
"name": d.label,
"flow": "external",
"cli_command": f"hermes auth add {d.slug}",
"docs_url": d.signup_url or "",
"status_fn": None,
})
except Exception:
pass
return rows
@app.get("/api/providers/oauth")
async def list_oauth_providers(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Enumerate every OAuth-capable LLM provider with current status.
Response shape (per provider):
id stable identifier (used in DELETE path)
name human label
flow "device_code" | "external"
cli_command fallback CLI command for users to run manually
disconnect_command shell command that clears an external provider's
creds (run in the embedded terminal), else null
docs_url external docs/portal link for the "Learn more" link
status:
logged_in bool — currently has usable creds
source short slug ("hermes_pkce", "claude_code", ...)
source_label human-readable origin (file path, env var name)
token_preview last N chars of the token, never the full token
expires_at ISO timestamp string or null
has_refresh_token bool
Membership is derived from the unified provider_catalog() so this stays in
sync with the `hermes model` picker; _OAUTH_OVERRIDES supplies per-provider
flow/status/cli metadata.
"""
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
providers = []
for p in _build_oauth_catalog():
status = _resolve_provider_status(p["id"], p.get("status_fn"))
disconnect_hint = _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(p, status)
providers.append({
"id": p["id"],
"name": p["name"],
"flow": p["flow"],
"cli_command": _external_process_cli_command(p["id"], p["cli_command"]),
"docs_url": p["docs_url"],
"disconnect_hint": disconnect_hint,
"disconnect_command": _oauth_provider_disconnect_command(p),
"disconnectable": disconnect_hint is None,
"status": status,
})
return {"providers": providers}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.delete("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}")
async def disconnect_oauth_provider(
provider_id: str,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Disconnect an OAuth provider. Token-protected (matches /env/reveal)."""
_require_token(request)
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
catalog_by_id = {p["id"]: p for p in _build_oauth_catalog()}
provider = catalog_by_id.get(provider_id)
if provider is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown provider: {provider_id}. "
f"Available: {', '.join(sorted(catalog_by_id))}",
)
disconnect_hint = _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(provider, {})
if disconnect_hint:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{provider['name']} cannot be disconnected automatically. {disconnect_hint}",
)
status = _resolve_provider_status(provider_id, provider.get("status_fn"))
disconnect_hint = _oauth_provider_disconnect_hint(provider, status)
if disconnect_hint:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{provider['name']} cannot be disconnected automatically. {disconnect_hint}",
)
# Anthropic clears only the Hermes-managed PKCE file and auth-store entry.
# The separate claude-code catalog row is external/read-only and rejected
# above so we never pretend to remove ~/.claude/* credentials owned by the CLI.
if provider_id == "anthropic":
cleared = False
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import _get_hermes_oauth_file
oauth_file = _get_hermes_oauth_file()
if oauth_file.exists():
oauth_file.unlink()
cleared = True
except Exception:
pass
# Also clear the credential pool entry if present.
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import clear_provider_auth
cleared = clear_provider_auth("anthropic") or cleared
except Exception:
pass
_log.info("oauth/disconnect: %s", provider_id)
return {"ok": bool(cleared), "provider": provider_id}
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import clear_provider_auth, invalidate_nous_auth_status_cache
cleared = clear_provider_auth(provider_id)
if provider_id == "nous":
invalidate_nous_auth_status_cache()
_log.info("oauth/disconnect: %s (cleared=%s)", provider_id, cleared)
return {"ok": bool(cleared), "provider": provider_id}
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("disconnect %s failed", provider_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# OAuth Phase 2 — in-browser device-code flows
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
#
# Anthropic previously had a dashboard-triggered PKCE flow here too (server
# generates a claude.ai/oauth/authorize URL, exchanges the code for tokens at
# the Anthropic token endpoint, persists them). It was removed: an unattended
# HTTP endpoint minting Claude Pro/Max subscription tokens outside Anthropic's
# own client sits on the wrong side of Anthropic's usage policies for OAuth
# credentials. The "anthropic" catalog entry is now flow == "external" and
# points at `hermes auth add anthropic` (terminal PKCE, unaffected) instead.
#
# Device code (Nous, OpenAI Codex):
# 1. POST /api/providers/oauth/{nous|openai-codex}/start
# → server hits provider's device-auth endpoint
# → gets { user_code, verification_url, device_code, interval, expires_in }
# → spawns background poller thread that polls the token endpoint
# every `interval` seconds until approved/expired
# → stores poll status in _oauth_sessions[session_id]
# → returns { session_id, flow: "device_code", user_code,
# verification_url, expires_in, poll_interval }
# 2. UI opens verification_url in a new tab and shows user_code.
# 3. UI polls GET /api/providers/oauth/{provider}/poll/{session_id}
# every 2s until status != "pending".
# 4. On "approved" the background thread has already saved creds; UI
# refreshes the providers list.
#
# Sessions are kept in-memory only (single-process FastAPI) and time out
# after 15 minutes. A periodic cleanup runs on each /start call to GC
# expired sessions so the dict doesn't grow without bound.
_OAUTH_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = 15 * 60
_oauth_sessions: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
_oauth_sessions_lock = threading.Lock()
def _gc_oauth_sessions() -> None:
"""Drop expired sessions. Called opportunistically on /start."""
cutoff = time.time() - _OAUTH_SESSION_TTL_SECONDS
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
stale = [sid for sid, sess in _oauth_sessions.items() if sess["created_at"] < cutoff]
for sid in stale:
_oauth_sessions.pop(sid, None)
def _oauth_profile_name(profile: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
return None
return requested
def _validate_oauth_profile(profile: Optional[str]) -> None:
profile_name = _oauth_profile_name(profile)
if profile_name:
_resolve_profile_dir(profile_name)
def _new_oauth_session(
provider_id: str,
flow: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
) -> tuple[str, Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Create + register a new OAuth session, return (session_id, session_dict)."""
sid = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
profile_name = _oauth_profile_name(profile)
sess = {
"session_id": sid,
"provider": provider_id,
"flow": flow,
"profile": profile_name,
"created_at": time.time(),
"status": "pending", # pending | approved | denied | expired | error
"error_message": None,
}
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
_oauth_sessions[sid] = sess
return sid, sess
def _oauth_session_profile(
session_id: str,
fallback: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the profile that owns an OAuth session, if one was provided."""
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
profile = sess.get("profile") if sess else None
return profile or _oauth_profile_name(fallback)
async def _start_device_code_flow(
provider_id: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Initiate a device-code flow (Nous, OpenAI Codex, MiniMax, or xAI).
Calls the provider's device-auth endpoint via the existing CLI helpers,
then spawns a background poller. Returns the user-facing display fields
so the UI can render the verification page link + user code.
"""
if provider_id == "nous":
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_request_device_code,
PROVIDER_REGISTRY,
)
import httpx
pconfig = PROVIDER_REGISTRY["nous"]
portal_base_url = (
os.getenv("HERMES_PORTAL_BASE_URL")
or os.getenv("NOUS_PORTAL_BASE_URL")
or pconfig.portal_base_url
).rstrip("/")
client_id = pconfig.client_id
scope = pconfig.scope
def _do_nous_device_request():
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
) as client:
return (
_request_device_code(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
scope=scope,
),
scope,
)
device_data, effective_scope = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _do_nous_device_request
)
sid, sess = _new_oauth_session("nous", "device_code", profile=profile)
sess["device_code"] = str(device_data["device_code"])
sess["interval"] = int(device_data["interval"])
sess["expires_at"] = time.time() + int(device_data["expires_in"])
sess["portal_base_url"] = portal_base_url
sess["client_id"] = client_id
sess["scope"] = effective_scope
threading.Thread(
target=_nous_poller, args=(sid,), daemon=True, name=f"oauth-poll-{sid[:6]}"
).start()
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": str(device_data["user_code"]),
"verification_url": str(device_data["verification_uri_complete"]),
"expires_in": int(device_data["expires_in"]),
"poll_interval": int(device_data["interval"]),
}
if provider_id == "openai-codex":
# Codex uses fixed OpenAI device-auth endpoints; reuse the helper.
sid, _ = _new_oauth_session("openai-codex", "device_code", profile=profile)
# Use the helper but in a thread because it polls inline.
# We can't extract just the start step without refactoring auth.py,
# so we run the full helper in a worker and proxy the user_code +
# verification_url back via the session dict. The helper prints
# to stdout — we capture nothing here, just status.
threading.Thread(
target=_codex_full_login_worker, args=(sid,), daemon=True,
name=f"oauth-codex-{sid[:6]}",
).start()
# Block briefly until the worker has populated the user_code, OR error.
deadline = time.monotonic() + 10
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
s = _oauth_sessions.get(sid)
if s and (s.get("user_code") or s["status"] != "pending"):
break
await asyncio.sleep(0.1)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
s = _oauth_sessions.get(sid, {})
if s.get("status") == "error":
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=s.get("error_message") or "device-auth failed")
if not s.get("user_code"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=504, detail="device-auth timed out before returning a user code")
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": s["user_code"],
"verification_url": s["verification_url"],
"expires_in": int(s.get("expires_in") or 900),
"poll_interval": int(s.get("interval") or 5),
}
if provider_id == "minimax-oauth":
# MiniMax uses a device-code-style flow (verification URI + user
# code + background poll) with a PKCE extension on top. From the
# operator's perspective it's identical to Nous's device-code
# flow; the PKCE bit (verifier + challenge from
# _minimax_pkce_pair) is a security extension that binds the
# token exchange to the original session.
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_minimax_pkce_pair,
_minimax_request_user_code,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_BASE,
)
import httpx
verifier, challenge, state = _minimax_pkce_pair()
portal_base_url = (
os.getenv("MINIMAX_PORTAL_BASE_URL") or MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_BASE
).rstrip("/")
def _do_minimax_request():
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
follow_redirects=True,
) as client:
return _minimax_request_user_code(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=MINIMAX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
code_challenge=challenge,
state=state,
)
device_data = await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _do_minimax_request
)
sid, sess = _new_oauth_session("minimax-oauth", "device_code", profile=profile)
# The CLI flow names this `interval_ms` because MiniMax's
# `interval` field is in milliseconds (defensive default 2000ms
# in _minimax_poll_token).
interval_raw = device_data.get("interval")
sess["interval_ms"] = (
int(interval_raw) if interval_raw is not None else None
)
sess["user_code"] = str(device_data["user_code"])
sess["code_verifier"] = verifier
sess["state"] = state
sess["portal_base_url"] = portal_base_url
sess["client_id"] = MINIMAX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID
sess["region"] = "global"
# `expired_in` from MiniMax is overloaded — could be a unix-ms
# timestamp OR a seconds-from-now duration. Mirror the heuristic
# in _minimax_poll_token. Stash the raw value for the poller;
# compute a derived expires_at + UI-friendly expires_in seconds.
expired_in_raw = int(device_data["expired_in"])
sess["expired_in_raw"] = expired_in_raw
if expired_in_raw > 1_000_000_000_000: # likely unix-ms
expires_at_ts = expired_in_raw / 1000.0
expires_in_seconds = max(0, int(expires_at_ts - time.time()))
else:
expires_at_ts = time.time() + expired_in_raw
expires_in_seconds = expired_in_raw
sess["expires_at"] = expires_at_ts
threading.Thread(
target=_minimax_poller,
args=(sid,),
daemon=True,
name=f"oauth-poll-{sid[:6]}",
).start()
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": str(device_data["user_code"]),
"verification_url": str(device_data["verification_uri"]),
"expires_in": expires_in_seconds,
"poll_interval": max(2, (sess["interval_ms"] or 2000) // 1000),
}
if provider_id == "xai-oauth":
from hermes_cli.auth import _xai_oauth_request_device_code
import httpx
def _do_xai_device_request():
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(20.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
) as client:
return _xai_oauth_request_device_code(client)
device_data = await asyncio.get_running_loop().run_in_executor(
None, _do_xai_device_request
)
sid, sess = _new_oauth_session("xai-oauth", "device_code", profile=profile)
sess["device_code"] = str(device_data["device_code"])
sess["interval"] = int(device_data["interval"])
sess["expires_at"] = time.time() + int(device_data["expires_in"])
threading.Thread(
target=_xai_device_poller,
args=(sid,),
daemon=True,
name=f"oauth-poll-{sid[:6]}",
).start()
return {
"session_id": sid,
"flow": "device_code",
"user_code": str(device_data["user_code"]),
"verification_url": str(
device_data.get("verification_uri_complete")
or device_data["verification_uri"]
),
"expires_in": int(device_data["expires_in"]),
"poll_interval": int(device_data["interval"]),
}
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Provider {provider_id} does not support device-code flow")
def _nous_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Background poller that drives a Nous device-code flow to completion."""
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_poll_for_token,
refresh_nous_oauth_from_state,
)
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import httpx
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
portal_base_url = sess["portal_base_url"]
client_id = sess["client_id"]
device_code = sess["device_code"]
interval = sess["interval"]
scope = sess.get("scope")
expires_in = max(60, int(sess["expires_at"] - time.time()))
try:
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0), headers={"Accept": "application/json"}) as client:
token_data = _poll_for_token(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
device_code=device_code,
expires_in=expires_in,
poll_interval=interval,
)
# Same post-processing as _nous_device_code_login (validate/refresh JWT)
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
token_ttl = int(token_data.get("expires_in") or 0)
auth_state = {
"portal_base_url": portal_base_url,
"inference_base_url": token_data.get("inference_base_url"),
"client_id": client_id,
"scope": token_data.get("scope") or scope,
"token_type": token_data.get("token_type", "Bearer"),
"access_token": token_data["access_token"],
"refresh_token": token_data.get("refresh_token"),
"obtained_at": now.isoformat(),
"expires_at": (
datetime.fromtimestamp(now.timestamp() + token_ttl, tz=timezone.utc).isoformat()
if token_ttl else None
),
"expires_in": token_ttl,
}
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id)):
full_state = refresh_nous_oauth_from_state(
auth_state,
timeout_seconds=15.0,
force_refresh=False,
)
from hermes_cli.auth import persist_nous_credentials
persist_nous_credentials(full_state)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: nous login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("nous device-code poll failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = str(e)
def _minimax_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Background poller that drives a MiniMax OAuth flow to completion.
Mirrors `_nous_poller` but calls the MiniMax-specific token endpoint,
which uses a PKCE-style ``code_verifier`` + ``user_code`` rather than
the ``device_code`` field used by Nous. On success, builds the same
auth_state dict that ``_minimax_oauth_login`` (the CLI flow) builds
and persists via ``_minimax_save_auth_state`` — so the dashboard
path leaves the system in the same state as
``hermes auth add minimax-oauth``.
"""
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_minimax_poll_token,
_minimax_resolve_token_expiry_unix,
_minimax_save_auth_state,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_INFERENCE,
MINIMAX_OAUTH_SCOPE,
)
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import httpx
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
portal_base_url = sess["portal_base_url"]
client_id = sess["client_id"]
user_code = sess["user_code"]
code_verifier = sess["code_verifier"]
interval_ms = sess.get("interval_ms")
expired_in_raw = sess["expired_in_raw"]
try:
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
follow_redirects=True,
) as client:
token_data = _minimax_poll_token(
client=client,
portal_base_url=portal_base_url,
client_id=client_id,
user_code=user_code,
code_verifier=code_verifier,
expired_in=expired_in_raw,
interval_ms=interval_ms,
)
# Build the auth_state dict in the same shape as the CLI flow's
# `_minimax_oauth_login` so `_minimax_save_auth_state` writes
# the canonical record. Region is fixed to "global" for the
# dashboard path; cn-region operators can still use the CLI
# flow which supports `--region cn`.
now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
expires_at_ts = _minimax_resolve_token_expiry_unix(
int(token_data["expired_in"]), now=now,
)
expires_in_s = max(0, int(expires_at_ts - now.timestamp()))
auth_state = {
"provider": "minimax-oauth",
"region": sess.get("region", "global"),
"portal_base_url": portal_base_url,
"inference_base_url": MINIMAX_OAUTH_GLOBAL_INFERENCE,
"client_id": client_id,
"scope": MINIMAX_OAUTH_SCOPE,
"token_type": token_data.get("token_type", "Bearer"),
"access_token": token_data["access_token"],
"refresh_token": token_data["refresh_token"],
"resource_url": token_data.get("resource_url"),
"obtained_at": now.isoformat(),
"expires_at": datetime.fromtimestamp(
expires_at_ts, tz=timezone.utc
).isoformat(),
"expires_in": expires_in_s,
}
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id)):
_minimax_save_auth_state(auth_state)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: minimax login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("minimax device-code poll failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = str(e)
def _xai_device_poller(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Background poller for xAI's OAuth device-code flow."""
import httpx
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_save_xai_oauth_tokens,
_xai_oauth_discovery,
_xai_oauth_poll_device_token,
mark_provider_active_if_unset,
unsuppress_credential_source,
)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
device_code = sess["device_code"]
interval = int(sess["interval"])
expires_in = max(60, int(sess["expires_at"] - time.time()))
try:
discovery = _xai_oauth_discovery(20.0)
with httpx.Client(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(20.0),
headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
) as client:
token_data = _xai_oauth_poll_device_token(
client,
token_endpoint=discovery["token_endpoint"],
device_code=device_code,
expires_in=expires_in,
poll_interval=interval,
)
tokens = {
"access_token": str(token_data.get("access_token", "") or "").strip(),
"refresh_token": str(token_data.get("refresh_token", "") or "").strip(),
"id_token": str(token_data.get("id_token", "") or "").strip(),
"expires_in": token_data.get("expires_in"),
"token_type": str(token_data.get("token_type") or "Bearer").strip() or "Bearer",
}
with _profile_scope(_oauth_session_profile(session_id)):
_save_xai_oauth_tokens(
tokens,
discovery=discovery,
last_refresh=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z"),
auth_mode="oauth_device_code",
# Persist credentials without hijacking an existing active
# chat provider.
set_active=False,
)
# Mirror `hermes auth add xai-oauth`: first credential may become
# active when none is set yet; never overwrite an existing choice.
mark_provider_active_if_unset("xai-oauth")
# The singleton write above is the single source of truth: the
# credential-pool load seeds it as the canonical ``device_code``
# entry. Do NOT also insert a parallel ``manual:dashboard_*`` pool
# entry — that duplicates the single-use refresh token across two
# entries and triggers rotation churn / ``refresh_token_reused``.
# An interactive dashboard login is also an explicit re-enable
# signal, so clear any ``device_code`` suppression left by a
# prior ``hermes auth remove xai-oauth`` (mirrors auth_add_command
# and the ``hermes model`` re-login path in _login_xai_oauth).
unsuppress_credential_source("xai-oauth", "device_code")
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: xai login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("xai device-code poll failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "error"
sess["error_message"] = str(e)
def _http_response_error_detail(resp: Any) -> str:
"""Best-effort extraction of a short provider error detail."""
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
payload = None
if isinstance(payload, dict):
error = payload.get("error")
if isinstance(error, dict):
parts = [
str(error.get(key, "")).strip()
for key in ("message", "error_description", "code", "type")
if str(error.get(key, "")).strip()
]
if parts:
return ": ".join(parts)
if isinstance(error, str) and error.strip():
return error.strip()
for key in ("detail", "message", "error_description"):
value = payload.get(key)
if isinstance(value, str) and value.strip():
return value.strip()
text = str(getattr(resp, "text", "") or "").strip()
return text[:500]
def _codex_device_code_start_error(resp: Any) -> str:
"""Dashboard-facing OpenAI Codex device-code start failure."""
status = getattr(resp, "status_code", "unknown")
detail = _http_response_error_detail(resp)
lower = detail.lower()
if "device" in lower and ("authori" in lower or "enable" in lower):
message = (
"OpenAI rejected the device-code login request. Your OpenAI "
"account may need device-code authorization enabled before Hermes "
"can start this dashboard login. Enable device-code authorization "
"in OpenAI, then return here and click Login again."
)
else:
message = (
"OpenAI rejected the device-code login request. Please try Login "
"again from the dashboard after checking your OpenAI account settings."
)
if detail:
return f"{message} (HTTP {status}: {detail})"
return f"{message} (HTTP {status})"
def _codex_full_login_worker(session_id: str) -> None:
"""Run the complete OpenAI Codex device-code flow.
Codex doesn't use the standard OAuth device-code endpoints; it has its
own ``/api/accounts/deviceauth/usercode`` (JSON body, returns
``device_auth_id``) and ``/api/accounts/deviceauth/token`` (JSON body
polled until 200). On success the response carries an
``authorization_code`` + ``code_verifier`` that get exchanged at
CODEX_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL with grant_type=authorization_code.
The flow is replicated inline (rather than calling
_codex_device_code_login) because that helper prints/blocks/polls in a
single function — we need to surface the user_code to the dashboard the
moment we receive it, well before polling completes.
"""
try:
import httpx
from hermes_cli.auth import (
CODEX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
CODEX_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL,
)
issuer = "https://auth.openai.com"
# Step 1: request device code
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0)) as client:
resp = client.post(
f"{issuer}/api/accounts/deviceauth/usercode",
json={"client_id": CODEX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
raise RuntimeError(_codex_device_code_start_error(resp))
device_data = resp.json()
user_code = device_data.get("user_code", "")
device_auth_id = device_data.get("device_auth_id", "")
poll_interval = max(3, int(device_data.get("interval", "5")))
if not user_code or not device_auth_id:
raise RuntimeError("device-code response missing user_code or device_auth_id")
verification_url = f"{issuer}/codex/device"
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
return
sess["user_code"] = user_code
sess["verification_url"] = verification_url
sess["device_auth_id"] = device_auth_id
sess["interval"] = poll_interval
sess["expires_in"] = 15 * 60 # OpenAI's effective limit
sess["expires_at"] = time.time() + sess["expires_in"]
# Captured now (not re-derived after cancel pops the session) so a
# cancelled session can never fall back to the caller's current
# profile scope at save time.
session_profile = sess.get("profile")
# Step 2: poll until authorized
deadline = time.monotonic() + sess["expires_in"]
code_resp = None
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0)) as client:
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
if sess.get("cancelled"):
_log.info("oauth/device: openai-codex login cancelled (session=%s)", session_id)
return
time.sleep(poll_interval)
if sess.get("cancelled"):
_log.info("oauth/device: openai-codex login cancelled (session=%s)", session_id)
return
poll = client.post(
f"{issuer}/api/accounts/deviceauth/token",
json={"device_auth_id": device_auth_id, "user_code": user_code},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
if poll.status_code == 200:
code_resp = poll.json()
break
if poll.status_code in {403, 404}:
continue # user hasn't authorized yet
raise RuntimeError(f"deviceauth/token poll returned {poll.status_code}")
if code_resp is None:
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess["status"] = "expired"
sess["error_message"] = "Device code expired before approval"
return
if sess.get("cancelled"):
_log.info("oauth/device: openai-codex login cancelled before token exchange (session=%s)", session_id)
return
# Step 3: exchange authorization_code for tokens
authorization_code = code_resp.get("authorization_code", "")
code_verifier = code_resp.get("code_verifier", "")
if not authorization_code or not code_verifier:
raise RuntimeError("device-auth response missing authorization_code/code_verifier")
with httpx.Client(timeout=httpx.Timeout(15.0)) as client:
token_resp = client.post(
CODEX_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL,
data={
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"code": authorization_code,
"redirect_uri": f"{issuer}/deviceauth/callback",
"client_id": CODEX_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
"code_verifier": code_verifier,
},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"},
)
if token_resp.status_code != 200:
raise RuntimeError(f"token exchange returned {token_resp.status_code}")
tokens = token_resp.json()
access_token = tokens.get("access_token", "")
refresh_token = tokens.get("refresh_token", "")
if not access_token:
raise RuntimeError("token exchange did not return access_token")
from hermes_cli.auth import _save_codex_tokens
# The cancellation check and the save must be one atomic critical
# section under the same lock cancel_oauth_session() uses. Checking
# "cancelled" and then saving as two separate steps left a window
# where DELETE could flip the flag between them and the worker would
# still persist tokens after the user believed the login was
# aborted. Holding the lock across both closes that window: DELETE
# either lands before this section (worker observes cancelled and
# returns) or blocks until this section (and the save) is done.
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
if sess.get("cancelled"):
_log.info("oauth/device: openai-codex login cancelled before token save (session=%s)", session_id)
return
with _profile_scope(session_profile):
_save_codex_tokens({
"access_token": access_token,
"refresh_token": refresh_token,
})
sess["status"] = "approved"
_log.info("oauth/device: openai-codex login completed (session=%s)", session_id)
except Exception as e:
_log.warning("codex device-code worker failed (session=%s): %s", session_id, e)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
s = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if s:
s["status"] = "error"
s["error_message"] = str(e)
@app.post("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}/start")
async def start_oauth_login(
provider_id: str,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Initiate an OAuth login flow. Token-protected."""
_require_token(request)
_gc_oauth_sessions()
_validate_oauth_profile(profile)
valid = {p["id"] for p in _OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG}
if provider_id not in valid:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown provider {provider_id}")
catalog_entry = next(p for p in _OAUTH_PROVIDER_CATALOG if p["id"] == provider_id)
if catalog_entry["flow"] == "external":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"{provider_id} uses an external CLI; run `{catalog_entry['cli_command']}` manually",
)
try:
if catalog_entry["flow"] == "device_code":
return await _start_device_code_flow(provider_id, profile=profile)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
_log.exception("oauth/start %s failed", provider_id)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=str(e))
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Unsupported flow")
@app.post("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}/submit")
async def submit_oauth_code(
provider_id: str,
body: OAuthSubmitBody,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Submit the auth code for PKCE flows. Token-protected."""
_require_token(request)
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"submit not supported for {provider_id}")
@app.get("/api/providers/oauth/{provider_id}/poll/{session_id}")
async def poll_oauth_session(
provider_id: str,
session_id: str,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Poll a session's status (no auth — read-only state).
Shared by the device-code flows (Nous, OpenAI Codex, MiniMax, xAI).
Each surfaces progress through the same background-worker-updated
``status`` field, so a single poll endpoint serves them all.
"""
_validate_oauth_profile(profile)
requested_profile = _oauth_profile_name(profile)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if not sess:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Session not found or expired")
if sess["provider"] != provider_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Provider mismatch for session")
if sess.get("profile") != requested_profile:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="OAuth session profile mismatch")
return {
"session_id": session_id,
"status": sess["status"],
"error_message": sess.get("error_message"),
"expires_at": sess.get("expires_at"),
}
@app.delete("/api/providers/oauth/sessions/{session_id}")
async def cancel_oauth_session(
session_id: str,
request: Request,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""Cancel a pending OAuth session. Token-protected.
Marks the session dict ``cancelled`` before popping it so any
background worker still holding a reference to that same dict (e.g.
the Codex device-code poller) observes the cancellation and stops
polling/exchanging/saving instead of completing the login after the
user believed it was aborted.
"""
_require_token(request)
_validate_oauth_profile(profile)
requested_profile = _oauth_profile_name(profile)
with _oauth_sessions_lock:
sess = _oauth_sessions.get(session_id)
if sess is not None:
if sess.get("profile") != requested_profile:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="OAuth session profile mismatch")
sess["cancelled"] = True
_oauth_sessions.pop(session_id, None)
if sess is None:
return {"ok": False, "message": "session not found"}
return {"ok": True, "session_id": session_id}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Session detail endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _session_latest_descendant(session_id: str, db):
"""Resolve a session id to the newest child leaf session.
/model may create child sessions. Dashboard refresh should continue the
newest child instead of reopening the old parent.
"""
def row_get(row, key, index):
if isinstance(row, dict):
return row.get(key)
try:
return row[key]
except Exception:
try:
return row[index]
except Exception:
return None
sid = db.resolve_session_id(session_id)
if not sid or not db.get_session(sid):
return None, []
conn = (
getattr(db, "conn", None)
or getattr(db, "_conn", None)
or getattr(db, "connection", None)
or getattr(db, "_connection", None)
)
rows = []
if conn is not None:
raw_rows = conn.execute(
"""
WITH RECURSIVE descendants(id, parent_session_id, started_at) AS (
SELECT id, parent_session_id, started_at FROM sessions WHERE id = ?
UNION
SELECT s.id, s.parent_session_id, s.started_at
FROM sessions s
JOIN descendants d ON s.parent_session_id = d.id
)
SELECT id, parent_session_id, started_at FROM descendants
""",
(sid,),
).fetchall()
for row in raw_rows:
rows.append({
"id": row_get(row, "id", 0),
"parent_session_id": row_get(row, "parent_session_id", 1),
"started_at": row_get(row, "started_at", 2),
})
else:
rows = db.list_sessions_rich(limit=10000, offset=0, compact_rows=True)
children = {}
for row in rows:
rid = row.get("id")
parent = row.get("parent_session_id")
if rid and parent:
children.setdefault(parent, []).append(row)
def started(row):
try:
return float(row.get("started_at") or 0)
except Exception:
return 0.0
current = sid
path = [sid]
seen = {sid}
while children.get(current):
candidates = [r for r in children[current] if r.get("id") not in seen]
if not candidates:
break
candidates.sort(key=started, reverse=True)
current = candidates[0]["id"]
path.append(current)
seen.add(current)
return current, path
# CRITICAL — every literal-path route below MUST be declared BEFORE the
# templated ``/api/sessions/{session_id}`` family that follows. FastAPI/
# Starlette match routes in registration order, and the ``{session_id}``
# pattern is unconstrained — it would otherwise swallow e.g.
# ``DELETE /api/sessions/empty``, ``POST /api/sessions/bulk-delete``, or
# ``GET /api/sessions/stats`` as "operate on the session with id
# 'empty'" / "'bulk-delete'" / "'stats'", which would 404 (or worse,
# succeed and delete the wrong row). Same story as the older
# ``/api/sessions/search`` endpoint up at line ~1191. If you split or
# reorder this block, move every route in it together.
# Keep the dashboard import endpoint stream-safe: FastAPI otherwise parses and
# buffers an arbitrarily large JSON body before SessionDB can enforce its own
# per-session and transaction-work limits.
_SESSION_IMPORT_MAX_BYTES = 25 * 1024 * 1024
async def _read_session_import_body(request: Request) -> bytes:
body = bytearray()
async for chunk in request.stream():
if len(body) + len(chunk) > _SESSION_IMPORT_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Session import payload is too large")
body.extend(chunk)
return bytes(body)
def _import_sessions_for_profile(profile: Optional[str], sessions: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile, read_only=False)
try:
return db.import_sessions(sessions)
finally:
db.close()
app.include_router(_sessions_routes.manage_router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.sessions import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
bulk_delete_sessions_endpoint,
import_sessions_endpoint,
count_empty_sessions_endpoint,
delete_empty_sessions_endpoint,
get_session_stats,
get_session_detail,
get_session_latest_descendant,
get_session_messages,
delete_session_endpoint,
rename_session_endpoint,
export_session_endpoint,
prune_sessions_endpoint,
)
# Serialises the one-time writable schema bootstrap for read-only opens.
# Concurrent first-load polls otherwise race sqlite file creation: the losers
# open mode=ro against a store whose schema is still being written and every
# query raises "no such table: sessions".
_session_db_bootstrap_lock = threading.Lock()
def _session_db_read_probe_statements() -> tuple:
"""Stale-schema probes for read-only opens, derived from SCHEMA_SQL.
Read-only opens skip _reconcile_columns(), so an older store would
otherwise 500 on every poll until something opened it writable. Derived
from the same schema the writable reconciler applies, so any column
added there is probed here automatically — the previous hand-written
probe listed four columns and went stale the first time a new column
(sessions.last_activity_at) shipped, leaving the desktop sidebar empty
after `hermes update` until the first message forced a writable open.
"""
from hermes_state_schema import schema_read_probe_statements
return schema_read_probe_statements()
# Stores where a heal WRITABLE OPEN SUCCEEDED and the read probe still
# failed afterwards: the schema problem is one reconciliation cannot fix
# (e.g. a NOT-NULL-without-default column SQLite refuses to ADD). Retrying
# the full writable init on every poll would hammer a live DB for nothing,
# so such stores fall back to the raw read-only open until restart. A
# FAILED writable open (transient lock) is deliberately NOT recorded —
# the next poll retries the heal.
_session_db_heal_exhausted: set = set()
# Deduplicates the heal-failure warning per store per process, so a
# persistent problem is loud once instead of once per sidebar poll.
_session_db_heal_warned: set = set()
def _open_session_db_at_path(db_path: Path, *, read_only: bool):
"""Open a SessionDB at an explicit path with an explicit access mode.
Writable opens keep the full init and repair path. Read-only opens
bootstrap a missing or zero-byte store once, and heal an older or
malformed schema through one writable open before reopening read-only.
The healthy read path never takes a write lock or requests a checkpoint.
Scope of the heal: the probe checks every table/column declared in
SCHEMA_SQL (see ``schema_read_probe_statements``), so ANY schema
addition escalates a stale store to a one-time writable open — the same
reconcile the store's own backend runs at startup. Tables created
outside SCHEMA_SQL (telemetry ``tel_*``, FTS shadow tables) are
deliberately outside both the probe and the heal.
"""
import sqlite3
from hermes_state import SessionDB, is_malformed_schema_error
if not read_only:
return SessionDB(db_path=db_path, read_only=False)
def _needs_bootstrap() -> bool:
try:
return db_path.stat().st_size == 0
except FileNotFoundError:
return True
except OSError:
return False
if _needs_bootstrap():
with _session_db_bootstrap_lock:
if _needs_bootstrap():
SessionDB(db_path=db_path, read_only=False).close()
def _open_probed():
db = SessionDB(db_path=db_path, read_only=True)
# Unit-test fakes may replace SessionDB without exposing a raw
# connection. Probe only real connections.
conn = getattr(db, "_conn", None)
if conn is not None and str(db_path) not in _session_db_heal_exhausted:
try:
for statement in _session_db_read_probe_statements():
conn.execute(statement).fetchone()
except BaseException:
db.close()
raise
return db
try:
return _open_probed()
except (sqlite3.DatabaseError, UnicodeDecodeError) as exc:
message = str(exc).lower()
stale_schema = "no such table" in message or "no such column" in message
if not stale_schema and not (
# UnicodeDecodeError = pysqlite could not decode SQLite's own
# error message because corrupt file bytes were embedded in it
# (#98924). The one-writable-open heal is the only repair path,
# so route it through the same dispatch as malformed schema.
is_malformed_schema_error(exc) or isinstance(exc, UnicodeDecodeError)
):
raise
SessionDB(db_path=db_path, read_only=False).close()
try:
return _open_probed()
except (sqlite3.DatabaseError, UnicodeDecodeError) as still_stale:
message = str(still_stale).lower()
if "no such table" not in message and "no such column" not in message:
raise
# The writable open succeeded but the store is STILL behind the
# probe: reconciliation cannot fix this one. Serve reads without
# the probe (queries touching the broken part will still fail,
# everything else works) and stop paying the writable init per
# poll.
_session_db_heal_exhausted.add(str(db_path))
if str(db_path) not in _session_db_heal_warned:
_session_db_heal_warned.add(str(db_path))
_log.warning(
"state.db at %s is missing schema that a writable "
"reconcile could not add (%s); read paths may partially "
"fail until the store is repaired",
db_path,
still_stale,
)
return _open_probed()
def _open_session_db_for_profile(profile: Optional[str], *, read_only: bool):
"""Open a SessionDB with an explicit access mode for a profile.
``profile`` None/empty selects this process's own ``state.db``. A named
profile opens that profile's on-disk store directly. Access-mode
semantics are documented on :func:`_open_session_db_at_path`.
"""
from hermes_state import _default_db_path
if profile:
_name, home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
db_path = Path(home) / "state.db"
else:
db_path = Path(_default_db_path())
return _open_session_db_at_path(db_path, read_only=read_only)
# In-process throttle for the opportunistic auto-archive trigger, keyed by
# profile. Bounds the config.yaml read to at most once per this window per
# profile; the actual sweep is throttled far more coarsely by state_meta
# (sessions.min_interval_hours) inside maybe_auto_archive.
_AUTO_ARCHIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_S = 300.0
_last_auto_archive_check: Dict[str, float] = {}
def _maybe_auto_archive_for_profile(profile: Optional[str]) -> None:
"""Run the config-gated stale-session auto-archive for ``profile``.
The Desktop backend is spawned as ``hermes serve`` — it runs neither the
interactive CLI nor the messaging gateway, so neither of those startup
hooks fire for Desktop users. Triggering the (double-throttled, config-off
by default) sweep from the session-list path is what makes
``sessions.auto_archive`` take effect there. Never raises.
"""
try:
key = profile or ""
now = time.monotonic()
last = _last_auto_archive_check.get(key)
if last is not None and now - last < _AUTO_ARCHIVE_CHECK_INTERVAL_S:
return
_last_auto_archive_check[key] = now
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load_full_config
cfg = (_load_full_config().get("sessions") or {})
if not cfg.get("auto_archive", False):
return
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile, read_only=False)
try:
db.maybe_auto_archive(
idle_days=float(cfg.get("auto_archive_days", 3)),
min_interval_hours=int(cfg.get("min_interval_hours", 24)),
)
finally:
db.close()
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("opportunistic auto-archive skipped: %s", exc)
async def _auto_archive_ticker_loop(
interval_s: float = 3600.0, initial_delay_s: float = 90.0
) -> None:
"""Live timer for the stale-session auto-archive (primary profile).
A long-running Desktop/serve backend must keep sweeping on schedule even
when no ``/api/sessions`` request arrives to fire the opportunistic
trigger — e.g. the app sits open for days on an idle chat. The real
cadence is still owned by state_meta (``sessions.min_interval_hours``)
inside ``maybe_auto_archive``; this loop is only the poll rate.
"""
def _sweep() -> None:
_maybe_auto_archive_for_profile(None)
await asyncio.sleep(initial_delay_s)
while True:
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(_sweep)
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("auto-archive tick skipped: %s", exc)
await asyncio.sleep(interval_s)
def _prune_sessions(body: SessionPrune):
"""Delete ended sessions matching filters (mirrors `hermes sessions prune`)."""
has_window = (
body.started_before is not None or body.started_after is not None
)
if body.older_than_days is not None and body.older_than_days < 1 and not has_window:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="older_than_days must be >= 1")
# Mirror the CLI: the implicit 90-day cutoff only applies to a truly bare
# prune. Any attribute filter (source, title, model, ...) suppresses it
# unless the caller explicitly sent older_than_days.
_attr_filters_set = any(
getattr(body, f) is not None
for f in (
"source", "title_like", "end_reason", "cwd_prefix",
"min_messages", "max_messages", "model_like", "provider",
"user_id", "chat_id", "chat_type", "branch_like",
"min_tokens", "max_tokens", "min_cost", "max_cost",
"min_tool_calls", "max_tool_calls",
)
)
_older_than_explicit = "older_than_days" in body.model_fields_set
_effective_older_than = body.older_than_days
if has_window or (_attr_filters_set and not _older_than_explicit):
_effective_older_than = None
profile_home = _cron_profile_home(body.profile)[1] if body.profile else get_hermes_home()
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(body.profile, read_only=False)
try:
filters = dict(
older_than_days=_effective_older_than,
source=(body.source or None),
started_before=body.started_before,
started_after=body.started_after,
title_like=(body.title_like or None),
end_reason=(body.end_reason or None),
cwd_prefix=(body.cwd_prefix or None),
min_messages=body.min_messages,
max_messages=body.max_messages,
model_like=(body.model_like or None),
provider=(body.provider or None),
user_id=(body.user_id or None),
chat_id=(body.chat_id or None),
chat_type=(body.chat_type or None),
branch_like=(body.branch_like or None),
min_tokens=body.min_tokens,
max_tokens=body.max_tokens,
min_cost=body.min_cost,
max_cost=body.max_cost,
min_tool_calls=body.min_tool_calls,
max_tool_calls=body.max_tool_calls,
archived=None if body.include_archived else False,
)
skipped_open = db.count_open_prune_matches(**filters)
if body.dry_run:
rows = db.list_prune_candidates(**filters)
return {
"ok": True,
"removed": 0,
"matched": len(rows),
"skipped_open": skipped_open,
# Rows are ordered by last activity, not creation time.
"oldest_last_active": rows[0]["last_active"] if rows else None,
"newest_last_active": rows[-1]["last_active"] if rows else None,
"oldest_started_at": (
min(r["started_at"] for r in rows) if rows else None
),
"newest_started_at": (
max(r["started_at"] for r in rows) if rows else None
),
"sessions": [
{
"id": r["id"],
"source": r["source"],
"title": r.get("title"),
"model": r.get("model"),
"started_at": r["started_at"],
"last_active": r["last_active"],
"message_count": r["message_count"],
}
for r in rows
],
}
sessions_dir = profile_home / "sessions"
removed = db.prune_sessions(
sessions_dir=sessions_dir if sessions_dir.exists() else None,
**filters,
)
return {"ok": True, "removed": removed, "skipped_open": skipped_open}
finally:
db.close()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Log viewer endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/logs")
async def get_logs(
file: str = "agent",
lines: int = 100,
level: Optional[str] = None,
component: Optional[str] = None,
search: Optional[str] = None,
):
from hermes_cli.logs import _read_tail, LOG_FILES
log_name = LOG_FILES.get(file)
if not log_name:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Unknown log file: {file}")
log_path = get_hermes_home() / "logs" / log_name
if not log_path.exists():
return {"file": file, "lines": []}
try:
from hermes_logging import COMPONENT_PREFIXES
except ImportError:
COMPONENT_PREFIXES = {}
# Normalize "ALL" / "all" / empty → no filter. _matches_filters treats an
# empty tuple as "must match a prefix" (startswith(()) is always False),
# so passing () instead of None silently drops every line.
min_level = level if level and level.upper() != "ALL" else None
if component and component.lower() != "all":
comp_prefixes = COMPONENT_PREFIXES.get(component)
if comp_prefixes is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown component: {component}. "
f"Available: {', '.join(sorted(COMPONENT_PREFIXES))}",
)
else:
comp_prefixes = None
has_filters = bool(min_level or comp_prefixes or search)
result = _read_tail(
log_path, min(lines, 500) if not search else 2000,
has_filters=has_filters,
min_level=min_level,
component_prefixes=comp_prefixes,
)
# Post-filter by search term (case-insensitive substring match).
# _read_tail doesn't support free-text search, so we filter here and
# trim to the requested line count afterward.
if search:
needle = search.lower()
result = [l for l in result if needle in l.lower()][-min(lines, 500):]
return {"file": file, "lines": result}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cron job management endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _cron_optional_text(value: Any, *, strip_trailing_slash: bool = False) -> Optional[str]:
if value is None:
return None
text = str(value).strip()
if strip_trailing_slash:
text = text.rstrip("/")
return text or None
def _cron_string_list(value: Any) -> Optional[List[str]]:
if value is None:
return None
if isinstance(value, str):
raw_items = re.split(r"[\n,]", value)
elif isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
raw_items = value
else:
return None
items = [str(item).strip() for item in raw_items if str(item).strip()]
return items or None
def _normalize_dashboard_cron_script(value: Any, profile_home: Path) -> Optional[str]:
"""Validate a dashboard-selected cron script against the profile sandbox."""
text = _cron_optional_text(value)
if not text:
return None
scripts_root = (profile_home / "scripts").resolve()
raw_path = Path(text).expanduser()
candidate = raw_path.resolve() if raw_path.is_absolute() else (scripts_root / raw_path).resolve()
try:
relative = candidate.relative_to(scripts_root)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"script must be inside {scripts_root}",
) from exc
if not candidate.exists():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"script does not exist: {candidate}")
if not candidate.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"script is not a file: {candidate}")
return str(relative)
def _validate_dashboard_cron_effective_job(job: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
prompt = _cron_optional_text(job.get("prompt"))
script = _cron_optional_text(job.get("script"))
skills = _cron_string_list(job.get("skills")) or _cron_string_list(job.get("skill"))
no_agent = bool(job.get("no_agent"))
if no_agent:
if not script:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="no_agent=True requires a script",
)
return
if not (prompt or skills or script):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="agent cron jobs require a prompt, skill, or script",
)
def _normalize_dashboard_cron_updates(
updates: Dict[str, Any],
profile_home: Path,
) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Normalize dashboard JSON into cron.jobs.update_job's storage shape.
This intentionally stays in the dashboard adapter layer: cron/jobs.py is the
source of truth for scheduling behaviour; the dashboard only translates form
payloads into the shapes that existing core functions already accept.
"""
normalized = dict(updates or {})
for key in ("model", "provider", "workdir"):
if key in normalized:
normalized[key] = _cron_optional_text(normalized[key])
if "script" in normalized:
normalized["script"] = _normalize_dashboard_cron_script(
normalized["script"],
profile_home,
)
if "base_url" in normalized:
normalized["base_url"] = _cron_optional_text(
normalized["base_url"], strip_trailing_slash=True
)
if "deliver" in normalized:
normalized["deliver"] = _cron_optional_text(normalized["deliver"]) or "local"
if "failure_deliver" in normalized:
# Same text normalization as deliver, but empty CLEARS the override
# (failures fall back to deliver) rather than coalescing to a target
# — the field is optional by design (NS-788).
normalized["failure_deliver"] = _cron_optional_text(
normalized["failure_deliver"]
)
if "context_from" in normalized:
normalized["context_from"] = _cron_string_list(normalized["context_from"])
if "enabled_toolsets" in normalized:
normalized["enabled_toolsets"] = _cron_string_list(normalized["enabled_toolsets"])
return normalized
def _validate_dashboard_cron_context_from(
refs: Optional[List[str]],
profile_name: str,
) -> None:
if not refs:
return
for ref in refs:
# "self" (the continuity toggle) resolves to the job's own id at run
# time — it can't be validated against the store (create precedes the
# job's existence).
if isinstance(ref, str) and ref.strip().lower() == "self":
continue
if not _call_cron_for_profile(profile_name, "get_job", ref):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=(
f"context_from job '{ref}' not found in profile "
f"'{profile_name}'"
),
)
def _cron_profile_dicts() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Return the minimal profile records needed by cron aggregation.
The two callers only consume ``name``. ``list_profiles()`` also parses
config/distribution metadata, probes gateway processes, and counts skills
for every profile; polling cron jobs through that path creates avoidable
GIL pressure on large profile pools.
"""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
return [
{
"name": name,
"path": str(home),
"is_default": name == "default",
}
for name, home in profiles_mod.profiles_to_serve(multiplex=True)
]
except Exception:
_log.exception("Failed to list profiles for cron dashboard; falling back to directory scan")
return _fallback_profile_dicts(profiles_mod)
def _cron_default_profile() -> str:
"""Profile to target when a cron request carries no explicit ``profile``.
A desktop pool backend runs one process per profile (HERMES_HOME already
scoped), but these cron endpoints deliberately route storage through the
profiles tree via ``_cron_profile_home`` — so a hardcoded ``"default"``
fallback would write a non-default profile's job into ``~/.hermes``.
Resolve the process's own profile instead. ``custom`` (an unrecognized
HERMES_HOME outside the profiles tree) has no profile-dir equivalent, so
it keeps the legacy ``default`` fallback.
"""
try:
from hermes_cli.profiles import get_active_profile_name
name = get_active_profile_name()
except Exception:
return "default"
return "default" if name in ("default", "custom") else name
def _cron_profile_home(profile: Optional[str]) -> Tuple[str, Path]:
"""Resolve a profile query value to (profile_name, HERMES_HOME)."""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
raw = (profile or _cron_default_profile()).strip() or "default"
try:
canon = profiles_mod.normalize_profile_name(raw)
profiles_mod.validate_profile_name(canon)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
if not profiles_mod.profile_exists(canon):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Profile '{canon}' does not exist.")
return canon, profiles_mod.get_profile_dir(canon)
def _annotate_cron_job(job: Dict[str, Any], profile: str, home: Path) -> Dict[str, Any]:
annotated = dict(job)
annotated["profile"] = profile
annotated["profile_name"] = profile
annotated["hermes_home"] = str(home)
annotated["is_default_profile"] = profile == "default"
return annotated
def _call_cron_for_profile(target_profile: Optional[str], func_name: str, *args, **kwargs):
"""Run cron.jobs helpers against the selected profile's cron directory.
The dashboard is a single process that can inspect many profiles. Route
storage through cron.jobs' execution-context override so dashboard calls
cannot retarget a concurrent desktop ticker's load/save transaction.
"""
profile_name, home = _cron_profile_home(target_profile)
from cron import jobs as cron_jobs
from hermes_constants import (
reset_hermes_home_override,
set_hermes_home_override,
)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(home))
try:
with cron_jobs.use_cron_store(home):
if func_name == "create_job":
from cron.scheduler import create_job_with_scheduler_registration
result = create_job_with_scheduler_registration(*args, **kwargs)
else:
result = getattr(cron_jobs, func_name)(*args, **kwargs)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
if isinstance(result, list):
return [_annotate_cron_job(j, profile_name, home) for j in result]
if isinstance(result, dict):
return _annotate_cron_job(result, profile_name, home)
return result
def _notify_cron_provider_for_profile(target_profile: Optional[str]) -> None:
"""Best-effort provider reconcile against one profile's job store.
Fail-closed for external providers on a multi-profile dashboard: an
external provider's ``reconcile`` converges its REMOTE registry toward
one profile's jobs.json, and its orphan cleanup cancels every remote
entry absent from that store. The NAS registry is not profile-scoped,
so reconciling profile B would silently disarm profile A's one-shots.
Until the provider contract carries a profile identity through
arm/cancel/list, a multi-profile dashboard must not drive unscoped
external reconciles at all — the affected profile simply re-arms on
its next fire/start (idempotent via dedup_key). The built-in provider
re-reads jobs.json each tick and stays a no-op here.
"""
try:
_profile_name, home = _cron_profile_home(target_profile)
from cron import jobs as cron_jobs
from cron.scheduler_provider import (
InProcessCronScheduler,
resolve_cron_scheduler,
)
from hermes_constants import (
reset_hermes_home_override,
set_hermes_home_override,
)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(home))
try:
with cron_jobs.use_cron_store(home):
provider = resolve_cron_scheduler()
if not isinstance(provider, InProcessCronScheduler):
profile_names = [
str(p.get("name") or "")
for p in _cron_profile_dicts()
]
if len([n for n in profile_names if n]) > 1:
_log.warning(
"Skipping cron provider reconcile for profile %s: "
"external provider '%s' reconcile is not "
"profile-scoped and would disarm other profiles' "
"armed one-shots. The mutated profile re-arms "
"idempotently on its next fire/start.",
target_profile,
provider.name,
)
return
provider.on_jobs_changed()
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
except Exception:
_log.debug(
"Cron provider reconciliation failed for profile %s",
target_profile,
exc_info=True,
)
def _mutate_cron_for_profile(
target_profile: Optional[str], func_name: str, *args, **kwargs
):
"""Apply a cron store mutation and reconcile its scheduler provider."""
result = _call_cron_for_profile(target_profile, func_name, *args, **kwargs)
if result:
_notify_cron_provider_for_profile(target_profile)
return result
def _find_cron_job_profile(job_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
for profile in _cron_profile_dicts():
name = str(profile.get("name") or "")
if not name:
continue
jobs = _call_cron_for_profile(name, "list_jobs", True)
if any(j.get("id") == job_id or j.get("name") == job_id for j in jobs):
return name
return None
def _list_cron_jobs_sync(profile: str = "all"):
requested = (profile or "all").strip()
if requested.lower() != "all":
return _call_cron_for_profile(requested, "list_jobs", True)
jobs: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for item in _cron_profile_dicts():
name = str(item.get("name") or "")
if not name:
continue
try:
jobs.extend(_call_cron_for_profile(name, "list_jobs", True))
except Exception:
_log.exception("Failed to list cron jobs for profile %s", name)
return jobs
async def _run_cron_dashboard_io(func, *args, **kwargs):
"""Run cron dashboard profile/job I/O outside the FastAPI event loop."""
if inspect.iscoroutinefunction(func):
raise TypeError("_run_cron_dashboard_io only accepts sync callables")
result = await run_in_threadpool(func, *args, **kwargs)
if inspect.isawaitable(result):
raise TypeError("_run_cron_dashboard_io sync callable returned an awaitable")
return result
def _raise_if_cron_registration_error(e: Exception) -> None:
"""Re-raise a cron partial-failure (job saved, external scheduler
registration failed) as HTTP 424 with the structured envelope.
Shared by every dashboard cron-create surface so the contract can't
drift between copies. The lazy import keeps cron out of module import.
"""
from cron.scheduler import CronSchedulerRegistrationError
if isinstance(e, CronSchedulerRegistrationError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=424, detail=e.to_dict()) from e
from hermes_cli.web_routers import cron as _cron_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_cron_routes.router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.cron import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
list_cron_jobs,
get_cron_job,
list_cron_job_runs,
create_cron_job,
get_cron_delivery_targets,
update_cron_job,
pause_cron_job,
resume_cron_job,
trigger_cron_job,
delete_cron_job,
cron_fire_webhook,
list_cron_blueprints,
instantiate_blueprint,
)
def _get_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "get_job", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
def _list_cron_job_runs_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None, limit: int = 20):
"""Run sessions produced by a cron job, newest first.
Cron runs are stored as ordinary sessions whose id is
``cron_{job_id}_{timestamp}`` (see cron/scheduler.run_job). A job's history
is therefore every session whose id carries that prefix; ``source='cron'``
narrows it and the id prefix binds it to this job. Powers the run-history
list under each job in the desktop cron detail. Same row shape as
``/api/sessions`` so the frontend can reuse SessionInfo.
Backed by ``SessionDB.list_cron_job_runs`` — a bounded ``[prefix, hi)``
id-range scan, not the compression-chain CTE used for the recents list,
so the cost scales with the requested window and not the (unbounded) total
cron history.
"""
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
# job_id may be a human name; resolve to the canonical id used in run-session ids.
canonical = job_id
if selected:
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "get_job", job_id)
if job and job.get("id"):
canonical = str(job["id"])
try:
limit_n = max(1, min(int(limit), 100))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
limit_n = 20
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(selected, read_only=True)
try:
runs = db.list_cron_job_runs(canonical, limit=limit_n, offset=0)
now = time.time()
for s in runs:
s["is_active"] = (
s.get("ended_at") is None
and (now - s.get("last_active", s.get("started_at", 0))) < 300
)
s["archived"] = bool(s.get("archived"))
if selected:
s["profile"] = selected
return {"runs": runs, "limit": limit_n}
finally:
db.close()
def _create_cron_job_sync(body: CronJobCreate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
profile_name, profile_home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
script = _normalize_dashboard_cron_script(body.script, profile_home)
skills = _cron_string_list(body.skills)
context_from = _cron_string_list(body.context_from)
_validate_dashboard_cron_context_from(context_from, profile_name)
no_agent = bool(body.no_agent)
_validate_dashboard_cron_effective_job({
"prompt": body.prompt,
"skills": skills,
"script": script,
"no_agent": no_agent,
})
return _mutate_cron_for_profile(
profile_name,
"create_job",
prompt=body.prompt or "",
schedule=body.schedule,
name=body.name,
deliver=_cron_optional_text(body.deliver) or "local",
skills=skills,
model=_cron_optional_text(body.model),
provider=_cron_optional_text(body.provider),
base_url=_cron_optional_text(body.base_url, strip_trailing_slash=True),
script=script,
context_from=context_from,
enabled_toolsets=_cron_string_list(body.enabled_toolsets),
workdir=_cron_optional_text(body.workdir),
no_agent=no_agent,
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as e:
_raise_if_cron_registration_error(e)
_log.exception("POST /api/cron/jobs failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
def _update_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, body: CronJobUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
try:
profile_name, profile_home = _cron_profile_home(selected)
existing = _call_cron_for_profile(profile_name, "get_job", job_id)
if not existing:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
updates = _normalize_dashboard_cron_updates(
body.updates,
profile_home,
)
if "context_from" in updates:
_validate_dashboard_cron_context_from(
updates.get("context_from"),
profile_name,
)
execution_fields = {"prompt", "skill", "skills", "script", "no_agent"}
if execution_fields.intersection(updates):
effective = {**existing, **updates}
if "skills" in updates and "skill" not in updates:
effective["skill"] = None
_validate_dashboard_cron_effective_job(effective)
job = _mutate_cron_for_profile(profile_name, "update_job", job_id, updates)
except HTTPException:
raise
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
def _pause_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _mutate_cron_for_profile(selected, "pause_job", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
def _resume_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _mutate_cron_for_profile(selected, "resume_job", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return job
def _trigger_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
job = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "resolve_job_ref", job_id)
if not job:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
# Do not expose the job as due before claiming it: the built-in ticker and
# external/manual fire paths share the same durable claim, so only one can
# execute this selected run even if they race across processes. Active jobs
# keep the legacy provider call shape; paused jobs need the explicit force
# flag to resume and claim atomically.
force = not job.get("enabled", True) or job.get("state") == "paused"
ran = _fire_cron_job_for_profile(selected, job["id"], force=force)
refreshed = _call_cron_for_profile(selected, "get_job", job["id"])
if refreshed and refreshed.get("last_run_at") != job.get("last_run_at"):
return refreshed
if not ran:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=409,
detail="Job is already running or was claimed by another scheduler",
)
if refreshed:
return refreshed
# A one-shot may remove itself after exhausting repeat=1. Keep the response
# shape compatible without inventing an outcome that is no longer present
# in the job store; authoritative list refresh removes the completed row.
return {
**job,
"enabled": False,
"state": "completed",
}
def _delete_cron_job_sync(job_id: str, profile: Optional[str] = None):
selected = profile or _find_cron_job_profile(job_id)
if not selected:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
try:
removed = _mutate_cron_for_profile(selected, "remove_job", job_id)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
if not removed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Job not found")
return {"ok": True}
def _fire_cron_job_for_profile(
profile: str,
job_id: str,
*,
force: bool = False,
) -> bool:
"""DEPRECATED for NAS webhook fires (superseded by gateway forwarding);
retained for the dashboard trigger path — do not add new uses.
Run ONE due cron job end-to-end for ``profile`` via the resolved
scheduler provider's ``fire_due`` (store CAS claim + ``run_one_job``).
Superseded by :func:`_forward_cron_fire_to_gateway`: cron fires must
execute in the GATEWAY process (which owns the live platform adapters),
not the dashboard. Executing here delivered through the standalone path
only, which cannot serve relay-fronted logical platforms (their only
sender is the live relay adapter — no native credential exists on the
box) or E2EE rooms. Kept temporarily because external callers may still
resolve it via the web_deps late-binding seam.
"""
_profile_name, home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
from cron import jobs as cron_jobs
from cron.scheduler_provider import (
provider_supports_force_fire,
resolve_cron_scheduler,
)
from hermes_constants import (
reset_hermes_home_override,
set_hermes_home_override,
)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(home))
try:
with cron_jobs.use_cron_store(home):
provider = resolve_cron_scheduler()
if force:
if not provider_supports_force_fire(provider):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=409,
detail=(
f"Cron provider '{getattr(provider, 'name', 'custom')}' "
"does not support atomic forced firing of paused jobs"
),
)
return bool(
provider.fire_due(job_id, adapters=None, loop=None, force=True)
)
return bool(provider.fire_due(job_id, adapters=None, loop=None))
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
def _profile_env_value(home: Path, key: str) -> str:
"""Best-effort read of one KEY=VALUE line from a profile's .env file."""
try:
env_path = home / ".env"
if not env_path.is_file():
return ""
for line in env_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():
line = line.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
continue
k, v = line.split("=", 1)
if k.strip() == key:
return v.strip().strip('"').strip("'")
except Exception:
pass
return ""
def _gateway_fire_endpoint(profile: str, home: Path) -> str:
"""Resolve the loopback URL of the gateway api_server's cron-fire route.
Port resolution mirrors gateway/config.py's api_server load order for the
LISTENER-OWNER profile: ``platforms.api_server.extra.port`` in that
profile's config.yaml, then ``API_SERVER_PORT`` (process env for the
active profile, the profile's own .env otherwise), then the adapter
default 8642. The bind host is the adapter's loopback default — the
dashboard and gateway share a network namespace in every supported
deployment (same host process tree, or the same container under s6).
Multiplex mode (one gateway serving several profiles) exposes per-profile
mirrors under ``/p/<profile>/…``, so a non-default profile routes through
the default gateway's port with that prefix — only the DEFAULT profile's
api_server is bound in that mode, so the port must be read from the
default home, never the target profile's (a secondary's own
``API_SERVER_PORT`` is a port nothing listens on). Per-profile-gateway
mode (each profile its own process/port) uses the bare path on the
profile's own port.
"""
import os as _os
multiplex = False
try:
from gateway.config import _env_multiplex_profiles_override
cfg = load_config()
multiplex = bool(cfg_get(cfg, "gateway", "multiplex_profiles", default=False))
env_flag = _env_multiplex_profiles_override()
if env_flag is not None:
multiplex = env_flag
except Exception:
_log.debug("cron fire: multiplex detection failed; assuming single-profile", exc_info=True)
listener_profile, listener_home = profile, home
if multiplex and profile != "default":
from hermes_constants import get_default_hermes_root
listener_profile, listener_home = "default", get_default_hermes_root()
_log.info(
"cron fire: multiplex gateway — resolving api_server port for %s "
"from the default profile's listener (%s)",
profile,
listener_home,
)
port = 0
try:
# Profile-scoped read through the CANONICAL loader (managed-scope
# overlay, ${ENV_VAR} expansion, profile pathing) — never a raw
# yaml.safe_load of config.yaml (tests/hermes_cli/
# test_config_read_guard.py). The HERMES_HOME override scopes
# get_config_path() to the LISTENER-OWNER profile, same pattern the
# deprecated _fire_cron_job_for_profile used for its store scope.
from hermes_constants import (
reset_hermes_home_override,
set_hermes_home_override,
)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(listener_home))
try:
profile_cfg = load_config()
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
raw = cfg_get(
profile_cfg, "platforms", "api_server", "extra", "port", default=None
)
if raw:
port = int(raw)
except Exception:
port = 0
if not port:
raw = (
_os.getenv("API_SERVER_PORT", "")
if listener_profile == _cron_default_profile()
else _profile_env_value(listener_home, "API_SERVER_PORT")
)
try:
port = int(raw) if raw else 0
except ValueError:
port = 0
if not port:
port = 8642
if multiplex and profile != "default":
return f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/p/{profile}/api/cron/fire"
return f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}/api/cron/fire"
async def _forward_cron_fire_to_gateway(
profile: str, job_id: str, authorization: str
) -> Optional[Tuple[int, Dict[str, Any]]]:
"""Forward a Chronos fire callback to the gateway api_server on loopback.
The dashboard is the hosted deployment's only public HTTP door (Fly proxy
→ internal_port 9119), but cron execution belongs to the GATEWAY process:
it owns the live platform adapters, so delivery works for relay-fronted
logical platforms and E2EE rooms — the standalone path the dashboard used
to run cannot serve either. This forwards the fire byte-preserved (same
job_id, same NAS bearer — the gateway re-verifies the JWT itself) and
passes the gateway's response through.
Returns ``(status_code, body)`` from the gateway, or ``None`` when the
gateway is unreachable (not started yet after a scale-to-zero wake,
restarting, or api_server disabled) — the caller maps that to 503 so NAS
retries per the Chronos contract (non-2xx = retryable; the store CAS
de-dupes the eventual double fire), UNLESS the profile's gateway was
deliberately stopped (see :func:`_gateway_intentionally_stopped`), in
which case the caller drops the fire with 200 — retrying into an
operator-stopped gateway can never succeed and only burns scheduler
retries (OOF-266).
"""
_profile_name, home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
url = _gateway_fire_endpoint(_profile_name, home)
import httpx
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0) as client:
resp = await client.post(
url,
json={"job_id": job_id},
headers={"Authorization": authorization},
)
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning(
"cron fire forward to %s failed (%s: %s); returning 503 for NAS retry",
url, type(exc).__name__, exc,
)
return None
try:
body = resp.json()
except Exception:
body = {"raw": (resp.text or "")[:500]}
if not isinstance(body, dict):
body = {"raw": body}
return resp.status_code, body
def _gateway_intentionally_stopped(profile: Optional[str]) -> bool:
"""True when the profile's gateway is stopped BY OPERATOR INTENT.
Reads the durable ``desired_state`` field of the profile's
``gateway_state.json`` — written exclusively by the s6 lifecycle
commands (``hermes gateway stop`` persists ``"stopped"``; start and
restart persist ``"running"``, see service_manager's
``_write_gateway_desired_state``). This is the same operator-intent
signal container-boot reconciliation trusts, and it is precisely NOT
set to "stopped" during transient windows (crash loops, drains,
scale-to-zero wakes, restarts) — so it cleanly splits "retry will
eventually succeed" from "retry can never succeed".
Deliberately does NOT fall back to the volatile ``gateway_state``
runtime field: a legacy file without ``desired_state`` (or a gateway
that crashed before persisting) must stay on the retryable-503 path.
Failing open to "not intentionally stopped" is the safe direction —
the worst case is retries against a dead gateway, which is exactly
today's behavior.
Exception-safe: any resolution or parse failure returns False.
"""
import json as _json
try:
_name, home = _cron_profile_home(profile)
state_file = home / "gateway_state.json"
if not state_file.exists():
return False
data = _json.loads(state_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return False
return data.get("desired_state") == "stopped"
except Exception:
return False
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Automation Blueprints — parameterized automation blueprints. The dashboard renders the
# slot schema as a form; submitting instantiates a real cron job via the same
# create_job path. See cron/blueprint_catalog.py for the single source of truth.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# MCP server endpoints — list / add / remove / test.
#
# Wraps the same config data layer the CLI uses (hermes_cli.mcp_config), so
# servers managed here show up under `hermes mcp list` and vice versa. Secrets
# in stdio `env` blocks are redacted on read; the agent picks them up from
# config.yaml at session start exactly as with CLI-added servers.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _normalize_mcp_server_create(
body: MCPServerCreate,
) -> tuple[str, Dict[str, Any], Optional[str]]:
"""Validate a Dashboard MCP create request and build its safe config.
The returned config never contains the submitted Bearer token. Callers
persist the token with the shared Bearer helper only after they enter the
intended profile scope. Keeping this conversion shared makes the
standalone MCP page and the Profile Builder enforce the same
transport/auth contract.
"""
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import (
_bearer_auth_headers,
_strip_bearer_prefix,
)
from hermes_cli.mcp_security import validate_mcp_server_entry
name = (body.name or "").strip()
if not name:
raise ValueError("Server name is required")
url = (body.url or "").strip()
command = (body.command or "").strip()
auth = (body.auth or "none").strip().lower()
bearer_token = (
body.bearer_token.get_secret_value()
if body.bearer_token is not None
else None
)
if bool(url) == bool(command):
raise ValueError("Provide exactly one of URL (HTTP/SSE) or command (stdio)")
if auth not in {"none", "header", "oauth"}:
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported auth mode: {auth}")
server_config: Dict[str, Any] = {}
if url:
if body.args:
raise ValueError("Arguments are only supported for stdio MCP servers")
if body.env:
raise ValueError(
"Environment variables are only supported for stdio MCP servers"
)
if auth == "header":
normalized = _strip_bearer_prefix(bearer_token) if bearer_token else ""
if not normalized or normalized.lower() == "bearer":
raise ValueError("Bearer token is required")
server_config["headers"] = _bearer_auth_headers(name)
elif body.bearer_token is not None:
raise ValueError("Bearer token requires header authentication")
server_config["url"] = url
if auth == "oauth":
server_config["auth"] = "oauth"
else:
if auth != "none" or body.bearer_token is not None:
raise ValueError(
"HTTP authentication is not supported for stdio MCP servers"
)
server_config["command"] = command
if body.args:
server_config["args"] = list(body.args)
if body.env:
server_config["env"] = dict(body.env)
issues = validate_mcp_server_entry(name, server_config)
if issues:
raise ValueError(f"Server '{name}' rejected: {'; '.join(issues)}")
return name, server_config, bearer_token
def _redact_mcp_env(env: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, str]:
"""Mask secret-shaped MCP env values for read responses."""
out: Dict[str, str] = {}
for k, v in (env or {}).items():
try:
out[str(k)] = redact_key(str(v)) if v else ""
except Exception:
out[str(k)] = "***"
return out
def _mcp_server_summary(name: str, cfg: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
transport = "http" if cfg.get("url") else ("stdio" if cfg.get("command") else "unknown")
auth = cfg.get("auth")
headers = cfg.get("headers") or {}
if not auth and isinstance(headers, dict) and any(
str(key).lower() == "authorization" for key in headers
):
auth = "header"
return {
"name": name,
"transport": transport,
"url": cfg.get("url"),
"command": cfg.get("command"),
"args": list(cfg.get("args") or []),
"env": _redact_mcp_env(cfg.get("env") or {}),
"auth": auth,
"enabled": cfg.get("enabled", True) is not False,
# Tool selection: list of enabled tool names, or None = all.
"tools": cfg.get("tools"),
}
from hermes_cli.web_routers import mcp as _mcp_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_mcp_routes.router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.mcp import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
list_mcp_servers,
add_mcp_server,
replace_mcp_servers,
remove_mcp_server,
test_mcp_server,
auth_mcp_server,
mcp_oauth_flow_status,
mcp_oauth_callback,
set_mcp_server_enabled,
list_mcp_catalog,
install_mcp_catalog_entry,
)
_MCP_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_TTL = 15 * 60
_MAX_PENDING_MCP_OAUTH_FLOWS = 8
_mcp_oauth_flows: dict[str, "DashboardOAuthFlow"] = {}
_mcp_oauth_flows_lock = threading.Lock()
_mcp_oauth_transactions: dict[tuple[str, str], threading.Lock] = {}
_mcp_oauth_transactions_lock = threading.Lock()
def _gc_mcp_oauth_flows() -> None:
cutoff = time.time() - _MCP_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_TTL
with _mcp_oauth_flows_lock:
stale = [
flow_id
for flow_id, flow in _mcp_oauth_flows.items()
if getattr(flow, "created_at", 0) < cutoff
]
for flow_id in stale:
_mcp_oauth_flows.pop(flow_id, None)
def _mcp_oauth_callback_url_from_base(base_url: str, server_name: str) -> str:
from urllib.parse import quote
return f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/api/mcp/oauth/callback/{quote(server_name, safe='')}"
def _mcp_oauth_callback_url(request: Request, server_name: str) -> str:
"""Build the externally reachable callback URL for a dashboard flow."""
from urllib.parse import urlparse, urlunparse
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import prefix_from_request, resolve_public_url
from urllib.parse import quote
suffix = f"/api/mcp/oauth/callback/{quote(server_name, safe='')}"
public_url = resolve_public_url()
if public_url:
return f"{public_url}{suffix}"
base = urlparse(str(request.base_url))
prefix = prefix_from_request(request)
return urlunparse(base._replace(path=f"{prefix}{suffix}", params="", query="", fragment=""))
def _mcp_oauth_transaction(flow) -> threading.Lock:
key = (flow.hermes_home, flow.server_name)
with _mcp_oauth_transactions_lock:
return _mcp_oauth_transactions.setdefault(key, threading.Lock())
def _run_dashboard_mcp_oauth(flow, cfg: dict) -> None:
"""Run the normal MCP probe with dashboard redirect/callback handlers."""
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import (
_oauth_tokens_present,
_probe_single_server,
_save_mcp_server,
)
try:
from agent.secret_scope import (
build_profile_secret_scope,
reset_secret_scope,
set_secret_scope,
)
from hermes_constants import reset_hermes_home_override, set_hermes_home_override
from tools.mcp_dashboard_oauth import dashboard_oauth_flow
from tools.mcp_oauth import HermesTokenStorage, force_interactive_oauth
from tools.mcp_oauth_manager import get_manager
home_token = set_hermes_home_override(flow.hermes_home)
secret_token = set_secret_scope(build_profile_secret_scope(Path(flow.hermes_home)))
try:
transaction = _mcp_oauth_transaction(flow)
with transaction, force_interactive_oauth(), dashboard_oauth_flow(flow):
manager = get_manager()
storage = HermesTokenStorage(flow.server_name)
backup = storage.snapshot()
previous_entry = None
try:
previous_entry = manager.remove(
flow.server_name,
hermes_home=flow.hermes_home,
)
tools = _probe_single_server(
flow.server_name,
cfg,
connect_timeout=max(float(cfg.get("connect_timeout", 0) or 0), 315),
)
if not _oauth_tokens_present(flow.server_name):
raise RuntimeError(
"The server responded, but no OAuth token was obtained — "
"this provider may require a manually-registered OAuth client."
)
_save_mcp_server(flow.server_name, cfg)
flow.tools = [{"name": t, "description": d} for t, d in tools]
flow.mark_approved()
if flow.reconnect_live:
from tools.mcp_tool import reconnect_mcp_server
reconnect_mcp_server(flow.server_name)
except Exception:
storage.restore(backup, only_if_absent=True)
manager.restore_entry(
flow.server_name,
previous_entry,
hermes_home=flow.hermes_home,
)
raise
finally:
reset_secret_scope(secret_token)
reset_hermes_home_override(home_token)
except Exception as exc:
msg = str(exc)
# Providers that gate RFC 7591 registration to pre-approved clients
# (Figma's MCP catalog, etc.) 403 the register call before any
# authorization URL exists — surface what's actually happening
# instead of a bare "403 Forbidden".
try:
from tools.mcp_oauth import humanize_oauth_registration_error
humanized = humanize_oauth_registration_error(
flow.server_name,
exc,
server_url=cfg.get("url") if isinstance(cfg, dict) else None,
)
if humanized:
msg = humanized
except Exception:
pass
flow.mark_error(msg)
finally:
flow.mark_worker_done()
def _mcp_install_action_name(name: str) -> str:
"""Unique per-entry mcp-install action name (+ registered log file), so a
re-click or a second catalog install doesn't overwrite the first's tracked
process/log while its git clone is still running."""
slug = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "-", name.lower()).strip("-")[:48] or "server"
digest = hashlib.sha1(name.encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
action = f"mcp-install-{slug}-{digest}"
_ACTION_LOG_FILES.setdefault(action, f"action-{action}.log")
return action
_ACTION_LOG_FILES.setdefault("computer-use-grant", "action-computer-use-grant.log")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pairing endpoints — approve / revoke / list messaging pairing codes.
#
# These are how a remote admin onboards messaging users (Telegram, Discord, …)
# without shell access. Wraps gateway.pairing.PairingStore directly.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _pairing_store(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Pairing store for ``profile`` — the dashboard's own when unspecified.
Every other admin endpoint scopes by profile, and the gateway already
keeps one store per served profile (``gateway/run.py``). Without this the
dashboard and desktop always read the global store, so an operator on a
named profile approves into a whitelist their gateway never consults.
``PairingStore`` resolves the profile's home itself (``default`` maps back
to the global store), so this only needs to validate the name — no
``_profile_scope`` needed, and nothing process-global is swapped across
the ``await`` boundary.
"""
from gateway.pairing import PairingStore
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
return PairingStore()
_resolve_profile_dir(requested) # 400/404 on an unknown profile
return PairingStore(profile=requested)
@app.get("/api/pairing")
async def list_pairing(profile: Optional[str] = None):
store = _pairing_store(profile)
return {
"pending": store.list_pending(),
"approved": store.list_approved(),
}
@app.post("/api/pairing/approve")
async def approve_pairing(body: PairingApprove):
store = _pairing_store(body.profile)
platform = (body.platform or "").lower().strip()
# `request_id` is what an admin surface sends after listing pending
# requests; `code` is the one-time code the user relays from their DM.
# A GUI that only knows the older field name still works — a value with
# request-id shape routes to the request path either way.
target = (body.request_id or body.code or "").strip()
if not platform or not target:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400, detail="platform and request_id or code are required"
)
by_request_id = bool(body.request_id) or store.looks_like_request_id(target)
if by_request_id:
result = store.approve_request(platform, target)
else:
result = store.approve_code(platform, target.upper())
if result:
return {"ok": True, "user": result}
# Lockout only gates the code path, so only report it there — otherwise a
# stale request id would surface as a bogus 429 while the platform sat
# locked out for an unrelated reason.
if not by_request_id and store._is_locked_out(platform):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=429,
detail=f"Platform '{platform}' is locked out after too many failed approvals.",
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail=f"Pairing request or code not found or expired for platform '{platform}'.",
)
@app.post("/api/pairing/revoke")
async def revoke_pairing(body: PairingRevoke):
store = _pairing_store(body.profile)
platform = (body.platform or "").lower().strip()
if not platform or not body.user_id:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="platform and user_id are required")
if store.revoke(platform, body.user_id):
return {"ok": True}
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail=f"User {body.user_id} not found in approved list for {platform}.",
)
@app.post("/api/pairing/clear-pending")
async def clear_pending_pairing(profile: Optional[str] = None):
store = _pairing_store(profile)
count = store.clear_pending()
return {"ok": True, "cleared": count}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Webhook subscription endpoints — list / subscribe / remove.
#
# Wraps the same JSON store the CLI uses (hermes_cli.webhook); the webhook
# adapter hot-reloads it without a gateway restart. Per-route HMAC secrets
# are redacted on read and surfaced once on create.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _webhook_route_summary(name: str, route: Dict[str, Any], base_url: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"name": name,
"description": route.get("description", ""),
"events": list(route.get("events") or []),
"deliver": route.get("deliver", "log"),
"deliver_only": bool(route.get("deliver_only")),
"prompt": route.get("prompt", ""),
"script": route.get("script", ""),
"skills": list(route.get("skills") or []),
"created_at": route.get("created_at"),
"url": f"{base_url}/webhooks/{name}",
# Secret is masked on read; full value only returned on create.
"secret_set": bool(route.get("secret")),
# Default-enabled; only an explicit enabled:false turns a route off.
"enabled": route.get("enabled", True) is not False,
}
@app.get("/api/webhooks")
async def list_webhooks():
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
base_url = wh._get_webhook_base_url()
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
return {
"enabled": wh._is_webhook_enabled(),
"base_url": base_url,
"subscriptions": [
_webhook_route_summary(name, route, base_url)
for name, route in subs.items()
],
}
@app.post("/api/webhooks/enable")
async def enable_webhooks():
try:
_write_platform_enabled("webhook", True)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to enable webhook platform from dashboard")
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail="Failed to enable webhook platform.",
) from exc
restart_result = _restart_gateway_after_webhook_enable()
return {
"ok": True,
"platform": "webhook",
"enabled": True,
"needs_restart": not restart_result["restart_started"],
**restart_result,
}
@app.post("/api/webhooks")
async def create_webhook(body: WebhookCreate):
import re as _re
import secrets as _secrets
import time as _time
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
if not wh._is_webhook_enabled():
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Webhook platform is not enabled. Enable it from the Webhooks page first.",
)
name = (body.name or "").strip().lower().replace(" ", "-")
if not _re.match(r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9_-]*$", name):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Invalid name. Use lowercase alphanumeric with hyphens/underscores.",
)
if body.deliver_only and body.deliver == "log":
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Direct delivery requires a real target (telegram, discord, …), not 'log'.",
)
secret = body.secret or _secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
route: Dict[str, Any] = {
"description": body.description or f"Dashboard-created subscription: {name}",
"events": [e.strip() for e in body.events if e.strip()],
"secret": secret,
"prompt": body.prompt or "",
"skills": [s.strip() for s in body.skills if s.strip()],
"deliver": body.deliver or "log",
"created_at": _time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", _time.gmtime()),
}
if body.script and body.script.strip():
route["script"] = body.script.strip()
if body.deliver_only:
route["deliver_only"] = True
if body.deliver_chat_id:
route["deliver_extra"] = {"chat_id": body.deliver_chat_id}
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
subs[name] = route
wh._save_subscriptions(subs)
base_url = wh._get_webhook_base_url()
summary = _webhook_route_summary(name, route, base_url)
# Surface the secret exactly once, on create.
summary["secret"] = secret
return summary
@app.delete("/api/webhooks/{name}")
async def delete_webhook(name: str):
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
key = (name or "").strip().lower()
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
if key not in subs:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"No subscription named '{key}'")
del subs[key]
wh._save_subscriptions(subs)
return {"ok": True}
@app.put("/api/webhooks/{name}/enabled")
async def set_webhook_enabled(name: str, body: WebhookEnabledToggle):
"""Enable or disable a webhook route.
Disabled routes stay in the subscriptions file (so they can be
re-enabled) but the gateway rejects incoming events with 403. The
gateway hot-reloads the subscriptions file, so this takes effect on the
next event without a restart.
"""
import hermes_cli.webhook as wh
key = (name or "").strip().lower()
subs = wh._load_subscriptions()
if key not in subs:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"No subscription named '{key}'")
subs[key]["enabled"] = bool(body.enabled)
wh._save_subscriptions(subs)
return {"ok": True, "name": key, "enabled": bool(body.enabled)}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Gateway lifecycle endpoints — start / stop.
#
# restart + update already exist above; these complete the lifecycle so a
# remote admin can bring the gateway up or down without shell access. Both
# spawn the real `hermes gateway <verb>` so behaviour matches the CLI exactly.
# Status is already surfaced by /api/status (gateway_running/state/platforms).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.post("/api/gateway/start")
async def start_gateway(profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(_gateway_subcommand(profile, "start"), "gateway-start")
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn gateway start")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to start gateway: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "gateway-start"}
@app.post("/api/gateway/stop")
async def stop_gateway(profile: Optional[str] = None):
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(_gateway_subcommand(profile, "stop"), "gateway-stop")
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn gateway stop")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to stop gateway: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "gateway-stop"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Credential pool endpoints — list / add / remove rotation keys.
#
# The credential pool (auth.json -> credential_pool.<provider>[]) holds the
# rotating API keys the agent round-robins through. Secrets are redacted on
# read; only the agent ever sees the raw values at session start.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _pool_entry_summary(entry: Any, index: int) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Redacted, display-safe view of one PooledCredential.
``index`` is 1-based to match CredentialPool.remove_index().
"""
token = getattr(entry, "access_token", "") or ""
return {
"index": index,
"id": getattr(entry, "id", None),
"label": getattr(entry, "label", None),
"auth_type": getattr(entry, "auth_type", None),
"source": getattr(entry, "source", None),
"priority": getattr(entry, "priority", 0),
"last_status": getattr(entry, "last_status", None),
"request_count": getattr(entry, "request_count", 0),
"token_preview": redact_key(token) if token else "",
"has_refresh": bool(getattr(entry, "refresh_token", None)),
}
@app.get("/api/credentials/pool")
async def list_credential_pool():
from agent.credential_pool import load_pool
from hermes_cli.auth import read_credential_pool
# load_pool() may hit the network synchronously (Copilot token exchange
# over raw urllib). urllib's timeout does NOT bound DNS resolution
# (getaddrinfo blocks in C), so on a networkless Windows host this froze
# the uvicorn event loop for 17 minutes (2026-08-22 00:03-00:20 stall).
# Keep every provider load off the loop - same pattern as
# get_memory_status below.
def _run():
providers = []
# read_credential_pool(None) lists every provider that has pooled entries;
# load_pool() then gives us the rich PooledCredential objects per provider.
raw_pool = read_credential_pool()
for provider_id in sorted(raw_pool.keys()):
try:
pool = load_pool(provider_id)
except Exception:
_log.exception("load_pool(%s) failed", provider_id)
continue
entries = pool.entries()
if not entries:
continue
providers.append({
"provider": provider_id,
"entries": [
_pool_entry_summary(e, i) for i, e in enumerate(entries, start=1)
],
})
return {"providers": providers}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.post("/api/credentials/pool")
async def add_credential_pool_entry(body: CredentialPoolAdd):
import uuid as _uuid
from agent.credential_pool import (
load_pool,
PooledCredential,
AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY,
CUSTOM_POOL_PREFIX,
SOURCE_MANUAL,
)
provider = (body.provider or "").strip().lower()
api_key = (body.api_key or "").strip()
if not provider or not api_key:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="provider and api_key are required")
# load_pool() may run synchronous OAuth token exchanges (network I/O);
# keep it off the event loop - see list_credential_pool (2026-08-22
# 17-minute stall fix).
def _run():
try:
pool = load_pool(provider)
label = (body.label or "").strip() or f"key #{len(pool.entries()) + 1}"
entry = PooledCredential(
provider=provider,
id=_uuid.uuid4().hex[:6],
label=label,
auth_type=AUTH_TYPE_API_KEY,
priority=0,
source=SOURCE_MANUAL,
access_token=api_key,
)
pool.add_entry(entry)
# Re-adding a credential is an explicit re-engagement signal: lift
# every suppression for this provider so a source deleted earlier
# (via DELETE below or `hermes auth add`) can seed again.
# Mirrors the `hermes auth add` behaviour in auth_commands.py.
if not provider.startswith(CUSTOM_POOL_PREFIX):
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import (
_load_auth_store,
unsuppress_credential_source,
)
suppressed = _load_auth_store().get("suppressed_sources", {})
for src in list(suppressed.get(provider, []) or []):
unsuppress_credential_source(provider, src)
except Exception:
_log.exception("unsuppress after pool add failed (non-fatal)")
return {"ok": True, "provider": provider, "count": len(pool.entries())}
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("POST /api/credentials/pool failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.delete("/api/credentials/pool/{provider}/{index}")
async def remove_credential_pool_entry(provider: str, index: int):
"""Remove a pool entry. ``index`` is 1-based (matches the list response).
Removal must be sticky (#55217): ``load_pool()`` re-seeds entries from
their backing source (.env var, OAuth singleton file, custom-provider
config) on every call, so deleting only the pool row silently reverts on
the next dashboard refresh. We dispatch through the same RemovalStep
registry the CLI ``hermes auth remove`` uses: each source cleans up its
external state and suppresses ``(provider, source)`` so the seeders skip
it. Manual entries have no registered step — nothing external to clean,
no suppression needed (they aren't re-seeded).
"""
from agent.credential_pool import load_pool
from agent.credential_sources import find_removal_step
from hermes_cli.auth import suppress_credential_source
provider = (provider or "").strip().lower()
# load_pool() may run synchronous token exchanges and the removal steps do
# blocking disk writes - keep them off the event loop (see
# list_credential_pool; 2026-08-22 17-minute stall fix).
def _run():
try:
pool = load_pool(provider)
removed = pool.remove_index(index)
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("DELETE /api/credentials/pool failed")
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
if removed is None:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="No pool entry at that index")
cleaned: List[str] = []
hints: List[str] = []
step = find_removal_step(provider, removed.source or "")
if step is not None:
try:
result = step.remove_fn(provider, removed)
cleaned = list(result.cleaned)
hints = list(result.hints)
if result.suppress:
suppress_credential_source(provider, removed.source)
except Exception:
# Cleanup is best-effort, but suppression is the actual bug fix -
# without it the entry resurrects on the next load_pool(). Apply
# it even when source-specific cleanup blew up.
_log.exception(
"credential source cleanup failed for %s/%s; suppressing anyway",
provider, removed.source,
)
try:
suppress_credential_source(provider, removed.source)
except Exception:
_log.exception("suppress_credential_source failed")
return {
"ok": True,
"provider": provider,
"count": len(pool.entries()),
"cleaned": cleaned,
"hints": hints,
}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Memory provider endpoints — status / list providers / select / disable / reset.
#
# Provider setup is dashboard-native when a provider exposes get_config_schema().
# The dashboard never runs interactive provider setup hooks; activation is only
# allowed once the provider is discoverable, available, and has required config.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/memory")
async def get_memory_status():
# load_config(), file stats and provider discovery are disk reads — keep
# them off the event loop.
def _run():
cfg = load_config()
active = ""
mem = cfg.get("memory")
if isinstance(mem, dict):
active = _normalize_memory_provider_name(mem.get("provider"))
# Built-in memory file sizes (so the UI can show what a reset would erase).
mem_dir = get_hermes_home() / "memories"
files = {}
for fname, key in (("MEMORY.md", "memory"), ("USER.md", "user")):
path = mem_dir / fname
files[key] = path.stat().st_size if path.exists() else 0
return {
"active": active,
"providers": _discover_memory_provider_statuses(),
"builtin_files": files,
}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.put("/api/memory/provider")
async def set_memory_provider(body: MemoryProviderSelect):
provider = _normalize_memory_provider_name(body.provider)
def _run():
_require_memory_provider_ready(provider)
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
cfg = load_config()
if not isinstance(cfg.get("memory"), dict):
cfg["memory"] = {}
cfg["memory"]["provider"] = provider
save_config(cfg)
return {"ok": True, "active": provider}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.post("/api/memory/reset")
async def reset_memory(body: MemoryReset):
target = (body.target or "all").strip().lower()
if target not in {"all", "memory", "user"}:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="target must be all, memory, or user")
mem_dir = get_hermes_home() / "memories"
deleted = []
targets = []
if target in {"all", "memory"}:
targets.append("MEMORY.md")
if target in {"all", "user"}:
targets.append("USER.md")
for fname in targets:
path = mem_dir / fname
if path.exists():
try:
path.unlink()
deleted.append(fname)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not delete {fname}: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "deleted": deleted}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Operations endpoints — doctor / security audit / backup / import /
# checkpoints / hooks.
#
# Diagnostic and maintenance commands. The long-running / text-output ones
# (doctor, security audit, backup, import, skills install) are spawned as
# background actions whose logs the dashboard tails via
# /api/actions/{name}/status — same pattern as gateway restart and update.
# The cheap, structured reads (hooks list, checkpoints list) return JSON
# directly.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.post("/api/ops/doctor")
async def run_doctor():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["doctor"], "doctor")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn doctor")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run doctor: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "doctor"}
@app.post("/api/ops/security-audit")
async def run_security_audit():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["security", "audit"], "security-audit")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn security audit")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run security audit: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "security-audit"}
def _dashboard_backup_dir() -> Path:
return get_hermes_home() / "backups"
def _new_dashboard_backup_path() -> Path:
stamp = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d-%H%M%S")
return _dashboard_backup_dir() / f"hermes-backup-{stamp}-{secrets.token_hex(4)}.zip"
@app.post("/api/ops/backup")
async def run_backup(body: BackupRequest):
args = ["backup"]
archive: Optional[Path] = None
output = (body.output or "").strip()
if output:
args.extend(["-o", output])
else:
archive = _new_dashboard_backup_path()
try:
archive.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Could not create backup directory: {exc}",
)
args.extend(["-o", str(archive)])
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(args, "backup")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn backup")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run backup: {exc}")
response = {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "backup"}
if archive is not None:
response["archive"] = str(archive)
return response
@app.get("/api/ops/backup/download")
async def download_dashboard_backup(archive: str):
try:
backup_dir = _dashboard_backup_dir().expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
target = Path(archive).expanduser().resolve(strict=True)
except FileNotFoundError:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup not found")
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid backup path")
if not _path_is_under(backup_dir, target):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Backup is outside the dashboard backup directory")
if not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Backup not found")
return FileResponse(
path=str(target),
media_type="application/zip",
filename=target.name,
content_disposition_type="attachment",
)
@app.post("/api/ops/import")
async def run_import(body: ImportRequest):
archive = (body.archive or "").strip()
if not archive:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="archive path is required")
if not os.path.isfile(archive):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Archive not found: {archive}")
args = ["import", archive]
if body.force:
args.append("--force")
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(args, "import")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn import")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run import: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "import"}
def _safe_backup_upload_name(filename: str | None) -> str:
name = Path(filename or "backup.zip").name.strip()
name = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._-]+", "-", name).strip(".-")
if not name:
name = "backup.zip"
if not name.lower().endswith(".zip"):
name = f"{name}.zip"
return name
@app.post("/api/ops/import-upload")
async def run_import_upload(
file: UploadFile = File(...),
force: bool = Form(False),
):
staging_dir = _dashboard_backup_dir()
try:
staging_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Could not create import staging directory: {exc}",
)
safe_name = _safe_backup_upload_name(file.filename)
stamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S")
target = staging_dir / f"dashboard-import-{stamp}-{secrets.token_hex(4)}-{safe_name}"
tmp_fd, tmp_name = tempfile.mkstemp(
prefix=f".{target.name}.",
suffix=".upload",
dir=str(staging_dir),
)
tmp_path = Path(tmp_name)
total = 0
renamed = False
try:
with os.fdopen(tmp_fd, "wb") as out:
while True:
chunk = await file.read(_UPLOAD_CHUNK_BYTES)
if not chunk:
break
total += len(chunk)
if total > _MANAGED_FILE_MAX_BYTES:
raise HTTPException(status_code=413, detail="Archive is too large")
out.write(chunk)
os.replace(tmp_path, target)
renamed = True
except HTTPException:
raise
except PermissionError:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Import staging directory is not writable",
)
except OSError as exc:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=500,
detail=f"Could not write uploaded archive: {exc}",
)
finally:
if not renamed:
tmp_path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
await file.close()
if not zipfile.is_zipfile(target):
target.unlink(missing_ok=True)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail="Uploaded archive is not a valid zip file",
)
args = ["import", str(target)]
if force:
args.append("--force")
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(args, "import")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn import")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to run import: {exc}")
return {
"ok": True,
"pid": proc.pid,
"name": "import",
"archive": str(target),
"uploaded_bytes": total,
}
@app.get("/api/ops/hooks")
async def list_hooks():
"""List configured shell hooks from config.yaml with consent + health.
Reports each hook's allowlist (consent) status and whether the script is
currently executable, plus the set of valid hook events so the create
form can offer them.
"""
def _run():
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load_config
from agent import shell_hooks
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import VALID_HOOKS
valid_events = sorted(VALID_HOOKS)
except Exception:
valid_events = []
specs = []
try:
specs = shell_hooks.iter_configured_hooks(_load_config())
except Exception:
_log.exception("iter_configured_hooks failed")
out = []
for spec in specs:
entry = None
try:
entry = shell_hooks.allowlist_entry_for(spec.event, spec.command)
except Exception:
pass
executable = False
try:
executable = shell_hooks.script_is_executable(spec.command)
except Exception:
pass
out.append({
"event": spec.event,
"matcher": spec.matcher,
"command": spec.command,
"timeout": spec.timeout,
"allowed": entry is not None,
"approved_at": (entry or {}).get("approved_at"),
"executable": executable,
})
return {"hooks": out, "valid_events": valid_events}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.post("/api/ops/hooks")
async def create_hook(body: HookCreate):
"""Add a shell hook to config.yaml (and optionally approve it).
Shell hooks run arbitrary commands, so this is a privileged action: it
writes to the ``hooks:`` config block and, when ``approve`` is set, records
consent in the allowlist so the hook actually fires. Takes effect on the
next session / gateway restart.
"""
from agent import shell_hooks
event = (body.event or "").strip()
command = (body.command or "").strip()
if not event or not command:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="event and command are required")
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import VALID_HOOKS
if event not in VALID_HOOKS:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=f"Unknown event '{event}'. Valid: {', '.join(sorted(VALID_HOOKS))}",
)
except HTTPException:
raise
except Exception:
pass
def _run():
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
cfg = load_config()
hooks_cfg = cfg.get("hooks")
if not isinstance(hooks_cfg, dict):
hooks_cfg = {}
cfg["hooks"] = hooks_cfg
entries = hooks_cfg.get(event)
if not isinstance(entries, list):
entries = []
hooks_cfg[event] = entries
new_entry: Dict[str, Any] = {"command": command}
if body.matcher:
new_entry["matcher"] = body.matcher
if body.timeout is not None:
new_entry["timeout"] = int(body.timeout)
entries.append(new_entry)
save_config(cfg)
approved = False
if body.approve:
try:
shell_hooks._record_approval(event, command)
approved = True
except Exception:
_log.exception("hook consent record failed")
return {"ok": True, "event": event, "command": command, "approved": approved}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.delete("/api/ops/hooks")
async def delete_hook(body: HookDelete):
"""Remove a hook from config.yaml and revoke its consent allowlist entry."""
from agent import shell_hooks
event = (body.event or "").strip()
command = (body.command or "").strip()
if not event or not command:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="event and command are required")
def _run():
removed = False
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
cfg = load_config()
hooks_cfg = cfg.get("hooks")
if isinstance(hooks_cfg, dict) and isinstance(hooks_cfg.get(event), list):
before = len(hooks_cfg[event])
hooks_cfg[event] = [
e for e in hooks_cfg[event]
if not (isinstance(e, dict) and e.get("command") == command)
]
removed = len(hooks_cfg[event]) < before
if not hooks_cfg[event]:
del hooks_cfg[event]
if not hooks_cfg:
cfg.pop("hooks", None)
save_config(cfg)
# Revoke consent regardless so a re-add re-prompts.
try:
shell_hooks.revoke(command)
except Exception:
pass
return removed
removed = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
if not removed:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="No matching hook found")
return {"ok": True}
@app.get("/api/ops/checkpoints")
async def list_checkpoints():
"""List the /rollback shadow store checkpoints (read-only)."""
# Checkpoints live under <hermes_home>/checkpoints/. Surface a count +
# total size so the dashboard can show what a prune would reclaim; the
# actual prune is a spawned action so confirmation/pruning logic stays
# in one place (the CLI).
cp_dir = get_hermes_home() / "checkpoints"
sessions = []
total_bytes = 0
if cp_dir.is_dir():
with os.scandir(cp_dir) as scan:
children = sorted((Path(e.path) for e in scan), key=lambda p: p.name)
for child in children:
if not child.is_dir():
continue
size = 0
count = 0
for f in child.rglob("*"):
if f.is_file():
try:
size += f.stat().st_size
count += 1
except OSError:
pass
total_bytes += size
sessions.append({
"session": child.name,
"files": count,
"bytes": size,
})
return {"sessions": sessions, "total_bytes": total_bytes}
@app.post("/api/ops/checkpoints/prune")
async def prune_checkpoints():
try:
proc = _spawn_hermes_action(["checkpoints", "prune"], "checkpoints-prune")
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("Failed to spawn checkpoints prune")
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to prune checkpoints: {exc}")
return {"ok": True, "pid": proc.pid, "name": "checkpoints-prune"}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Skills hub endpoints — search / install / uninstall / update.
#
# Search and install touch the network (GitHub, hub sources) and run the same
# complex source-router pipeline the CLI uses, so they're spawned as background
# actions whose logs the dashboard tails. The already-installed skill list +
# enable/disable toggle live in the existing /api/skills endpoints.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _profile_cli_args(profile: Optional[str]) -> List[str]:
"""Return ``["-p", <name>]`` for a validated non-default profile.
Hub install/uninstall/update run in a fresh ``hermes`` subprocess, and
``_apply_profile_override()`` reads ``-p`` from argv in the child — the
only mechanism that reaches import-time-bound globals like
``skills_hub.SKILLS_DIR``. Empty/"current" means the dashboard's own
profile (no args, legacy behavior).
"""
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() in {"current", "default"}:
return []
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
_resolve_profile_dir(requested)
return ["-p", profiles_mod.normalize_profile_name(requested)]
def _hub_action_name(verb: str, key: str) -> str:
"""Unique per-skill hub action name (+ registered log file).
``_spawn_hermes_action`` tracks one process/log per name, so a shared
"skills-install"/"skills-uninstall" would make concurrent row-level actions
overwrite each other's status/log while the UI polls per identifier. Slug
(readable) + hash (collision-proof) keys each action to its own row.
"""
slug = re.sub(r"[^a-z0-9]+", "-", key.lower()).strip("-")[:48] or "skill"
digest = hashlib.sha1(key.encode()).hexdigest()[:8]
name = f"skills-{verb}-{slug}-{digest}"
_ACTION_LOG_FILES.setdefault(name, f"action-{name}.log")
return name
from hermes_cli.web_routers import skills as _skills_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_skills_routes.hub_router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.skills import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
install_skill_hub,
uninstall_skill_hub,
update_skills_hub,
list_skills_hub_sources,
search_skills_hub,
preview_skill_hub,
scan_skill_hub,
)
# Human-readable labels for each hub source id (matches `hermes skills search`
# provenance). Keep in sync with create_source_router()'s source list.
_SKILL_HUB_SOURCE_LABELS = {
"official": "Official (Nous)",
"hermes-index": "Hermes Index",
"skills-sh": "skills.sh",
"well-known": "Well-Known",
"url": "Direct URL",
"github": "GitHub",
"clawhub": "ClawHub",
"lobehub": "LobeHub",
"browse-sh": "browse.sh",
}
def _skill_meta_to_payload(m) -> dict:
return {
"name": m.name,
"description": m.description,
"source": m.source,
"identifier": m.identifier,
"trust_level": m.trust_level,
"repo": m.repo,
"tags": list(m.tags or []),
}
def _installed_hub_identifiers(profile: Optional[str] = None) -> dict:
"""Map identifier -> installed lock entry for hub-installed skills.
Lets the UI mark search results that are already installed. Scoped to
``profile``'s skills/.hub/lock.json when provided (HubLockFile takes an
explicit path, sidestepping the import-time LOCK_FILE binding).
Best-effort: returns an empty dict if the lock file can't be read.
"""
try:
from tools.skills_hub import HubLockFile
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if requested and requested.lower() != "current":
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
lock = HubLockFile(profile_dir / "skills" / ".hub" / "lock.json")
else:
lock = HubLockFile()
out = {}
for entry in lock.list_installed():
ident = entry.get("identifier")
if ident:
out[ident] = {
"name": entry.get("name"),
"trust_level": entry.get("trust_level"),
"scan_verdict": entry.get("scan_verdict"),
}
return out
except Exception:
return {}
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Profile management endpoints (minimal — list/create/rename/delete + SOUL.md)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _profile_attr(info, name: str, default: Any = None) -> Any:
try:
return getattr(info, name)
except Exception:
return default
def _profile_to_dict(info) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {
"name": _profile_attr(info, "name", ""),
"path": str(_profile_attr(info, "path", "")),
"is_default": bool(_profile_attr(info, "is_default", False)),
"model": _profile_attr(info, "model"),
"provider": _profile_attr(info, "provider"),
"has_env": bool(_profile_attr(info, "has_env", False)),
"skill_count": int(_profile_attr(info, "skill_count", 0) or 0),
"gateway_running": bool(_profile_attr(info, "gateway_running", False)),
"description": _profile_attr(info, "description", "") or "",
"description_auto": bool(_profile_attr(info, "description_auto", False)),
"display_name": _profile_attr(info, "display_name", "") or "",
"distribution_name": _profile_attr(info, "distribution_name"),
"distribution_version": _profile_attr(info, "distribution_version"),
"distribution_source": _profile_attr(info, "distribution_source"),
"has_alias": _profile_attr(info, "alias_path") is not None,
}
def _fallback_profile_dicts(profiles_mod) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
def _safe(callable_, default):
try:
return callable_()
except Exception:
return default
profiles: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
default_home = profiles_mod._get_default_hermes_home()
if default_home.is_dir():
model, provider = _safe(lambda: profiles_mod._read_config_model(default_home), (None, None))
profiles.append({
"name": "default",
"path": str(default_home),
"is_default": True,
"model": model,
"provider": provider,
"has_env": (default_home / ".env").exists(),
"skill_count": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod._count_skills(default_home), 0),
"gateway_running": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod._check_gateway_running(default_home), False),
"description": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(default_home).get("description", ""), ""),
"description_auto": _safe(lambda: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(default_home).get("description_auto", False), False),
"distribution_name": None,
"distribution_version": None,
"distribution_source": None,
"has_alias": False,
})
profiles_root = profiles_mod._get_profiles_root()
if profiles_root.is_dir():
# Use os.scandir (context-managed) instead of Path.iterdir to avoid
# leaking directory fds when an exception interrupts iteration — the
# sidebar polls every few seconds so an fd leak exhausts RLIMIT_NOFILE
# within days (#81547).
with os.scandir(profiles_root) as scan:
entries = sorted(scan, key=lambda e: e.name)
for entry in entries:
entry_path = Path(entry.path)
if not entry.is_dir() or not profiles_mod._PROFILE_ID_RE.match(entry.name):
continue
model, provider = _safe(lambda entry=entry_path: profiles_mod._read_config_model(entry), (None, None))
profiles.append({
"name": entry.name,
"path": str(entry_path),
"is_default": False,
"model": model,
"provider": provider,
"has_env": _safe(lambda entry=entry_path: (entry / ".env").exists(), False),
"skill_count": _safe(lambda entry=entry_path: profiles_mod._count_skills(entry), 0),
"gateway_running": _safe(
lambda entry=entry_path, name=entry.name: (
profiles_mod._check_gateway_running(entry)
or profiles_mod._served_by_running_multiplexer(name)
),
False,
),
"description": _safe(lambda entry=entry_path: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(entry).get("description", ""), ""),
"description_auto": _safe(lambda entry=entry_path: profiles_mod.read_profile_meta(entry).get("description_auto", False), False),
"distribution_name": None,
"distribution_version": None,
"distribution_source": None,
"has_alias": False,
})
return profiles
def _resolve_profile_dir(name: str) -> Path:
"""Validate ``name`` and resolve to its directory or raise an HTTPException."""
from hermes_cli import profiles as profiles_mod
try:
profiles_mod.validate_profile_name(name)
except ValueError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(e))
if not profiles_mod.profile_exists(name):
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=f"Profile '{name}' does not exist.")
return profiles_mod.get_profile_dir(name)
def _profile_setup_command(name: str) -> str:
"""Return the shell command used to configure a profile in the CLI."""
_resolve_profile_dir(name)
return "hermes setup" if name == "default" else f"{name} setup"
def _write_profile_model(profile_dir: Path, provider: str, model: str) -> None:
"""Write the main model assignment into a specific profile's config.yaml.
Scopes ``load_config``/``save_config`` to ``profile_dir`` via the
context-local HERMES_HOME override so the write lands in the target
profile's config rather than the dashboard process's active profile.
Clears any stale ``base_url`` / ``context_length`` the same way
``POST /api/model/set`` does, since the new model may differ.
"""
from hermes_constants import set_hermes_home_override, reset_hermes_home_override
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
provider, model = _normalize_main_model_assignment(provider, model)
cfg = load_config()
cfg["model"] = _apply_main_model_assignment(cfg.get("model", {}), provider, model)
save_config(cfg)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
def _write_profile_mcp_servers(profile_dir: Path, servers: List["MCPServerCreate"]) -> int:
"""Write MCP server entries into a specific profile's config.yaml.
Scopes ``load_config``/``save_config`` to ``profile_dir`` via the
context-local HERMES_HOME override (same mechanism as
``_write_profile_model``) so the entries land in the target profile's
config rather than the dashboard process's active profile.
Mirrors the per-server shape the ``POST /api/mcp/servers`` endpoint builds,
but batched so the whole profile-create write is a single config save.
Returns the number of servers written.
"""
from hermes_constants import set_hermes_home_override, reset_hermes_home_override
from hermes_cli.mcp_config import _save_bearer_auth_token
written = 0
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
cfg = load_config()
mcp = cfg.setdefault("mcp_servers", {})
for server in servers:
try:
name, entry, bearer_token = _normalize_mcp_server_create(server)
except ValueError as exc:
display_name = (server.name or "").strip() or "<unnamed>"
_log.warning(
"Profile-create: skipping MCP server '%s': %s",
display_name,
exc,
)
continue
if bearer_token is not None:
entry["headers"] = _save_bearer_auth_token(name, bearer_token)
mcp[name] = entry
written += 1
if written:
save_config(cfg)
elif not mcp:
# We created an empty mcp_servers dict but wrote nothing — don't
# leave a stray empty key in the new profile's config.
cfg.pop("mcp_servers", None)
save_config(cfg)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
return written
def _disable_unselected_skills(profile_dir: Path, keep: List[str]) -> int:
"""Disable every installed skill in ``profile_dir`` not in ``keep``.
Profiles manage skill activation via a *disabled* list — all installed
skills are active by default and users opt out. The builder's skill step
uses "replace" semantics: the user picks exactly which seeded built-in /
optional skills stay active, and everything else gets added to the disabled
list. (Hub skills are installed separately via subprocess and are active on
install.) Scoped to the profile via the HERMES_HOME override. Returns the
number of skills newly disabled.
"""
from hermes_constants import set_hermes_home_override, reset_hermes_home_override
from hermes_cli.skills_config import get_disabled_skills, save_disabled_skills
keep_set = {s.strip() for s in keep if s and s.strip()}
disabled_count = 0
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
installed: List[str] = []
skills_root = profile_dir / "skills"
if skills_root.is_dir():
for md in skills_root.rglob("SKILL.md"):
installed.append(md.parent.name)
cfg = load_config()
disabled = get_disabled_skills(cfg)
for name in installed:
if name not in keep_set and name not in disabled:
disabled.add(name)
disabled_count += 1
if disabled_count:
save_disabled_skills(cfg, disabled)
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
return disabled_count
app.include_router(_profiles_routes.router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.profiles import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
list_profiles_endpoint,
create_profile_endpoint,
get_active_profile_endpoint,
set_active_profile_endpoint,
get_profile_setup_command,
open_profile_terminal_endpoint,
rename_profile_endpoint,
delete_profile_endpoint,
get_profile_soul,
update_profile_soul,
update_profile_description_endpoint,
update_profile_model_endpoint,
describe_profile_auto_endpoint,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Skills & Tools endpoints
#
# Every read/write below accepts an optional ``profile`` query param so the
# dashboard can manage ANY profile's skills/toolsets, not just the profile
# the dashboard process happens to be running under. Without this, "Set as
# active" on the Profiles page (which only flips the sticky ``active_profile``
# file for FUTURE CLI/gateway invocations) misled users into thinking skill
# toggles would land in the activated profile — they silently wrote into the
# dashboard's own config instead. See _profile_scope() for the mechanism.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK = threading.RLock()
@contextmanager
def _profile_scope(profile: Optional[str]):
"""Scope config + skill-directory resolution to ``profile`` for one request.
Two seams must be redirected for skills/toolsets endpoints:
1. ``load_config``/``save_config`` resolve ``get_hermes_home()`` at call
time — the context-local override from ``set_hermes_home_override``
reaches them (same pattern as ``_write_profile_model``).
2. ``tools.skills_tool`` and ``tools.skill_manager_tool`` bind
``SKILLS_DIR`` at import time, so the override CANNOT reach them.
Like ``_call_cron_for_profile`` does for cron's module globals,
temporarily retarget both under a lock and restore them
immediately after.
``tools.skills_sync`` (reset/diff/list-modified/opt-in/opt-out/
repair-official) needs NO retargeting: since #65828 its directory
lookups resolve at call time through the same contextvar override
set in step 1.
``profile`` of None/""/"current" means "the dashboard's own profile" —
config resolution is untouched, but the skill-module globals are still
retargeted to the *current* ``get_hermes_home()`` so writes land in the
live home even when the import-time binding is stale (e.g. the process
imported the modules before a HERMES_HOME override, or under test
isolation).
"""
requested = (profile or "").strip()
from hermes_constants import (
get_hermes_home,
set_hermes_home_override,
reset_hermes_home_override,
)
from tools import skills_tool as _skills_tool
from tools import skill_manager_tool as _skill_mgr
token = None
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
profile_dir = get_hermes_home()
else:
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
with _SKILLS_PROFILE_LOCK:
old_home = _skills_tool.HERMES_HOME
old_skills_dir = _skills_tool.SKILLS_DIR
old_mgr_home = _skill_mgr.HERMES_HOME
old_mgr_skills_dir = _skill_mgr.SKILLS_DIR
_skills_tool.HERMES_HOME = profile_dir
_skills_tool.SKILLS_DIR = profile_dir / "skills"
_skill_mgr.HERMES_HOME = profile_dir
_skill_mgr.SKILLS_DIR = profile_dir / "skills"
try:
yield profile_dir if token is not None else None
finally:
_skills_tool.HERMES_HOME = old_home
_skills_tool.SKILLS_DIR = old_skills_dir
_skill_mgr.HERMES_HOME = old_mgr_home
_skill_mgr.SKILLS_DIR = old_mgr_skills_dir
if token is not None:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
@contextmanager
def _config_profile_scope(profile: Optional[str]):
"""Await-safe, config-only profile scope for handlers that ``await``.
Unlike ``_profile_scope`` this touches ONLY the context-local
``set_hermes_home_override`` contextvar — it does NOT swap the
process-global ``skills_tool``/``skill_manager`` module attributes.
Those globals are shared across all event-loop tasks, so holding them
across an ``await`` lets a concurrent skills request restore THIS
request's profile dir on its ``finally`` (cross-contamination). The
contextvar override is task-local and survives an ``await`` cleanly,
which is all endpoints that resolve ``get_hermes_home()`` at call time
(config, env, gateway status) actually need.
None/""/"current" means the dashboard's own profile — no override.
"""
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if not requested or requested.lower() == "current":
yield None
return
from hermes_constants import (
set_hermes_home_override,
reset_hermes_home_override,
)
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
token = set_hermes_home_override(str(profile_dir))
try:
yield profile_dir
finally:
reset_hermes_home_override(token)
app.include_router(_skills_routes.router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.skills import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
get_skills,
toggle_skill,
get_skill_content,
create_skill,
update_skill_content,
)
def _clear_skills_prompt_cache() -> None:
"""Best-effort: invalidate the skills system-prompt snapshot after a write.
Mirrors what ``skill_manage`` does so a dashboard-authored skill is picked
up by the next session without a manual cache reset.
"""
try:
from agent.prompt_builder import clear_skills_system_prompt_cache
clear_skills_system_prompt_cache(clear_snapshot=True)
except Exception:
pass
from hermes_cli.web_routers import tools as _tools_routes # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_tools_routes.router)
from hermes_cli.web_routers.tools import ( # noqa: E402,F401 — legacy re-exports; tests call these via web_server.<name>
get_toolsets,
toggle_toolset,
get_toolset_config,
get_toolset_models,
select_toolset_model,
select_toolset_provider,
save_toolset_env,
run_toolset_post_setup,
get_terminal_backends,
select_terminal_backend,
get_computer_use_status,
grant_computer_use_permissions,
)
# Toolsets whose backends carry a selectable model catalog, mapped to the
# config.yaml section their `model` key lives in. Mirrors the CLI's
# post-selection model pickers (`_configure_imagegen_model_for_plugin` /
# `_configure_videogen_model_for_plugin` in tools_config.py).
_MODEL_CATALOG_TOOLSETS = {
"image_gen": "image_gen",
"video_gen": "video_gen",
}
def _resolve_toolset_model_plugin(ts_key: str, provider_row: dict) -> Optional[str]:
"""Map a provider picker row to its model-catalog plugin name.
Plugin-backed rows carry ``image_gen_plugin_name`` / ``video_gen_plugin_name``;
the managed "Nous Subscription" image row instead carries the legacy
``imagegen_backend: "fal"`` marker (same underlying FAL catalog).
"""
if ts_key == "image_gen":
return provider_row.get("image_gen_plugin_name") or (
"fal" if provider_row.get("imagegen_backend") else None
)
if ts_key == "video_gen":
return provider_row.get("video_gen_plugin_name")
return None
def _toolset_model_catalog(ts_key: str, plugin_name: str):
"""Return ``(catalog_dict, default_model)`` for a toolset's plugin backend."""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
_plugin_image_gen_catalog,
_plugin_video_gen_catalog,
)
if ts_key == "image_gen":
return _plugin_image_gen_catalog(plugin_name)
return _plugin_video_gen_catalog(plugin_name)
def _find_toolset_provider_row(ts_key: str, config: dict, provider: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Resolve a provider picker row by name, or the active row when omitted."""
from hermes_cli.tools_config import (
TOOL_CATEGORIES,
_is_provider_active,
_visible_providers,
)
cat = TOOL_CATEGORIES.get(ts_key)
if cat is None:
return None
rows = _visible_providers(cat, config, force_fresh=True)
if provider:
return next((p for p in rows if p.get("name") == provider), None)
return next(
(p for p in rows if _is_provider_active(p, config, force_fresh=True)), None
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Terminal execution backend picker — the GUI counterpart of terminal.backend
# in config.yaml. Each row carries a fast, defensive health probe (Docker
# daemon reachable, SSH host configured, Modal/Daytona credentials present) so
# the Capabilities panel can render Ready / Needs setup guidance instead of a
# bare enum (issues #57738 / #63783). Probes must never raise — a probe
# failure renders as a status, not a 500.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Table-driven backend metadata — kept in sync with the dispatch ladder in
# tools/terminal_tool.py::_create_environment and the terminal.backend enum
# surfaced in the desktop raw-config settings.
_TERMINAL_BACKENDS: List[Dict[str, str]] = [
{
"name": "local",
"label": "Local",
"description": "Run commands directly on this machine. No isolation.",
},
{
"name": "docker",
"label": "Docker",
"description": "Run commands in an isolated Docker container with a persistent workspace.",
},
{
"name": "singularity",
"label": "Singularity / Apptainer",
"description": "Run commands in a Singularity/Apptainer container (HPC-friendly, rootless).",
},
{
"name": "modal",
"label": "Modal",
"description": "Run commands in a Modal cloud sandbox.",
},
{
"name": "daytona",
"label": "Daytona",
"description": "Run commands in a Daytona cloud sandbox.",
},
{
"name": "ssh",
"label": "SSH",
"description": "Run commands on a remote host over SSH.",
},
]
_TERMINAL_BACKEND_NAMES = {row["name"] for row in _TERMINAL_BACKENDS}
def _plugin_terminal_backend_rows() -> List[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Picker rows for plugin-registered terminal backends (fail-soft)."""
rows: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins import discover_plugins
discover_plugins() # idempotent — plugin state may not be loaded yet
except Exception:
pass
try:
from agent.terminal_env_registry import list_providers
for provider in list_providers():
try:
rows.append({
"name": provider.name.strip().lower(),
"label": provider.display_name,
"description": provider.description,
})
except Exception:
continue
except Exception:
return rows
return rows
def _terminal_backend_rows() -> List[Dict[str, str]]:
"""Built-in picker rows plus plugin-registered backends (request time).
Computed per request (mirrors ``_schema_with_dynamic_provider_options``)
so a plugin installed after server start still shows up.
"""
return [*_TERMINAL_BACKENDS, *_plugin_terminal_backend_rows()]
def _terminal_backend_names() -> set:
"""Valid ``terminal.backend`` values, including plugin backends."""
return {row["name"] for row in _terminal_backend_rows()}
def _terminal_cfg_value(terminal_cfg: dict, key: str, env_var: str) -> str:
"""Read a terminal.* setting from config.yaml, falling back to its env var."""
value = terminal_cfg.get(key)
if value is not None and str(value).strip():
return str(value).strip()
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
return (get_env_value(env_var) or "").strip()
except Exception:
return ""
def _probe_docker_backend() -> tuple:
if not shutil.which("docker"):
return (
"needs_setup",
"Docker CLI not found — install Docker Desktop or docker-ce.",
)
try:
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "info", "--format", "{{.ServerVersion}}"],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
encoding="utf-8",
errors="replace",
timeout=2,
)
if proc.returncode == 0:
return ("ready", "")
return (
"needs_setup",
"Docker daemon not reachable — start Docker and retry.",
)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return ("needs_setup", "Docker daemon not responding (timed out).")
except Exception as exc:
return ("unavailable", f"Docker probe failed: {exc}")
def _probe_singularity_backend() -> tuple:
if shutil.which("singularity") or shutil.which("apptainer"):
return ("ready", "")
return (
"needs_setup",
"Neither singularity nor apptainer found on PATH.",
)
def _probe_ssh_backend(terminal_cfg: dict) -> tuple:
host = _terminal_cfg_value(terminal_cfg, "ssh_host", "TERMINAL_SSH_HOST")
user = _terminal_cfg_value(terminal_cfg, "ssh_user", "TERMINAL_SSH_USER")
missing = []
if not host:
missing.append("terminal.ssh_host")
if not user:
missing.append("terminal.ssh_user")
if missing:
return (
"needs_setup",
f"Set {' and '.join(missing)} in config.yaml (or the matching TERMINAL_SSH_* env vars).",
)
return ("ready", f"{user}@{host}")
def _probe_modal_backend() -> tuple:
try:
from tools.tool_backend_helpers import has_direct_modal_credentials
if has_direct_modal_credentials():
return ("ready", "")
except Exception:
pass
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
if get_env_value("MODAL_TOKEN_ID") and get_env_value("MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET"):
return ("ready", "")
except Exception:
pass
return (
"needs_setup",
"Modal credentials not found — set MODAL_TOKEN_ID and MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET (or run `modal setup`).",
)
def _probe_daytona_backend() -> tuple:
try:
from hermes_cli.config import get_env_value
if get_env_value("DAYTONA_API_KEY"):
return ("ready", "")
except Exception:
pass
return ("needs_setup", "Set DAYTONA_API_KEY to use the Daytona backend.")
def _probe_terminal_backend(name: str, terminal_cfg: dict) -> tuple:
"""Return ``(status, detail)`` for one backend. Never raises."""
try:
if name == "local":
return ("ready", "")
if name == "docker":
return _probe_docker_backend()
if name == "singularity":
return _probe_singularity_backend()
if name == "ssh":
return _probe_ssh_backend(terminal_cfg)
if name == "modal":
return _probe_modal_backend()
if name == "daytona":
return _probe_daytona_backend()
try:
from agent.terminal_env_registry import get_provider
provider = get_provider(name)
if provider is not None:
return provider.probe()
except Exception:
pass
return ("unavailable", f"Unknown backend: {name}")
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover — belt-and-braces guard
return ("unavailable", f"Probe failed: {exc}")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Computer Use (cua-driver) — cross-platform readiness + macOS permission grant
#
# cua-driver runs on macOS, Windows, and Linux. The desktop card reflects
# per-OS readiness: on macOS the Accessibility + Screen Recording TCC grants
# (which attach to cua-driver's OWN identity, com.trycua.driver — not Hermes,
# so no app entitlement is involved); elsewhere, driver health from
# `cua-driver doctor`. The grant flow is macOS-only (no TCC toggles to request
# on Windows/Linux).
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Raw YAML config endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.get("/api/config/raw")
async def get_config_raw(profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Raw config.yaml text plus its resolved path.
``path`` is resolved inside ``_profile_scope`` so the Config page header
shows the file the switched profile actually reads/writes — /api/status's
``config_path`` is machine-global and always reports the dashboard
process's own profile, which is wrong under the global profile switcher.
"""
def _run():
with _profile_scope(profile):
path = get_config_path()
if not path.exists():
return {"yaml": "", "path": str(path)}
return {"yaml": path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"), "path": str(path)}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.put("/api/config/raw")
async def update_config_raw(body: RawConfigUpdate, profile: Optional[str] = None):
def _run():
parsed = yaml.safe_load(body.yaml_text)
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="YAML must be a mapping")
approvals_mode_changed = False
with _profile_scope(body.profile or profile):
# Full-document replacement: the editor owns the whole file; do not
# merge omitted sections back from disk (#62723).
approvals_mode_changed = _approval_mode_of(parsed) != _approval_mode_of(read_raw_config())
save_config(parsed, merge_existing=False)
# Same indicator refresh as the schema-driven save above.
if approvals_mode_changed and not _is_other_profile(body.profile or profile):
_broadcast_gateway_session_info()
return {"ok": True}
try:
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
except yaml.YAMLError as e:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Invalid YAML: {e}")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Token / cost analytics endpoint
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _aux_usage_rows(db, cutoff: float) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Per-(model, task) auxiliary usage within the window (issue #23270).
Reads the task-dimension rows (task != '') that record_auxiliary_usage
writes into session_model_usage. Returns [] when the table predates the
task column (older DB opened read-only by newer code).
"""
try:
cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT u.model,
u.task,
u.billing_provider,
SUM(u.input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(u.output_tokens) as output_tokens,
SUM(u.cache_read_tokens) as cache_read_tokens,
SUM(u.reasoning_tokens) as reasoning_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(u.estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COUNT(DISTINCT u.session_id) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(u.api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls,
MAX(u.last_seen) as last_used_at
FROM session_model_usage u
JOIN sessions s ON s.id = u.session_id
WHERE s.started_at > ? AND u.task != ''
GROUP BY u.model, u.task, u.billing_provider
ORDER BY SUM(u.input_tokens) + SUM(u.output_tokens) DESC
""", (cutoff,))
return [dict(r) for r in cur.fetchall()]
except Exception:
# Table predates the task column (older DB opened by newer code) —
# aux breakdown is simply unavailable.
return []
def _merge_aux_into_by_model(
by_model: List[Dict[str, Any]], aux_rows: List[Dict[str, Any]]
) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Fold aux usage rows into the sessions-derived per-model list.
Aux usage lives only in session_model_usage (never in the sessions
counters), so adding it here cannot double-count. Models that ONLY
appear via aux calls (e.g. a dedicated vision model) get their own
entry — previously they were entirely invisible.
"""
if not aux_rows:
return by_model
merged: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for row in by_model:
merged[row.get("model") or "unknown"] = row
for aux in aux_rows:
model = aux.get("model") or "unknown"
target = merged.get(model)
if target is None:
target = {
"model": model,
"input_tokens": 0,
"output_tokens": 0,
"estimated_cost": 0,
"sessions": 0,
"api_calls": 0,
}
merged[model] = target
target["input_tokens"] = (target.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (aux.get("input_tokens") or 0)
target["output_tokens"] = (target.get("output_tokens") or 0) + (aux.get("output_tokens") or 0)
target["estimated_cost"] = (target.get("estimated_cost") or 0) + (aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0)
target["api_calls"] = (target.get("api_calls") or 0) + (aux.get("api_calls") or 0)
tasks = target.setdefault("aux_tasks", [])
tasks.append({
"task": aux.get("task") or "",
"input_tokens": aux.get("input_tokens") or 0,
"output_tokens": aux.get("output_tokens") or 0,
"estimated_cost": aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0,
"api_calls": aux.get("api_calls") or 0,
})
result = list(merged.values())
result.sort(
key=lambda r: (r.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (r.get("output_tokens") or 0),
reverse=True,
)
return result
def _aux_task_summary(aux_rows: List[Dict[str, Any]]) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Aggregate aux usage rows across models into a per-task summary."""
by_task: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
for aux in aux_rows:
task = aux.get("task") or ""
d = by_task.setdefault(task, {
"task": task,
"input_tokens": 0,
"output_tokens": 0,
"estimated_cost": 0,
"api_calls": 0,
"models": [],
})
d["input_tokens"] += aux.get("input_tokens") or 0
d["output_tokens"] += aux.get("output_tokens") or 0
d["estimated_cost"] += aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0
d["api_calls"] += aux.get("api_calls") or 0
model = aux.get("model") or "unknown"
if model not in d["models"]:
d["models"].append(model)
result = list(by_task.values())
result.sort(
key=lambda r: (r.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (r.get("output_tokens") or 0),
reverse=True,
)
return result
def _get_usage_analytics(days: int = 30, profile: Optional[str] = None):
from agent.insights import InsightsEngine
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile, read_only=True)
try:
cutoff = time.time() - (days * 86400)
cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT date(started_at, 'unixepoch') as day,
SUM(input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(output_tokens) as output_tokens,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as cache_read_tokens,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as reasoning_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ?
GROUP BY day ORDER BY day
""", (cutoff,))
daily = [dict(r) for r in cur.fetchall()]
cur2 = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT model,
SUM(input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(output_tokens) as output_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COUNT(*) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ? AND model IS NOT NULL
GROUP BY model ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) + SUM(output_tokens) DESC
""", (cutoff,))
by_model = [dict(r) for r in cur2.fetchall()]
# Fold in auxiliary usage (vision, compression, title_generation, ...)
# recorded per (model, task) in session_model_usage. Aux calls never
# touch the sessions counters, so this is add-only — no double count.
# Without it the models list shows only the main agent model even when
# aux models are actively burning tokens (issue #23270).
aux_rows = _aux_usage_rows(db, cutoff)
by_model = _merge_aux_into_by_model(by_model, aux_rows)
cur3 = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT SUM(input_tokens) as total_input,
SUM(output_tokens) as total_output,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as total_cache_read,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as total_reasoning,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as total_estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as total_actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as total_sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as total_api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ?
""", (cutoff,))
totals = dict(cur3.fetchone())
usage = InsightsEngine(db).get_usage_breakdown(days=days)
return {
"daily": daily,
"by_model": by_model,
# Aux-task summary across models (vision, compression, ...). Lets
# the dashboard answer "what is compression costing me" directly.
"by_task": _aux_task_summary(aux_rows),
"totals": totals,
"period_days": days,
"skills": usage["skills"],
# Per-tool-name call counts (already computed by InsightsEngine);
# the desktop Capabilities page aggregates these per toolset.
"tools": usage["tools"],
}
finally:
db.close()
@app.get("/api/analytics/usage")
async def get_usage_analytics(
days: int = Query(30, ge=1, le=365),
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
"""``days`` is clamped to 1-365 (idea from #74778): huge or non-positive
values would force expensive full-history SQL and InsightsEngine work, or
produce empty/inverted time windows. The UI only offers 7/30/90-day
presets."""
return await asyncio.to_thread(_get_usage_analytics, days, profile)
def _get_models_analytics(days: int = 30, profile: Optional[str] = None):
"""Rich per-model analytics for the Models dashboard page.
Returns token/cost/session breakdown per model plus capability metadata
from models.dev (context window, vision, tools, reasoning, etc.).
"""
db = _open_session_db_for_profile(profile, read_only=True)
try:
cutoff = time.time() - (days * 86400)
cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT model,
billing_provider,
SUM(input_tokens) as input_tokens,
SUM(output_tokens) as output_tokens,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as cache_read_tokens,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as reasoning_tokens,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as api_calls,
SUM(tool_call_count) as tool_calls,
MAX(started_at) as last_used_at,
AVG(input_tokens + output_tokens) as avg_tokens_per_session
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ? AND model IS NOT NULL AND model != ''
GROUP BY model, billing_provider
ORDER BY SUM(input_tokens) + SUM(output_tokens) DESC
""", (cutoff,))
raw_rows = [dict(r) for r in cur.fetchall()]
# Add auxiliary usage as (model, provider) rows so aux-only models
# (dedicated vision/compression models) appear on the Models page
# instead of being invisible (issue #23270). Keyed by
# model+billing_provider to match the GROUP BY above.
for aux in _aux_usage_rows(db, cutoff):
raw_rows.append({
"model": aux.get("model") or "unknown",
"billing_provider": aux.get("billing_provider") or "",
"input_tokens": aux.get("input_tokens") or 0,
"output_tokens": aux.get("output_tokens") or 0,
"cache_read_tokens": aux.get("cache_read_tokens") or 0,
"reasoning_tokens": aux.get("reasoning_tokens") or 0,
"estimated_cost": aux.get("estimated_cost") or 0,
"actual_cost": 0,
"sessions": aux.get("sessions") or 0,
"api_calls": aux.get("api_calls") or 0,
"tool_calls": 0,
"last_used_at": aux.get("last_used_at"),
"avg_tokens_per_session": 0,
"aux_task": aux.get("task") or "",
})
# Session rows can be created before the first billable provider call
# finishes. If that early row records only the model name, and a later
# row for the same model has real accounting + billing_provider, the
# Models page used to show a duplicate "0 tokens / — API calls" card
# next to the real provider card. Fold those session-only rows into
# the single accounted provider row when the ownership is unambiguous.
rows_by_model: Dict[str, List[Dict[str, Any]]] = {}
for row in raw_rows:
rows_by_model.setdefault(row.get("model") or "", []).append(row)
rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for model_rows in rows_by_model.values():
provider_rows = [r for r in model_rows if r.get("billing_provider")]
if len(provider_rows) == 1:
target = provider_rows[0]
for row in model_rows:
if row is target or row.get("billing_provider"):
continue
has_usage = any(
(row.get(key) or 0) != 0
for key in (
"input_tokens",
"output_tokens",
"cache_read_tokens",
"reasoning_tokens",
"estimated_cost",
"actual_cost",
"api_calls",
"tool_calls",
)
)
if has_usage:
continue
target["sessions"] = (target.get("sessions") or 0) + (row.get("sessions") or 0)
target["last_used_at"] = max(target.get("last_used_at") or 0, row.get("last_used_at") or 0)
total_tokens = (target.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (target.get("output_tokens") or 0)
sessions = target.get("sessions") or 0
target["avg_tokens_per_session"] = total_tokens / sessions if sessions else 0
rows.append(target)
rows.extend(
r for r in model_rows
if r is not target
and (r.get("billing_provider") or any(
(r.get(key) or 0) != 0
for key in (
"input_tokens",
"output_tokens",
"cache_read_tokens",
"reasoning_tokens",
"estimated_cost",
"actual_cost",
"api_calls",
"tool_calls",
)
))
)
else:
rows.extend(model_rows)
rows.sort(
key=lambda r: (r.get("input_tokens") or 0) + (r.get("output_tokens") or 0),
reverse=True,
)
models = []
for row in rows:
provider = row.get("billing_provider") or ""
model_name = row["model"]
caps = {}
try:
from agent.models_dev import get_model_capabilities
mc = get_model_capabilities(provider=provider, model=model_name)
if mc is not None:
caps = {
"supports_tools": mc.supports_tools,
"supports_vision": mc.supports_vision,
"supports_reasoning": mc.supports_reasoning,
"context_window": mc.context_window,
"max_output_tokens": mc.max_output_tokens,
"model_family": mc.model_family,
}
except Exception:
pass
models.append({
"model": model_name,
"provider": provider,
"input_tokens": row["input_tokens"],
"output_tokens": row["output_tokens"],
"cache_read_tokens": row["cache_read_tokens"],
"reasoning_tokens": row["reasoning_tokens"],
"estimated_cost": row["estimated_cost"],
"actual_cost": row["actual_cost"],
"sessions": row["sessions"],
"api_calls": row["api_calls"],
"tool_calls": row["tool_calls"],
"last_used_at": row["last_used_at"],
"avg_tokens_per_session": row["avg_tokens_per_session"],
"capabilities": caps,
})
totals_cur = db._conn.execute("""
SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT model) as distinct_models,
SUM(input_tokens) as total_input,
SUM(output_tokens) as total_output,
SUM(cache_read_tokens) as total_cache_read,
SUM(reasoning_tokens) as total_reasoning,
COALESCE(SUM(estimated_cost_usd), 0) as total_estimated_cost,
COALESCE(SUM(actual_cost_usd), 0) as total_actual_cost,
COUNT(*) as total_sessions,
SUM(COALESCE(api_call_count, 0)) as total_api_calls
FROM sessions WHERE started_at > ? AND model IS NOT NULL AND model != ''
""", (cutoff,))
totals = dict(totals_cur.fetchone())
return {
"models": models,
"totals": totals,
"period_days": days,
}
finally:
db.close()
@app.get("/api/analytics/models")
async def get_models_analytics(
days: int = Query(30, ge=1, le=365),
profile: Optional[str] = None,
):
# ``days`` clamped to 1-365 (idea from #74778) — see get_usage_analytics.
"""Return model analytics without blocking the serving event loop."""
return await asyncio.to_thread(_get_models_analytics, days, profile)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/pty — PTY-over-WebSocket bridge for the dashboard "Chat" tab.
#
# The endpoint spawns the same ``hermes --tui`` binary the CLI uses, behind
# a POSIX pseudo-terminal, and forwards bytes + resize escapes across a
# WebSocket. The browser renders the ANSI through xterm.js (see
# web/src/pages/ChatPage.tsx).
#
# Auth: ``?token=<session_token>`` query param (browsers can't set
# Authorization on the WS upgrade). Same ephemeral ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` as
# REST. Localhost-only — we defensively reject non-loopback clients even
# though uvicorn binds to 127.0.0.1.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# PTY bridge: POSIX uses pty_bridge (fcntl/termios/ptyprocess); native Windows
# uses win_pty_bridge (pywinpty/ConPTY, already a declared dependency). Both
# expose the same public surface — spawn/read/write/resize/close/is_available —
# so the /api/pty WebSocket handler needs no platform guards.
if sys.platform.startswith("win"):
try:
from hermes_cli.win_pty_bridge import WinPtyBridge as PtyBridge, PtyUnavailableError
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - pywinpty missing
PtyBridge = None # type: ignore[assignment]
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = False
class PtyUnavailableError(RuntimeError): # type: ignore[no-redef]
"""Stub when win_pty_bridge cannot be imported."""
pass
else:
try:
from hermes_cli.pty_bridge import PtyBridge, PtyUnavailableError
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = True
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - dev env without ptyprocess
PtyBridge = None # type: ignore[assignment]
_PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE = False
class PtyUnavailableError(RuntimeError): # type: ignore[no-redef]
"""Stub on platforms where pty_bridge can't be imported."""
pass
_RESIZE_RE = re.compile(rb"\x1b\[RESIZE:(\d+);(\d+)\]")
_PTY_READ_CHUNK_TIMEOUT = 0.2
# Back-off delay between idle PTY reads so a quiet terminal does not spin
# the event loop. A positive sleep lets other coroutines run and keeps
# dashboard idle CPU low (#42627).
_PTY_IDLE_BACKOFF = 0.05
# Keep-alive PTY sessions: a terminal connecting with ``?attach=<token>`` is
# bound to a process that survives disconnect/refresh and is reattachable.
from hermes_cli.pty_session import PtySessionRegistry, RegistryFull, run_reaper # noqa: E402
PTY_REGISTRY = PtySessionRegistry(
ttl=30 * 60,
max_sessions=16,
buffer_cap=1 * 1024 * 1024,
read_timeout=_PTY_READ_CHUNK_TIMEOUT,
)
async def _legacy_pump(ws: "WebSocket", bridge) -> None:
"""Original 1:1 socket<->PTY pump: stream until disconnect, then close the
bridge. Used when no ``?attach=`` token is supplied (keep-alive opt-in).
Behavior is identical to the pre-keep-alive ``pty_ws`` body, including the
#54028 half-open-socket protection (reader EOF → close the WS so the
writer's ``ws.receive()`` unparks) and the #53227 ``to_thread`` offloads
for the blocking ``bridge.close()``.
"""
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
# --- reader task: PTY master → WebSocket ----------------------------
async def pump_pty_to_ws() -> None:
try:
while True:
chunk = await loop.run_in_executor(
None, bridge.read, _PTY_READ_CHUNK_TIMEOUT
)
if chunk is None: # EOF
return
if not chunk: # no data this tick; yield control and retry
await asyncio.sleep(_PTY_IDLE_BACKOFF)
continue
try:
await ws.send_bytes(chunk)
except Exception:
return
finally:
# The child has exited (EOF) or the send side broke. Close the
# WebSocket so the writer loop's ``ws.receive()`` returns instead
# of blocking forever — otherwise, when the browser's socket is
# half-open (no FIN delivered, common on macOS/launchd) the
# handler never reaches its ``finally`` and the PTY's fds leak.
# With dashboard auto-reconnect (#52962) every dropped socket then
# stacks a fresh PTY on top of the orphaned one, exhausting fds.
#
# Reap the bridge here too (close() is idempotent): on child EOF the
# writer loop's ``finally`` is the usual closer, but if the handler
# task is cancelled the instant we close the WS, that ``finally``
# can be skipped, leaking the PTY. Closing from the EOF path makes
# the reap independent of that cancellation race (#54028).
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(bridge.close)
except Exception:
pass
try:
await ws.close()
except Exception:
pass
reader_task = asyncio.create_task(pump_pty_to_ws())
# --- writer loop: WebSocket → PTY master ----------------------------
try:
while True:
try:
msg = await ws.receive()
except RuntimeError:
# Raised when ws.receive() is called after the socket is
# already disconnected (e.g. closed by the reader task above).
break
if msg.get("type") == "websocket.disconnect":
break
raw = msg.get("bytes")
if raw is None:
text = msg.get("text")
raw = text.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(text, str) else b""
if not raw:
continue
# Resize escape is consumed locally, never written to the PTY.
match = _RESIZE_RE.match(raw)
if match and match.end() == len(raw):
bridge.resize(cols=int(match.group(1)), rows=int(match.group(2)))
continue
bridge.write(raw)
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
reader_task.cancel()
try:
await reader_task
except (asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
pass
await asyncio.to_thread(bridge.close)
_VALID_CHANNEL_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]{1,128}$")
# Starlette's TestClient reports the peer as "testclient"; treat it as
# loopback so tests don't need to rewrite request scope.
_LOOPBACK_HOSTS = frozenset({"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost", "testclient"})
def _ws_client_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a rejection reason for the client IP, or None when allowed.
Reasons are short machine-parseable tokens logged on the rejection path
so a "WS keeps closing" report can be diagnosed from agent.log without a
repro. ``None`` means the peer IP passed this gate.
See :func:`_ws_client_is_allowed` for the full policy rationale.
"""
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
return None
bound_host = (getattr(app.state, "bound_host", "") or "").strip().lower()
if bound_host and bound_host not in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return None
client_host = ws.client.host if ws.client else ""
if not client_host:
# Fail-closed: a loopback-bound dashboard with auth disabled must
# not accept a WebSocket with no identifiable peer. ASGI servers
# behind a misconfigured proxy or unix socket can deliver
# ws.client == None or "" — treating that as "allowed" would let
# an unidentified peer reach a loopback-only surface.
return f"missing_or_empty_peer bound={bound_host or '?'}"
if client_host in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return None
return f"peer_not_loopback peer={client_host} bound={bound_host or '?'}"
def _ws_client_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""Check if the WebSocket client IP is acceptable.
Loopback bind: only loopback clients allowed — the legacy
``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>`` path is the only auth we have, so we
don't want LAN hosts guessing tokens.
Explicit non-loopback bind (``--host 0.0.0.0``, ``--host ::``, or a
specific address such as a Tailscale/LAN IP, always with
``--insecure``): allow any peer. The operator explicitly opted into
non-loopback exposure, so the loopback-only peer restriction does not
apply. DNS-rebinding is still blocked by the Host/Origin guard in
:func:`_ws_host_origin_is_allowed`, which mirrors the HTTP layer and
requires the Host header to match the bound interface — the same
defence ``_is_accepted_host`` applies to non-loopback HTTP requests.
Gated mode: any peer is allowed — uvicorn's ``proxy_headers=True``
(enabled when the OAuth gate is active so cookies can pick up
``X-Forwarded-Proto``) rewrites ``ws.client.host`` to the
X-Forwarded-For value, which is the real internet client IP. The
OAuth gate + single-use ``?ticket=`` is the auth at that point; the
Host/Origin guard in :func:`_ws_host_origin_is_allowed` is what
blocks DNS-rebinding here, not the peer IP.
"""
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
return True
# Any explicit non-loopback bind (0.0.0.0, ::, or a specific LAN /
# Tailscale address) means the operator opted into non-loopback
# access via --insecure. The loopback-only peer gate only applies to
# an actual loopback bind; otherwise the WS handshake is rejected even
# though same-bind HTTP requests pass _is_accepted_host.
bound_host = (getattr(app.state, "bound_host", "") or "").strip().lower()
if bound_host and bound_host not in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return True
client_host = ws.client.host if ws.client else ""
if not client_host:
# Fail-closed: see _ws_client_reason for rationale. An empty
# client_host on a loopback-bound dashboard with auth disabled
# must be rejected, not accepted as a default-allow.
return False
return client_host in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS
def _ws_host_origin_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a Host/Origin rejection reason, or None when allowed.
Mirrors :func:`_ws_host_origin_is_allowed` but yields a short
machine-parseable token (``host_mismatch …`` / ``origin_mismatch …``)
on rejection so the close path can log *why* the upgrade was refused.
"""
bound_host = getattr(app.state, "bound_host", None)
if not bound_host:
return None
trusted_public_hosts = getattr(
app.state, "trusted_public_hosts", frozenset()
)
host_header = ws.headers.get("host", "")
if not _is_accepted_host(
host_header, bound_host, trusted_public_hosts
):
return f"host_mismatch host={host_header or '?'} bound={bound_host}"
origin = ws.headers.get("origin", "")
if not origin:
return None
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(origin)
if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
# Non-web origin (packaged Electron: file://, null, app://). The
# upstream credential check is the real auth boundary; trust it.
# See _ws_host_origin_is_allowed for the full rationale.
return None
if not parsed.netloc:
return f"origin_mismatch origin={origin} bound={bound_host}"
if not _is_accepted_host(
parsed.netloc, bound_host, trusted_public_hosts
):
return f"origin_mismatch origin={origin} bound={bound_host}"
return None
def _ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""Apply the dashboard Host/Origin guard to WebSocket upgrades.
FastAPI HTTP middleware does not run for WebSocket routes, so the
DNS-rebinding Host check used for normal dashboard HTTP requests must be
repeated here before accepting the upgrade. Browsers also send an Origin
header on WebSocket handshakes; when present, require it to target the
same bound dashboard host.
"""
return _ws_host_origin_reason(ws) is None
def _ws_request_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> Optional[str]:
"""First Host/Origin or peer-IP rejection reason, or None when allowed."""
return _ws_host_origin_reason(ws) or _ws_client_reason(ws)
def _ws_request_is_allowed(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""Return True when the WebSocket upgrade matches dashboard boundaries."""
return _ws_host_origin_is_allowed(ws) and _ws_client_is_allowed(ws)
def _ws_auth_mode() -> str:
"""Short label for the active WS auth mode — logged on every connection."""
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
return "gated"
bound_host = (getattr(app.state, "bound_host", "") or "").strip().lower()
if bound_host and bound_host not in _LOOPBACK_HOSTS:
return "insecure"
return "loopback"
_GATEWAY_WS_PROTOCOL = "hermes-gateway-v1"
_GATEWAY_WS_TICKET_PROTOCOL_PREFIX = "hermes-gateway-ticket."
def _gateway_ws_ticket_from_subprotocol(ws: "WebSocket") -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Return ``(ticket, reason)`` from an unambiguous gateway protocol set."""
raw = str(ws.headers.get("sec-websocket-protocol", "") or "")
protocols = [value.strip() for value in raw.split(",") if value.strip()]
ticket_protocols = [
value for value in protocols
if value.startswith(_GATEWAY_WS_TICKET_PROTOCOL_PREFIX)
]
if not ticket_protocols:
return "", "none"
if _GATEWAY_WS_PROTOCOL not in protocols or len(ticket_protocols) != 1:
return "", "invalid"
ticket = ticket_protocols[0][len(_GATEWAY_WS_TICKET_PROTOCOL_PREFIX):]
return (ticket, "ok") if ticket else ("", "invalid")
def _ws_auth_reason(ws: "WebSocket") -> tuple[Optional[str], str]:
"""Validate WS-upgrade auth; return ``(reason, credential)``.
``reason`` is None when the credential is accepted, else a short
machine-parseable token explaining the rejection (``no_credential``,
``token_mismatch``, ``ticket_invalid``, ``internal_invalid``).
``credential`` names which credential type was presented (``ticket``,
``internal``, ``token``, or ``none``) so the accepted path can log *how*
a peer authed, not just that it did.
Loopback / ``--insecure``: legacy ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>`` query
parameter, constant-time compared.
Gated (public bind, no ``--insecure``): one of two credentials —
* ``?ticket=<single-use>`` — a browser-minted, single-use, 30s-TTL ticket
consumed against the dashboard-auth ticket store. This is what the SPA
(and native clients) use.
* ``?internal=<process-credential>`` — the process-lifetime internal
credential, used only by WS clients the server spawns itself (the
embedded-TUI PTY child attaching to ``/api/ws`` and ``/api/pub``). It
is multi-use and never expires so the child can reconnect, and is never
injected into the SPA — see ``dashboard_auth.ws_tickets`` for the
threat model.
The legacy ``?token=`` path is unconditionally rejected in gated mode
(the SPA bundle isn't carrying the token any longer, and a leaked
``_SESSION_TOKEN`` must not grant WS access once the gate is engaged).
Audit-logs the rejection so operators can debug "WS keeps closing"
issues from the log.
"""
auth_required = bool(getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False))
if auth_required:
# Lazy import — keeps this function importable in test harnesses
# that don't bring in the dashboard_auth layer.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.audit import AuditEvent, audit_log
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import (
TicketInvalid,
consume_internal_credential,
consume_ticket,
)
# Server-spawned children (PTY child → /api/ws, /api/pub) present the
# multi-use internal credential rather than a single-use ticket, so
# they survive reconnects and slow cold boots.
internal = ws.query_params.get("internal", "")
if internal:
try:
info = consume_internal_credential(internal)
# Stamp the server-minted identity onto the WS object so the
# connection (and any transport built from it) can never be
# impersonated by RPC params. Internal peers are marked
# ``server-internal`` and are excluded from privileged
# controller registration downstream.
ws._hermes_auth_identity = {
"user_id": info.get("user_id"),
"provider": info.get("provider"),
}
return None, "internal"
except TicketInvalid as exc:
audit_log(
AuditEvent.WS_TICKET_REJECTED,
reason=f"internal: {exc}",
ip=(ws.client.host if ws.client else ""),
path=ws.url.path,
)
return "internal_invalid", "internal"
protocol_ticket, protocol_reason = _gateway_ws_ticket_from_subprotocol(ws)
if protocol_reason == "invalid":
return "ticket_invalid", "ticket-subprotocol"
ticket = protocol_ticket or ws.query_params.get("ticket", "")
if not ticket:
return "no_credential", "none"
try:
info = consume_ticket(ticket)
# The ticket binds a server-minted {user_id, provider}; stamp it
# onto the WS object so ``gateway_ws`` can hand it to the gateway
# transport, where it is the sole identity authority for
# browser-controller registration. A client can never supply or
# spoof this value through RPC params. Only the two identity
# fields are carried — bookkeeping (e.g. ``minted_at``) is not
# part of the identity contract.
ws._hermes_auth_identity = {
"user_id": info.get("user_id"),
"provider": info.get("provider"),
}
if protocol_ticket:
# Select only the stable public protocol during accept. The
# ticket-bearing protocol is a credential and must never be
# reflected back to the browser or retained after admission.
ws._hermes_ws_subprotocol = _GATEWAY_WS_PROTOCOL
return None, "ticket-subprotocol"
return None, "ticket"
except TicketInvalid as exc:
audit_log(
AuditEvent.WS_TICKET_REJECTED,
reason=str(exc),
ip=(ws.client.host if ws.client else ""),
path=ws.url.path,
)
return "ticket_invalid", "ticket"
token = ws.query_params.get("token", "")
if not token:
return "no_credential", "none"
if hmac.compare_digest(token.encode(), _SESSION_TOKEN.encode()):
return None, "token"
return "token_mismatch", "token"
def _ws_auth_ok(ws: "WebSocket") -> bool:
"""True when the WS-upgrade credential is accepted. See _ws_auth_reason."""
return _ws_auth_reason(ws)[0] is None
# Per-channel subscriber registry used by /api/pub (PTY-side gateway → dashboard)
# and /api/events (dashboard → browser sidebar). Keyed by an opaque channel id
# the chat tab generates on mount; entries auto-evict when the last subscriber
# drops AND the publisher has disconnected.
# (Channel state and the chat-argv lock are initialised in _lifespan on app
# startup — see _get_event_state / _get_chat_argv_lock above.)
def _resolve_chat_argv(
resume: Optional[str] = None,
sidecar_url: Optional[str] = None,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
active_session_file: Optional[str] = None,
) -> tuple[list[str], Optional[str], Optional[dict]]:
"""Resolve the argv + cwd + env for the chat PTY.
Default: whatever ``hermes --tui`` would run. Tests monkeypatch this
function to inject a tiny fake command (``cat``, ``sh -c 'printf …'``)
so nothing has to build Node or the TUI bundle.
Session resume is propagated via the ``HERMES_TUI_RESUME`` env var —
matching what ``hermes_cli.main._launch_tui`` does for the CLI path.
Appending ``--resume <id>`` to argv doesn't work because ``ui-tui`` does
not parse its argv.
``HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL`` is injected so the PTY child can attach to
this process's in-memory ``tui_gateway`` instance instead of spawning
its own Python gateway subprocess.
`sidecar_url` (when set) is forwarded as ``HERMES_TUI_SIDECAR_URL`` so
the spawned ``tui_gateway.entry`` can mirror dispatcher emits to the
dashboard's ``/api/pub`` endpoint (see :func:`pub_ws`).
`active_session_file` (when set) is forwarded as
``HERMES_TUI_ACTIVE_SESSION_FILE``. The TUI writes the current session id
there whenever it creates/resumes/switches sessions, giving the dashboard a
small cross-process breadcrumb for reconnecting after an unexpected browser
WebSocket close.
`profile` (when set) scopes the ENTIRE chat to that profile by pointing
``HERMES_HOME`` at the profile dir in the child env. Every spawned
process (the TUI and the ``tui_gateway.entry`` it launches) resolves
``get_hermes_home()`` from that env var at its own import, so the child
binds the profile's config, skills, memory, and state.db from the start
— the same propagation ``hermes -p <name>`` performs. The in-process
``HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL`` attach is SKIPPED for scoped chats: the
dashboard's in-memory gateway runs under the dashboard's own profile,
so a profile-scoped chat must spawn its own gateway subprocess.
"""
from hermes_cli.main import PROJECT_ROOT, _apply_tui_python_env, _make_tui_argv
profile_dir: Optional[Path] = None
requested = (profile or "").strip()
if requested and requested.lower() != "current":
profile_dir = _resolve_profile_dir(requested)
argv, cwd = _make_tui_argv(PROJECT_ROOT / "ui-tui", tui_dev=False)
# Hermes TUI child: build via the single spawn-env factory (profile-home
# contract applied; secrets kept — the spawned agent needs provider creds).
# An explicit profile scope still overrides HERMES_HOME before config is
# bridged into the child environment.
from tools.environments.local import build_subprocess_env
env = build_subprocess_env(scrub_secrets=False, inherit_profile_home=True)
if profile_dir is not None:
env["HERMES_HOME"] = str(profile_dir)
try:
from hermes_cli.config import (
apply_terminal_config_to_env,
read_raw_config,
terminal_config_owned_env_vars,
)
if profile_dir is not None:
# The dashboard process already bridged its own terminal config
# into os.environ at startup. Remove only keys explicitly owned by
# that launch profile before applying the selected profile. Values
# exported by the operator for keys omitted from the launch profile
# remain valid fallbacks, matching apply_terminal_config_to_env().
raw_launch_terminal = read_raw_config().get("terminal")
for env_var in terminal_config_owned_env_vars(raw_launch_terminal):
env.pop(env_var, None)
with _config_profile_scope(requested):
apply_terminal_config_to_env(env=env)
else:
apply_terminal_config_to_env(env=env)
except Exception:
_log.warning("Failed to apply terminal config bridge for dashboard chat", exc_info=True)
_apply_tui_python_env(env)
env.setdefault("NODE_ENV", "production")
# Browser-embedded chat should prefer stable wheel-based scrollback over
# native terminal mouse tracking. When mouse tracking is enabled, wheel
# events are consumed by the TUI and forwarded as terminal input, which
# makes browser-side transcript scrolling feel broken. Keep the terminal
# build unchanged for native CLI usage; only disable mouse tracking for
# the dashboard PTY path.
env.setdefault("HERMES_TUI_DISABLE_MOUSE", "1")
env.setdefault("HERMES_TUI_INLINE", "1")
# The dashboard terminal is xterm.js, which always renders 24-bit RGB.
# But chalk inside the TUI child decides its color depth from the
# SERVER process env — and hosted/cloud deploys run the dashboard under
# a process manager (container init, systemd) with no COLORTERM, so
# chalk downgrades every hex color to the xterm 256 palette. The skin's
# bronze border #CD7F32 snaps to palette 173 (#D7875F, salmon-red) and
# the banner reads red/yellow instead of gold. Local launches dodge
# this only because the operator's interactive terminal leaks
# COLORTERM=truecolor into os.environ. Backfill it for the PTY child;
# setdefault so an explicit operator value still wins.
env.setdefault("COLORTERM", "truecolor")
env["HERMES_TUI_DASHBOARD"] = "1"
if resume:
_resume_db = _open_session_db_for_profile(
requested if profile_dir is not None else None,
read_only=True,
)
try:
latest_resume, _latest_path = _session_latest_descendant(resume, _resume_db)
finally:
_resume_db.close()
if latest_resume:
resume = latest_resume
env["HERMES_TUI_RESUME"] = resume
if sidecar_url:
env["HERMES_TUI_SIDECAR_URL"] = sidecar_url
if active_session_file:
env["HERMES_TUI_ACTIVE_SESSION_FILE"] = active_session_file
# Profile-scoped chats must NOT attach to the dashboard's in-memory
# gateway — it runs under the dashboard's own profile. Without the
# attach URL, gatewayClient spawns its own `tui_gateway.entry`, which
# inherits the profile HERMES_HOME set above.
if profile_dir is None:
if gateway_ws_url := _build_gateway_ws_url():
env["HERMES_TUI_GATEWAY_URL"] = gateway_ws_url
return list(argv), str(cwd) if cwd else None, env
# Hosts that mean "listen on every interface" — the server should bind to
# them, but an in-container client must NOT dial them: dialing 0.0.0.0
# resolves to "any local interface", which on most platforms routes through
# the kernel's wildcard stack and behind a forward proxy (HTTPS_PROXY with
# a NO_PROXY that doesn't list 0.0.0.0) gets MITM'd into a failed handshake
# (issue #58993). The fix is to use a loopback address for the client
# netloc while leaving the bind host alone.
_WILDCARD_HOSTS = frozenset({"0.0.0.0", "::"})
def _resolve_client_ws_host() -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the host the in-container WS client should dial.
Resolution order:
1. Explicit ``HERMES_DASHBOARD_WS_HOST`` env var — wins always. Operators
running the dashboard behind a forward proxy can pin a routable host
(e.g. ``127.0.0.1``, the container's internal IP, or a sidecar DNS
name) and bypass auto-detection entirely.
2. The configured bind host — if it's a wildcard (``0.0.0.0`` / ``::``),
substitute ``127.0.0.1`` since both the dashboard and its TUI child
run in the same container.
3. Any other bind host (loopback or LAN IP) — preserved verbatim.
"""
explicit = os.environ.get("HERMES_DASHBOARD_WS_HOST", "").strip()
if explicit:
return explicit
host = getattr(app.state, "bound_host", None)
if not host:
return None
if host in _WILDCARD_HOSTS:
return "127.0.0.1"
return host
def _build_gateway_ws_url() -> Optional[str]:
"""ws:// URL the PTY child should attach to for JSON-RPC gateway traffic.
Loopback / ``--insecure``: ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>``.
Gated mode: the legacy token path is rejected by ``_ws_auth_ok``, so the
server-spawned PTY child authenticates with the process-lifetime internal
credential (``?internal=``). It must NOT use a single-use browser ticket:
the child reads this URL once at startup and reuses it on every reconnect,
and a 30s-TTL ticket can expire before a slow cold boot even dials.
"""
host = _resolve_client_ws_host()
port = getattr(app.state, "bound_port", None)
if not host or not port:
return None
netloc = (
f"[{host}]:{port}"
if ":" in host and not host.startswith("[")
else f"{host}:{port}"
)
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import internal_ws_credential
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode({"internal": internal_ws_credential()})
else:
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode({"token": _SESSION_TOKEN})
return f"ws://{netloc}/api/ws?{qs}"
async def _resolve_chat_argv_async(
resume: Optional[str] = None,
sidecar_url: Optional[str] = None,
profile: Optional[str] = None,
active_session_file: Optional[str] = None,
) -> tuple[list[str], Optional[str], Optional[dict]]:
"""Resolve chat argv without blocking the dashboard event loop.
``_resolve_chat_argv`` may run ``npm install`` / ``npm run build`` through
``_make_tui_argv``. Keep that synchronous work off the WebSocket event
loop so reverse proxies and existing dashboard connections can continue
to exchange keepalives while the TUI launch command is prepared. The
async lock preserves the previous one-build-at-a-time behavior when
multiple browser tabs connect at once without occupying worker threads
while queued connections wait.
"""
kwargs = {
"resume": resume,
"sidecar_url": sidecar_url,
"profile": profile,
}
if active_session_file is not None:
kwargs["active_session_file"] = active_session_file
async with _get_chat_argv_lock(app):
return await asyncio.to_thread(
_resolve_chat_argv,
**kwargs,
)
def _build_sidecar_url(channel: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""ws:// URL the PTY child should publish events to, or None when unbound.
Loopback / ``--insecure``: uses ``?token=<_SESSION_TOKEN>``.
Gated mode: authenticates with the process-lifetime internal credential
(``?internal=``), the same one ``_build_gateway_ws_url`` uses. The PTY
child is a server-spawned process we trust; the credential is multi-use
and never expires, so the child can reconnect ``/api/pub`` without a new
URL. (This previously minted a single-use 30s ticket, which meant the
child could not reconnect and could miss the window on a slow cold boot.)
Connections authenticated this way are recorded under the
``server-internal`` identity in the audit log.
"""
host = _resolve_client_ws_host()
port = getattr(app.state, "bound_port", None)
if not host or not port:
return None
netloc = f"[{host}]:{port}" if ":" in host and not host.startswith("[") else f"{host}:{port}"
if getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False):
# Gated mode — use the internal credential so the WS upgrade survives
# _ws_auth_ok and the child can reconnect.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.ws_tickets import internal_ws_credential
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode(
{"internal": internal_ws_credential(), "channel": channel}
)
else:
qs = urllib.parse.urlencode({"token": _SESSION_TOKEN, "channel": channel})
return f"ws://{netloc}/api/pub?{qs}"
async def _broadcast_event(app: Any, channel: str, payload: str) -> None:
"""Fan out one publisher frame to every subscriber on `channel`."""
event_channels, event_lock = _get_event_state(app)
async with event_lock:
subs = list(event_channels.get(channel, ()))
for sub in subs:
try:
await sub.send_text(payload)
except Exception:
# Subscriber went away mid-send; the /api/events finally clause
# will remove it from the registry on its next iteration.
_log.warning("broadcast send failed for subscriber on %s", channel, exc_info=True)
def _channel_or_close_code(ws: WebSocket) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return the channel id from the query string or None if invalid."""
channel = ws.query_params.get("channel", "")
return channel if _VALID_CHANNEL_RE.match(channel) else None
def _active_session_file_for_channel(app: "FastAPI", channel: str) -> Path:
"""Return the per-channel file where a dashboard TUI writes its active sid."""
files = _get_pty_active_session_files(app)
existing = files.get(channel)
if existing is not None:
return existing
fd, raw_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix="hermes-pty-active-", suffix=".json")
os.close(fd)
path = Path(raw_path)
files[channel] = path
return path
def _read_active_session_file(path: Path) -> Optional[str]:
try:
data = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return None
session_id = str(data.get("session_id") or "").strip()
return session_id or None
def _forget_active_session_file(path: Path) -> None:
try:
path.unlink(missing_ok=True)
except OSError:
pass
def _ws_close_reason(text: str) -> str:
"""Clamp a WS close reason to the protocol's 123-byte UTF-8 limit.
RFC 6455 caps the close-frame reason at 123 bytes; uvicorn raises if a
longer string is passed. Our reasons embed an attacker-controlled origin,
so truncate defensively rather than crash the close handler.
"""
encoded = text.encode("utf-8", "replace")
if len(encoded) <= 123:
return text
return encoded[:120].decode("utf-8", "ignore") + "..."
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/console — safe Hermes Console command WebSocket.
#
# Unlike /api/pty, this endpoint never spawns a PTY, shell, or full Hermes CLI
# subprocess. It runs the curated console engine in-process and exchanges
# structured JSON frames with the dashboard xterm overlay.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_CONSOLE_PROMPT = "hermes> "
_CONSOLE_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60.0
_CONSOLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT = 50000
# Console commands run in a worker thread. On a timeout, asyncio.wait_for cancels
# the *awaitable*, but Python threads aren't preemptible, so a genuinely stuck
# worker keeps running to completion. To keep that from exhausting the shared
# default thread pool (asyncio.to_thread), we run console commands on a small
# dedicated, bounded pool: a leaked worker is capped, and concurrent console
# execution is bounded to a fixed number of threads regardless of reconnects.
_CONSOLE_EXECUTOR_MAX_WORKERS = 4
_console_executor: Optional[concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor] = None
_console_executor_lock = threading.Lock()
def _get_console_executor() -> concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor:
"""Lazily create the bounded console worker pool (once per process)."""
global _console_executor
if _console_executor is None:
with _console_executor_lock:
if _console_executor is None:
_console_executor = concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(
max_workers=_CONSOLE_EXECUTOR_MAX_WORKERS,
thread_name_prefix="hermes-console",
)
# Ensure the pool is torn down on interpreter exit. Don't wait on
# in-flight workers: a stuck 60s console command must not block
# shutdown (cancel_futures drops anything not yet started).
atexit.register(
lambda: _console_executor
and _console_executor.shutdown(wait=False, cancel_futures=True)
)
return _console_executor
def _console_profile_from_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> Optional[str]:
profile = (ws.query_params.get("profile") or "").strip()
return profile or None
def _execute_console_line(
engine: Any,
line: str,
*,
confirmed: bool,
profile: Optional[str],
) -> Any:
# _profile_scope swaps process-global skill module paths; keep it inside
# the worker thread and never hold it across awaits.
with _profile_scope(profile):
return engine.execute(line, confirmed=confirmed)
async def _console_send(
ws: WebSocket,
send_lock: asyncio.Lock,
payload: Dict[str, Any],
) -> None:
async with send_lock:
await ws.send_json(payload)
async def _console_send_result(
ws: WebSocket,
send_lock: asyncio.Lock,
result: Any,
*,
command_id: int,
) -> None:
command = result.command or ""
status = result.status
if status == "ok":
if result.output:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "output",
"id": command_id,
"stream": "stdout",
"data": result.output,
"command": command,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "ok",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "error":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": result.output or "Command failed.",
"command": command,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "error",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "confirm_required":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "confirm_required",
"id": command_id,
"command": command,
"message": result.confirmation_message or f"Run `{command}`?",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "confirm_required",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "clear":
await _console_send(ws, send_lock, {"type": "clear", "id": command_id})
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "clear",
"command": command,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
return
if status == "exit":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "exit",
"command": command,
"prompt": "",
},
)
return
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": f"Unknown console result status: {status}",
"command": command,
},
)
def _console_json_payload(msg: Any) -> tuple[Optional[dict[str, Any]], Optional[str]]:
raw: str | bytes | None = msg.get("text")
if raw is None:
raw = msg.get("bytes")
if raw is None:
return None, None
if isinstance(raw, bytes):
try:
raw = raw.decode("utf-8")
except UnicodeDecodeError:
return None, "Console frames must be UTF-8 JSON."
try:
payload = json.loads(raw)
except json.JSONDecodeError:
return None, "Console frames must be JSON objects."
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return None, "Console frames must be JSON objects."
return payload, None
@app.websocket("/api/console")
async def console_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
peer = ws.client.host if ws.client else "?"
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
_log.info("console refused: embedded chat disabled peer=%s", peer)
await ws.close(code=4404, reason="embedded chat disabled")
return
auth_reason, cred = _ws_auth_reason(ws)
mode = _ws_auth_mode()
if auth_reason is not None:
_log.warning(
"console auth rejected reason=%s mode=%s cred=%s peer=%s",
auth_reason, mode, cred, peer,
)
await ws.close(code=4401, reason=_ws_close_reason(f"auth: {auth_reason}"))
return
host_origin_reason = _ws_host_origin_reason(ws)
if host_origin_reason is not None:
_log.warning("console refused: %s peer=%s", host_origin_reason, peer)
await ws.close(code=4403, reason=_ws_close_reason(host_origin_reason))
return
client_reason = _ws_client_reason(ws)
if client_reason is not None:
_log.warning("console refused: %s", client_reason)
await ws.close(code=4408, reason=_ws_close_reason(client_reason))
return
await ws.accept()
profile = _console_profile_from_ws(ws)
send_lock = asyncio.Lock()
try:
from hermes_cli.console_engine import HermesConsoleEngine
engine = HermesConsoleEngine(output_limit=_CONSOLE_OUTPUT_LIMIT)
if profile and profile.lower() != "current":
_resolve_profile_dir(profile)
except HTTPException as exc:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": str(exc.detail),
"prompt": "",
},
)
await ws.close(code=4400, reason=_ws_close_reason(str(exc.detail)))
return
except Exception as exc:
_log.exception("console failed to initialize")
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": f"Console unavailable: {exc}",
"prompt": "",
},
)
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
_log.info(
"console accepted peer=%s mode=%s cred=%s profile=%s",
peer,
mode,
cred,
profile or "current",
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "ready",
"profile": profile or "current",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
active_task: asyncio.Task | None = None
pending_confirmation: Optional[str] = None
command_generation = 0
async def run_command(line: str, *, confirmed: bool, command_id: int) -> None:
nonlocal active_task, pending_confirmation, command_generation
try:
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
result = await asyncio.wait_for(
loop.run_in_executor(
_get_console_executor(),
functools.partial(
_execute_console_line,
engine,
line,
confirmed=confirmed,
profile=profile,
),
),
timeout=_CONSOLE_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
except asyncio.CancelledError:
raise
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
if command_id == command_generation:
pending_confirmation = None
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": (
"Command timed out. Hermes Console returned to the prompt."
),
"command": line,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "timeout",
"command": line,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
except Exception as exc:
if command_id == command_generation:
pending_confirmation = None
_log.exception("console command failed")
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"id": command_id,
"message": str(exc) or exc.__class__.__name__,
"command": line,
},
)
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"id": command_id,
"status": "error",
"command": line,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
else:
if command_id != command_generation:
return
pending_confirmation = (
result.command if result.status == "confirm_required" else None
)
await _console_send_result(
ws,
send_lock,
result,
command_id=command_id,
)
if result.status == "exit":
await ws.close(code=1000)
finally:
if command_id == command_generation:
active_task = None
async def start_command(line: str, *, confirmed: bool = False) -> None:
nonlocal active_task, command_generation
command_generation += 1
command_id = command_generation
active_task = asyncio.create_task(
run_command(line, confirmed=confirmed, command_id=command_id)
)
try:
while True:
try:
msg = await ws.receive()
except RuntimeError:
break
msg_type = msg.get("type")
if msg_type == "websocket.disconnect":
break
payload, error = _console_json_payload(msg)
if error:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": error,
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if payload is None:
continue
frame_type = str(payload.get("type") or "").strip().lower()
if frame_type == "ping":
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "pong",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if frame_type == "cancel":
if active_task and not active_task.done():
command_generation += 1
active_task.cancel()
active_task = None
pending_confirmation = None
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "cancelled",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
elif pending_confirmation:
pending_confirmation = None
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "cancelled",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
else:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "idle",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if active_task and not active_task.done():
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": "A console command is already running.",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if frame_type == "confirm":
command = str(payload.get("command") or pending_confirmation or "").strip()
if not pending_confirmation:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": "No command is waiting for confirmation.",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if command != pending_confirmation:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": "Confirmation does not match the pending command.",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
pending_confirmation = None
await start_command(command, confirmed=True)
continue
if frame_type in {"input", "command"}:
line = str(payload.get("line") or payload.get("command") or "").strip()
if not line:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "complete",
"status": "ok",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
if pending_confirmation:
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": (
"Confirm or cancel the pending command before "
"running another one."
),
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
continue
await start_command(line)
continue
await _console_send(
ws,
send_lock,
{
"type": "error",
"message": f"Unsupported console frame: {frame_type or '?'}",
"prompt": _CONSOLE_PROMPT,
},
)
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
if active_task and not active_task.done():
active_task.cancel()
try:
await active_task
except (asyncio.CancelledError, Exception):
pass
@app.websocket("/api/pty")
async def pty_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
peer = ws.client.host if ws.client else "?"
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
_log.info("pty refused: embedded chat disabled peer=%s", peer)
await ws.close(code=4404, reason="embedded chat disabled")
return
# --- auth + host/origin/peer check (before accept so we can close
# cleanly AND tell the client WHY via the close code + reason).
# Each gate maps to a distinct close code so the log and the
# browser banner agree on the cause:
# 4401 bad credential 4403 host/origin mismatch
# 4408 peer not allowed 4404 chat disabled
auth_reason, cred = _ws_auth_reason(ws)
mode = _ws_auth_mode()
if auth_reason is not None:
_log.warning(
"pty auth rejected reason=%s mode=%s cred=%s peer=%s",
auth_reason, mode, cred, peer,
)
await ws.close(code=4401, reason=_ws_close_reason(f"auth: {auth_reason}"))
return
host_origin_reason = _ws_host_origin_reason(ws)
if host_origin_reason is not None:
_log.warning("pty refused: %s peer=%s", host_origin_reason, peer)
await ws.close(code=4403, reason=_ws_close_reason(host_origin_reason))
return
client_reason = _ws_client_reason(ws)
if client_reason is not None:
_log.warning("pty refused: %s", client_reason)
await ws.close(code=4408, reason=_ws_close_reason(client_reason))
return
await ws.accept()
_log.info("pty accepted peer=%s mode=%s cred=%s", peer, mode, cred)
# On native Windows, the POSIX PTY bridge can't be imported. Tell the
# client and close cleanly rather than pretending the feature works.
if not _PTY_BRIDGE_AVAILABLE:
await ws.send_text(
"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: the embedded terminal requires a "
"POSIX PTY, which native Windows Python doesn't provide.\x1b[0m\r\n"
"\x1b[33mInstall Hermes inside WSL2 to use the dashboard's /chat "
"tab — the rest of the dashboard works here.\x1b[0m\r\n"
)
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
# --- spawn PTY ------------------------------------------------------
raw_resume = ws.query_params.get("resume") or None
resume = raw_resume
profile = ws.query_params.get("profile") or None
channel = _channel_or_close_code(ws)
sidecar_url = _build_sidecar_url(channel) if channel else None
force_fresh = (ws.query_params.get("fresh") or "").strip().lower() in {
"1",
"true",
"yes",
"on",
}
active_session_file: Optional[Path] = None
if channel:
active_session_file = _active_session_file_for_channel(ws.app, channel)
if force_fresh:
resume = None
_forget_active_session_file(active_session_file)
elif not resume:
resume = _read_active_session_file(active_session_file)
if resume:
# The client only knows to pin the viewport to the bottom
# when it requested `?resume=`. Tell it a replay is coming
# anyway so the implicit active-session fallback gets the
# same follow-scroll treatment as an explicit resume (#93518).
await ws.send_json({"type": "resume", "id": resume})
resolve_kwargs = {
"resume": resume,
"sidecar_url": sidecar_url,
"profile": profile,
}
if active_session_file is not None:
resolve_kwargs["active_session_file"] = str(active_session_file)
try:
argv, cwd, env = await _resolve_chat_argv_async(**resolve_kwargs)
except HTTPException as exc:
# Unknown/invalid profile from _resolve_profile_dir.
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc.detail}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
except SystemExit as exc:
# _make_tui_argv calls sys.exit(1) when node/npm is missing.
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
attach_token = ws.query_params.get("attach") or None
registry_resume = raw_resume
if raw_resume and env:
registry_resume = env.get("HERMES_TUI_RESUME") or raw_resume
if attach_token is not None and (registry_resume or profile):
# Key explicit resumes on their canonical target, never the active-session fallback.
attach_token = f"{attach_token}\0{profile or ''}\0{registry_resume or ''}"
def _spawn():
return PtyBridge.spawn(argv, cwd=cwd, env=env)
if attach_token is None:
# Legacy path: 1:1 socket<->PTY, killed on disconnect (unchanged).
try:
bridge = _spawn()
except PtyUnavailableError as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
except (FileNotFoundError, OSError) as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat failed to start: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
await _legacy_pump(ws, bridge)
return
# Keep-alive path: the PTY outlives this socket; reattach by token.
try:
session, _created = await PTY_REGISTRY.attach_or_spawn(
attach_token, spawn=_spawn
)
except PtyUnavailableError as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
except (FileNotFoundError, OSError, RegistryFull) as exc:
await ws.send_text(f"\r\n\x1b[31mChat unavailable: {exc}\x1b[0m\r\n")
await ws.close(code=1011)
return
# A fresh xterm cannot reliably reconstruct the TUI from an arbitrary
# bounded tail of alternate-screen, differential ANSI output. Reused PTYs
# emit a complete frame after replay so reconnects never reopen blank.
await session.attach(ws, force_redraw=not _created)
# --- writer loop: WebSocket → PTY master ----------------------------
# No reader task here: the session's drain task (spawned once per PTY,
# inside the registry) forwards PTY output to whichever socket is
# attached and rings-buffers it while detached. On child EOF the drain
# closes the attached socket with 4410, which unparks ``ws.receive()``
# below — same half-open-socket protection the legacy pump has (#54028).
try:
while True:
try:
msg = await ws.receive()
except RuntimeError:
# ws.receive() after the socket is already disconnected
# (e.g. closed by the drain task on process exit).
break
if msg.get("type") == "websocket.disconnect":
break
raw = msg.get("bytes")
if raw is None:
text = msg.get("text")
raw = text.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(text, str) else b""
if not raw:
continue
# Resize escape is consumed locally, never written to the PTY.
match = _RESIZE_RE.match(raw)
if match and match.end() == len(raw):
session.bridge.resize(cols=int(match.group(1)), rows=int(match.group(2)))
continue
session.bridge.write(raw)
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
# Detach only — the PTY keeps running for a reattach; the registry
# reaper closes it after the TTL (or immediately on process exit).
PTY_REGISTRY.detach(attach_token, ws)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/ws — JSON-RPC WebSocket sidecar for the dashboard "Chat" tab.
#
# Drives the same `tui_gateway.dispatch` surface Ink uses over stdio, so the
# dashboard can render structured metadata (model badge, tool-call sidebar,
# slash launcher, session info) alongside the xterm.js terminal that PTY
# already paints. Both transports bind to the same session id when one is
# active, so a tool.start emitted by the agent fans out to both sinks.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.websocket("/api/ws")
async def gateway_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
if not _ws_auth_ok(ws):
await ws.close(code=4401)
return
if not _ws_request_is_allowed(ws):
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
from tui_gateway.ws import handle_ws
# The authenticated identity (ticket / internal credential) was stamped
# onto the WS object by _ws_auth_reason; carry it into the gateway
# transport where it becomes the identity authority for privileged RPCs
# (browser.controller.register). None on the legacy token path.
await handle_ws(
ws,
auth_identity=getattr(ws, "_hermes_auth_identity", None),
subprotocol=getattr(ws, "_hermes_ws_subprotocol", None),
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# /api/pub + /api/events — chat-tab event broadcast.
#
# The PTY-side ``tui_gateway.entry`` opens /api/pub at startup (driven by
# HERMES_TUI_SIDECAR_URL set in /api/pty's PTY env) and writes every
# dispatcher emit through it. The dashboard fans those frames out to any
# subscriber that opened /api/events on the same channel id. This is what
# gives the React sidebar its tool-call feed without breaking the PTY
# child's stdio handshake with Ink.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@app.websocket("/api/pub")
async def pub_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
if not _ws_auth_ok(ws):
await ws.close(code=4401)
return
if not _ws_request_is_allowed(ws):
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
channel = _channel_or_close_code(ws)
if not channel:
await ws.close(code=4400)
return
await ws.accept()
try:
while True:
await _broadcast_event(ws.app, channel, await ws.receive_text())
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
@app.websocket("/api/events")
async def events_ws(ws: WebSocket) -> None:
if not _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED:
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
if not _ws_auth_ok(ws):
await ws.close(code=4401)
return
if not _ws_request_is_allowed(ws):
await ws.close(code=4403)
return
channel = _channel_or_close_code(ws)
if not channel:
await ws.close(code=4400)
return
await ws.accept()
event_channels, event_lock = _get_event_state(ws.app)
async with event_lock:
event_channels.setdefault(channel, set()).add(ws)
try:
while True:
# Subscribers don't speak — the receive() just blocks until
# disconnect so the connection stays open as long as the
# browser holds it.
await ws.receive_text()
except WebSocketDisconnect:
pass
finally:
async with event_lock:
subs = event_channels.get(channel)
if subs is not None:
subs.discard(ws)
if not subs:
event_channels.pop(channel, None)
def _normalise_prefix(raw: Optional[str]) -> str:
"""Normalise an X-Forwarded-Prefix header value.
Thin re-export of :func:`hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix.normalise_prefix`
— the single source of truth lives in the dashboard_auth package so
the gate middleware, the OAuth routes, the cookie helpers, and the
SPA mount all agree on validation rules.
"""
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import normalise_prefix
return normalise_prefix(raw)
def _render_active_theme_bootstrap_css() -> str:
"""Critical-CSS shim for the active user theme.
Returns a ``<style>`` block with the ``:root`` CSS variables that
``ThemeProvider.applyTheme()`` installs once the
``/api/dashboard/themes`` round-trip completes. The goal is to
eliminate the green flash where the first paint shows the bundle's
default Hermes Teal canvas before the SPA flips the configured user
theme into place.
Built-in themes return an empty string — their full definitions live
in ``web/src/themes/presets.ts`` and are applied by the bundle
before paint, so no shim is needed for them.
"""
try:
config = load_config()
active = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "theme", default="default")
if not active or not isinstance(active, str):
return ""
# Built-in: the bundle already owns the definition, no flash.
if any(b["name"] == active for b in _BUILTIN_DASHBOARD_THEMES):
return ""
for theme in _discover_user_themes():
if theme.get("name") != active:
continue
palette = theme.get("palette") or {}
bg = palette.get("background") or {}
mg = palette.get("midground") or {}
bg_hex = bg.get("hex", "#0a0a0a") if isinstance(bg, dict) else "#0a0a0a"
mg_hex = mg.get("hex", "#e5e5e5") if isinstance(mg, dict) else "#e5e5e5"
typo = theme.get("typography") or {}
font_sans = typo.get("fontSans") or _THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY["fontSans"]
base_size = typo.get("baseSize") or _THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY["baseSize"]
# Defensive ``</style>`` escape — current values are well-known
# hex/font strings, but this keeps the helper safe if it is
# later extended to ship user-authored CSS literals.
def _esc(s: str) -> str:
return str(s).replace("</", "<\\/")
# Variable names MUST match what the bundle actually consumes:
# - ``--background-base`` / ``--midground-base`` come from
# ``layerVars()`` in ``web/src/themes/context.tsx``.
# - ``--theme-font-sans`` / ``--theme-base-size`` come from
# ``typographyVars()`` there, and ``index.css`` applies them
# via ``html{font-family:var(--theme-font-sans);
# font-size:var(--theme-base-size)}``.
# The ``html,body`` canvas rule references the SAME variables
# instead of literal values so runtime theme switches stay
# live: ``applyTheme()`` writes these vars as inline styles on
# ``documentElement``, which outrank this stylesheet block in
# the cascade — the rule below re-resolves automatically and
# never goes stale when the user picks a different theme.
return (
'<style id="hermes-theme-bootstrap">'
":root{"
f"--background-base:{_esc(bg_hex)};"
f"--midground-base:{_esc(mg_hex)};"
f"--theme-font-sans:{_esc(font_sans)};"
f"--theme-base-size:{_esc(base_size)};"
"}"
"html,body{background-color:var(--background-base);"
"color:var(--midground-base);"
"font-family:var(--theme-font-sans);"
"font-size:var(--theme-base-size);}"
"</style>"
)
return ""
except Exception:
_log.debug("theme bootstrap render failed", exc_info=True)
return ""
# Hashed bundle assets (``/assets/<name>-<contenthash>.<ext>``) are immutable
# by construction: any content change produces a new filename, and the entry
# point (index.html) is served ``no-store`` so it always references the
# current hashes. A year-long immutable cache lets browsers skip even the
# revalidation round-trip on every dashboard load.
_IMMUTABLE_ASSET_CACHE_CONTROL = "public, max-age=31536000, immutable"
def mount_spa(application: FastAPI):
"""Mount the built SPA. Falls back to index.html for client-side routing.
The session token is injected into index.html via a ``<script>`` tag so
the SPA can authenticate against protected API endpoints without a
separate (unauthenticated) token-dispensing endpoint.
When served behind a path-prefix reverse proxy (e.g.
``mission-control.tilos.com/hermes/*`` -> local Caddy -> :9119), the
proxy injects ``X-Forwarded-Prefix: /hermes`` on every request. We
rewrite the served ``index.html`` so absolute asset URLs (``/assets/...``)
and the SPA's runtime ``__HERMES_BASE_PATH__`` honour that prefix
without rebuilding the bundle.
"""
# `hermes serve` is the headless backend: it must NEVER serve the browser
# SPA, even if a dist is lying around from a prior `dashboard`/build. Take
# the no-frontend path so only the JSON-RPC/WS/API surface is reachable.
_headless = os.environ.get("HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS") == "1"
if _headless:
_msg = (
"Headless backend (hermes serve): web UI disabled — use "
"`hermes dashboard` for the browser UI."
)
@application.get("/{full_path:path}")
async def no_frontend(full_path: str):
# Desktop token handshake (#94227): the Electron shell boots by
# fetching `/` and extracting ``window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__``
# for /api/ws auth (apps/desktop/electron/dashboard-token.ts).
# When headless serve 404'd every path, a renderer whose spawn
# token no longer matched the backend's live token (e.g. after
# `hermes update` replaced the backend) had no way to adopt the
# served token — the WS handshake failed and the window
# white-screened (#95575). Serve a minimal token-only page at the
# exact root, but ONLY when the dashboard auth gate is off: on a
# gated (non-loopback/remote) serve the token must never be
# readable without auth, so the 404 JSON stays.
gated = bool(getattr(application.state, "auth_required", False))
if full_path == "" and not gated:
token_js = json.dumps(_SESSION_TOKEN)
return HTMLResponse(
"<!doctype html><html><head><script>"
f"window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__={token_js};"
"window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__=false;"
"</script></head><body>"
"Headless backend (hermes serve): web UI disabled — use "
"`hermes dashboard` for the browser UI."
"</body></html>",
headers={
"Cache-Control": "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate"
},
)
return JSONResponse({"error": _msg}, status_code=404)
return
# A missing WEB_DIST is deliberately NOT a mount-time terminal state
# (#82614): a long-lived `hermes dashboard --skip-build` process that
# survives a `git pull` (or starts before the first build) used to
# install a permanent no_frontend catch-all here and could never
# recover — every route answered 404 "Frontend not built" until the
# process was restarted, even after `npm run build` completed. The SPA
# routes below all cope with a missing dist per-request (`_serve_index`
# returns the same 404 JSON when index.html is unreadable; the asset
# mounts use check_dir=False and 404 on missing files), so mounting
# them unconditionally makes the dashboard recover the moment a build
# appears on disk — no restart needed.
_index_path = WEB_DIST / "index.html"
def _serve_index(prefix: str = ""):
"""Return index.html with the session token + base-path injected.
``prefix`` is the normalised ``X-Forwarded-Prefix`` (e.g. ``/hermes``)
or empty string when served at root.
When the OAuth auth gate is active (``app.state.auth_required``),
the legacy ``_SESSION_TOKEN`` is NOT injected — the SPA reads
identity from ``/api/auth/me`` over cookie auth instead. The
``__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__`` flag lets the SPA pick the right
auth scheme for /api/pty and /api/ws (ticket vs token).
"""
try:
html = _index_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except OSError:
# The dist dir existed at mount time but index.html is missing or
# unreadable now (partial build, wiped dist, permissions). Without
# this guard every request raises FileNotFoundError (500). Return
# the same JSON 404 payload mount_spa uses for a fully-missing
# dist so clients get a clear, consistent signal.
return JSONResponse(
{"error": "Frontend not built. Run: cd web && npm run build"},
status_code=404,
)
chat_js = "true" if _DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT_ENABLED else "false"
gated = bool(getattr(app.state, "auth_required", False))
gated_js = "true" if gated else "false"
if gated:
bootstrap_script = (
f"<script>"
f"window.__HERMES_DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT__={chat_js};"
f'window.__HERMES_BASE_PATH__="{prefix}";'
f"window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__={gated_js};"
f"</script>"
)
else:
bootstrap_script = (
f'<script>window.__HERMES_SESSION_TOKEN__="{_SESSION_TOKEN}";'
f"window.__HERMES_DASHBOARD_EMBEDDED_CHAT__={chat_js};"
f'window.__HERMES_BASE_PATH__="{prefix}";'
f"window.__HERMES_AUTH_REQUIRED__={gated_js};"
f"</script>"
)
if prefix:
# Rewrite absolute asset URLs baked into the Vite build so the
# browser fetches them through the same proxy prefix.
html = html.replace('href="/assets/', f'href="{prefix}/assets/')
html = html.replace('src="/assets/', f'src="{prefix}/assets/')
html = html.replace('href="/favicon.ico"', f'href="{prefix}/favicon.ico"')
html = html.replace('href="/fonts/', f'href="{prefix}/fonts/')
html = html.replace('href="/ds-assets/', f'href="{prefix}/ds-assets/')
html = html.replace('src="/ds-assets/', f'src="{prefix}/ds-assets/')
# Theme flash mitigation: when the active theme is a user theme
# (``HERMES_HOME/dashboard-themes/<name>.yaml``), inject a minimal
# critical-CSS block so the first paint uses the target palette.
# Without this the SPA paints the default Hermes Teal canvas, then
# ``ThemeProvider`` flips the CSS variables once
# ``/api/dashboard/themes`` resolves. Built-in themes are already
# in the bundle's ``presets.ts`` so no shim is needed for them.
theme_bootstrap = _render_active_theme_bootstrap_css()
if theme_bootstrap:
html = html.replace("</head>", f"{theme_bootstrap}</head>", 1)
html = html.replace("</head>", f"{bootstrap_script}</head>", 1)
return HTMLResponse(
html,
headers={"Cache-Control": "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate"},
)
# When served behind a path-prefix proxy, the built CSS contains
# absolute ``url(/fonts/...)`` and ``url(/ds-assets/...)`` references.
# Browsers resolve those against the document origin, which means
# under ``/hermes`` they'd hit ``mission-control.tilos.com/fonts/...``
# (the MC Pages app), not the Hermes backend. Intercept CSS asset
# requests BEFORE the StaticFiles mount and rewrite the absolute paths
# when a prefix is in play.
@application.get("/assets/{filename}.css")
async def serve_css(filename: str, request: Request):
css_path = WEB_DIST / "assets" / f"{filename}.css"
if not css_path.is_file() or not css_path.resolve().is_relative_to(
WEB_DIST.resolve()
):
return JSONResponse({"error": "not found"}, status_code=404)
prefix = _normalise_prefix(request.headers.get("x-forwarded-prefix"))
css = css_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
if prefix:
for asset_dir in ("/fonts/", "/fonts-terminal/", "/ds-assets/", "/assets/"):
css = css.replace(f"url({asset_dir}", f"url({prefix}{asset_dir}")
css = css.replace(f"url(\"{asset_dir}", f"url(\"{prefix}{asset_dir}")
css = css.replace(f"url('{asset_dir}", f"url('{prefix}{asset_dir}")
return Response(
content=css,
media_type="text/css",
headers={"Cache-Control": _IMMUTABLE_ASSET_CACHE_CONTROL},
)
class _ImmutableAssetFiles(StaticFiles):
"""StaticFiles that marks hashed bundle assets immutable.
Everything under ``/assets/`` carries a Vite content hash in its
filename, so a given URL's bytes can never change — a rebuild
produces a NEW filename referenced by a fresh (``no-store``)
index.html. Without this header every dashboard load re-validated
each chunk; with it the browser serves reloads straight from its
HTTP cache.
"""
async def get_response(self, path: str, scope):
response = await super().get_response(path, scope)
if response.status_code == 200:
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = _IMMUTABLE_ASSET_CACHE_CONTROL
return response
application.mount(
"/assets",
# check_dir=False: the dist (and its assets/ dir) may not exist yet —
# the whole point of the dynamic recheck (#82614). StaticFiles then
# 404s per-request until a build appears instead of raising at mount.
_ImmutableAssetFiles(directory=WEB_DIST / "assets", check_dir=False),
name="assets",
)
@application.get("/{full_path:path}")
async def serve_spa(full_path: str, request: Request):
prefix = _normalise_prefix(request.headers.get("x-forwarded-prefix"))
# An unmatched /api/* path is a missing/renamed endpoint, NOT a
# client-side route. Falling through to index.html here returns
# `<!doctype html>` with status 200, which makes JSON clients (the
# desktop app's fetchJson, dashboard fetch wrappers) blow up with an
# opaque `SyntaxError: Unexpected token '<'`. Return a real 404 JSON
# so the caller sees a clear "no such endpoint" instead.
if full_path == "api" or full_path.startswith("api/"):
return JSONResponse(
{"detail": f"No such API endpoint: /{full_path}"},
status_code=404,
)
file_path = WEB_DIST / full_path
# Prevent path traversal via url-encoded sequences (%2e%2e/)
if (
full_path
and file_path.resolve().is_relative_to(WEB_DIST.resolve())
and file_path.exists()
and file_path.is_file()
):
return FileResponse(file_path)
return _serve_index(prefix)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard theme endpoints
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Built-in dashboard themes — label + description only. The actual color
# definitions live in the frontend (web/src/themes/presets.ts).
_BUILTIN_DASHBOARD_THEMES = [
{"name": "default", "label": "Hermes Teal", "description": "Classic dark teal — the canonical Hermes look"},
{"name": "default-large", "label": "Hermes Teal (Large)", "description": "Hermes Teal with bigger fonts and roomier spacing"},
{"name": "nous-blue", "label": "Nous Blue", "description": "Light mode — vivid Nous-blue accents on cream canvas"},
{"name": "midnight", "label": "Midnight", "description": "Deep blue-violet with cool accents"},
{"name": "ember", "label": "Ember", "description": "Warm crimson and bronze — forge vibes"},
{"name": "mono", "label": "Mono", "description": "Clean grayscale — minimal and focused"},
{"name": "cyberpunk", "label": "Cyberpunk", "description": "Neon green on black — matrix terminal"},
{"name": "rose", "label": "Rosé", "description": "Soft pink and warm ivory — easy on the eyes"},
]
def _parse_theme_layer(value: Any, default_hex: str, default_alpha: float = 1.0) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Normalise a theme layer spec from YAML into `{hex, alpha}` form.
Accepts shorthand (a bare hex string) or full dict form. Returns
``None`` on garbage input so the caller can fall back to a built-in
default rather than blowing up.
"""
if value is None:
return {"hex": default_hex, "alpha": default_alpha}
if isinstance(value, str):
return {"hex": value, "alpha": default_alpha}
if isinstance(value, dict):
hex_val = value.get("hex", default_hex)
alpha_val = value.get("alpha", default_alpha)
if not isinstance(hex_val, str):
return None
try:
alpha_f = float(alpha_val)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
alpha_f = default_alpha
return {"hex": hex_val, "alpha": max(0.0, min(1.0, alpha_f))}
return None
_THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY: Dict[str, str] = {
"fontSans": 'system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", Arial, sans-serif',
"fontMono": 'ui-monospace, "SF Mono", "Cascadia Mono", Menlo, Consolas, monospace',
"baseSize": "15px",
"lineHeight": "1.55",
"letterSpacing": "0",
}
_THEME_DEFAULT_LAYOUT: Dict[str, str] = {
"radius": "0.5rem",
"density": "comfortable",
}
_THEME_OVERRIDE_KEYS = {
"card", "cardForeground", "popover", "popoverForeground",
"primary", "primaryForeground", "secondary", "secondaryForeground",
"muted", "mutedForeground", "accent", "accentForeground",
"destructive", "destructiveForeground", "success", "warning",
"border", "input", "ring",
}
# Well-known named asset slots themes can populate. Any other keys under
# ``assets.custom`` are exposed as ``--theme-asset-custom-<key>`` CSS vars
# for plugin/shell use.
_THEME_NAMED_ASSET_KEYS = {"bg", "hero", "logo", "crest", "sidebar", "header"}
# Component-style buckets themes can override. The value under each bucket
# is a mapping from camelCase property name to CSS string; each pair emits
# ``--component-<bucket>-<kebab-property>`` on :root. The frontend's shell
# components (Card, App header, Backdrop, etc.) consume these vars so themes
# can restyle chrome (clip-path, border-image, segmented progress, etc.)
# without shipping their own CSS.
_THEME_COMPONENT_BUCKETS = {
"card", "header", "footer", "sidebar", "tab",
"progress", "badge", "backdrop", "page",
}
_THEME_LAYOUT_VARIANTS = {"standard", "cockpit", "tiled"}
# Cap on customCSS length so a malformed/oversized theme YAML can't blow up
# the response payload or the <style> tag. 32 KiB is plenty for every
# practical reskin (the Strike Freedom demo is ~2 KiB).
_THEME_CUSTOM_CSS_MAX = 32 * 1024
def _normalise_theme_definition(data: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Normalise a user theme YAML into the wire format `ThemeProvider`
expects. Returns ``None`` if the theme is unusable.
Accepts both the full schema (palette/typography/layout) and a loose
form with bare hex strings, so hand-written YAMLs stay friendly.
"""
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return None
name = data.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name.strip():
return None
# Palette
palette_src = data.get("palette", {}) if isinstance(data.get("palette"), dict) else {}
# Allow top-level `colors.background` as a shorthand too.
colors_src = data.get("colors", {}) if isinstance(data.get("colors"), dict) else {}
def _layer(key: str, default_hex: str, default_alpha: float = 1.0) -> Dict[str, Any]:
spec = palette_src.get(key, colors_src.get(key))
parsed = _parse_theme_layer(spec, default_hex, default_alpha)
return parsed if parsed is not None else {"hex": default_hex, "alpha": default_alpha}
palette = {
"background": _layer("background", "#041c1c", 1.0),
"midground": _layer("midground", "#ffe6cb", 1.0),
"foreground": _layer("foreground", "#ffffff", 0.0),
"warmGlow": palette_src.get("warmGlow") or data.get("warmGlow") or "rgba(255, 189, 56, 0.35)",
"noiseOpacity": 1.0,
}
raw_noise = palette_src.get("noiseOpacity", data.get("noiseOpacity"))
try:
palette["noiseOpacity"] = float(raw_noise) if raw_noise is not None else 1.0
except (TypeError, ValueError):
palette["noiseOpacity"] = 1.0
# Typography
typo_src = data.get("typography", {}) if isinstance(data.get("typography"), dict) else {}
typography = dict(_THEME_DEFAULT_TYPOGRAPHY)
for key in ("fontSans", "fontMono", "fontDisplay", "fontUrl", "baseSize", "lineHeight", "letterSpacing"):
val = typo_src.get(key)
if isinstance(val, str) and val.strip():
typography[key] = val
# Layout
layout_src = data.get("layout", {}) if isinstance(data.get("layout"), dict) else {}
layout = dict(_THEME_DEFAULT_LAYOUT)
radius = layout_src.get("radius")
if isinstance(radius, str) and radius.strip():
layout["radius"] = radius
density = layout_src.get("density")
if isinstance(density, str) and density in {"compact", "comfortable", "spacious"}:
layout["density"] = density
# Color overrides — keep only valid keys with string values.
overrides_src = data.get("colorOverrides", {})
color_overrides: Dict[str, str] = {}
if isinstance(overrides_src, dict):
for key, val in overrides_src.items():
if key in _THEME_OVERRIDE_KEYS and isinstance(val, str) and val.strip():
color_overrides[key] = val
# Assets — named slots + arbitrary user-defined keys. Values must be
# strings (URLs or CSS ``url(...)``/``linear-gradient(...)`` expressions).
# We don't fetch remote assets here; the frontend just injects them as
# CSS vars. Empty values are dropped so a theme can explicitly clear a
# slot by setting ``hero: ""``.
assets_out: Dict[str, Any] = {}
assets_src = data.get("assets", {}) if isinstance(data.get("assets"), dict) else {}
for key in _THEME_NAMED_ASSET_KEYS:
val = assets_src.get(key)
if isinstance(val, str) and val.strip():
assets_out[key] = val
custom_assets_src = assets_src.get("custom")
if isinstance(custom_assets_src, dict):
custom_assets: Dict[str, str] = {}
for key, val in custom_assets_src.items():
if (
isinstance(key, str)
and key.replace("-", "").replace("_", "").isalnum()
and isinstance(val, str)
and val.strip()
):
custom_assets[key] = val
if custom_assets:
assets_out["custom"] = custom_assets
# Custom CSS — raw CSS text the frontend injects as a scoped <style>
# tag on theme apply. Clipped to _THEME_CUSTOM_CSS_MAX to keep the
# payload bounded. We intentionally do NOT parse/sanitise the CSS
# here — the dashboard is localhost-only and themes are user-authored
# YAML in ~/.hermes/, same trust level as the config file itself.
custom_css_val = data.get("customCSS")
custom_css: Optional[str] = None
if isinstance(custom_css_val, str) and custom_css_val.strip():
custom_css = custom_css_val[:_THEME_CUSTOM_CSS_MAX]
# Component style overrides — per-bucket dicts of camelCase CSS
# property -> CSS string. The frontend converts these into CSS vars
# that shell components (Card, App header, Backdrop) consume.
component_styles_src = data.get("componentStyles", {})
component_styles: Dict[str, Dict[str, str]] = {}
if isinstance(component_styles_src, dict):
for bucket, props in component_styles_src.items():
if bucket not in _THEME_COMPONENT_BUCKETS or not isinstance(props, dict):
continue
clean: Dict[str, str] = {}
for prop, value in props.items():
if (
isinstance(prop, str)
and prop.replace("-", "").replace("_", "").isalnum()
and isinstance(value, (str, int, float))
and str(value).strip()
):
clean[prop] = str(value)
if clean:
component_styles[bucket] = clean
layout_variant_src = data.get("layoutVariant")
layout_variant = (
layout_variant_src
if isinstance(layout_variant_src, str) and layout_variant_src in _THEME_LAYOUT_VARIANTS
else "standard"
)
result: Dict[str, Any] = {
"name": name,
"label": data.get("label") or name,
"description": data.get("description", ""),
"palette": palette,
"typography": typography,
"layout": layout,
"layoutVariant": layout_variant,
}
if color_overrides:
result["colorOverrides"] = color_overrides
if assets_out:
result["assets"] = assets_out
if custom_css is not None:
result["customCSS"] = custom_css
if component_styles:
result["componentStyles"] = component_styles
return result
def _discover_user_themes() -> list:
"""Scan ~/.hermes/dashboard-themes/*.yaml for user-created themes.
Returns a list of fully-normalised theme definitions ready to ship
to the frontend, so the client can apply them without a secondary
round-trip or a built-in stub.
Uses the dashboard process launch home, not ``get_hermes_home()``, so a
transient profile override from embedded chat does not hide themes that
live under the server's own ``HERMES_HOME``.
"""
themes_dir = get_process_hermes_home() / "dashboard-themes"
if not themes_dir.is_dir():
return []
result = []
for f in sorted(themes_dir.glob("*.yaml")):
try:
data = yaml.safe_load(f.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
except Exception:
continue
normalised = _normalise_theme_definition(data)
if normalised is not None:
result.append(normalised)
return result
@app.get("/api/dashboard/themes")
async def get_dashboard_themes():
"""Return available themes and the currently active one.
Built-in entries ship name/label/description only (the frontend owns
their full definitions in `web/src/themes/presets.ts`). User themes
from `~/.hermes/dashboard-themes/*.yaml` ship with their full
normalised definition under `definition`, so the client can apply
them without a stub.
"""
def _run():
config = load_config()
active = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "theme", default="default")
user_themes = _discover_user_themes()
seen = set()
themes = []
for t in _BUILTIN_DASHBOARD_THEMES:
seen.add(t["name"])
themes.append(t)
for t in user_themes:
if t["name"] in seen:
continue
themes.append({
"name": t["name"],
"label": t["label"],
"description": t["description"],
"definition": t,
})
seen.add(t["name"])
return {"themes": themes, "active": active}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.put("/api/dashboard/theme")
async def set_dashboard_theme(body: ThemeSetBody):
"""Set the active dashboard theme (persists to config.yaml)."""
def _run():
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
config = load_config()
if "dashboard" not in config:
config["dashboard"] = {}
config["dashboard"]["theme"] = body.name
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "theme": body.name}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
# Curated font-override ids. Kept in sync with FONT_CHOICES in
# web/src/themes/fonts.ts — the frontend owns the stacks + webfont URLs;
# the backend only needs the id allow-list so it can reject anything not
# in the vetted catalog (the font's webfont URL is injected as a <link>,
# so we never accept an arbitrary user-supplied id/URL here).
_FONT_DEFAULT_ID = "theme"
_FONT_CHOICES = frozenset({
"system-sans", "system-serif", "system-mono",
"inter", "ibm-plex-sans", "work-sans", "atkinson-hyperlegible", "dm-sans",
"spectral", "fraunces", "source-serif",
"jetbrains-mono", "ibm-plex-mono", "space-mono",
})
@app.get("/api/dashboard/font")
async def get_dashboard_font():
"""Return the active font override (``"theme"`` = use the theme's font)."""
def _run():
config = load_config()
font = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "font", default=_FONT_DEFAULT_ID)
if font not in _FONT_CHOICES:
font = _FONT_DEFAULT_ID
return {"font": font}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.put("/api/dashboard/font")
async def set_dashboard_font(body: FontSetBody):
"""Set the dashboard font override (persists to config.yaml).
Accepts any id in the curated catalog, or ``"theme"`` to clear the
override and fall back to the active theme's own font. Unknown ids are
coerced to ``"theme"`` rather than 400'd so a stale client can't wedge
the picker.
"""
font = body.font if body.font in _FONT_CHOICES else _FONT_DEFAULT_ID
def _run():
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
config = load_config()
if "dashboard" not in config:
config["dashboard"] = {}
config["dashboard"]["font"] = font
save_config(config)
return {"ok": True, "font": font}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Dashboard plugin system
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def _safe_plugin_api_relpath(api_field: Any, *, dashboard_dir: Path) -> Optional[str]:
"""Validate the manifest's ``api`` field for the plugin loader.
The web server later imports this file as a Python module via
``importlib.util.spec_from_file_location`` (arbitrary code
execution by design — that's how plugins extend the backend).
Pre-#29156 the field was used as-is, which meant:
* An absolute path swallowed the plugin's dashboard directory
entirely — ``Path('safe/dashboard') / '/tmp/evil.py'`` resolves
to ``/tmp/evil.py``, so any attacker-controlled manifest could
point the import at any Python file on disk (GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j).
* A ``../..`` traversal could climb out of the plugin into
neighbouring directories on the search path.
Return the original string when the resolved path stays under
``dashboard_dir``; return ``None`` (with a warning logged at the
call site) otherwise so the plugin still loads its static JS/CSS
but its backend ``api`` is rejected.
"""
if not isinstance(api_field, str) or not api_field.strip():
return None
candidate = Path(api_field)
if candidate.is_absolute():
return None
try:
resolved = (dashboard_dir / candidate).resolve()
base = dashboard_dir.resolve()
except (OSError, RuntimeError):
return None
try:
resolved.relative_to(base)
except ValueError:
return None
return api_field
def _discover_dashboard_plugins() -> list:
"""Scan plugins/*/dashboard/manifest.json for dashboard extensions.
Checks three plugin sources (same as hermes_cli.plugins):
1. User plugins: ~/.hermes/plugins/<name>/dashboard/manifest.json
2. Bundled plugins: <repo>/plugins/<name>/dashboard/manifest.json (memory/, etc.)
3. Project plugins: ./.hermes/plugins/ (only if HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_PLUGINS)
"""
plugins = []
seen_names: set = set()
from hermes_cli.plugins import get_bundled_plugins_dir
bundled_root = get_bundled_plugins_dir()
# User dashboard plugins are a dashboard-owned asset (same category as
# theme YAML): resolve them from the process launch home so they don't
# vanish when a request is scoped to another profile via a context-local
# HERMES_HOME override (e.g. embedded /chat under --open-profile).
#
# #87197: when the process itself is profile-scoped (``--profile <name>``
# sets ``HERMES_HOME=<root>/profiles/<name>``), the launch home is the
# profile directory, which has no ``plugins/`` — user plugins are
# installed in the hermes root (``~/.hermes/plugins``). Scan the default
# root as well (``get_default_hermes_root()`` unwraps
# ``<root>/profiles/<name>`` → ``<root>`` and returns a custom
# ``HERMES_HOME`` unchanged when it *is* the root), mirroring how
# ``hermes_cli.plugins`` resolves plugin install locations. The
# ``seen_names`` dedupe below keeps profile-local plugins (if any)
# authoritative over same-named root plugins.
from hermes_constants import get_default_hermes_root
user_plugin_roots = [get_process_hermes_home() / "plugins"]
root_plugins = get_default_hermes_root() / "plugins"
if root_plugins.resolve(strict=False) != user_plugin_roots[0].resolve(strict=False):
user_plugin_roots.append(root_plugins)
search_dirs = [(d, "user") for d in user_plugin_roots]
search_dirs += [
(bundled_root / "memory", "bundled"),
(bundled_root, "bundled"),
]
# GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j (#29156): the previous ``os.environ.get(...)``
# check treated *any* non-empty string as truthy, so ``=0``, ``=false``,
# and ``=no`` — all of which the agent loader and operators correctly
# read as "disabled" — silently *enabled* the untrusted project source
# in the web server. Combined with the absolute-path RCE primitive on
# the manifest's ``api`` field (now patched below), this turned the
# opt-in into a sticky always-on switch. Use the shared truthy
# semantics (``1`` / ``true`` / ``yes`` / ``on``) so the gate matches
# ``hermes_cli/plugins.py`` and the documented user contract.
if env_var_enabled("HERMES_ENABLE_PROJECT_PLUGINS"):
search_dirs.append((Path.cwd() / ".hermes" / "plugins", "project"))
for plugins_root, source in search_dirs:
if not plugins_root.is_dir():
continue
with os.scandir(plugins_root) as scan:
children = sorted((Path(e.path) for e in scan), key=lambda p: p.name)
for child in children:
if not child.is_dir():
continue
manifest_file = child / "dashboard" / "manifest.json"
if not manifest_file.exists():
continue
try:
data = json.loads(manifest_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
name = data.get("name", child.name)
if name in seen_names:
continue
seen_names.add(name)
# Tab options: ``path`` + ``position`` for a new tab, optional
# ``override`` to replace a built-in route, and ``hidden`` to
# register the plugin component/slots without adding a tab
# (useful for slot-only plugins like a header-crest injector).
raw_tab = data.get("tab", {}) if isinstance(data.get("tab"), dict) else {}
tab_info = {
"path": raw_tab.get("path", f"/{name}"),
"position": raw_tab.get("position", "end"),
}
override_path = raw_tab.get("override")
if isinstance(override_path, str) and override_path.startswith("/"):
tab_info["override"] = override_path
if bool(raw_tab.get("hidden")):
tab_info["hidden"] = True
# Slots: list of named slot locations this plugin populates.
# The frontend exposes ``registerSlot(pluginName, slotName, Component)``
# on window; plugins with non-empty slots call it from their JS bundle.
slots_src = data.get("slots")
slots: List[str] = []
if isinstance(slots_src, list):
slots = [s for s in slots_src if isinstance(s, str) and s]
# Validate ``api`` at discovery time so the value cached
# on the plugin entry is already safe to feed into the
# importer. An attacker-controlled manifest can name
# any absolute path or ``..`` traversal here — the
# web server then imports that file as a Python module
# (RCE, GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j).
raw_api = data.get("api")
dashboard_dir = child / "dashboard"
safe_api = _safe_plugin_api_relpath(raw_api, dashboard_dir=dashboard_dir)
if raw_api and safe_api is None:
_log.warning(
"Plugin %s: refusing unsafe api path %r (must be a "
"relative file inside the plugin's dashboard/ "
"directory); backend routes from this plugin will "
"not be mounted",
name, raw_api,
)
plugins.append({
"name": name,
"label": data.get("label", name),
"description": data.get("description", ""),
"icon": data.get("icon", "Puzzle"),
"version": data.get("version", "0.0.0"),
"tab": tab_info,
"slots": slots,
"entry": data.get("entry", "dist/index.js"),
"css": data.get("css"),
"has_api": bool(safe_api),
"source": source,
"_dir": str(dashboard_dir),
"_api_file": safe_api,
})
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("Bad dashboard plugin manifest %s: %s", manifest_file, exc)
continue
return plugins
# Cache discovered plugins per-process (refresh on explicit re-scan).
_dashboard_plugins_cache: Optional[list] = None
def _get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan: bool = False) -> list:
global _dashboard_plugins_cache
if _dashboard_plugins_cache is None or force_rescan:
_dashboard_plugins_cache = _discover_dashboard_plugins()
elif _dashboard_plugins_cache:
if any(not Path(p["_dir"]).is_dir() for p in _dashboard_plugins_cache):
_dashboard_plugins_cache = _discover_dashboard_plugins()
return _dashboard_plugins_cache
@app.get("/api/dashboard/plugins")
async def get_dashboard_plugins():
"""Return discovered dashboard plugins (excludes user-hidden and non-enabled ones)."""
def _run():
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins()
# Read user's hidden plugins list from config.
config = load_config()
hidden: list = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "hidden_plugins", default=[]) or []
# Gate: only serve user plugins that are in plugins.enabled and not
# in plugins.disabled. This prevents the frontend from loading JS/CSS
# from plugins the user has not explicitly activated. (#46435)
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _get_enabled_set, _get_disabled_set
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
return plugins, hidden, enabled_set, disabled_set
plugins, hidden, enabled_set, disabled_set = await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
def _is_active(p: dict) -> bool:
name = p.get("name", "")
if name in hidden:
return False
if p.get("source") == "user":
if name in disabled_set:
return False
if name not in enabled_set:
return False
elif p.get("source") == "bundled":
if name in disabled_set:
return False
return True
# Strip internal fields before sending to frontend.
return [
{k: v for k, v in p.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
for p in plugins
if _is_active(p)
]
@app.get("/api/dashboard/plugins/rescan")
async def rescan_dashboard_plugins():
"""Force re-scan of dashboard plugins."""
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
return {"ok": True, "count": len(plugins)}
def _strip_dashboard_manifest(p: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
return {k: v for k, v in p.items() if not k.startswith("_")}
_PLUGINS_HUB_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 5.0
_plugins_hub_cache: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None
_plugins_hub_cache_expires_at = 0.0
_plugins_hub_cache_lock = threading.Lock()
def _invalidate_plugins_hub_cache() -> None:
global _plugins_hub_cache, _plugins_hub_cache_expires_at
with _plugins_hub_cache_lock:
_plugins_hub_cache = None
_plugins_hub_cache_expires_at = 0.0
_plugins_hub_probe_inflight: set = set()
_plugins_hub_probe_lock = threading.Lock()
def _schedule_check_fn_probe(fn) -> Optional[threading.Thread]:
"""Warm a cold ``check_fn`` verdict off the request path.
The hub read path only consumes cached availability (never probes
inline). But the only other warmer lives in the tool-schema build, which
a dashboard-only session never runs — so a cold cache would report
``auth_required=False`` forever. Kick a daemon-thread probe on the miss;
the short hub TTL picks up the verdict on the next fetch. Deduplicates
concurrent probes per function. Returns the spawned thread (or ``None``
when a probe for *fn* is already in flight).
"""
with _plugins_hub_probe_lock:
if fn in _plugins_hub_probe_inflight:
return None
_plugins_hub_probe_inflight.add(fn)
def _probe():
try:
from tools.registry import _check_fn_cached
_check_fn_cached(fn)
except Exception:
pass
finally:
with _plugins_hub_probe_lock:
_plugins_hub_probe_inflight.discard(fn)
thread = threading.Thread(
target=_probe, name="plugins-hub-checkfn-probe", daemon=True
)
thread.start()
return thread
def _merged_plugins_hub(force_refresh: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Agent discovery + dashboard manifests + optional provider picker metadata.
IMPORTANT: this powers a dashboard request path, so it must stay read-only
and cheap. In particular, do not execute tool ``check_fn`` probes here —
those can trigger imports, auth/network checks, and other synchronous work
that starves the root event loop. We only consume last-known cached tool
availability, and we memoize the assembled payload briefly to collapse the
dashboard's bursty duplicate fetches.
"""
global _plugins_hub_cache, _plugins_hub_cache_expires_at
now = time.monotonic()
if not force_refresh:
with _plugins_hub_cache_lock:
if _plugins_hub_cache is not None and now < _plugins_hub_cache_expires_at:
return _plugins_hub_cache
started_at = time.monotonic()
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import (
_discover_all_plugins,
_get_current_context_engine,
_get_current_memory_provider,
_discover_context_engines,
_get_disabled_set,
_get_enabled_set,
_read_manifest as _read_plugin_manifest_at,
)
dashboard_list = _get_dashboard_plugins()
dash_by_name = {str(p["name"]): p for p in dashboard_list}
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
# Read user-hidden plugins from config for the user_hidden field.
config = load_config()
hidden_plugins: list = cfg_get(config, "dashboard", "hidden_plugins", default=[]) or []
plugins_root_resolved = (get_hermes_home() / "plugins").resolve()
rows: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
for name, version, description, source, dir_str, key in _discover_all_plugins():
# Both the path-derived key (nested category plugins) and the bare
# manifest name count for enabled/disabled state, matching the runtime
# loader's back-compat lookup.
aliases = {name}
if key:
aliases.add(key)
if aliases & disabled_set:
runtime_status = "disabled"
elif aliases & enabled_set:
runtime_status = "enabled"
else:
runtime_status = "inactive"
dir_path = Path(dir_str)
dm = dash_by_name.get(name)
has_dash_manifest = dm is not None or (dir_path / "dashboard" / "manifest.json").exists()
under_user_tree = False
try:
dir_path.resolve().relative_to(plugins_root_resolved)
under_user_tree = True
except ValueError:
pass
can_remove_update = (
source in {"user", "git"} and under_user_tree and Path(dir_str).is_dir()
)
# Read-only auth hint: consult only last-known cached tool availability.
# A missing cache entry is treated as "unknown" rather than triggering a
# live probe inside this request path.
auth_required = False
auth_command = ""
manifest_data = _read_plugin_manifest_at(dir_path)
provides_tools = manifest_data.get("provides_tools") or []
if provides_tools:
try:
from tools.registry import get_cached_check_fn_result, registry
for tname in provides_tools:
entry = registry.get_entry(tname)
if not entry or not entry.check_fn:
continue
cached_result = get_cached_check_fn_result(entry.check_fn)
if cached_result is None:
# Cold cache: nothing else warms check_fns on
# dashboard-only sessions, so kick a background
# probe; the short hub TTL surfaces the verdict on
# the next fetch instead of pinning auth_required
# to False forever.
_schedule_check_fn_probe(entry.check_fn)
continue
if cached_result is False:
auth_required = True
auth_command = f"hermes auth {name}"
break
except Exception:
pass
rows.append({
"name": name,
"version": version or "",
"description": description or "",
"source": source,
"runtime_status": runtime_status,
"has_dashboard_manifest": has_dash_manifest,
"dashboard_manifest": _strip_dashboard_manifest(dm) if dm else None,
"path": dir_str,
"can_remove": can_remove_update,
"can_update_git": can_remove_update and (Path(dir_str) / ".git").exists(),
"auth_required": auth_required,
"auth_command": auth_command,
"user_hidden": name in hidden_plugins,
})
agent_names = {r["name"] for r in rows}
orphan_dashboard = [
_strip_dashboard_manifest(p)
for p in dashboard_list
if str(p["name"]) not in agent_names
]
memory_providers = _discover_memory_provider_statuses()
context_engines: List[Dict[str, str]] = []
try:
for n, desc in _discover_context_engines():
context_engines.append({"name": n, "description": desc})
except Exception:
context_engines = []
payload = {
"plugins": rows,
"orphan_dashboard_plugins": orphan_dashboard,
"providers": {
"memory_provider": _normalize_memory_provider_name(_get_current_memory_provider()),
"memory_options": memory_providers,
"context_engine": _get_current_context_engine(),
"context_options": context_engines,
},
}
duration = time.monotonic() - started_at
if duration >= 0.25:
_log.info(
"plugins/hub rebuilt in %.3fs (plugins=%d memory_options=%d)",
duration,
len(rows),
len(memory_providers),
)
with _plugins_hub_cache_lock:
_plugins_hub_cache = payload
_plugins_hub_cache_expires_at = time.monotonic() + _PLUGINS_HUB_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS
return payload
@app.get("/api/dashboard/plugins/hub")
async def get_plugins_hub(request: Request):
"""Unified agent plugins + dashboard extension metadata (session protected)."""
_require_token(request)
try:
return _merged_plugins_hub()
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("plugins/hub failed: %s", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to build plugins hub.") from exc
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/install")
async def post_agent_plugin_install(request: Request, body: _AgentPluginInstallBody):
_require_token(request)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_install_plugin
result = dashboard_install_plugin(
body.identifier.strip(),
force=body.force,
enable=body.enable,
)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=400,
detail=result.get("error") or "Install failed.",
)
_get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
# Strip internal paths from the response
result.pop("after_install_path", None)
return result
def _validate_plugin_name(name: str) -> str:
"""Reject path-traversal attempts in plugin name URL parameters."""
name = name.strip("/")
if not name or ".." in name or "\\" in name:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid plugin name.")
return name
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}/enable")
async def post_agent_plugin_enable(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled
result = dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled(name, enabled=True)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Enable failed.")
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return result
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}/disable")
async def post_agent_plugin_disable(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled
result = dashboard_set_agent_plugin_enabled(name, enabled=False)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Disable failed.")
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return result
@app.post("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}/update")
async def post_agent_plugin_update(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_update_user_plugin
result = dashboard_update_user_plugin(name)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Update failed.")
_get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return result
@app.delete("/api/dashboard/agent-plugins/{name:path}")
async def delete_agent_plugin(request: Request, name: str):
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import dashboard_remove_user_plugin
result = dashboard_remove_user_plugin(name)
if not result.get("ok"):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=result.get("error") or "Remove failed.")
_get_dashboard_plugins(force_rescan=True)
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return result
@app.put("/api/dashboard/plugin-providers")
async def put_plugin_providers(request: Request, body: _PluginProvidersPutBody):
"""Persist memory provider / context engine selection (writes config.yaml)."""
_require_token(request)
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import (
_save_context_engine,
_save_memory_provider,
)
def _run():
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
if body.memory_provider is not None:
memory_provider = _normalize_memory_provider_name(body.memory_provider)
_require_memory_provider_ready(memory_provider)
_save_memory_provider(memory_provider)
if body.context_engine is not None:
_save_context_engine(body.context_engine)
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return {"ok": True}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.post("/api/dashboard/plugins/{name:path}/visibility")
async def post_plugin_visibility(request: Request, name: str, body: _PluginVisibilityBody):
"""Toggle a plugin's sidebar visibility (persists to config.yaml dashboard.hidden_plugins)."""
_require_token(request)
name = _validate_plugin_name(name)
def _run():
with _CONFIG_MUTATION_LOCK:
config = load_config()
if "dashboard" not in config or not isinstance(config.get("dashboard"), dict):
config["dashboard"] = {}
hidden_list: list = config["dashboard"].get("hidden_plugins") or []
if not isinstance(hidden_list, list):
hidden_list = []
if body.hidden and name not in hidden_list:
hidden_list.append(name)
elif not body.hidden and name in hidden_list:
hidden_list.remove(name)
config["dashboard"]["hidden_plugins"] = hidden_list
save_config(config)
_invalidate_plugins_hub_cache()
return {"ok": True, "name": name, "hidden": body.hidden}
return await asyncio.to_thread(_run)
@app.get("/dashboard-plugins/{plugin_name}/{file_path:path}")
async def serve_plugin_asset(plugin_name: str, file_path: str):
"""Serve static assets from a dashboard plugin directory.
Only serves files from the plugin's ``dashboard/`` subdirectory.
Path traversal is blocked by checking ``resolve().is_relative_to()``.
Restricted to a browser-fetchable suffix allowlist (JS/CSS/JSON/HTML/
SVG/PNG/JPG/WOFF). The dashboard loads plugin JS via ``<script src>``
and CSS via ``<link href>``, neither of which can attach a custom
auth header — so this route stays unauthenticated to keep the SPA
working. But user-installed plugins ship a ``plugin_api.py``
backend module that the browser never fetches; it's only imported
by :func:`_mount_plugin_api_routes` at startup. Without a suffix
allowlist, anyone on the loopback port can curl the ``.py`` source
of a private third-party plugin. Reject everything outside the
browser-asset set.
User plugins must be in plugins.enabled before their assets are
served. (#46435, GHSA-mcfc-hp25-cjv7)
"""
plugins = _get_dashboard_plugins()
plugin = next((p for p in plugins if p["name"] == plugin_name), None)
if not plugin:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Plugin not found")
# Gate: user plugins must be enabled to serve assets;
# bundled plugins must not be explicitly disabled.
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _get_enabled_set, _get_disabled_set
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
if plugin.get("source") == "user":
if plugin_name in disabled_set or plugin_name not in enabled_set:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Plugin not found")
elif plugin.get("source") == "bundled":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Plugin not found")
base = Path(plugin["_dir"])
target = (base / file_path).resolve()
if not target.is_relative_to(base.resolve()):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Path traversal blocked")
if not target.exists() or not target.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="File not found")
# Browser-asset suffix allowlist. Everything outside this set is
# rejected with 404 so we don't leak ``.py`` backend sources, README
# files, ``.env.example`` templates, etc. — none of which the SPA
# actually fetches. Add to this set deliberately when a new asset
# type comes up; do NOT change the default fallback.
suffix = target.suffix.lower()
content_types = {
".js": "application/javascript",
".mjs": "application/javascript",
".css": "text/css",
".json": "application/json",
".html": "text/html",
".svg": "image/svg+xml",
".png": "image/png",
".jpg": "image/jpeg",
".jpeg": "image/jpeg",
".gif": "image/gif",
".webp": "image/webp",
".ico": "image/x-icon",
".woff2": "font/woff2",
".woff": "font/woff",
".ttf": "font/ttf",
".otf": "font/otf",
".map": "application/json",
}
if suffix not in content_types:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=404,
detail="File not found",
)
media_type = content_types[suffix]
return FileResponse(
target,
media_type=media_type,
headers={"Cache-Control": "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate"},
)
def _mount_plugin_api_routes():
"""Import and mount backend API routes from plugins that declare them.
Each plugin's ``api`` field points to a Python file that must expose
a ``router`` (FastAPI APIRouter). Routes are mounted under
``/api/plugins/<name>/``.
Backend import is restricted to ``bundled`` and ``user`` sources.
Project plugins (``./.hermes/plugins/``) ship with the CWD and are
therefore attacker-controlled in any threat model where the user
opens a malicious repo; they can extend the dashboard UI via
static JS/CSS but their Python ``api`` file is never auto-imported
by the web server. See GHSA-5qr3-c538-wm9j (#29156).
Additionally, user plugins must be explicitly enabled via the
``plugins.enabled`` allow-list in config.yaml before their backend
code is imported. Without this gate, an installed-but-not-enabled
plugin's Python code would execute at dashboard startup — a code
execution vector that bypasses the user's intent. (#46435,
GHSA-mcfc-hp25-cjv7)
"""
# Load the enabled/disabled sets once for the loop.
try:
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _get_enabled_set, _get_disabled_set
enabled_set = _get_enabled_set()
disabled_set = _get_disabled_set()
except Exception:
enabled_set = set()
disabled_set = set()
for plugin in _get_dashboard_plugins():
api_file_name = plugin.get("_api_file")
if not api_file_name:
continue
plugin_name = plugin.get("name", "")
# Gate: user plugins must be in plugins.enabled and not in
# plugins.disabled before we import their Python code.
# Bundled plugins are trusted (they ship with the release) but
# still respect an explicit disable.
if plugin.get("source") == "user":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
_log.debug(
"Plugin %s: skipping API mount (explicitly disabled)",
plugin_name,
)
continue
if plugin_name not in enabled_set:
_log.debug(
"Plugin %s: skipping API mount (not in plugins.enabled)",
plugin_name,
)
continue
elif plugin.get("source") == "bundled":
if plugin_name in disabled_set:
_log.debug(
"Plugin %s: skipping API mount (explicitly disabled)",
plugin_name,
)
continue
if plugin.get("source") == "project":
_log.warning(
"Plugin %s: ignoring backend api=%s (project plugins may "
"not auto-import Python code; move the plugin to "
"~/.hermes/plugins/ if you trust it)",
plugin["name"], api_file_name,
)
continue
dashboard_dir = Path(plugin["_dir"])
api_path = dashboard_dir / api_file_name
try:
resolved_api = api_path.resolve()
resolved_base = dashboard_dir.resolve()
resolved_api.relative_to(resolved_base)
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
# Discovery already filters this, but re-check here in case
# ``_dir`` was tampered with after caching or a future caller
# bypasses the validator. Defence in depth keeps the import
# primitive contained even if the upstream check regresses.
_log.warning(
"Plugin %s: refusing to import api file outside its "
"dashboard directory (%s)", plugin["name"], api_path,
)
continue
if not api_path.exists():
_log.warning("Plugin %s declares api=%s but file not found", plugin["name"], api_file_name)
continue
try:
module_name = f"hermes_dashboard_plugin_{plugin['name']}"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, api_path)
if spec is None or spec.loader is None:
continue
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
# Register in sys.modules BEFORE exec_module so pydantic/FastAPI
# can resolve forward references (e.g. models defined in a file
# that uses `from __future__ import annotations`). Without this,
# TypeAdapter lazy-build fails at first request with
# "is not fully defined" because the module namespace isn't
# reachable by name for string-annotation resolution.
sys.modules[module_name] = mod
try:
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
except Exception:
sys.modules.pop(module_name, None)
raise
router = getattr(mod, "router", None)
if router is None:
_log.warning("Plugin %s api file has no 'router' attribute", plugin["name"])
continue
app.include_router(router, prefix=f"/api/plugins/{plugin['name']}")
_log.info("Mounted plugin API routes: /api/plugins/%s/", plugin["name"])
except Exception as exc:
_log.warning("Failed to load plugin %s API routes: %s", plugin["name"], exc)
# Mount plugin API routes before the SPA catch-all.
_mount_plugin_api_routes()
# Mount the dashboard auth routes (/login, /auth/*, /api/auth/*) before the
# SPA catch-all so /{full_path:path} doesn't swallow them. These are
# always mounted — the gate middleware decides whether to enforce auth,
# not whether the routes exist.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.routes import router as _dashboard_auth_router # noqa: E402
app.include_router(_dashboard_auth_router)
mount_spa(app)
def _read_bound_port(server: "uvicorn.Server", fallback: int) -> int:
"""Read the OS-assigned port from a live uvicorn server socket.
After ``server.startup()`` the socket is bound. Returns the actual
port so ephemeral (port-0) discovery works without a pre-bind TOCTOU.
Falls back to *fallback* if the socket list is empty (shouldn't happen
but guards against uvicorn internals changing).
"""
if server.servers and server.servers[0].sockets:
return server.servers[0].sockets[0].getsockname()[1]
return fallback
def _write_dashboard_ready_file(actual_port: int) -> None:
"""Optionally publish the dashboard port through an atomic ready file.
Windows Desktop can launch dashboard backends with ``pythonw.exe`` to avoid
console flashes. That path cannot rely on stdout for the port announcement,
so Electron passes ``HERMES_DESKTOP_READY_FILE`` and waits for this JSON.
Normal CLI/dashboard launches still use the stdout READY line below.
"""
target = os.environ.get("HERMES_DESKTOP_READY_FILE")
if not target:
return
tmp_name = ""
try:
path = Path(target)
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
payload = json.dumps({"port": int(actual_port)}, separators=(",", ":"))
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(
"w",
encoding="utf-8",
dir=str(path.parent),
prefix=f"{path.name}.",
suffix=".tmp",
delete=False,
) as fh:
fh.write(payload)
fh.flush()
os.fsync(fh.fileno())
tmp_name = fh.name
os.replace(tmp_name, path)
except Exception as exc:
if tmp_name:
try:
Path(tmp_name).unlink(missing_ok=True)
except Exception:
pass
_log.warning("Failed to write dashboard ready file %r: %s", target, exc)
def _maybe_open_browser(
host: str, actual_port: int, open_browser: bool, initial_profile: str
) -> None:
"""Open the dashboard URL in the user's browser if appropriate.
Skips on headless Linux (no ``DISPLAY`` / ``WAYLAND_DISPLAY``) to avoid
TUI browsers (links, lynx) that would SIGHUP the server process.
Maps ``0.0.0.0`` / ``::`` binds to ``127.0.0.1`` so the browser opens
a reachable URL.
"""
if not open_browser:
return
import webbrowser
_has_display = (
sys.platform != "linux"
or bool(os.environ.get("DISPLAY"))
or bool(os.environ.get("WAYLAND_DISPLAY"))
)
if not _has_display:
_log.debug(
"Skipping browser-open: no DISPLAY or WAYLAND_DISPLAY detected "
"(headless Linux). Pass --no-open to suppress this detection."
)
return
_display_host = host if host not in ("0.0.0.0", "::") else "127.0.0.1"
_open_url = f"http://{_display_host}:{actual_port}"
if initial_profile:
from urllib.parse import quote
_open_url += f"/?profile={quote(initial_profile)}"
def _open():
try:
time.sleep(1.0)
webbrowser.open(_open_url)
except Exception:
pass
threading.Thread(target=_open, daemon=True).start()
def _is_serve_orphaned(
desktop_pid: int,
expected_start_marker: Optional[str] = None,
*,
pid_exists=None,
process_start_marker=None,
) -> bool:
"""True when the exact Desktop process that owns this backend is gone.
``HERMES_PARENT_PID`` is the Electron Desktop PID, not necessarily this
Python process's immediate PPID. On Windows the venv ``hermes.exe`` launcher
introduces one or more shim processes, so comparing ``os.getppid()`` to the
Electron PID incorrectly treats a healthy backend as orphaned and exits 0.
New Desktop versions also provide the owner's process-start marker. This
prevents a recycled PID from keeping an orphan alive. Older versions remain
compatible through the PID-only probe. Any inconclusive probe failure is
fail-safe: keep serving rather than killing a backend whose owner could not
be conclusively shown to be dead.
"""
try:
if expected_start_marker is not None:
probe = process_start_marker or _process_start_marker
return not _parent_start_markers_match(
probe(int(desktop_pid)), expected_start_marker
)
if pid_exists is None:
from gateway.status import _pid_exists
pid_exists = _pid_exists
return not bool(pid_exists(int(desktop_pid)))
except ProcessLookupError:
return True
except Exception:
return False
def _start_parent_death_watchdog() -> None:
"""Exit when the exact desktop parent that spawned this backend dies.
The desktop passes its PID and, in newer versions, its process-start marker
plus a per-spawn nonce. The marker distinguishes a live owner from PID reuse;
the nonce makes partial/mixed-version identity plumbing fail safe. Legacy
Desktop versions that provide only ``HERMES_PARENT_PID`` retain PID-only
tracking.
"""
raw_pid = os.environ.get("HERMES_PARENT_PID")
start_marker = os.environ.get("HERMES_PARENT_START_MARKER")
nonce = os.environ.get("HERMES_PARENT_NONCE")
try:
desktop_pid = int(raw_pid or "")
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return
if desktop_pid <= 0:
return
has_marker = start_marker is not None
has_nonce = nonce is not None
if has_marker != has_nonce:
return
if has_marker and (
not _valid_parent_start_marker(start_marker or "")
or not nonce
or nonce != nonce.strip()
):
return
try:
poll = max(0.5, float(os.environ.get("HERMES_SERVE_WATCHDOG_POLL_S", "2.0")))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
poll = 2.0
def _loop() -> None:
while not _is_serve_orphaned(desktop_pid, start_marker):
time.sleep(poll)
os._exit(0)
threading.Thread(target=_loop, daemon=True, name="serve-parent-watchdog").start()
def _demo() -> None:
assert _is_serve_orphaned(999999999, pid_exists=lambda _pid: False) is True
assert _is_serve_orphaned(42, pid_exists=lambda _pid: True) is False
print("web_server parent-death watchdog self-check: OK")
# ── Port-conflict sentinel (#93608) ─────────────────────────────────────────
# When the requested port is already bound, uvicorn's ``bind_socket()``
# catches the OSError itself and does ``logger.error(exc); sys.exit(1)`` — a
# bare ERROR line plus the same exit 1 as any real backend crash. The desktop
# spawn (and any script wrapping ``hermes serve``) cannot tell "port occupied"
# from "backend broken". So we probe the exact bind before handing the socket
# to uvicorn and, on conflict, emit ONE machine-readable stdout sentinel plus
# a human hint, then exit with a distinct code.
#
# 75 == BSD ``EX_TEMPFAIL`` (sysexits.h) — the codebase's existing convention
# for "transient environmental condition, not a code failure" (see
# gateway/restart.py and kanban_db.py's quota-wall sentinel).
PORT_IN_USE_EXIT_CODE = 75
# One line, stable format, parsed by machines — mirrors the shape of the
# HERMES_BACKEND_READY sentinel (which is NOT changed by any of this).
_PORT_IN_USE_SENTINEL = "BACKEND_PORT_IN_USE port={port}"
def _is_addr_in_use_error(exc: OSError) -> bool:
"""True when ``exc`` is the platform's address-in-use bind failure."""
import errno
codes = {errno.EADDRINUSE, 98, 48, 10048} # POSIX, Linux, macOS, WinSock
if exc.errno in codes:
return True
return getattr(exc, "winerror", None) == 10048 # WSAEADDRINUSE
def _port_bind_conflict(host: str, port: int) -> bool:
"""Probe whether binding ``host:port`` would fail with EADDRINUSE.
``port == 0`` (ephemeral) can never conflict — the kernel picks a free
port — so the probe is skipped and ``--port 0`` behaves exactly as
before. Any probe error other than address-in-use returns ``False`` so
uvicorn surfaces it with its normal diagnostics (bad host, EACCES, …).
"""
if not port:
return False
import socket as _socket
family = _socket.AF_INET6 if ":" in host else _socket.AF_INET
try:
probe = _socket.socket(family, _socket.SOCK_STREAM)
except OSError:
return False
try:
import sys as _sys_mod
_exclusive = getattr(_socket, "SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE", None)
if _sys_mod.platform == "win32" and _exclusive is not None:
# Windows: SO_REUSEADDR means "bind over anyone" — a probe (or
# uvicorn bind) with it SUCCEEDS on top of a live LISTEN socket,
# so it can never detect a conflict. SO_EXCLUSIVEADDRUSE makes
# the probe fail with WSAEADDRINUSE exactly when another socket
# holds the port (the reporter's 10048 shape in #93608).
probe.setsockopt(_socket.SOL_SOCKET, _exclusive, 1)
else:
# POSIX: match uvicorn's bind flags (uvicorn/config.py
# bind_socket) so the probe conflicts exactly when uvicorn's own
# bind would: SO_REUSEADDR lets TIME_WAIT remnants pass while a
# live LISTEN socket still fails.
probe.setsockopt(_socket.SOL_SOCKET, _socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
probe.bind((host, port))
except OSError as exc:
return _is_addr_in_use_error(exc)
except Exception:
return False
finally:
probe.close()
return False
def _write_machine_sentinel_line(line: str) -> None:
"""Write a machine-parsed sentinel line to the REAL stdout (fd 1).
The serve startup path imports ``tui_gateway.server`` (flush-on-SIGTERM
handlers, #94724) which redirects ``sys.stdout`` to ``sys.stderr`` at
import time to keep stray prints off the JSON-RPC protocol stream. Any
machine-readable sentinel printed after that import via ``print()`` lands
on stderr — invisible to consumers that parse the child's stdout pipe
(the Desktop spawn, scripts). fd 1 is untouched by the Python-level
redirect, so write there.
Best-effort by design: if fd 1 is unwritable (closed; invalid under
pythonw.exe), fall back to ``print()`` for human visibility only — the
redirected stream can't reach stdout-parsing consumers, and pythonw
Desktop spawns rely on ``_write_dashboard_ready_file()`` (the
HERMES_DESKTOP_READY_FILE channel) for port discovery instead. Never
raises: a sentinel-delivery failure must not kill a healthy serve.
"""
try:
os.write(1, (line + "\n").encode())
except OSError:
try:
print(line, flush=True)
except Exception:
pass
def _report_port_in_use(host: str, port: int) -> None:
"""Print the machine sentinel + a human hint naming likely holders."""
_write_machine_sentinel_line(_PORT_IN_USE_SENTINEL.format(port=port))
print(
f" Port {port} on {host} is already in use — likely another "
"'hermes serve' / 'hermes dashboard' backend or the Hermes gateway. "
"Stop the other process, or pass --port <other> "
"(--port 0 picks a free ephemeral port).",
flush=True,
)
_DEFAULT_DASHBOARD_FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS = ("127.0.0.1", "::1")
def _dashboard_forwarded_allow_ips(dashboard_config: dict[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
"""Return the bounded proxy addresses uvicorn may trust.
Uvicorn's default trusts loopback. Preserve that behavior and extend it
only with explicit IP addresses or CIDR networks from config. Invalid or
unbounded entries fail closed instead of turning arbitrary client-supplied
forwarding headers into request metadata.
"""
configured = dashboard_config.get("trusted_proxies", [])
if configured in (None, ""):
configured = []
elif isinstance(configured, str):
configured = [configured]
elif not isinstance(configured, (list, tuple)):
_log.warning(
"dashboard.trusted_proxies must be a list of IP addresses or CIDR networks; "
"ignoring %r",
configured,
)
configured = []
trusted = list(_DEFAULT_DASHBOARD_FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS)
for raw_entry in configured:
if not isinstance(raw_entry, str) or not raw_entry.strip():
_log.warning(
"Ignoring invalid dashboard.trusted_proxies entry %r; expected an IP "
"address or CIDR network",
raw_entry,
)
continue
entry = raw_entry.strip()
try:
if "/" in entry:
network = ipaddress.ip_network(entry, strict=False)
if network.prefixlen == 0:
raise ValueError("unbounded network")
normalized = str(network)
else:
normalized = str(ipaddress.ip_address(entry))
except ValueError:
_log.warning(
"Ignoring unsafe dashboard.trusted_proxies entry %r; use a bounded IP "
"address or CIDR network, never '*' or a /0 network",
raw_entry,
)
continue
if normalized not in trusted:
trusted.append(normalized)
if trusted != list(_DEFAULT_DASHBOARD_FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS):
_log.info("Dashboard trusted proxies: %s", ", ".join(trusted))
return trusted
def start_server(
host: str = "127.0.0.1",
port: int = 9119,
open_browser: bool = True,
allow_public: bool = False,
initial_profile: str = "",
headless: bool = False,
ssh_session_token: Optional[str] = None,
ssh_owner_nonce: Optional[str] = None,
start_mcp_discovery_after_bind: bool = False,
):
"""Start the web UI server.
``initial_profile`` (when set) is appended to the auto-opened browser
URL as ``?profile=<name>`` so the SPA's profile switcher preselects it
— used when a profile alias (``<profile> dashboard``) routes to the
machine dashboard.
``headless`` is the ``serve`` path: the JSON-RPC/WS backend with no UI
build and no SPA mount (mount_spa() honours ``HERMES_SERVE_HEADLESS``), so
the banner announces the bind rather than a browser URL.
``ssh_session_token`` and ``ssh_owner_nonce`` are process-local Desktop SSH
bootstrap state. Neither is persisted or exported to child processes.
``start_mcp_discovery_after_bind`` (Desktop ``serve``) defers the
background MCP discovery thread until the ready sentinel has been written,
so its SDK import cannot hold the GIL against the pre-bind import path.
"""
_apply_ssh_session_token(ssh_session_token or "")
_apply_ssh_owner_nonce(ssh_owner_nonce)
# Raise RLIMIT_NOFILE for dashboard-mode starts that don't route through
# the `serve` path in main.py (which applies the same floor). Canonical
# policy lives in resource_limits; #81547's motivating leak (iterdir fds)
# is fixed above, this covers legitimate high fd demand.
from hermes_cli.resource_limits import apply_nofile_soft_limit
apply_nofile_soft_limit()
import uvicorn
try:
from hermes_cli.nous_auth_keepalive import start_nous_auth_keepalive
start_nous_auth_keepalive()
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("Nous auth keepalive did not start: %s", exc)
# A configured browser-facing URL is also the exact Host/Origin trust
# declaration for reverse-proxy deployments. Resolve it once at startup so
# request middleware never reloads config. Any non-loopback public hostname
# engages the auth gate even when the backend itself remains on loopback;
# otherwise the SPA's local session token would become remotely reachable.
app.state.trusted_public_hosts = _dashboard_public_hosts()
# Stash the auth-gate flag on app.state so middleware / SPA-token injection /
# WS-auth paths can branch on it consistently. It also decides whether to
# refuse startup, log the gate-on banner, and enable uvicorn proxy_headers.
if _desktop_loopback_auth_exempt(host, ssh_session_token, ssh_owner_nonce):
# A configured dashboard.public_url describes the operator's PUBLIC
# deployment, not this private Desktop-owned loopback backend (#96490).
# Desktop authenticates with the per-spawn session token; forcing the
# ticket-only gate here broke every Desktop boot while the actual
# public dashboard — a separate non-loopback process — stayed gated.
app.state.auth_required = should_require_auth(host)
_log.info(
"Desktop-owned loopback backend: dashboard.public_url does not "
"engage the ticket gate for this process; the public deployment "
"keeps its own gate.",
)
else:
app.state.auth_required = should_require_dashboard_auth(
host, app.state.trusted_public_hosts
)
# ``--insecure`` no longer disables the auth gate (June 2026 hardening:
# the hermes-0day MCP-persistence campaign abused unauthenticated public
# dashboards). If a caller still passes it, warn that it is now a no-op
# rather than silently changing their expectation of an open bind.
if allow_public and host not in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES:
_log.warning(
"--insecure no longer bypasses dashboard authentication. A "
"non-loopback bind (%s) now ALWAYS requires an auth provider "
"(OAuth or the bundled password provider). Configure one — see "
"below — or bind to 127.0.0.1 and reach it over an SSH tunnel / "
"Tailscale.", host,
)
if app.state.auth_required:
# The gate engages on every non-loopback bind. Require at least one
# provider to be registered, else fail closed — there is no longer an
# escape hatch that serves the dashboard without authentication.
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import list_providers
if not list_providers():
# Surface the *specific* reason any bundled provider declined
# to register (e.g. missing HERMES_DASHBOARD_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID).
# Each provider plugin that ships with Hermes Agent exposes a
# module-level ``LAST_SKIP_REASON`` string for this purpose;
# without it the operator would only see "no providers" which
# is misleading when the provider IS installed but unconfigured.
skip_reasons: list[str] = []
try:
from plugins.dashboard_auth import nous as _nous_plugin
if _nous_plugin.LAST_SKIP_REASON:
skip_reasons.append(
f" • nous: {_nous_plugin.LAST_SKIP_REASON}"
)
except Exception:
pass
# Name the exact reason the gate engaged. When the bind itself is
# loopback the ONLY trigger is dashboard.public_url — an operator
# (or a stale config.yaml entry) declared external exposure. Say
# so explicitly, print the offending URL, and give the two exits:
# configure auth, or remove public_url to restore local-only mode.
if host in _LOOPBACK_HOST_VALUES:
_public_url_for_msg = ""
try:
from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.prefix import (
resolve_public_url as _rpu,
)
_public_url_for_msg = _rpu()
except Exception:
pass
_gate_reason = (
f"dashboard.public_url is set to "
f"{_public_url_for_msg or '<a non-loopback URL>'} — an "
f"operator-declared external URL engages the auth gate "
f"even on a loopback bind"
)
_local_only_hint = (
"If this dashboard should be LOCAL-ONLY (no reverse "
"proxy), remove dashboard.public_url from config.yaml "
"(and unset HERMES_DASHBOARD_PUBLIC_URL) to restore the "
"unauthenticated loopback mode.\n"
)
else:
_gate_reason = (
f"the auth gate engages on non-loopback binds ({host})"
)
_local_only_hint = ""
_fix_hint = (
_local_only_hint
+ "Configure an auth provider before exposing the dashboard:\n"
" • Password: set dashboard.basic_auth.username + "
"password_hash in config.yaml\n"
" (hash with: python -c \"from "
"plugins.dashboard_auth.basic import hash_password; "
"print(hash_password('your-password'))\")\n"
" • OAuth: run `hermes dashboard register` (Nous Portal) or "
"install a DashboardAuthProvider plugin.\n"
"There is no unauthenticated public-dashboard option. For "
"local-only use, bind 127.0.0.1 and leave dashboard.public_url "
"unset; a configured external public URL requires auth even "
"when a local reverse proxy reaches a loopback backend."
)
# Hint when credentials exist but the bundled provider is blocked
# (#54489).
try:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config as _load_cfg
from hermes_cli.plugins_cmd import _BASIC_AUTH_PLUGIN_KEYS
_cfg = _load_cfg()
_ba = (_cfg.get("dashboard") or {}).get("basic_auth") or {}
_disabled = (_cfg.get("plugins") or {}).get("disabled") or []
# Basic auth only activates with a username AND a credential
# (plaintext password or password_hash); don't fire the hint on
# a half-configured block.
_has_creds = bool(_ba.get("username")) and bool(
_ba.get("password_hash") or _ba.get("password")
)
if _has_creds and (set(_disabled) & _BASIC_AUTH_PLUGIN_KEYS):
_fix_hint = (
"The 'basic' dashboard-auth plugin is in "
"plugins.disabled but dashboard.basic_auth is "
"configured.\n"
"Remove 'basic' from plugins.disabled (or run "
"`hermes plugins enable basic`), then restart the "
"dashboard.\n\n"
) + _fix_hint
except Exception:
pass
if skip_reasons:
raise SystemExit(
f"Refusing to bind dashboard to {host} — {_gate_reason}, "
f"but no auth providers are registered.\n\n"
f"Bundled providers reported these issues:\n"
+ "\n".join(skip_reasons)
+ "\n\n"
+ _fix_hint
)
raise SystemExit(
f"Refusing to bind dashboard to {host} — {_gate_reason}, "
f"but no auth providers are registered.\n\n" + _fix_hint
)
_log.info(
"Dashboard binding to %s with auth gate enabled. Providers: %s",
host,
", ".join(p.name for p in list_providers()),
)
# Record the bound host so host_header_middleware can validate incoming
# Host headers against it. Defends against DNS rebinding (GHSA-ppp5-vxwm-4cf7).
app.state.bound_host = host
# ── Start uvicorn with direct Server API ─────────────────────────
# We use uvicorn.Server directly (not uvicorn.run) so we can split
# startup from the main loop. After startup() the socket is actually
# bound — we read the OS-assigned port from the live socket, print
# HERMES_DASHBOARD_READY, open the browser, *then* serve.
#
# This eliminates the TOCTOU of the old pre-bind-then-close approach
# (bind port 0 → close → uvicorn rebind): the socket is held by
# uvicorn the entire time, so no other process can steal the port.
#
# For explicit non-zero ports, a taken port is detected by the #93608
# preflight probe below (BACKEND_PORT_IN_USE sentinel + distinct exit
# code); uvicorn's own bind error remains the fallback for races.
# Loopback binds are the Desktop case: a single local client, no reverse
# proxy in front. uvicorn's ws keepalive ping runs ON the same event loop
# as agent turns, and a single synchronous GIL-holding call on a worker
# thread (e.g. a regex/scrub over a large model output, or a long
# delegate_task subagent turn) can starve that loop for *minutes* — the
# loop cannot process the incoming pong, so uvicorn declares the socket
# dead and closes it, dropping an otherwise-healthy local connection
# (#53773: "event loop stalled 226.3s"; #48445/#50005). A longer timeout
# only raises the threshold — a multi-minute stall sails past any finite
# window. The keepalive ping exists to detect *half-open* connections
# (reverse-proxy 524, dropped tunnels), which cannot happen on loopback:
# there is no network or proxy in the path, and a dead local client tears
# the socket down with a real FIN/RST that starlette surfaces as
# WebSocketDisconnect regardless of the ping. So on loopback the ping
# provides ~no liveness value while actively killing recoverable stalls —
# disable it entirely. Non-loopback binds sit behind a Cloudflare Tunnel
# (idle timeout ~100s) where half-open IS a real failure mode, so keep the
# ping at 20/20 to detect it promptly and stay under the tunnel's idle
# window.
_is_loopback = host in ("127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1")
# Non-loopback ping cadence is config-driven (dashboard.ws_ping_interval /
# dashboard.ws_ping_timeout, #79635); the 20/20 defaults keep the
# Cloudflare-Tunnel-friendly behaviour when unset or invalid.
try:
_dash_cfg = load_config().get("dashboard") or {}
except Exception:
_dash_cfg = {}
def _ws_ping_setting(key: str, default: float = 20.0) -> float:
try:
return float(_dash_cfg.get(key, default))
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return default
config = uvicorn.Config(
app, host=host, port=port, log_level="warning",
# proxy_headers defaults to False so _ws_client_is_allowed sees
# the real connection peer rather than X-Forwarded-For's rewritten
# value (which would defeat the loopback gate when behind a reverse
# proxy). When the OAuth gate is active we are explicitly running
# behind a TLS terminator (Fly.io) and need X-Forwarded-Proto to
# decide cookie Secure flags, so we flip proxy_headers on for that
# mode.
proxy_headers=bool(app.state.auth_required),
# Keep uvicorn's loopback-only default unless the operator explicitly
# trusts the address or bounded network of an upstream proxy. This is
# what lets a separate-container TLS terminator supply HTTPS/client
# metadata without accepting spoofed X-Forwarded-* headers from every
# caller.
forwarded_allow_ips=_dashboard_forwarded_allow_ips(_dash_cfg),
# Half-open detection for public binds only (see above). Loopback
# disables the protocol ping (None) so an event-loop stall can never
# trigger a false disconnect; a genuinely dead local client is still
# reaped via the WebSocketDisconnect → disconnect/reap path.
ws_ping_interval=None if _is_loopback else _ws_ping_setting("ws_ping_interval"),
ws_ping_timeout=None if _is_loopback else _ws_ping_setting("ws_ping_timeout"),
ws_max_size=_DESKTOP_ATTACHMENT_WS_MAX_BYTES,
)
server = uvicorn.Server(config)
# Flush-on-kill guard (#94724 item 2): install chaining SIGTERM/SIGINT
# handlers that first persist in-memory session transcripts to state.db
# (bounded, best-effort) before the normal shutdown story runs. Installed
# on the main thread BEFORE uvicorn's capture_signals() so uvicorn saves
# these as the "original" handlers and re-raises into them after its own
# graceful shutdown — kills outside the serve window are covered too.
try:
from tui_gateway.server import install_exit_flush_signal_handlers
install_exit_flush_signal_handlers()
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("exit-flush signal handlers not installed: %s", exc)
# ── #93608: machine-readable port-conflict detection ──────────────
# uvicorn's own bind_socket() would catch the EADDRINUSE and exit 1
# with a bare ERROR line — indistinguishable from "backend broken".
# Probe the exact bind first so a conflict surfaces as the stable
# BACKEND_PORT_IN_USE sentinel + a distinct exit code instead.
# ``--port 0`` (ephemeral) is skipped by the probe and unaffected.
if _port_bind_conflict(host, port):
_report_port_in_use(host, port)
raise SystemExit(PORT_IN_USE_EXIT_CODE)
async def _serve():
# Split startup from main_loop so we can read the bound port
# after the socket is live (ephemeral port discovery).
if not config.loaded:
config.load()
server.lifespan = config.lifespan_class(config)
with server.capture_signals():
await server.startup()
if server.should_exit:
return
# Parent-death watchdog. The desktop spawns us and is supposed to
# SIGTERM us on quit, but a crash / SIGKILL / update handoff that
# exits before reaping leaves us orphaned (ppid→1) yet still
# serving — leaking the whole backend + its MCP child subtree
# (each MCP watchdog is parented to THIS process, so os._exit here
# cascades their teardown). Same pattern as
# Clear corpses left by a previous unclean Desktop exit before we
# stack another backend + MCP tree (EMFILE / missing tabs).
# Parent-death watchdog only protects *this* process going forward.
if os.getenv("HERMES_DESKTOP") == "1":
try:
from hermes_cli.dashboard_procs import (
_reap_orphaned_desktop_local_serves,
)
_reap_orphaned_desktop_local_serves()
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("orphan desktop-local serve reap skipped: %s", exc)
# Same sweep for stdio MCP helper children (#61514): ledger-
# identified helpers whose recorded spawner is provably dead are
# corpses from a prior unclean exit — reap them before this
# backend stacks a fresh MCP tree on top. Positive identity only
# (spawn ledger + spawner_is_dead); a helper whose spawner is
# alive or unprovable is never touched.
try:
from hermes_cli.process_identity import reap_orphaned_mcp_helpers
reap_orphaned_mcp_helpers()
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("orphan MCP helper reap skipped: %s", exc)
# tui_gateway/slash_worker.py::_start_parent_death_watchdog. No-op
# for standalone `hermes serve` (no HERMES_PARENT_PID env).
_start_parent_death_watchdog()
actual_port = _read_bound_port(server, fallback=port)
app.state.bound_port = actual_port
# Positive process identity: record (pid, create_time, purpose,
# spawner) in the machine spawn ledger and — on Windows — attach
# to a kill-on-close job so this backend's whole child tree dies
# with it. Both best-effort; failures degrade to legacy behavior.
# Registered AFTER the bind so the entry carries the ACTUAL port
# (ephemeral binds included) — the structured host/port/profile
# is what lets `hermes update` relaunch a manually-started serve
# on its real endpoint instead of dropping it (#63206).
try:
from hermes_cli.process_identity import (
attach_self_to_kill_on_close_job,
register_self,
)
register_self(
"serve" if headless else "dashboard",
detail={
"host": host,
"port": actual_port,
"profile": initial_profile or "",
},
)
attach_self_to_kill_on_close_job()
except Exception as exc:
_log.debug("process-identity registration skipped: %s", exc)
_write_dashboard_ready_file(actual_port)
# Port-discovery sentinel parsed by the desktop spawn. `serve` is a
# plain backend, not a dashboard, so it announces a neutral token;
# `dashboard` keeps the legacy one. The desktop matches either.
ready_token = "HERMES_BACKEND_READY" if headless else "HERMES_DASHBOARD_READY"
# tui_gateway.server (imported above for the flush-on-SIGTERM
# handlers, #94724) redirects sys.stdout→sys.stderr at import time
# to keep stray prints off the JSON-RPC protocol stream. fd 1 is
# still the real stdout — and the Desktop spawn watches
# child.stdout for this sentinel — so write to the fd, not to the
# (redirected) sys.stdout, or the desktop times out after 90s
# against a perfectly healthy backend (#96282).
_write_machine_sentinel_line(f"{ready_token} port={actual_port}")
if headless:
# No SPA, and the JSON-RPC/WS endpoints are auth-gated — don't
# advertise a paste-and-connect URL, just announce the bind.
# flush: on a piped stdout (Desktop spawn) this line is
# block-buffered and can surface MINUTES after the flushed
# READY sentinel above, which reads as a slow boot in
# support bundles when the backend was actually up.
print(f" Hermes backend listening on {host}:{actual_port}", flush=True)
else:
print(f" Hermes Web UI → http://{host}:{actual_port}")
_maybe_open_browser(host, actual_port, open_browser, initial_profile)
if start_mcp_discovery_after_bind:
# Deferred from cmd_dashboard for Desktop `serve` (see there).
# Not started at the bind itself either: the ~350ms `mcp` SDK
# import holds the GIL, and at bind time the renderer is doing
# its WebSocket handshake + first hydration reads against this
# loop (measured: starting it here gave back most of the
# READY gain as a slower connect). One second later the shell
# is painted and idle. An agent build inside that second fires
# the deferred start itself (wait_for_mcp_discovery), so its
# bounded join and the late-binding refresh are unchanged.
try:
from hermes_cli.mcp_startup import defer_background_mcp_discovery
defer_background_mcp_discovery(
logger=_log,
thread_name="dashboard-mcp-discovery",
delay=_DESKTOP_MCP_DISCOVERY_DELAY_S,
)
except Exception:
_log.debug("Deferred MCP discovery arm failed", exc_info=True)
# Collapse the peer-hangup teardown flood (#50005). When the Desktop
# forcibly closes its WebSocket mid-write, asyncio logs a full
# traceback per pending connection-lost callback — 50+ identical
# WinError 10054 (ConnectionResetError) lines per disconnect on
# Windows. This filter downgrades exactly that class to one debug
# line and passes every other loop error through unchanged.
try:
from tui_gateway.loop_noise import install_loop_noise_filter
install_loop_noise_filter(asyncio.get_running_loop())
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - best-effort
_log.debug("loop noise filter install skipped: %s", exc)
# ── Loop heartbeat watchdog (CF-1) ───────────────────────────
# Confirm the GIL-pressure hypothesis in production. Re-arm a 2s
# tick and measure the drift between when it *should* fire and
# when it actually does: a healthy loop drifts ~0, but a turn that
# holds the GIL blocks the loop and the next tick fires late by the
# stall duration. We log that so a stalled-loop WS drop is
# diagnosable from the gateway log. Uses loop.time() (monotonic)
# for drift, and call_later (not a task) so it dies with the loop —
# nothing to cancel on shutdown.
_hb_interval = 2.0
_hb_stall_threshold = 5.0
_hb_loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
def _loop_heartbeat(expected: float) -> None:
now = _hb_loop.time()
drift = now - expected
if drift > _hb_stall_threshold:
_log.warning(
"event loop stalled %.1fs (GIL pressure suspected)",
drift,
)
_hb_loop.call_later(
_hb_interval, _loop_heartbeat, now + _hb_interval
)
_hb_loop.call_later(
_hb_interval, _loop_heartbeat, _hb_loop.time() + _hb_interval
)
await server.main_loop()
if server.started:
await server.shutdown()
# On POSIX, keep the long-standing ``asyncio.run(_serve())`` runner —
# Python's default loop there is already a SelectorEventLoop (or uvloop when
# uvicorn[standard] installs it), which is exactly what uvicorn serves on.
# Uvicorn's ``capture_signals()`` restores the original SIGINT handler and
# re-raises the captured signal after a graceful shutdown, which otherwise
# leaks a noisy KeyboardInterrupt traceback for the normal foreground
# dashboard Ctrl+C path. Treat that one signal as a clean user-requested
# shutdown; other serve-time errors still propagate.
#
# On Windows it is broken: ``asyncio.run`` defaults to a ProactorEventLoop,
# but uvicorn's socket-serving stack assumes a SelectorEventLoop on win32
# (``uvicorn/loops/asyncio.py`` forces it, and ``uvicorn.Server.run`` threads
# ``config.get_loop_factory()`` into its runner for exactly this reason).
# Driving uvicorn on the proactor loop makes ``server.startup()`` bind a
# socket that never accepts — the dashboard / desktop backend prints
# "Skipping web UI build" and then hangs forever with the port LISTENING but
# no TCP handshake completing (#50641). So *only on Windows* we mirror
# uvicorn's own machinery and run on the loop factory it picks.
if sys.platform != "win32":
try:
asyncio.run(_serve())
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return
except SystemExit as exc:
# Probe-to-bind race (#93608): another process grabbed the port
# between our preflight probe and uvicorn's real bind. uvicorn's
# bind_socket() exits 1 — re-check the bind and translate a
# confirmed conflict into the sentinel + distinct exit code.
if exc.code == 1 and _port_bind_conflict(host, port):
_report_port_in_use(host, port)
raise SystemExit(PORT_IN_USE_EXIT_CODE) from None
raise
return
# Windows-only path. Resolve the runner + loop factory FIRST (and fall back
# to a hand-installed Windows selector policy only when uvicorn predates the
# loop-factory API, < 0.36). The actual serve call is then OUTSIDE this
# import try/except so genuine serve-time errors (port in use) propagate
# normally instead of being swallowed and double-run.
try:
from uvicorn._compat import asyncio_run as _runner
_loop_factory = config.get_loop_factory()
except Exception:
_runner = None
_loop_factory = None
try:
asyncio.set_event_loop_policy(
asyncio.WindowsSelectorEventLoopPolicy() # type: ignore[attr-defined]
)
except Exception:
pass
# Same clean Ctrl+C contract as the POSIX branch above: ``capture_signals()``
# re-raises the captured signal after the graceful shutdown has already
# completed. For console Ctrl+C the re-raised SIGINT lands as
# ``KeyboardInterrupt`` — a clean user-requested exit here too. (Re-raised
# SIGTERM/SIGBREAK keep their default terminate disposition and never reach
# this except.)
try:
if _runner is not None:
_runner(_serve(), loop_factory=_loop_factory)
else:
asyncio.run(_serve())
except KeyboardInterrupt:
return
except SystemExit as exc:
# Same probe-to-bind race translation as the POSIX branch (#93608).
if exc.code == 1 and _port_bind_conflict(host, port):
_report_port_in_use(host, port)
raise SystemExit(PORT_IN_USE_EXIT_CODE) from None
raise
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