Import AITURK IDE 1.0.0-beta.1 from Hermes 63279301; preserve MIT license

tests/tools/test_denial_circuit_breaker.py

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+"""Tests for the consecutive-denial circuit breaker in smart approvals.
+
+After ``approvals.denial_breaker_threshold`` consecutive guardian DENY
+verdicts in one session, the deny message returned to the model escalates
+from "Do NOT retry" to a hard-stop CIRCUIT BREAKER instruction. Any
+approval resets the tally. State is per-session and capped in size.
+
+Follows the existing smart-approval mocking patterns from
+tests/tools/test_execute_code_approval_cluster.py: monkeypatch
+``_smart_approve`` / ``_get_approval_mode`` on the module and drive the
+public guard entry points.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import pytest
+
+from tools import approval as A
+
+BREAKER_MARKER = "CIRCUIT BREAKER:"
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def breaker_session(monkeypatch):
+    """A clean gateway smart-mode session with the guardian forced to DENY.
+
+    Uses the gateway path with a notify callback that resolves 'deny'
+    (user denies the smart-DENY override) so the guard returns a definitive
+    BLOCKED message — the channel the breaker text rides on.
+    """
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", "1")
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_CRON_SESSION", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_get_approval_mode", lambda: "smart")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_smart_approve", lambda _c, _d: "deny")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_get_denial_breaker_threshold", lambda: 3)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        A, "detect_dangerous_command",
+        lambda command: (True, "breaker-test-danger", f"risk:{command}"),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "tools.tirith_security.check_command_security",
+        lambda _command: {"action": "allow", "findings": [], "summary": ""},
+        raising=False,
+    )
+
+    session_key = "breaker-test-session"
+    token = A.set_current_session_key(session_key)
+    A._reset_denials(session_key)
+    with A._lock:
+        A._permanent_approved.discard("breaker-test-danger")
+        A._permanent_approved.discard("execute_code")
+        A._session_approved.get(session_key, set()).discard("breaker-test-danger")
+        A._session_approved.get(session_key, set()).discard("execute_code")
+        A._gateway_queues.pop(session_key, None)
+        A._gateway_notify_cbs.pop(session_key, None)
+    try:
+        yield session_key
+    finally:
+        A.reset_current_session_key(token)
+        A._reset_denials(session_key)
+        with A._lock:
+            A._gateway_queues.pop(session_key, None)
+            A._gateway_notify_cbs.pop(session_key, None)
+
+
+def _register_resolver(session_key: str, result):
+    """Notify callback resolving the newest queued approval with *result*."""
+    def cb(_approval_data):
+        with A._lock:
+            entries = A._gateway_queues.get(session_key, [])
+            if entries:
+                entries[-1].result = result
+                entries[-1].event.set()
+    with A._lock:
+        A._gateway_notify_cbs[session_key] = cb
+
+
+def _denied_terminal(command="dangerous thing"):
+    return A.check_all_command_guards(command, "local")
+
+
+def _denied_execute_code(code="print('x')"):
+    return A.check_execute_code_guard(code, "local")
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# (a) Two denials -> normal message; third -> breaker text present
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_breaker_trips_on_third_consecutive_denial(breaker_session):
+    _register_resolver(breaker_session, "deny")
+
+    first = _denied_terminal("dangerous one")
+    second = _denied_terminal("dangerous two")
+    third = _denied_terminal("dangerous three")
+
+    assert first["approved"] is False
+    assert BREAKER_MARKER not in first["message"]
+    assert second["approved"] is False
+    assert BREAKER_MARKER not in second["message"]
+    assert third["approved"] is False
+    assert BREAKER_MARKER in third["message"]
+    assert "3 consecutive commands were blocked" in third["message"]
+    assert "STOP attempting variations" in third["message"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# (b) An approval resets the tally
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_approval_resets_tally(breaker_session, monkeypatch):
+    _register_resolver(breaker_session, "deny")
+    _denied_terminal("dangerous one")
+    _denied_terminal("dangerous two")
+
+    # Guardian approves the next command → tally resets.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_smart_approve", lambda _c, _d: "approve")
+    ok = _denied_terminal("benign command")
+    assert ok["approved"] is True and ok.get("smart_approved") is True
+
+    # Back to denials: the count restarts, so the next deny is #1, not #3.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_smart_approve", lambda _c, _d: "deny")
+    after = _denied_terminal("dangerous again")
+    assert after["approved"] is False
+    assert BREAKER_MARKER not in after["message"]
+
+
+def test_human_approval_resets_tally(breaker_session):
+    _register_resolver(breaker_session, "deny")
+    _denied_terminal("dangerous one")
+    _denied_terminal("dangerous two")
+
+    # User overrides the smart DENY (one-operation approval) → tally resets.
+    _register_resolver(breaker_session, "once")
+    ok = _denied_terminal("dangerous but user says yes")
+    assert ok["approved"] is True and ok.get("user_approved") is True
+
+    _register_resolver(breaker_session, "deny")
+    after = _denied_terminal("dangerous again")
+    assert after["approved"] is False
+    assert BREAKER_MARKER not in after["message"]
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# (c) Threshold 0 disables the breaker
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# (d) Tally is per-session — two session keys are independent
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# (e) BOTH call paths increment: terminal guard and execute_code guard
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Headless hard-deny path (no cli/gateway/ask override) also increments
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_headless_smart_deny_increments_and_trips(monkeypatch):
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_CRON_SESSION", raising=False)
+    monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", "0")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_get_approval_mode", lambda: "smart")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_YOLO_MODE_FROZEN", False)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_smart_approve", lambda _c, _d: "deny")
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_get_denial_breaker_threshold", lambda: 3)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "_is_interactive_cli", lambda: True)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        A, "detect_dangerous_command",
+        lambda command: (True, "headless-breaker-danger", f"risk:{command}"),
+    )
+    monkeypatch.setattr(
+        "tools.tirith_security.check_command_security",
+        lambda _command: {"action": "allow", "findings": [], "summary": ""},
+        raising=False,
+    )
+    # CLI-interactive path: the owner denies via the prompt callback.
+    monkeypatch.setattr(A, "prompt_dangerous_approval",
+                        lambda *args, **kwargs: "deny")
+
+    session_key = "headless-breaker-session"
+    token = A.set_current_session_key(session_key)
+    A._reset_denials(session_key)
+    with A._lock:
+        A._permanent_approved.discard("headless-breaker-danger")
+        A._session_approved.get(session_key, set()).discard(
+            "headless-breaker-danger")
+    try:
+        first = A.check_all_command_guards("dangerous h1", "local")
+        second = A.check_all_command_guards("dangerous h2", "local")
+        third = A.check_all_command_guards("dangerous h3", "local")
+        assert BREAKER_MARKER not in first["message"]
+        assert BREAKER_MARKER not in second["message"]
+        assert BREAKER_MARKER in third["message"]
+    finally:
+        A.reset_current_session_key(token)
+        A._reset_denials(session_key)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Eviction cap: the tally dict never grows past _DENIAL_TALLY_MAX_SESSIONS
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+def test_tally_evicts_oldest_sessions():
+    with A._lock:
+        saved = dict(A._denial_tally)
+        A._denial_tally.clear()
+    try:
+        for i in range(A._DENIAL_TALLY_MAX_SESSIONS + 10):
+            A._record_denial(f"evict-session-{i}")
+        with A._lock:
+            assert len(A._denial_tally) == A._DENIAL_TALLY_MAX_SESSIONS
+            # Oldest entries were evicted, newest survive.
+            assert "evict-session-0" not in A._denial_tally
+            assert (
+                f"evict-session-{A._DENIAL_TALLY_MAX_SESSIONS + 9}"
+                in A._denial_tally
+            )
+    finally:
+        with A._lock:
+            A._denial_tally.clear()
+            A._denial_tally.update(saved)