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"""GitHub Copilot authentication utilities.
Implements the OAuth device code flow used by the Copilot CLI and handles
token validation/exchange for the Copilot API.
Token type support (per GitHub docs):
gho_ OAuth token ✓ (default via copilot login)
github_pat_ Fine-grained PAT ✓ (needs Copilot Requests permission)
ghu_ GitHub App token ✓ (via environment variable)
ghp_ Classic PAT ✗ NOT SUPPORTED
Credential search order (matching Copilot CLI behaviour):
1. COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN env var
2. GH_TOKEN env var
3. GITHUB_TOKEN env var
4. gh auth token CLI fallback
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
import shutil
import subprocess
import threading
import time
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional
from hermes_cli._subprocess_compat import IS_WINDOWS, windows_hide_flags
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# OAuth device code flow constants — VS Code's GitHub App client ID.
# The previous opencode OAuth App ID (Ov23li8tweQw6odWQebz) produces gho_*
# tokens that cannot be exchanged for Copilot API JWTs (404 on
# /copilot_internal/v2/token). VS Code's App ID produces ghu_* tokens
# that support exchange, which is required to access internal-only models
# (e.g. claude-opus-4.6-1m) and enterprise endpoints.
# Tested on Individual and Enterprise accounts.
COPILOT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID = "Iv1.b507a08c87ecfe98"
# Token type prefixes
_CLASSIC_PAT_PREFIX = "ghp_"
_SUPPORTED_PREFIXES = ("gho_", "github_pat_", "ghu_")
# Env var search order (matches Copilot CLI)
COPILOT_ENV_VARS = ("COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN", "GH_TOKEN", "GITHUB_TOKEN")
# Polling constants
_DEVICE_CODE_POLL_INTERVAL = 5 # seconds
_DEVICE_CODE_POLL_SAFETY_MARGIN = 3 # seconds
def validate_copilot_token(token: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Validate that a token is usable with the Copilot API.
Returns (valid, message).
"""
token = token.strip()
if not token:
return False, "Empty token"
if token.startswith(_CLASSIC_PAT_PREFIX):
return False, (
"Classic Personal Access Tokens (ghp_*) are not supported by the "
"Copilot API. Use one of:\n"
" → `copilot login` or `hermes model` to authenticate via OAuth\n"
" → A fine-grained PAT (github_pat_*) with Copilot Requests permission\n"
" → `gh auth login` with the default device code flow (produces gho_* tokens)"
)
return True, "OK"
def resolve_copilot_token() -> tuple[str, str]:
"""Resolve a GitHub token suitable for Copilot API use.
Returns (token, source) where source describes where the token came from.
Raises ValueError if only a classic PAT is available.
"""
# 1. Check env vars in priority order
any_env_var_set = False
for env_var in COPILOT_ENV_VARS:
val = os.getenv(env_var, "").strip()
if val:
any_env_var_set = True
valid, msg = validate_copilot_token(val)
if not valid:
logger.warning(
"Token from %s is not supported: %s", env_var, msg
)
continue
return val, env_var
# 2. Fall back to gh auth token — but ONLY when no Copilot env var was
# explicitly set. When the user exported GITHUB_TOKEN (even an
# unsupported classic PAT), their intent is to use *that* token, not
# to silently substitute one from the gh CLI credential store.
# Skipping the subprocess here also avoids a slow `gh auth token`
# call (up to 5s timeout on Windows) on every cold start that scans
# Copilot auth state — a measurable contributor to the ~14s
# cold-start stall (#60800). The user can run `copilot login` or
# set a supported token (gho_*/github_pat_*/ghu_) explicitly.
if any_env_var_set:
logger.debug(
"Copilot env var(s) set but none held a supported token; "
"skipping `gh auth token` fallback to honor explicit env-var "
"intent (and avoid the subprocess cost on cold start, #60800)."
)
return "", ""
token = _try_gh_cli_token()
if token:
valid, msg = validate_copilot_token(token)
if not valid:
raise ValueError(
f"Token from `gh auth token` is a classic PAT (ghp_*). {msg}"
)
return token, "gh auth token"
return "", ""
def _gh_cli_candidates() -> list[str]:
"""Return candidate ``gh`` binary paths, including common Homebrew installs."""
candidates: list[str] = []
resolved = shutil.which("gh")
if resolved:
candidates.append(resolved)
for candidate in (
"/opt/homebrew/bin/gh",
"/usr/local/bin/gh",
str(Path.home() / ".local" / "bin" / "gh"),
):
if candidate in candidates:
continue
if os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK):
candidates.append(candidate)
return candidates
# ``gh auth token`` result cache. The probe shells out to the gh CLI, and when
# gh has no credential store for this HOME (fresh profile, desktop-spawned
# backend, CI) it can block for its full 5s subprocess timeout — on keyring /
# D-Bus prompts rather than returning immediately. Provider inventory builds
# (``/api/model/options``, ``hermes tools``) probe Copilot auth several times
# per request, so an uncached miss turns one settings-page load into a 4×5s
# stall that exceeds the Desktop renderer's 15s IPC budget and paints an error
# (observed Aug 2026: Models/Providers settings pages timing out on every
# open). Successes and failures are both cached; a short TTL keeps a freshly
# run ``gh auth login`` discoverable without restarting the backend.
_GH_CLI_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS = 300.0
_gh_cli_token_cache: tuple[float, Optional[str]] | None = None
def _invalidate_gh_cli_token_cache() -> None:
"""Reset the ``gh auth token`` probe cache (used by tests and re-auth flows)."""
global _gh_cli_token_cache
_gh_cli_token_cache = None
def _try_gh_cli_token() -> Optional[str]:
"""Return a token from ``gh auth token`` when the GitHub CLI is available.
When COPILOT_GH_HOST is set, passes ``--hostname`` so gh returns the
correct host's token. Also strips GITHUB_TOKEN / GH_TOKEN from the
subprocess environment so ``gh`` reads from its own credential store
(hosts.yml) instead of just echoing the env var back.
The result (including a miss) is cached for a short TTL — see the cache
comment above. Callers that just re-authenticated can call
``_invalidate_gh_cli_token_cache()`` to re-probe immediately.
"""
global _gh_cli_token_cache
now = time.monotonic()
if _gh_cli_token_cache is not None:
cached_at, cached_token = _gh_cli_token_cache
if now - cached_at < _GH_CLI_TOKEN_CACHE_TTL_SECONDS:
return cached_token
token = _probe_gh_cli_token()
_gh_cli_token_cache = (now, token)
return token
def _probe_gh_cli_token() -> Optional[str]:
"""Uncached ``gh auth token`` subprocess probe (see ``_try_gh_cli_token``)."""
hostname = os.getenv("COPILOT_GH_HOST", "").strip()
# Build a clean env so gh doesn't short-circuit on GITHUB_TOKEN / GH_TOKEN
clean_env = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
if k not in {"GITHUB_TOKEN", "GH_TOKEN"}}
# Never let gh open an interactive prompt from a backend process.
clean_env.setdefault("GH_PROMPT_DISABLED", "1")
clean_env.setdefault("GH_NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER", "1")
_popen_kwargs = {"creationflags": windows_hide_flags()} if IS_WINDOWS else {}
for gh_path in _gh_cli_candidates():
cmd = [gh_path, "auth", "token"]
if hostname:
cmd += ["--hostname", hostname]
try:
result = subprocess.run(
cmd,
capture_output=True,
text=True, encoding='utf-8', errors='replace',
timeout=5,
env=clean_env,
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL,
**_popen_kwargs,
)
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as exc:
logger.debug("gh CLI token lookup failed (%s): %s", gh_path, exc)
continue
if result.returncode == 0 and result.stdout.strip():
return result.stdout.strip()
return None
# ─── OAuth Device Code Flow ────────────────────────────────────────────────
def copilot_device_code_login(
*,
host: str = "github.com",
timeout_seconds: float = 300,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Run the GitHub OAuth device code flow for Copilot.
Prints instructions for the user, polls for completion, and returns
the OAuth access token on success, or None on failure/cancellation.
This replicates the flow used by opencode and the Copilot CLI.
"""
import urllib.request
import urllib.parse
domain = host.rstrip("/")
device_code_url = f"https://{domain}/login/device/code"
access_token_url = f"https://{domain}/login/oauth/access_token"
# Step 1: Request device code
data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
"client_id": COPILOT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
"scope": "read:user",
}).encode()
req = urllib.request.Request(
device_code_url,
data=data,
headers={
"Accept": "application/json",
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
"User-Agent": "HermesAgent/1.0",
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=15) as resp:
device_data = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("Failed to initiate device authorization: %s", exc)
print(f" ✗ Failed to start device authorization: {exc}")
return None
verification_uri = device_data.get("verification_uri", "https://github.com/login/device")
user_code = device_data.get("user_code", "")
device_code = device_data.get("device_code", "")
interval = max(device_data.get("interval", _DEVICE_CODE_POLL_INTERVAL), 1)
if not device_code or not user_code:
print(" ✗ GitHub did not return a device code.")
return None
# Step 2: Show instructions
print()
print(f" Open this URL in your browser: {verification_uri}")
print(f" Enter this code: {user_code}")
print()
print(" Waiting for authorization...", end="", flush=True)
# Step 3: Poll for completion
deadline = time.monotonic() + timeout_seconds
while time.monotonic() < deadline:
time.sleep(interval + _DEVICE_CODE_POLL_SAFETY_MARGIN)
poll_data = urllib.parse.urlencode({
"client_id": COPILOT_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID,
"device_code": device_code,
"grant_type": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:device_code",
}).encode()
poll_req = urllib.request.Request(
access_token_url,
data=poll_data,
headers={
"Accept": "application/json",
"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
"User-Agent": "HermesAgent/1.0",
},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(poll_req, timeout=10) as resp:
result = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
except Exception:
print(".", end="", flush=True)
continue
if result.get("access_token"):
print("")
return result["access_token"]
error = result.get("error", "")
if error == "authorization_pending":
print(".", end="", flush=True)
continue
elif error == "slow_down":
# RFC 8628: add 5 seconds to polling interval
server_interval = result.get("interval")
if isinstance(server_interval, (int, float)) and server_interval > 0:
interval = int(server_interval)
else:
interval += 5
print(".", end="", flush=True)
continue
elif error == "expired_token":
print()
print(" ✗ Device code expired. Please try again.")
return None
elif error == "access_denied":
print()
print(" ✗ Authorization was denied.")
return None
elif error:
print()
print(f" ✗ Authorization failed: {error}")
return None
print()
print(" ✗ Timed out waiting for authorization.")
return None
# ─── Copilot Token Exchange ────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Module-level cache for exchanged Copilot API tokens.
# Maps raw_token_fingerprint -> (api_token, expires_at_epoch, base_url).
_jwt_cache: dict[str, tuple[str, float, Optional[str]]] = {}
_JWT_REFRESH_MARGIN_SECONDS = 120 # refresh 2 min before expiry
# Token exchange endpoint and headers (matching VS Code / Copilot CLI)
_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_URL = "https://api.github.com/copilot_internal/v2/token"
_EDITOR_VERSION = "vscode/1.104.1"
_EXCHANGE_USER_AGENT = "GitHubCopilotChat/0.26.7"
# Transient-failure hardening for the token exchange. Gateway startup often
# races network readiness (launchd relaunch, DHCP/VPN settling); a single-shot
# exchange that fails there silently degrades to the RAW GitHub token, which the
# Copilot server routes to the "copilot-language-server" integrator whose model
# allowlist omits enterprise-only models (e.g. claude-opus-4.8) → HTTP 400 on
# every turn until the next restart. Retry a few times, and persist the last
# good exchanged JWT to disk so a restart during a blip reuses the still-valid
# ~30-min token instead of degrading.
_EXCHANGE_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3
_EXCHANGE_BACKOFF_BASE_SECONDS = 1.5 # sleeps ~1.5s, ~3.0s between attempts
_JWT_DISK_FILENAME = ".copilot_jwt.json"
_JWT_DISK_MAX_BYTES = 1_048_576 # 1 MiB cap on the persisted JWT store read
# Negative cache for failed exchanges. Without it, every load_pool("copilot")
# call re-runs the full exchange — and on a permanently-rejected token
# (HTTP 403: account not Copilot-entitled, expired grant, org policy) the
# retry backoff burned ~4.5s of time.sleep() on EVERY provider-discovery
# pass. The /model picker, delegation child spawns, and the web dashboard
# all walk that path, so a single bad Copilot token made all of them crawl.
# Maps raw-token fingerprint -> epoch until which exchange attempts are
# skipped (raise immediately). Success clears the entry.
_exchange_failure_cache: dict[str, float] = {}
# Single-flight guard per token fingerprint: concurrent callers (the dashboard
# polls /api/credentials/pool every few seconds, each poll off-loop) wait on
# the ONE in-flight exchange and then hit the positive/negative cache, instead
# of each spawning their own hung resolver thread during a DNS outage.
_exchange_locks: dict[str, threading.Lock] = {}
_exchange_locks_guard = threading.Lock()
def _exchange_lock_for(fp: str) -> threading.Lock:
with _exchange_locks_guard:
lock = _exchange_locks.get(fp)
if lock is None:
lock = _exchange_locks[fp] = threading.Lock()
return lock
_EXCHANGE_FAILURE_TTL_TRANSIENT_SECONDS = 60.0 # network blips: retry soon
_EXCHANGE_FAILURE_TTL_PERMANENT_SECONDS = 1800.0 # 401/403/404: won't heal
# HTTP statuses that indicate the token itself is rejected — retrying with
# backoff is pointless (the retry loop exists for startup network races,
# not for auth rejections) and sleeping on them just blocks the caller.
_EXCHANGE_PERMANENT_HTTP_STATUSES = frozenset({401, 403, 404})
def _token_fingerprint(raw_token: str) -> str:
"""Short fingerprint of a raw token for cache keying (avoids storing full token)."""
import hashlib
return hashlib.sha256(raw_token.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
def _read_jwt_store(path: Path) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Bounded read of the on-disk JWT store → dict, or None if unusable.
Single chokepoint for every read of the persisted store (load, eviction,
save-merge). A well-formed store is a few KB; a file over the 1 MiB cap or
with non-dict content is treated as unusable so a corrupt/oversized file
can't balloon memory or get rewritten back out.
"""
try:
if path.stat().st_size > _JWT_DISK_MAX_BYTES:
logger.debug(
"Persisted Copilot JWT store exceeds %d bytes; ignoring", _JWT_DISK_MAX_BYTES
)
return None
loaded = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
return loaded if isinstance(loaded, dict) else None
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Failed to read persisted Copilot JWT store: %s", exc)
return None
def evict_cached_exchanged_token(raw_token: str) -> None:
"""Drop any cached exchanged JWT for ``raw_token`` (in-process + on-disk).
Used by the runtime stale-credential recovery path: when a live request
starts failing with a Copilot ``model_not_available_for_integrator`` /
``model_not_supported`` 400, the cached exchanged token (or a degraded raw
fallback that was cached in its place) is stale. Evicting both cache tiers
forces the next ``exchange_copilot_token`` call to hit the network and mint
a fresh token instead of returning the poisoned cache entry.
"""
if not raw_token:
return
fp = _token_fingerprint(raw_token)
_jwt_cache.pop(fp, None)
# Also clear any negative-cache entry: eviction is an explicit "force a
# fresh exchange" signal from the stale-credential recovery path, so the
# next exchange_copilot_token() must be allowed to hit the network.
_exchange_failure_cache.pop(fp, None)
path = _jwt_disk_path()
if not path or not path.exists():
return
try:
store = _read_jwt_store(path)
if store is not None and fp in store:
del store[fp]
tmp = path.with_suffix(path.suffix + ".tmp")
tmp.write_text(json.dumps(store), encoding="utf-8")
try:
os.chmod(tmp, 0o600)
except Exception:
pass
os.replace(tmp, path)
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Failed to evict cached Copilot JWT: %s", exc)
def _jwt_disk_path() -> Optional[Path]:
"""Path to the on-disk exchanged-JWT cache (profile-aware), or None."""
try:
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
return Path(get_hermes_home()) / _JWT_DISK_FILENAME
except Exception:
return None
def _load_jwt_from_disk(fp: str) -> Optional[tuple[str, float, Optional[str]]]:
"""Load a persisted exchanged JWT for ``fp`` → (api_token, expires_at, base_url)."""
path = _jwt_disk_path()
if not path or not path.exists():
return None
try:
# Bound the read: this file is a small JSON map of fingerprint → token.
# An oversized/corrupt store is treated as unusable — the caller
# re-exchanges (bound shared with eviction/save via _read_jwt_store).
store = _read_jwt_store(path)
entry = store.get(fp) if store is not None else None
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
return None
api_token = entry.get("api_token", "")
expires_at = float(entry.get("expires_at", 0) or 0)
base_url = entry.get("base_url")
if api_token and expires_at:
return api_token, expires_at, base_url
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Failed to load persisted Copilot JWT: %s", exc)
return None
def _save_jwt_to_disk(
fp: str, api_token: str, expires_at: float, base_url: Optional[str]
) -> None:
"""Persist an exchanged JWT (0o600), pruning expired entries."""
path = _jwt_disk_path()
if not path:
return
try:
store: dict = {}
if path.exists():
store = _read_jwt_store(path) or {}
now = time.time()
store = {
k: v
for k, v in store.items()
if isinstance(v, dict) and float(v.get("expires_at", 0) or 0) > now
}
store[fp] = {
"api_token": api_token,
"expires_at": expires_at,
"base_url": base_url,
}
tmp = path.with_suffix(path.suffix + ".tmp")
tmp.write_text(json.dumps(store), encoding="utf-8")
try:
os.chmod(tmp, 0o600)
except Exception:
pass
os.replace(tmp, path)
try:
os.chmod(path, 0o600)
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Failed to persist Copilot JWT: %s", exc)
# Hard wall-clock cap for the token-exchange HTTP call. urllib's ``timeout``
# only bounds socket operations AFTER DNS resolution succeeds; getaddrinfo
# blocks in C and ignores it entirely, so on a networkless Windows host the
# resolver can hang for many minutes (observed: a 17-minute event-loop stall
# on 2026-08-22 that took the whole backend down with it).
_DNS_GRACE_SECONDS = 5.0
def _urlopen_bounded(req, timeout: float):
"""urlopen() with a hard wall-clock cap of timeout + _DNS_GRACE_SECONDS.
Runs the call on a daemon thread and abandons it if the cap fires, so a
DNS/getaddrinfo hang cannot block the caller indefinitely. Raises the
worker's exception, or TimeoutError when the cap fires.
"""
import urllib.request
box: dict = {}
abandoned = threading.Event()
def _worker() -> None:
try:
resp = urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout)
except BaseException as exc: # re-raised on the caller's thread
box["exc"] = exc
return
if abandoned.is_set():
# The caller already timed out; nobody will read this response,
# so release its socket instead of leaking it with the thread.
try:
resp.close()
except Exception:
pass
return
box["resp"] = resp
t = threading.Thread(
target=_worker, name="copilot-token-exchange", daemon=True
)
t.start()
t.join(timeout + _DNS_GRACE_SECONDS)
if t.is_alive():
abandoned.set()
raise TimeoutError(
"copilot token exchange exceeded hard cap of "
f"{timeout + _DNS_GRACE_SECONDS:.0f}s (DNS/getaddrinfo hang?)"
)
if "exc" in box:
raise box["exc"]
if "resp" not in box:
raise TimeoutError("copilot token exchange worker died without result")
return box["resp"]
def exchange_copilot_token(raw_token: str, *, timeout: float = 10.0) -> tuple[str, float, Optional[str]]:
"""Exchange a raw GitHub token for a short-lived Copilot API token.
Calls ``GET https://api.github.com/copilot_internal/v2/token`` with
the raw GitHub token and returns ``(api_token, expires_at, base_url)``.
The returned token is a semicolon-separated string (not a standard JWT)
used as ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` for Copilot API requests.
``base_url`` is the account-specific API host: the authoritative
``endpoints.api`` advertised by the exchange (enterprise/proxied
accounts), falling back to a host derived from the token's ``proxy-ep``
field. Individual accounts have neither, so ``base_url`` is None.
Results are cached in-process and reused until close to expiry.
Raises ``ValueError`` on failure.
"""
fp = _token_fingerprint(raw_token)
# Fast paths outside the lock: a valid in-process JWT needs no exchange,
# and a recent failure means queueing behind the in-flight holder (up to
# ~50 s) would only park an executor thread to learn the same answer.
cached = _jwt_cache.get(fp)
if cached and time.time() < cached[1] - _JWT_REFRESH_MARGIN_SECONDS:
return cached
_fail_until = _exchange_failure_cache.get(fp, 0.0)
if time.time() < _fail_until:
raise ValueError(
"Copilot token exchange recently failed; skipping re-attempt "
f"for another {int(_fail_until - time.time())}s"
)
# Note: a waiter's own ``timeout`` is not honoured across the lock wait —
# by design of single-flight, it observes the holder's outcome instead.
with _exchange_lock_for(fp):
return _exchange_copilot_token_locked(raw_token, fp, timeout=timeout)
def _exchange_copilot_token_locked(
raw_token: str, fp: str, *, timeout: float
) -> tuple[str, float, Optional[str]]:
import urllib.request
# Re-check the caches under the lock: a concurrent caller may have just
# completed (or just failed) the exchange we were queued behind.
cached = _jwt_cache.get(fp)
if cached:
api_token, expires_at, base_url = cached
if time.time() < expires_at - _JWT_REFRESH_MARGIN_SECONDS:
return api_token, expires_at, base_url
# Then the on-disk cache: a fresh process (e.g. gateway restart) has an
# empty in-process cache but may have a still-valid persisted JWT. Reusing
# it avoids a network round-trip at startup — precisely when the network is
# most likely to be flaky and the single-shot exchange would degrade to the
# raw token.
disk_cached = _load_jwt_from_disk(fp)
if disk_cached:
api_token, expires_at, base_url = disk_cached
if time.time() < expires_at - _JWT_REFRESH_MARGIN_SECONDS:
_jwt_cache[fp] = (api_token, expires_at, base_url)
return api_token, expires_at, base_url
# Negative cache: a recent exchange failure for this token means the
# network round-trip (and its retry backoff) would just repeat. Fail
# fast so provider discovery / picker opens don't block on a token we
# already know is rejected or unreachable.
_fail_until = _exchange_failure_cache.get(fp, 0.0)
if time.time() < _fail_until:
raise ValueError(
"Copilot token exchange recently failed; skipping re-attempt "
f"for another {int(_fail_until - time.time())}s"
)
req = urllib.request.Request(
_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_URL,
method="GET",
headers={
"Authorization": f"token {raw_token}",
"User-Agent": _EXCHANGE_USER_AGENT,
"Accept": "application/json",
"Editor-Version": _EDITOR_VERSION,
},
)
# Retry with backoff. Startup network races (launchd relaunch, VPN/DHCP
# settling) make the first attempt flaky; without this the sole failure
# silently degrades to the raw token for the whole process lifetime.
# Permanent HTTP rejections (401/403/404 — token not Copilot-entitled,
# revoked, or org-blocked) skip the retry loop entirely: backoff exists
# for transient network races, and sleeping on an auth rejection just
# blocks the caller for ~4.5s with an identical outcome.
data = None
last_exc: Optional[Exception] = None
permanent_failure = False
for attempt in range(_EXCHANGE_MAX_ATTEMPTS):
try:
with _urlopen_bounded(req, timeout) as resp:
data = json.loads(resp.read().decode())
break
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — retry all, re-raise below
last_exc = exc
status = getattr(exc, "code", None) or getattr(exc, "status", None)
if status in _EXCHANGE_PERMANENT_HTTP_STATUSES:
permanent_failure = True
logger.debug(
"Copilot token exchange rejected (HTTP %s); not retrying",
status,
)
break
if attempt < _EXCHANGE_MAX_ATTEMPTS - 1:
sleep_s = _EXCHANGE_BACKOFF_BASE_SECONDS * (attempt + 1)
logger.debug(
"Copilot token exchange attempt %d/%d failed (%s); retrying in %.1fs",
attempt + 1, _EXCHANGE_MAX_ATTEMPTS, exc, sleep_s,
)
time.sleep(sleep_s)
if data is None:
ttl = (
_EXCHANGE_FAILURE_TTL_PERMANENT_SECONDS
if permanent_failure
else _EXCHANGE_FAILURE_TTL_TRANSIENT_SECONDS
)
_exchange_failure_cache[fp] = time.time() + ttl
raise ValueError(
f"Copilot token exchange failed after {_EXCHANGE_MAX_ATTEMPTS} attempts: {last_exc}"
) from last_exc
_exchange_failure_cache.pop(fp, None)
api_token = data.get("token", "")
expires_at = data.get("expires_at", 0)
if not api_token:
raise ValueError("Copilot token exchange returned empty token")
# Convert expires_at to float if needed
expires_at = float(expires_at) if expires_at else time.time() + 1800
# Resolve the account-specific API base URL. GitHub advertises the
# authoritative endpoint under ``endpoints.api`` in the exchange response
# (it differs for Copilot Enterprise / proxied accounts). When the
# response omits it, fall back to deriving the host from the ``proxy-ep``
# field embedded in the exchanged token. Individual accounts have neither,
# so ``base_url`` stays None and callers use the registry default.
base_url: Optional[str] = None
endpoints = data.get("endpoints")
if isinstance(endpoints, dict):
api_endpoint = str(endpoints.get("api") or "").strip().rstrip("/")
if api_endpoint:
base_url = api_endpoint
if not base_url:
base_url = _derive_base_url_from_proxy_ep(api_token)
_jwt_cache[fp] = (api_token, expires_at, base_url)
_save_jwt_to_disk(fp, api_token, expires_at, base_url)
logger.debug(
"Copilot token exchanged, expires_at=%s, base_url=%s",
expires_at,
base_url,
)
return api_token, expires_at, base_url
def _derive_base_url_from_proxy_ep(token: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Derive the Copilot API base URL from a proxy-ep field in the token.
The exchanged Copilot token is a semicolon-separated string like
``tid=xxx;exp=xxx;proxy-ep=proxy.enterprise.githubcopilot.com;...``.
This extracts ``proxy-ep`` and converts it to an API base URL by
replacing the leading ``proxy.`` with ``api.``.
Returns ``https://{api_hostname}`` or None if proxy-ep is absent.
"""
import re
m = re.search(r'(?:^|;)\s*proxy-ep=([^;\s]+)', token)
if not m:
return None
proxy_ep = m.group(1)
# Strip scheme if present
for prefix in ("https://", "http://"):
if proxy_ep.startswith(prefix):
proxy_ep = proxy_ep[len(prefix):]
break
proxy_ep = proxy_ep.rstrip("/")
# Replace leading "proxy." with "api."
if proxy_ep.startswith("proxy."):
api_host = "api." + proxy_ep[len("proxy."):]
else:
api_host = proxy_ep
return f"https://{api_host}"
def get_copilot_api_token(raw_token: str) -> tuple[str, Optional[str]]:
"""Exchange a raw GitHub token for a Copilot API token, with fallback.
Convenience wrapper: returns ``(api_token, base_url)`` on success, or
``(raw_token, None)`` if the exchange fails (e.g. network error, unsupported
account type). This preserves existing behaviour for accounts that don't
need exchange while enabling access to internal-only models for those that do.
``base_url`` is the account-specific API endpoint advertised by the
exchange (``endpoints.api``, with a ``proxy-ep`` fallback), or None for
individual accounts.
"""
if not raw_token:
return raw_token, None
try:
api_token, _, base_url = exchange_copilot_token(raw_token)
return api_token, base_url
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Copilot token exchange failed, using raw token: %s", exc)
return raw_token, None
# ─── Copilot API Headers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
def copilot_request_headers(
*,
is_agent_turn: bool = True,
is_vision: bool = False,
) -> dict[str, str]:
"""Build the standard headers for Copilot API requests.
Replicates the header set used by opencode and the Copilot CLI.
"""
headers: dict[str, str] = {
"Editor-Version": "vscode/1.104.1",
"User-Agent": "HermesAgent/1.0",
"Copilot-Integration-Id": "vscode-chat",
"Openai-Intent": "conversation-edits",
"x-initiator": "agent" if is_agent_turn else "user",
}
if is_vision:
headers["Copilot-Vision-Request"] = "true"
return headers