Import AITURK IDE 1.0.0-beta.1 from Hermes 63279301; preserve MIT license

agent/file_safety.py

@@ -0,0 +1,758 @@
+"""Shared file safety rules used by both tools and ACP shims."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from pathlib import Path
+from typing import Optional
+
+
+def _hermes_home_path() -> Path:
+    """Resolve the active HERMES_HOME (profile-aware) without circular imports."""
+    try:
+        from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home  # local import to avoid cycles
+        return get_hermes_home()
+    except Exception:
+        return Path(os.path.expanduser("~/.hermes"))
+
+
+def _hermes_root_path() -> Path:
+    """Resolve the Hermes root dir (always the parent of any profile, never per-profile)."""
+    try:
+        from hermes_constants import get_default_hermes_root  # local import to avoid cycles
+        return get_default_hermes_root()
+    except Exception:
+        return Path(os.path.expanduser("~/.hermes"))
+
+
+def build_write_denied_paths(home: str) -> set[str]:
+    """Return exact sensitive paths that must never be written."""
+    hermes_home = _hermes_home_path()
+    hermes_root = _hermes_root_path()
+    return {
+        os.path.realpath(p)
+        for p in [
+            os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "authorized_keys"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "id_rsa"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "id_ed25519"),
+            # NOTE: ``~/.ssh/config`` is deliberately NOT hard-denied here.
+            # It carries no private-key bytes and editing it (host aliases,
+            # ProxyJump, VS Code Remote-SSH targets) is a routine, expected
+            # task. Free-writing it is still wrong -- it can carry
+            # ProxyCommand / Match exec directives -- so it is routed through
+            # an approval gate in tools/file_tools.py instead (the same
+            # approve-once/session/always flow the terminal tool already uses
+            # for ~/.ssh writes). See build_write_approval_paths() below and
+            # _check_ssh_config_write() in tools/file_tools.py. Hard-denying
+            # it while the terminal only *asked* was an inconsistency that
+            # made writes look like they flip-flopped between denied and OK.
+            # Active profile .env (or top-level .env when not in profile mode).
+            str(hermes_home / ".env"),
+            # Top-level .env, even when running under a profile — overwriting it
+            # leaks credentials across every profile that inherits from root (#15981).
+            str(hermes_root / ".env"),
+            # Active profile Anthropic PKCE credential store.
+            str(hermes_home / ".anthropic_oauth.json"),
+            # Top-level Anthropic PKCE credential store remains sensitive even
+            # when a profile is active; default/non-profile sessions still read it.
+            str(hermes_root / ".anthropic_oauth.json"),
+            # Bitwarden Secrets Manager encrypted disk cache.
+            str(hermes_home / "cache" / "bws_cache.enc.json"),
+            str(hermes_root / "cache" / "bws_cache.enc.json"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".netrc"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".pgpass"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".npmrc"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".pypirc"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".git-credentials"),
+            "/etc/sudoers",
+            "/etc/passwd",
+            "/etc/shadow",
+        ]
+    }
+
+
+def build_write_denied_prefixes(home: str) -> list[str]:
+    """Return sensitive directory prefixes that must never be written."""
+    return [
+        os.path.realpath(p) + os.sep
+        for p in [
+            os.path.join(home, ".ssh"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".aws"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".gnupg"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".kube"),
+            "/etc/sudoers.d",
+            "/etc/systemd",
+            os.path.join(home, ".docker"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".azure"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".config", "gh"),
+            os.path.join(home, ".config", "gcloud"),
+        ]
+    ]
+
+
+def get_safe_write_roots() -> set[str]:
+    """Return resolved HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT paths. Supports multiple directories
+    separated by ``os.pathsep`` (``:`` on Unix, ``;`` on Windows).
+    E.g., ``/opt/data:/var/www/html`` on Unix, ``C:\\data;D:\\www`` on Windows."""
+    env = os.getenv("HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT", "")
+    if not env:
+        return set()
+    roots: set[str] = set()
+    for path in env.split(os.pathsep):
+        if path:
+            try:
+                resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(path))
+                roots.add(resolved)
+            except (OSError, ValueError):
+                continue
+    return roots
+
+
+def build_write_approval_paths(home: str) -> set[str]:
+    """Return paths that require human APPROVAL to write, but are not
+    hard-denied credentials.
+
+    ``~/.ssh/config`` lives here: it is routine to edit (host aliases,
+    ProxyJump, VS Code Remote-SSH targets) and holds no private-key bytes,
+    but it CAN carry ``ProxyCommand`` / ``Match exec`` directives, so a
+    free write is inappropriate. The interactive file tools gate these
+    through an approve-once/session/always prompt (mirroring the terminal
+    tool's existing ``~/.ssh`` write approval); non-interactive callers
+    that cannot prompt (ACP shims, background jobs) treat an
+    approval-required path as denied and fail closed.
+    """
+    return {
+        os.path.realpath(p)
+        for p in [
+            os.path.join(home, ".ssh", "config"),
+        ]
+    }
+
+
+def _classify_write_denial(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return ``'credential'``, ``'safe_root'``, or ``None`` if writes are allowed."""
+    home = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser("~"))
+    resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(str(path)))
+
+    # Approval-gated paths (e.g. ~/.ssh/config) are NOT hard-denied here:
+    # they are allowed at this layer so the interactive file tools can run
+    # their approval prompt, and only blocked for non-interactive callers
+    # via get_write_approval_error(). Checked before the credential deny so
+    # the ``.ssh/`` directory prefix below doesn't swallow the config file.
+    if resolved in build_write_approval_paths(home):
+        return None
+
+    if resolved in build_write_denied_paths(home):
+        return "credential"
+    for prefix in build_write_denied_prefixes(home):
+        if resolved.startswith(prefix):
+            return "credential"
+
+    mcp_tokens_dir_name = "mcp-tokens"
+
+    hermes_dirs = []
+    for base in (_hermes_home_path(), _hermes_root_path()):
+        try:
+            real = os.path.realpath(base)
+            if real not in hermes_dirs:
+                hermes_dirs.append(real)
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+
+    for base_real in hermes_dirs:
+        # Session transcripts are application-owned state.  Letting the agent's
+        # generic file tools rewrite state.db or legacy JSON snapshots can
+        # falsify conversation history and invalidate resume/compression state.
+        try:
+            if resolved == os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_real, "state.db")):
+                return True
+            sessions_real = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_real, "sessions"))
+            if resolved == sessions_real or resolved.startswith(sessions_real + os.sep):
+                return True
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        try:
+            mcp_real = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_real, mcp_tokens_dir_name))
+            if resolved == mcp_real or resolved.startswith(mcp_real + os.sep):
+                return "credential"
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        try:
+            pairing_real = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(base_real, "pairing"))
+            if resolved == pairing_real or resolved.startswith(pairing_real + os.sep):
+                return "credential"
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+
+    safe_roots = get_safe_write_roots()
+    if safe_roots:
+        allowed = False
+        for safe_root in safe_roots:
+            if resolved == safe_root or resolved.startswith(safe_root + os.sep):
+                allowed = True
+                break
+        if not allowed:
+            return "safe_root"
+
+    return None
+
+
+def is_write_denied(path: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if path is blocked by the write denylist or safe root."""
+    return _classify_write_denial(path) is not None
+
+
+def get_write_denied_error(path: str, *, verb: str = "Write") -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return a user/model-facing error when writes to ``path`` are blocked."""
+    denial = _classify_write_denial(path)
+    if denial is None:
+        return None
+    if denial == "safe_root":
+        roots_display = os.pathsep.join(sorted(get_safe_write_roots()))
+        return (
+            f"{verb} denied: '{path}' is outside HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT "
+            f"({roots_display}). Unset the variable or add this path's directory prefix."
+        )
+    return f"{verb} denied: '{path}' is a protected system/credential file."
+
+
+def is_write_approval_required(path: str) -> bool:
+    """Return True if ``path`` is an approval-gated write target.
+
+    These paths (currently ``~/.ssh/config``) are not credentials and are
+    not hard-denied, but a write to them must be confirmed by a human
+    because they can influence process execution (e.g. an SSH
+    ``ProxyCommand``). Callers with an interactive/gateway channel should
+    prompt; callers without one should treat this as a block (fail closed).
+    """
+    home = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser("~"))
+    resolved = os.path.realpath(os.path.expanduser(str(path)))
+    return resolved in build_write_approval_paths(home)
+
+
+# Common secret-bearing project-local environment file basenames.
+# These are blocked because .env files routinely contain API keys,
+# database passwords, and other credentials.
+_BLOCKED_PROJECT_ENV_BASENAMES: set[str] = {
+    ".env",
+    ".env.local",
+    ".env.development",
+    ".env.production",
+    ".env.test",
+    ".env.staging",
+    ".envrc",
+}
+
+
+def get_read_block_error(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return an error message when a read targets a denied Hermes path.
+
+    Three categories are blocked:
+
+      * Internal Hermes cache files under ``HERMES_HOME/skills/.hub`` —
+        readable metadata that an attacker could use as a prompt-injection
+        carrier.
+      * Credential / secret stores under HERMES_HOME and the global Hermes
+        root: ``auth.json``, ``auth.lock``, ``.anthropic_oauth.json``,
+        ``.env``, ``webhook_subscriptions.json``, ``auth/google_oauth.json``,
+        and anything under ``mcp-tokens/``. These hold plaintext provider keys,
+        OAuth tokens, and HMAC secrets that the agent never needs to read
+        directly — provider tools / gateway adapters consume them through
+        internal channels.
+      * Project-local environment files anywhere on disk: ``.env``,
+        ``.env.local``, ``.env.development``, ``.env.production``,
+        ``.env.test``, ``.env.staging``, ``.envrc``. These routinely hold
+        API keys, database passwords, and other credentials for the user's
+        own projects. The agent helping debug a project shouldn't normally
+        need to read these — ``.env.example`` is the documented-shape
+        substitute.
+
+    **This is NOT a security boundary.** The terminal tool runs as the
+    same OS user with shell access; the agent can still ``cat auth.json``
+    or ``cat ~/.hermes/.env`` and exfiltrate the file. The read-deny exists
+    as defense-in-depth that:
+
+      * Returns a clear error to models that respect tool denials, which
+        empirically prompts most modern models to stop rather than reach
+        for the shell.
+      * Surfaces a visible audit trail when something tries to read
+        credentials — easier to spot in logs than a generic ``cat``.
+
+    Treat any user-visible framing around this as "may help" rather than
+    "stops attackers." A determined model or malicious instruction can
+    always shell out.
+
+    Callers that resolve relative paths against a non-process cwd
+    (e.g. ``TERMINAL_CWD`` in ``tools/file_tools.py``) MUST pre-resolve
+    and pass the absolute path string.  This function's own ``resolve()``
+    is anchored at the Python process cwd, so a relative input like
+    ``"auth.json"`` would otherwise miss the denylist when the task's
+    terminal cwd differs from the process cwd.
+    """
+    resolved = Path(path).expanduser().resolve()
+
+    # Resolve BOTH the active HERMES_HOME (profile-aware) AND the global
+    # Hermes root so credential stores at <root>/auth.json etc. are also
+    # blocked when running under a profile (HERMES_HOME points at
+    # <root>/profiles/<name> in profile mode). Same shape as the write
+    # deny widening (#15981, #14157).
+    hermes_dirs: list[Path] = []
+    for base in (_hermes_home_path(), _hermes_root_path()):
+        try:
+            real = base.resolve()
+            if real not in hermes_dirs:
+                hermes_dirs.append(real)
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+
+    # Skills .hub: prompt-injection carriers.
+    for hd in hermes_dirs:
+        blocked_dirs = [
+            hd / "skills" / ".hub" / "index-cache",
+            hd / "skills" / ".hub",
+        ]
+        for blocked in blocked_dirs:
+            try:
+                resolved.relative_to(blocked)
+            except ValueError:
+                continue
+            return (
+                f"Access denied: {path} is an internal Hermes cache file "
+                "and cannot be read directly to prevent prompt injection. "
+                "Use the skills_list or skill_view tools instead."
+            )
+
+    # Credential / secret stores. Exact-file matches under either
+    # HERMES_HOME or <root>.
+    credential_file_names = (
+        "auth.json",
+        "auth.lock",
+        ".anthropic_oauth.json",
+        ".env",
+        "webhook_subscriptions.json",
+        os.path.join("auth", "google_oauth.json"),
+        # Bitwarden Secrets Manager disk cache: stores plaintext secret values
+        # to avoid re-fetching across back-to-back CLI invocations. The file
+        # was introduced by #31968 but not added to this guard.
+        os.path.join("cache", "bws_cache.json"),
+    )
+    for hd in hermes_dirs:
+        for name in credential_file_names:
+            try:
+                blocked = (hd / name).resolve()
+            except Exception:
+                continue
+            if resolved == blocked:
+                return (
+                    f"Access denied: {path} is a Hermes credential store "
+                    "and cannot be read directly. Provider tools consume "
+                    "these credentials through internal channels. "
+                    "(Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the "
+                    "terminal tool can still bypass.)"
+                )
+
+    # mcp-tokens/: directory prefix match — anything inside is OAuth
+    # token material.
+    for hd in hermes_dirs:
+        try:
+            mcp_tokens = (hd / "mcp-tokens").resolve()
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        if resolved == mcp_tokens:
+            return (
+                f"Access denied: {path} is the Hermes MCP token directory "
+                "and cannot be read directly. (Defense-in-depth — not a "
+                "security boundary; the terminal tool can still bypass.)"
+            )
+        try:
+            resolved.relative_to(mcp_tokens)
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        return (
+            f"Access denied: {path} is a Hermes MCP token file "
+            "and cannot be read directly. (Defense-in-depth — not a "
+            "security boundary; the terminal tool can still bypass.)"
+        )
+
+    # browser-profile/: real-profile browsing snapshot (browser.use_real_profile).
+    # A copy of the user's Cookies / Login Data / Web Data lives here — the same
+    # credential class as auth.json, so it gets the same directory-prefix read
+    # deny. Prefix (not a finite filename list) so future Chromium files are
+    # covered too.
+    for hd in hermes_dirs:
+        try:
+            browser_profile = (hd / "browser-profile").resolve()
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        if resolved == browser_profile:
+            return (
+                f"Access denied: {path} is the Hermes real-profile browser "
+                "snapshot directory (copied cookies/logins) and cannot be read "
+                "directly. (Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the "
+                "terminal tool can still bypass.)"
+            )
+        try:
+            resolved.relative_to(browser_profile)
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+        return (
+            f"Access denied: {path} is inside the Hermes real-profile browser "
+            "snapshot (copied cookies/logins) and cannot be read directly. "
+            "(Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the terminal tool "
+            "can still bypass.)"
+        )
+
+    # Block common secret-bearing project-local .env files anywhere on disk.
+    # The agent helping a user with their project rarely needs to read raw
+    # .env contents — .env.example is the documented-shape substitute. The
+    # terminal tool can still ``cat .env``; this is defense-in-depth, not a
+    # boundary (see module docstring).
+    if resolved.name.lower() in _BLOCKED_PROJECT_ENV_BASENAMES:
+        return (
+            f"Access denied: {path} is a secret-bearing environment file "
+            "and cannot be read to prevent credential leakage. "
+            "If you need to check the file structure, read .env.example instead. "
+            "(Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the terminal tool can still bypass.)"
+        )
+
+    return None
+
+
+def raise_if_read_blocked(path: str) -> None:
+    """Raise ``ValueError`` if ``path`` is a denied Hermes read (see
+    :func:`get_read_block_error`), else return.
+
+    Shared chokepoint for provider input-loading sites that read a local
+    file the model/tool supplied (e.g. image-gen ``image_url`` /
+    ``reference_image_urls`` paths). Centralizes the guard so every provider
+    enforces the same read boundary with identical semantics instead of each
+    open-coding the try/except block (#57698).
+
+    Best-effort by design: if ``agent.file_safety`` machinery is somehow
+    unavailable at the call site the guard no-ops rather than breaking local
+    image loading — consistent with the defense-in-depth (not security
+    boundary) framing of the denylist itself. The blocking ``ValueError`` from
+    a real hit still propagates; only unexpected internal errors are swallowed.
+    """
+    try:
+        blocked = get_read_block_error(path)
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - guard must never break local-file loading
+        return
+    if blocked:
+        raise ValueError(blocked)
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Cross-profile write guard (#TBD)
+#
+# Hermes profiles are separate HERMES_HOME dirs under
+# ``<root>/profiles/<name>/``. Each profile has its own skills/, plugins/,
+# cron/, memories/. When an agent runs under one profile, writing into
+# ANOTHER profile's directories is almost always wrong — those skills /
+# plugins / cron jobs / memories affect a different session the user runs
+# from a different shell.
+#
+# Soft guard, NOT a security boundary: the agent runs as the same OS user
+# and has unrestricted terminal access, so this returns a warning the model
+# can choose to honor or override with ``cross_profile=True``. Same shape
+# as the dangerous-command approval flow — the agent is told the boundary
+# exists, and explicit user direction is required to cross it.
+#
+# Reference: May 2026 incident where a hermes-security profile session
+# edited skills under both ``~/.hermes/profiles/hermes-security/skills/``
+# AND ``~/.hermes/skills/`` (the default profile's skills) without realizing
+# the second path belonged to a different profile.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+# Profile-scoped directories under HERMES_HOME / <root> / <root>/profiles/<X>/
+# that should be guarded. Adding a new area here extends the guard with no
+# other code change.
+PROFILE_SCOPED_AREAS = ("skills", "plugins", "cron", "memories")
+
+
+def _resolve_active_profile_name() -> str:
+    """Return the active profile name derived from HERMES_HOME.
+
+    ``~/.hermes``              -> ``"default"``
+    ``~/.hermes/profiles/X``  -> ``"X"``
+
+    Falls back to ``"default"`` on any resolution failure so the guard
+    never raises into the tool path.
+    """
+    try:
+        home_real = _hermes_home_path().resolve()
+        root_real = _hermes_root_path().resolve()
+    except (OSError, RuntimeError):
+        return "default"
+    profiles_dir = root_real / "profiles"
+    try:
+        rel = home_real.relative_to(profiles_dir)
+        parts = rel.parts
+        if len(parts) >= 1:
+            return parts[0]
+    except ValueError:
+        pass
+    return "default"
+
+
+def classify_cross_profile_target(path: str) -> Optional[dict]:
+    """Classify a write target as cross-profile if it lands in another
+    profile's scoped area (skills/plugins/cron/memories).
+
+    Returns ``None`` when the target is outside Hermes scope, or is inside
+    the ACTIVE profile, or doesn't hit a profile-scoped area. Otherwise
+    returns a dict with:
+
+      * ``active_profile``: name of the profile the agent is running as
+      * ``target_profile``: name of the profile the path belongs to
+      * ``area``: which scoped area (``"skills"``, ``"plugins"``, etc.)
+      * ``target_path``: the resolved path string
+
+    The caller decides what to do with the result — surface a warning to
+    the model, prompt the user, or (with explicit consent /
+    ``cross_profile=True``) proceed anyway.
+    """
+    try:
+        target = Path(os.path.expanduser(str(path))).resolve()
+        root_real = _hermes_root_path().resolve()
+    except (OSError, RuntimeError):
+        return None
+
+    target_profile: Optional[str] = None
+    area: Optional[str] = None
+
+    try:
+        rel = target.relative_to(root_real)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+
+    parts = rel.parts
+    if not parts:
+        return None
+
+    if parts[0] in PROFILE_SCOPED_AREAS:
+        # ``<root>/<area>/...`` → default profile.
+        target_profile = "default"
+        area = parts[0]
+    elif (
+        parts[0] == "profiles"
+        and len(parts) >= 3
+        and parts[2] in PROFILE_SCOPED_AREAS
+    ):
+        # ``<root>/profiles/<name>/<area>/...`` → named profile.
+        target_profile = parts[1]
+        area = parts[2]
+    else:
+        return None
+
+    active_profile = _resolve_active_profile_name()
+    if target_profile == active_profile:
+        # In-profile write — not a cross-profile event.
+        return None
+
+    return {
+        "active_profile": active_profile,
+        "target_profile": target_profile,
+        "area": area,
+        "target_path": str(target),
+    }
+
+
+def get_cross_profile_warning(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """RETIRED (maintainer decision): always returns ``None``.
+
+    The cross-profile write guard was removed — profiles were never
+    isolated (same OS user; the terminal tool writes anywhere), so the
+    block was ceremony that cost every schema real tokens and taught a
+    bypass arg. The system prompt's active-profile hint remains the only
+    steering; the classifier below survives for that hint and for
+    diagnostics. Kept as a stub so external callers/plugins fail soft.
+    """
+    return None
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Sandbox-mirror write guard (#32049)
+#
+# Non-local terminal backends (Docker, Daytona, etc.) bind a sandbox-local
+# directory to the container's ``$HOME``. The on-disk layout looks like
+#
+#   <HERMES_HOME>/profiles/<name>/sandboxes/<backend>/<task>/home/.hermes/...
+#
+# When the agent (running host-side) speculates that authoritative profile
+# state lives at one of those sandbox-mirror paths, the write lands on the
+# mirror — never read by the host process — while the host file is left
+# untouched. The agent reports success, the user sees no change, and on
+# disk two divergent copies accumulate. See #32049 for evidence.
+#
+# This guard is path-shape-only: it detects the
+# ``…/sandboxes/<backend>/<task>/home/.hermes/…`` segment and warns
+# regardless of which Hermes profile is active. It does NOT cover the
+# inner-container case where the bind mount strips the ``sandboxes/`` prefix
+# (the agent's view inside the container is plain ``/root/.hermes/...``);
+# that case needs a separate dispatch-layer or host-side ``profile_state``
+# tool.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _find_sandbox_mirror_segments(parts: tuple) -> Optional[int]:
+    """Return the index of the inner ``.hermes`` part in a sandbox-mirror path.
+
+    Matches ``…/sandboxes/<backend>/<task>/home/.hermes/…`` and returns the
+    index where the inner Hermes-state portion starts. Returns ``None`` for
+    paths that do not contain the sandbox-mirror shape.
+    """
+    for i, part in enumerate(parts):
+        if part != "sandboxes":
+            continue
+        # Need at least: sandboxes / <backend> / <task> / home / .hermes / <thing>
+        if i + 5 >= len(parts):
+            continue
+        if parts[i + 3] == "home" and parts[i + 4] == ".hermes":
+            return i + 4
+    return None
+
+
+def classify_sandbox_mirror_target(path: str) -> Optional[dict]:
+    """Classify a write target as a sandbox-mirror of authoritative Hermes state.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when the path does not match the sandbox-mirror shape.
+    Otherwise returns a dict with:
+
+      * ``target_path``: the resolved path string
+      * ``mirror_root``: the ``…/sandboxes/<backend>/<task>/home/.hermes``
+        prefix (so callers can show users which sandbox owns the mirror)
+      * ``inner_path``: the portion under the mirror's ``.hermes`` (what the
+        agent likely meant to address on the host)
+
+    Detection is path-shape-only — does not require any Hermes resolver to
+    succeed, so it works correctly even when called from contexts where
+    HERMES_HOME resolution would be ambiguous.
+    """
+    try:
+        target = Path(os.path.expanduser(str(path))).resolve()
+    except (OSError, RuntimeError):
+        return None
+
+    parts = target.parts
+    inner_idx = _find_sandbox_mirror_segments(parts)
+    if inner_idx is None:
+        return None
+
+    mirror_root = str(Path(*parts[: inner_idx + 1]))
+    inner_path = str(Path(*parts[inner_idx + 1 :])) if inner_idx + 1 < len(parts) else ""
+
+    return {
+        "target_path": str(target),
+        "mirror_root": mirror_root,
+        "inner_path": inner_path,
+    }
+
+
+def get_sandbox_mirror_warning(path: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return a model-facing warning when ``path`` lands in a sandbox mirror.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when the path is not a sandbox-mirror target. Caller
+    is expected to surface the warning to the agent as a tool-result
+    error. The bypass kwarg (``cross_profile=True``) is shared with the
+    cross-profile guard: both are soft "I know what I'm doing" overrides
+    a user can authorise.
+
+    Defense-in-depth, NOT a security boundary: the terminal tool runs as
+    the same OS user and can write the mirror path directly. The guard
+    exists to surface the misclassification before the silent-success +
+    divergent-copy footgun in #32049 fires.
+    """
+    info = classify_sandbox_mirror_target(path)
+    if info is None:
+        return None
+    return (
+        f"Sandbox-mirror write blocked by soft guard: {info['target_path']} "
+        f"sits under {info['mirror_root']!r}, which is a per-task mirror "
+        f"created by a non-local terminal backend (docker/daytona/etc.). "
+        f"Writes here land on a copy that the host Hermes process never "
+        f"reads — the authoritative file is likely {info['inner_path']!r} "
+        f"under the real HERMES_HOME. Use the host-side tool for "
+        f"authoritative state (e.g. ``memory`` for memories), or address "
+        f"the host path directly. To bypass this guard after explicit "
+        f"user direction, retry the call with ``cross_profile=True``. "
+        f"(Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the terminal tool "
+        f"can still bypass.)"
+    )
+
+
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Container-context mirror guard (inner-container case — #32049 follow-up)
+#
+# Brian's shape-based detector (#32213) catches paths that still carry the
+# full ``…/sandboxes/<backend>/<task>/home/.hermes/…`` prefix on the host.
+# But when file tools execute *inside* the container the bind-mount strips
+# that prefix: the agent sees plain ``/root/.hermes/…``.  The root:root
+# ownership on the divergent SOUL.md in #32049 confirms this is the primary
+# failure mode.
+#
+# Fix: file_tools passes the active Docker mirror prefix when the terminal
+# backend is docker + persistent. This catches the very first file-tool call,
+# before a DockerEnvironment object necessarily exists.
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def classify_container_mirror_target(
+    path: str,
+    mirror_prefix: str | None = None,
+) -> Optional[dict]:
+    """Classify a write target as a container-side sandbox mirror.
+
+    ``mirror_prefix`` must be supplied by the caller after it has established
+    that file tools are executing in a container whose home is a sandbox
+    mirror. Returns ``None`` when no such context is active or the path is not
+    under the mirror prefix. Otherwise returns:
+
+      * ``target_path``: resolved path string
+      * ``mirror_root``: the declared container mirror prefix
+      * ``inner_path``: portion under the mirror root (what the agent
+        likely meant to address in the host HERMES_HOME)
+    """
+    if not mirror_prefix:
+        return None
+    try:
+        target = Path(os.path.expanduser(str(path))).resolve()
+        mirror = Path(os.path.expanduser(mirror_prefix)).resolve()
+        inner = target.relative_to(mirror)
+    except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
+        return None
+    return {
+        "target_path": str(target),
+        "mirror_root": str(mirror),
+        "inner_path": inner.as_posix(),
+    }
+
+
+def get_container_mirror_warning(
+    path: str,
+    mirror_prefix: str | None = None,
+) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Return a model-facing warning when *path* lands in the container's
+    sandbox mirror of authoritative Hermes state.
+
+    The caller supplies ``mirror_prefix`` only when the current file-tool
+    backend is known to execute inside a Docker sandbox. Same contract as
+    ``get_cross_profile_warning``: soft guard, returns ``None`` for
+    non-mirror paths, caller surfaces as a tool-result error. Bypass via
+    ``cross_profile=True`` after explicit user direction.
+    """
+    info = classify_container_mirror_target(path, mirror_prefix)
+    if info is None:
+        return None
+    return (
+        f"Sandbox-mirror write blocked by soft guard: {info['target_path']} "
+        f"sits under {info['mirror_root']!r}, which is the container's "
+        f"bind-mounted home — a per-task mirror that the host Hermes "
+        f"process never reads. The authoritative file is "
+        f"{info['inner_path']!r} under the real HERMES_HOME. Use the "
+        f"host-side tool for authoritative state (e.g. ``memory`` for "
+        f"memories), or address the host path directly. To bypass after "
+        f"explicit user direction, retry with ``cross_profile=True``. "
+        f"(Defense-in-depth — not a security boundary; the terminal tool "
+        f"can still bypass.)"
+    )